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Abstract
This research investigated the causal factors and processes of international development and
diffusion of wind energy technology by examining private sector cross-border technology
transfer from Denmark and Germany to India between 1990 and 2005. The motivation stemmed
from the lack of active private sector participation in transfer of climate change mitigation
technologies. Special attentions were paid to the role and effects of: government policy and
institutional settings; co-evolution of policy, market, industry, and technology; and industrial
competitiveness management.
The research found that the centrality of government policy, in particular market value creation/
rewarding policy, in successful wind energy technology development and diffusion at the
technology frontier of Denmark and Germany. Sources of technological change were complex,
but it was the policy-induced substantial market size and performance-oriented demand
characteristics that determined the speed and direction of technology development and diffusion.
Yet, the change was only materialized by the successful establishment of co-evolving
mechanism of policy, market, industry, and technology; again, policy was central in the creation
and timely adjustment of such virtuous cycle. The research also found strong connections
between technological characteristics/specificity and industrial competitiveness management,
and their intertwined transformations.
On the Indian side, the increasing technology gaps in both product and capability with the
frontier and the transformed structural relationship between market development and the number
of new technology introduction were evident from the mid 1990s. Non-performance-oriented
market mechanism, policy inconsistency, institutional problems of power sector, persistent
infrastructure deficiency, along with the intertwined competitiveness management and
technology transformations at the frontier, all contributed to the structural transformation; the
failed virtuous cycle creation was due to strong technology- and industry-related external factors
and weak demand-pull and supply push internal policy. India lost the potentials for replicable
technology transfer and the larger development benefits.
The process-oriented nature of replicable technology transfer requires simultaneous and
continuous demand-pull and technology-push policy; performance-oriented market development
through market value creation and rewarding policy as well as technology-push supports
connected to technology-specific learning mechanisms and market trials are central for the
advancement of both climate change mitigation and sustainable development.
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FACT = Fatigue of Composite for Wind Turbines
FDI = Foreign Direct Investment
FOI = Swedish Defense Research Agency (Sweden)
GE = General Electric (the United States)
GEDA = Gujarat Energy Development Agency (India)
GEF = Global Environmental Facility
GFRE = Glass-fiber Reinforced Epoxy
GFRP = Glass-fiber Reinforced Plastic
GHG = Greenhouse Gas
GNP = Gross National Product
GOI = Government of India (India)
GTZ = German Agency for Technical Cooperation (Germany)
HSW = Husumer Schiffswerft
IEA = International Energy Agency
IEC = International Electrotechnical Commission
IFU = Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries (Denmark)
IGBT = Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor
INR = Indian Rupees
IPCC = International Panel on Climate Change
IRR= Internal rate of return
ISET = Institut fur Solare Energieversorgungstechnik
ISO = International Standards Organization 0
JI = Joint Implementation
KfW = German Development Bank (Germany)
KVRRH = Quantum of Reactive Power (India)
M&A = Merger & Acquisition
MAT = Minimum Alternative Tax (India)
MBB = Messerschmidt-Bblkow-Blohm (Germany)
MEDA = Maharashtra Energy Development Agency (India)
MOD = NASA modification program (the United States)
NACA = National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (the United States)
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration (the United States)
NEPC = Non-conventional Energy Product Company (India)
NOC = No Objection Certificates (India)
NPV= Net Present Value
ODA = Official Development Assistance
PMSG = Permanent Magnet Synchronous Generator
PSO = Public Service Obligation (EU)
PSU = Public Sector Undertaking (India)
PURPA = Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (United States)
RD = rotor diameter
R&D = Research and Development
R&DD = Research, Development, and Demonstration
rpm = revolutions per minute
SCADA = Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition
SCIG = Squirrel Cage Induction generator
SERC = State Electricity Regulatory Commission (India)
SMEs = Small-and-medium sized enterprises
SNA = State Nodal Agency (India)
SEB = State Electricity Board (India)
T&D = Transmission and Distribution
TAPS = Turbine Approval Provisional Scheme (India)
TNEB = Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (India)
UBA = Federal Environmental Agency (Germany)
UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD = US Dollar
UVE = Development Program for Renewable Energy (Denmark)
VAT = Value Added Tax
WAsP = Wind Atlas Analysis and Application Program
WCED = World Commission on Environment and Development
WPD = Wind Power Density
WRIG = Wound Rotor Induction Generator
WRSG = Wound Rotor Synchronous Generator
WTO = World Trade Organization
ZIP = Investment Program for the Future (Germany)
Chapter 1:
Introduction and Context
Section 1.1: Research Motivation and Research Question
Why is it so difficult to transfer more advanced climate change mitigation technologies from
developed countries to developing countries? How can we stimulate private sector involvement
further in cross-border transfer of such technologies in order to advance not only global climate
change mitigation but also sustainable development? This research tries to find some answers to
these questions by examining a case of wind energy technology transfer from Denmark/Germany
to India from 1990 through 2005.
Global climate change mitigation is one of the most significant agenda for human race to face in
the coming decades. Technology holds a key for the process, as it plays the central role in
mitigating global climate change by reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) while
advancing our welfare creation capacity by increasing productivity. Incentive creation for robust
private sector participation is an essential- part of this process, because a large part of capacity
and capability to advance such global efforts by innovating and diffusing new technologies now
belongs to private sector. The past two decades of privatization efforts and process of
globalization have led to the increase in capacity and capability of private sector, while
transforming the role of public sector into the one inducing private sector to contribute to public
welfare creation. In this context, public and private partnerships are not a choice but a necessity
to advance climate change mitigation. Also, international collaborations are crucial in order to
increase productivity and efficiency of the climate change mitigation efforts as well as to
expedite the diffusion of the efforts worldwide. And transfer of climate change mitigation
technologies and investments from developed to developing countries is considered vital to this
process. However, in reality, the progress has been slow and technology transfer remains the
most conflicted aspect of climate change negotiations between developed and developing
countries.
This research argues the importance of replicable technology transfer for both the advancement
of climate change mitigation efforts and the materialization of long-term developmental benefits
through technological capacity and capability building. However, such technology transfer is far
more challenging than the initiation of transfer itself under the increasing global competition
with intensifying technology control by technology holders. As one of the reasons of the
difficulty, this research claims the process-oriented characteristics of technology transfer; it is
not only the factors which control the mode of transfer but also the processes of the factor
transformations that determine transfer outcomes. In particular, the research argues the centrality
of government policy, in particular market value creation and rewarding policy, in creation and
continuation of virtuous cycle of market, industry, and technology in new climate change
mitigation technology development and transfer; such cycle is only triggered and supported by
policy incentives that create both demand-pull and technology-push forces simultaneously.
Replicable technology transfer can only happen as a part of such virtuous cycle, which has
continuous technology upgrading market demands supported by sizeable market and ability of
transforming technological capacity/capability backed by robust firm-level competitiveness
management. Such competitiveness management has strong connections to the specificity of
each technology component and value activity as well as to the way of their integration as
technology system, hence strongly sector- and technology-specific. Without replicable
technology transfer as a part of such virtuous cycle, technology gaps will increase and long-term
sustainable development benefits will diminish even with successful initial technology transfer.
This centrality of policy and the importance of virtuous cycle creation are same for both
technology provider and receiver countries. However, due to the lack of stable macroeconomic
and infrastructure environments as well as the lack of appropriate technological capacity and
capability, along with various technology controls by technology providers, it is far more
difficult for technology receiver countries to create and sustain such cycle.
In order to support the above arguments, this research takes an approach not to assemble short-
term transfer cases of various technologies but to explore a historical path of one technology
transfer case in depth. The research focuses on the following factors and processes of the case.
First, it focuses on the role and effects of government policy and institutional settings on
domestic and international technology development and diffusion, because the role of
government has been transformed under the growing privatization and globalization as
mentioned above and because the development of climate change mitigation market, industry,
and technology is strongly policy-driven due to the presence of both negative and positive socio-
environmental externalities related to climate change mitigation activities in the present market
mechanism.
Second, the research focuses on the co-evolution of policy, market, industry, and technology, in
order to see the effects of the processes of interaction among the factors on technology transfer
outcomes. While the role and effects of government policy and institutional settings are the first
focus of this research, they are not the only factor in creating necessary dynamics of technology
development and diffusion. With this reason, analyzing the co-evolution of market, industry,
and technology factors together with policy factors is important to understand the processes of
technology development and diffusion. Every aspect of our society is continuously changing.
This research examines technology transfer not as a static but as a dynamic process; hence, the
factors and processes necessary for replicable technology transfer are considered in dynamic
way.
Third, this research pays a special attention to the role and effects of industrial competitiveness
management in cross-border technology transfer. Competitiveness creation and control through
technology and cost management are central to the current and future business activities. In
technology transfer, firm competitiveness management plays a significant role in determining the
transfer mode and has significant interactions with the co-evolving policy, market, industry, and
technology dynamics over time. This research follows the evolution of firm competitiveness
management strategies and their relationship to technological characteristics, and examines their
effects on technology transfer outcome, in order to deepen the understanding of how to utilize
the power of private sector in international development and diffusion of climate change
mitigation technologies.
Section 1.2: Theoretical Basis of Research
This research draws upon different bodies of literatures. This section introduces theoretical
arguments and some empirical study results regarding international technology transfer and
technological change for general economic and sustainable development.
1.2.1 Technological Change and Economic Growth
From empirical point of views, technical change has been recognized as the most vital dynamic
force for economic growth, since Solow (1957) found that the productivity growth occurs mainly
not through the accumulation of capital but through technical change, which was a residual
component not explicable by the measured increases in capital intensity. The main cause of
Solow's technical change was recognized as the improvement of technology (Scherer 1999;
Solow 1957).'
Technology is defined as the process of physical transformation of inputs to outputs, and
knowledge and skills that structure the activities involved with such transformations (Kim 1997).
Technological change is the change in the way in which inputs are transformed into outputs,
including changes in output quality (Fransman 1984); technological change involve in both
changes in product and in production process.
The existing economic growth theories are largely formed around neo-classical approach
(including endogenous new growth theory) and evolutionary approach (including capability and
other structural analyses). Both approaches emphasize the importance of high-level physical and
human investment, and reject linear model of technology development. However, their
perception on the sources and causal mechanisms of technological changes and their process at
firm level, the markets surrounds them, and the necessary failures to be addressed differ greatly.
Neo-classical Theories of Technical Change and Economic Growth
Neo-classical approaches take highly simplified assumptions on technology development. In the
neo-classical theories, firms are small and homogeneous, operating in perfectly competitive
markets, where all technological options are known, i.e., well-behaved production functions.
Choices to optimize allocation are made costlessly based on capital and labor costs. Because
technology is codified information, and information on sources and characteristics of all
technologies are available to all firms equally, technology is absorbed and used without further
effort and cost. Firms operate in isolation, without inter-linkages and spillovers.
In the mainstream traditional models, technical change takes the form of shifts of production
function resulting from exogenous innovation; technology is an exogenous factor, which means
technical changes come in the form of scientific discoveries through academic research, and it is
not directly influenced by the economic system, but rather influencing it (Solow 1956; Solow
1957).
On the other hand, in the new growth models, technology is an endogenous factor and technical
change takes the form of shifts of production function resulting from firms optimizing Research
1 Solow found that only 12.5% (later corrected to 19%) of the long-run change in labor productivity in the US
economy between 1909 and 1949 could be attributed to increased capital intensity (Solow, 1957).
& Development (R&D) choices by devoting human capital on top of ordinary labor and capital,
in order to orchestrate an interaction with the pool of design knowledge as public good and
create specified designs embodied in products. The more knowledge there is as public good, the
more productive R&D efforts using human capital are. Economies with very limited human
capital, e.g., developing countries, however, cannot create a comparable interaction with the pool
of knowledge, and therefore they are unable to sustain the production of capital goods essential
to rapid economic growth. Hence, underdevelopment and low productivity persist (Romer 1986;
Romer 1990; Scherer 1999).
In either way, innovations are assumed as the movements of production function rather than
along it and are a totally different activity from mastering and adapting technology to different
conditions, which are restricted to the movements along the function, because the only
admissible country-wise differences in theory are capital/labor ratios. In addition, the theories
assume that all major innovations occur only in advanced industrial countries and developing
countries select and costlessly apply those innovations.
In developing country context, thus, the neo-classical theories on economic growth stress the role
of investments in physical and human capital in moving the economies "along" their production
function. Nelson and Pack (1997) called this line of thinking "Accumulation" theories, which
were applied to the explanations of the growth of the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, China,
Singapore, and Hong Kong) by several economists who explained the large percentages of the
increased output per worker in those countries were due to the increases of physical and human
capital per worker (Kim and Lau 1994; Krugman 1994; Young 1993).
In the neo-classical framework, the assumption of competitive equilibrium leads to the logical
conclusion that free markets optimize resources, hence welfare. Government policy
interventions are very limited to correct only restricted cases of market failures, e.g., under-
investments through stimulating R&D, inaccessibility of knowledge through Intellectual
Property Right (IPR) protection, market imperfection due to monopoly through antitrust laws,
and information asymmetries by providing information. For developing countries, policy
prescriptions are confined to the ones such as "get price right," "reduce or eliminate protection,"
or "free international flows of capital and technology' and "cut back on government intervention
in industrial activity" (Lall 1992). And the accumulation theories simply stress the investments
in physical and human capital. This neo-classical framework is the central notion of the
Washington Consensus - minimal government intervention and trade liberalization.
Evolutionary Theories of Technical Change and Economic Growth
Various empirical researches on firm technology development have cast serious doubts on the
neo-classical theories and resulted in the formation of evolutionary theories of economic growth
(Dosi, Freeman, and Fabiani 1994; Metcalfe 1993; Nelson 1993; Nelson and Winter 1982).
In the evolutionary theories, technology is treated as endogenous factor. Technology cannot be
fully codified and has important tacit elements and idiosyncratic features. Firms do not have full
information on technical alternatives; hence costless and instantaneous mastery of existing
technologies does not happen. Firms require time and efforts to choose technology, learn to use
efficiently and master technology, and improve and innovate technology. Thus, firms do not
operate on a common production function, which is the starting point of the evolutionary
theories, and can explain the "permanent existence of asymmetries among firms, in terms of their
process technologies and quality output" (Dosi et al. 1988). Technological knowledge is not
shared equally among firms, and technical efforts are undertaken in relatively risky and uncertain
world of imperfectly understood information.
In the evolutionary approach, innovations take place at firms along certain familiar and known
paths in order to deal with uncertainties, resulting in non-optimal outcomes and technology lock-
in. Firms cope with the situations not by maximizing clear and well-defined objective functions
but by developing and adapting organizational and managerial routines.
The evolutionary theories also stress the costs of technological learning. Technological learning
is to increase the ability to make effective use of technological knowledge in production,
engineering, and innovation, in order to sustain competitiveness in price and quality (Kim 2001),
and it strengthens technological capability and its acquisition. Both technical and organizational
capabilities are essential to spur the process of technological change.
Process of technological change occurs in all or a part of the three stages of permeation of new
technology - invention, innovation and diffusion (Schumpeter 1942; Schumpeter 1935).2
Technological capability incorporates additional and distinct resources (skills, knowledge and
experience, institutional structures and linkages) necessary to generate and manage technological
change (Bell and Pavitt 1992; Bell and Pavitt 1993). Although there are various ways to
categorize technological capability at firm level, basically it can be categorized into three
elements: project execution capability; production capability, and innovation capability (Amsden
1989; Amsden and Hikono 1994; Bell and Pavitt 1992; Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman 1985).
The evolutionary theories, however, cover far larger aspects of technology development than that
involves at firm-level. In industrial network approach of the evolutionary theories, technology
development is seen as the result of interaction among various economic actors and takes place
in the realm of economic relationship that belong to neither market nor hierarchy, and firms
never innovate in isolation. Actors are embedded in industrial networks that serve as a
coordinating mechanism and play significant roles in creating and accessing tacit knowledge and
have constraining and enabling function to important external resources.
Extending this to the far larger context, the system of innovation approach considers technology
development as an interactive learning process, characterized by complex feedback mechanisms
and relationships among actors in the system or networks of private and public sector
institutions, whose interactions produce, diffuse and use economically useful knowledge.
Technology development is a social process, not automatic or predictable, because technological
learning required for technological change is collective, cumulative and path-dependent. This
2 Schumpeter defined these three concepts as follows: 1) invention as creation of a new device, idea, process, or
system; 2) innovation as activity that entails commercial or practical application of the new device; and 3) diffusion
as process whereby a new technology or techniques is adopted over the course of time (Schumpeter, 1935). He
actually provided the ideas that innovation lay at the heart of economic development, facilitating the growth of
material prosperity, and acts of entrepreneurships is required to make innovations happen. His works laid out the
foundation for later works concerning technological changes and economic growth such as Solow's. See
(Schumpeter, 1934, 1911 in German).
approach has a national, regional, or cluster focus towards technology development. The
components and the interactions are determined by culturally defined norms, historically
determined institutional development, national priorities, geographic borders and national
policies (Dosi et al. 1988; Freeman and Soete 1997; Lundvall 1992; Metcalfe 1993; Nelson
1993).
In developing country context, the evolutionary theories on economic growth stress the
importance of firm ability and skillful entrepreneurship of firms and learning, which developing
economies have to go through before they could master new technologies that they are adopting
from more advanced industrialized nations. Nelson and Pack (1997) called this line of thinking
"Assimilation" theories (Nelson and Pack 1997), and many economists support this view on
explaining the rapid growth of the Asian Miracle since the 1960s (Amsden 1989; Amsden 2001;
Pack and Westphal 1986; Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman 1985).
In the evolutionary framework, government intervention policy takes various forms and in far
more selective ways than the neo-classical approach, e.g., the ones to address the market failures
created by externalities due to the costs of technological learning and capability building.3 In
addition to policy, a large volume of literatures expressed the significant role of institutions in
economic development (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Rodrik 1995; Rodrik 2000).
1.2.2 Theories on Mode of International Technology Transfer
Technology transfer is the diffusion and inculcation of new technical equipment, practices and
development know-how from one region or company to another (Forsyth 1999). Empirical
studies suggest the complexity of international technology transfer, far greater than the simple
description above.
Theories of International Technology Transfer
In both the neo-classical and evolutionary theories as well as in empirical evidences,
international technology transfer has been a key mechanism of technological change for
developing countries where the levels of domestic R&D innovations are low. Technology
transfer can take different mechanisms: 1) trade; 2) internalized mode within a multinational
company, taking a form of foreign direct investment (FDI); and 3) externalized mode, taking a
form of partnership (licensing, franchising, joint venture, management contract, turnkey contract,
production-sharing contract, and international subcontracting).
A large volume of literatures are dedicated to the studies of international technology transfer.
Yet, no overreaching theory on technology transfer has been developed. Theories of
international technology transfer largely derive from the studies of multinational enterprises and
FDI, and those theoretical arguments are mostly concentrated on mode of entry, but the
perspectives of arguments vary greatly.
Mode of technology transfer/entry is studied greatly in both theoretical and empirical manners
and is the focus and important framework of these arguments, because different choice of entry
3 Learning and information is the most imperfect market, and market failures are caused by imperfect and costly
information. Problem of development is the acquisition of technology, knowledge, information about technology
and methods of production (Stiglitz, 1989).
mode is considered creating great differences in benefits and spillovers from developmental
perspectives. In the neo-classical theories, there are no differences between various modes of
technology transfer, because free markets yield the best set of choices. In the evolutionary
theories, however, the mode of transfer is not neutral to the resulting developmental effects and
the benefits greatly differ (Lall 1992), as technology transfer is linked to capability building and
catching up. Theoretical arguments are divided into several different groups.
According to the transaction cost and industrial organization/internalization theories of
international technology transfer and determinants of FDI, firms choose the entry mode and
organizational form, which minimize the overall transaction costs (Anderson and Gatignon 1986;
Buckley and Casson 1976; Erramilli and Rao 1993; Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Williamson
1985). Imperfection in markets for intangible assets, intermediate products, and information
makes it more efficient for firms to integrate rather than interacting as number of independent
single-plant firms. Internalization overcomes transaction costs, risks and uncertainties in arm's
length market and creates advantages in control, market power, scale and scope economies, and
transfer pricing. Transaction costs and barriers to entry are key elements for FDI. According to
this line of theory, if technology transfer of a product requires high cost due to high degree of
asset specific resources, technology providing firm is expected to choose higher entry modes
such as FDI instead of lower entry modes such as blueprint. Also the entry mode is influenced
by the bargaining power of provider and receiver of technology, as technology transfer is usually
costly due to high level of investments required for new and different legal, administrative, and
operating infrastructure (Davidson and McFertridge 1985). From the perspective to see
internationalization as stage process, technology providing firms originally choose low risk
indirect options of market entry mode and gradually increase their market commitments
overtime, shifting to equity investment and sales operations (Johanson and Vahlne 1977).
Overall, as the external mode of entry can reduce political and economic risks associated with
FDI, it is taken when risks are relevant.
The organizational capability perspective argues that the mode of technology transfer is
influenced by the perspective of donor on ownership effects (the ratio of embedded-to-generic
firm specific know-how) and location effects (the ratio of embedded-to-generic market specific
knowledge) as well as by the perception of recipient of its own technological absorption
capability, because value creating activities of a firm are a function of its resources and
capability (Madhok 1997; Pfeffer and Novak 1976; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). According
to this perspective, technology provider would avoid low entry modes if technology is advanced
or unfamiliar with the potential users. Also, if a technology receiver believes it has higher
technology absorptive capability, it will choose licensing options, but if a receiver has low belief
in its own absorptive capability, it would opt for financial and higher forms of provider
involvement.
Arguing no single theory could explain the existence of FDI, Dunning (1980) formulated the 0-
L-I framework of FDI, a more eclectic form of theory applied to entry mode. In his theory, firms
will select their entry mode structure by considering three sets of variables: 1) ownership
advantages (advantages derived from controlling of firm specific assets such as know-how, labor
skills and technologies, control over markets, trade monopoly, scale advantages, managerial
capabilities, and patents); 2) location advantages (advantages derived from availability and cost
of inputs such as transportation, labor, and natural resources); and 3) internalization advantages
(advantages derived from reduction of transaction and coordination costs through internalization)
(Dunning 1993; Dunning 1995; Dunning and McQueen 1982; Dunning 1980). These three sets
of variables influence the firm's entry mode decision by affecting management's perception of
asset power (ownership advantage), market attractiveness (location advantage), and costs of
integration (internalization advantage) (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992). According to this
framework, firms will prefer more integrated modes of entry when the O-L-I advantages are
high. Empirical studies by various scholars have showed the superiority of the O-L-I framework
over the transaction cost approach in explaining the selection of entry mode (Agarwal and
Ramaswami 1992; Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner 1996; Dunning and Kundu 1995; Dunning
and McQueen 1982; Tse, Pan, and Au 1997). The Dunning's OLI framework is now widely
accepted.
Related empirical studies verify that the issues in control and ownership dominate the decision
for mode of technology transfer (Stewart and Nihei 1987). However, many other influential
factors have been also found, including: national culture; political environment; needs for local
identity; intellectual property right (IPR) regime; education level of host country; risk
diversification of foreign market entry; government constraints; concerns for sovereignty rights
of management; personal characteristics of top management; and technology provider's growth
strategy in the home market (organic vs. radical) (Davidson and McFertridge 1985; Kogut and
Singh 1988; Kumar, Cray, and Kumar 2002; Lee and Mansfield 1996; Maskus 2000; World
Trade Organization 2002).
Technology Diffusion through International Technology Transfer
In terms of developmental effects of international technology transfer, active spillover
(technological know-how that disseminates from foreign production plants into domestic
economy through learning about foreign technology by active participation of technology
receiver) is said to be created by technology transfer, rather than passive spillover derived from
using technologically advanced intermediate products invested abroad.
There are four basic effects/channels of interaction between technology provider and receiver
firms that lead to technology diffusion through FDI and external modes of technology transfer:
1) backward and forward linkages (both linkages make technology provider firms support their
host country firms in inventory and quality control methods, standardization, etc. to raise their
quality and service standards); 2) demonstration effect (copying, imitating and reverse
engineering of new technologies and adoption of managerial, marketing and production
processes of higher efficiency); 3) competition effects (local firms start adopting new managerial
habits and imitating new technologies when they feel the pressure of foreign competitors with an
advantage consisting of superior technologies or organizational methods in the market); and 4)
learning-by-doing. The effectiveness of these four channels depends on characteristics and mode
of technology transfer as well as economic conditions of host country such as IPR regime,
general level of education, labor mobility, etc (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; World Trade
Organization 2002).
Empirical evidences show the mixed presence of spillovers and there is a systematic pattern
where various host industry and country characteristics influence the incidence of spillovers
(Blomstrom 2001). They are positively related to the host economy's capacity and technological
capacity of indigenous firms to absorb. Although spillovers should not be expected in all kinds
of industries, they are weak in enclave, where neither products nor technologies have much in
common with those of local firms (Cantwell 1989; Hadda and Harrison 1993; Kokko 1994). The
size of national market and high level of local competition and competence are the important
determinants of spillovers (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998).
Technology transfer can be divided into two forms by the extent of integration with local market
and with local labor force, which determine its potential to diffuse technology for a given level
of intensity of technology transfer. Vertical technology transfer, typical for technology transfer
from developed countries to developing countries, has lower potentials of technology transfer,
because firms fragment their production chain into stages, matching factor intensities of their
activities with factor endorsements of host countries. Only training and learning-by-doing is the
channel of technology transfer. On the other hand, horizontal technology transfer has higher
potential of technology transfer, as it concerns the production of goods for the local market of
host country where multiple firms produce similar goods in all locations. This is more common
between developcd economies, and all possible channels act as a mechanism of technology
transfer (Forsyth 1999; World Trade Organization 2002).
1.2.3 Technological Change and Sustainable Development
Concepts of sustainability and sustainable development cannot be separated from economic
growth.
Although sustainability is an essentially vague concept, Solow (1991) defines it as an obligation
to conduct ourselves so that we leave to the future generation the option or the capacity to be as
well off as we are (Solow 1991). During the 1970s, the sustainability concept emphasized the
notion of environment as simply an additional constraint on economic growth; hence long-term
sustainability requires limiting the volume of economic activities to what is compatible with the
sharply constrained natural capital (carrying capacity, rates of renewable resources, assimilation
capacity by ecosystems of wastes). This led to the old proposition for zero-growth of economic
activities based on technological pessimism, advocated by the Report of the Club of Rome (Daly
1991; Kryer and Gillete 1985; Meadows et al. 1972).
On the other hand, during the 1980s, a new concept of sustainable development emerged based
on technological optimism, aiming at reconciling the pursuit of economic growth with ecological
protection, by drawing an inspiration from the neo-classical capital theory that extended to
include natural capital. The view of sustainable development concept presumes that
technological change/progress can, automatically through market mechanism, offer some relief
from environmental constraint, through some combination of substitutions (from natural capital
toward human and produced capital) and secular increases in factor productivity (Ausbel 1996;
Faucheux, Muir, and O'Connor 1997; Faucheux 2000; Solow 1991). The United Nations
Conference for Environment and Development (the Earth Summit at Rio) in 1992 endorsed this
concept of sustainable development as a new social project.4
4 The term "sustainability" has since been defined with reference to scientific principles.
Thus, the role of technology and technological change/progress is central to achieve sustainable
development, in particular decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation and
unsustainable resource use that have led to the global environmental concerns, including the loss
of biodiversity, climate change, ozone layer depletion, and desertification. The importance of
technological change for sustainable development was enunciated in the definition of sustainable
development in the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) as follows:
The concept of sustainable development does not imply limits - not absolute limits but
limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on
environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of
human activities. But technology and social organization can both be managed and
improved to make way for a new era of economic growth (World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED) 1987).
However, the relationship between technological change and sustainable development is not very
straightforward. While technological innovations can bring remedy for environmental
degradation and vehicle of economic growth simultaneously, they can also bring new risks to
society and can be new sources of environmental degradation. Many historical examples showed
this kind of ambiguity of technology in light of the concept of sustainable development.
Section 1.3: Practical Background of Research
1.3.1 Role of Technology Transfer in Climate Change Mitigation
Global climate change mitigation is one of the most significant sustainable development
challenges. Technology is central to the transition toward more climate-friendly social system,
because it plays the central role of mitigating global climate change by reducing the GHG
emissions while advancing our welfare creation capacity by increasing productivity. A
frequently expressed view on technology and global climate change has been as follows: "If the
introduction of technologies created the problem, other new technologies will help us in solving
it (IPCC Working Group III 2000)."
International collaborations are also crucial in order to increase productivity and efficiency of the
climate mitigation efforts as well as to expedite the diffusion of the efforts worldwide. Global
economic growth is currently increasing energy use and the GHG emissions. In many cases,
technologies that could be used to mitigate the increase in the GHG emissions do exist but not in
locations where they could be best used, in particular, in developing countries that are
experiencing rapid economic growth but not in sustainable ways. Therefore, transfer of climate
change mitigation technologies and investments from developed to developing countries have
been considered vital to the transition toward more climate-friendly social system, ever since the
launching of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)5 in
5 The UNFCCC is an intergovernmental treaty developed to address the problem of climate change. The UJNFCCC
was opened for signature at the Earth Summit at Rio in 1992 and entered into force on March 21, 1994. Article
4.1 .c requires the parties "to promote and cooperate in the development, application, diffusion, including transfer, or
prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases." Then, Article 4.5 states "The developed country Parties and
other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as
1992. The Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 emphasizes more on the role of private investment
and on the actions by and in developing countries themselves in technology transfer than the
UNFCCC, and it formally recognizes the role of private sector6 (UNFCCC 1997a).
In the climate change mitigation context, technology transfer involves not only private sector
entities, which are the foremost focus of developmental economic literatures, but also other
stakeholders such as governments, financial institutions, NGOs and research/educational
institutions, although private sector-driven pathways are considered more dominant than
government-driven and/or community-driven pathways of technology transfer (IPCC Working
Group III 2000).
1.3.2 Technology Transfer in the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the Convention that the parties to the UNFCCC negotiated
and first agreed in December 1997. It entered into force as a legally-binding document on
February 16th, 2005, following the ratification of the Russian Federation in November 2004.
Although the United States, the world's largest GHG emitter, rejected the Kyoto Treaty in 2001,
a majority of other Annex I Parties (industrialized countries and countries of the former Soviet
bloc) including Canada, Japan, and the countries of the European Union ratified the treaty.
The Kyoto Protocol obliges Annex I Parties to cut their GHG emissions by an average of
approximately 5% compared to the 1990 levels for the first commitment period of 2008-2012.
The Kyoto Protocol has three innovative "flexibility mechanisms" (Emissions Trading, 7 Joint
Implementation, 8 and Clean Development Mechanism) to lower the overall costs of achieving its
appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties,
particularly developing country parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Conventions. In this
process, the developed country parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and
technologies of developing country Parties (UNFCCC. 1992).
6 Before the Kyoto Protocol, there was very limited progress on determining what constitutes technology transfer,
the roles of governments and private sector, and how compliances with Article 4.5 of the UNGCCC should be
measured. Article 10c of the Kyoto Protocol asks all parties to "cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities
for the development, application and diffusion of, and take all possible steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as
appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes
pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including the formation of policies and
programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are public owned or in the public
domain and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of,
and access to environmentally sound technologies." See (UNFCCC. 1997a).
7 Emissions Trading (defined by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol) provides for Annex I Parties to acquire units from
other Annex I Parties and use them towards meeting their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol by allowing
Parties to grasp the lower cost opportunities to reduce emissions. Only Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol with
emissions limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B to the Protocol can participate in the
Emission Trading (UNFCCC, 1997b).
8 Joint Implementation (JI, defined by Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol) is another project-based mechanism of the
Kyoto Protocol that may be used by Annex I Parties to fulfill their Kyoto targets. Under JI, an Annex I Party (with a
commitment inscribed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol) may implement an emission-reducing project or a project
that enhances removals by sinks in the territory of another Annex I Party (with a commitment inscribed in Annex B
emissions reduction targets by enabling the Parties to access cost-effective options to reduce
emissions or to remove carbon from the atmosphere in other countries. The mechanisms are
based on the fact that while the costs of reducing emissions vary considerably from region to
region, the global effects of mitigation efforts are the same regardless the locations of actions.
Among the three mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, defined by Article 12
of the Kyoto Protocol) is a project-based mechanism, which greatly concerns cross-border
transfer of climate change mitigation technologies between developed countries and developing
countries. As Emission Trading and Joint Implementation (JI) are not applicable to developing
countries, only the CDM provides considerable scope for creative partnerships involving private
parties by stimulating international investments for cleaner economic growth in developing
countries. The CDM provides opportunities for Annex I Parties to implement project activities
that reduce emissions in non-Annex I Parties, in return for certified emission reductions (CERs).
The CERs generated by such project activities can be used by Annex I Parties to help meet their
emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, carbon credits to help finance
emission reduction projects of GHGs are called "carbon finance." "Carbon finance" is an
additional value creation mechanism to the existing monetary value system in order to mobilize
more private-sector projects to spur the international diffusion of climate change mitigation and
adaptation technologies.
The CDM has two-fold objectives: while it assists Annex I Parties to comply with their GHG
emission reduction targets, it supports non-Annex I Parties in contributing to the climate change
mitigation efforts and achieving sustainable development. The emission reductions by the CDM
must be real and measurable as well as additional. The last is called the "additionality" criteria;
the CDM projects activity is considered to be additional only if the GHG emissions are reduced
below those that would have occurred in the absence of the CDM project activity, which is the
baseline for the project. Various tools for identifying and measuring additionality have been
developed and they are still evolving. Operational criteria for additionality include: that the
project is not duplicating a common practice; that the project is economically or financially less
attractive; that the project exceeds current legal or regulation requirements; that the project uses
more advanced technology with higher performance uncertainty than the normal practice in the
country; and, that the project cannot be implemented in normal course due to barriers, etc
(Ministry of Environment of Japan 2006).
Also, the CDM projects must satisfy the sustainable development criteria; they must assist
developing countries in achieving some of their economic, social, environmental criteria for
sustainable development, but the specification of the criteria is left for each individual host
country of the CDM projects (UNFCCC 1997d).
of the Kyoto Protocol) and count the resulting emission reduction units (ERUs) towards meeting its own Kyoto
target (UNFCCC. 1997c)
1.3.3 Issues in Climate Change Mitigation Technology Transfer
Although the CDM was devised to stimulate private sector transfer of climate change mitigation
(and adaptation) technologies from developed countries to developing countries, many issues
remain to be considered and addressed by more progressive efforts.
Changing Global Business Environments
One of the issues is how to effectively incorporate the rapidly changing business environments
into the CDM and other climate change mitigation efforts. While the importance of private
sector technology transfer is increasingly recognized, the global environments surrounding
private sector cross-border business activities have been rapidly changing since 1980.
First, since the 1990s the types and magnitudes of international financial flows that drive private
sector cross-border technology transfer to developing countries have greatly changed due to the
liberalization of certain domestic sectors and capital markets in many countries with access
granting to foreign investors, lowered interest rates in developed countries, development of
stronger domestic legal and financial systems, and development and diffusion of information
technology. On the other hand, both official development assistance (ODA) and domestic
resource mobilization have fallen short of the commitments made (French 1998; IPCC Working
Group III 2000). While this has greatly increased the opportunities for obtaining private sector
financing for technology acquisitions and changed the structure of international financial flows,
private sector investments in general has been very selective and remains highly erratic, most
notably in foreign portfolio equity investment and commercial lending.
The increase in private foreign capital flows to the infrastructure sector in developing countries
also began in the 1990s. The electricity sector, which is one of the most important sectors
concerning the GHG emissions, was no exception. This trend was significantly related to the
energy sector reform and restructuring trend (deregulation and restructuring of energy markets in
developed countries and privatization of energy sectors in developing countries) since the 1980s.
The principle driving forces behind the reform movement of the electricity sector are: 1) poor
performance of state-run electricity utilities in terms of costs, expansion of access to services,
and/or supply reliability; 2) financial inability to make essential new investments and/or
maintenance; 3) needs to remove subsidies in order to release the resources for other more
pressing public expenditure needs; and 4) desire of the governments to raise immediate revenue
through the sales from the sector (Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001). The electricity reform
movements have increased market access and interests by multinational corporations, which
have increasingly engaged in corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and have grown by
converging both electricity and non electricity-energy business and by expanding to rapidly
growing developing countries that urgently need energy services, and have augmented the capital
flows and investments but increased the emphasis on short-term financial returns (Sagar and
Holdren 2002).
In terms of mode of foreign investments, although 100% subsidiaries have been a dominant
mode, joint ventures have been increasing since the 1980s due to host government requirements,
volatile local business environments, and internationalization of business to reduce costs (Datta
1988). Other types of external business arrangements such as licensing and franchising have
also increased greatly since the beginning of the 1980s (Helleiner 1989).
The increase in international capital flows and the internationalized patterns of business
management in technology, investment and sourcing by multinational corporations are
considered as a part of the phenomena of intensified globalization. There is another clear global
trend: the intensified globalization of governance and the increasing role of international
organizations. In the field of policy making and implementation, globalization is taking a form
of policy harmonization in areas such as trade and technology quality standards through the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Standards Organization
(ISO). On the other hand, while the intensified role of the UN systems and the Conventions that
deal with growing environmental problems and challenges beyond national borders is a part of
such harmonization efforts emerged in the area of environmental governance, these international
mechanisms and nation states have been having difficulty in understanding their role and the way
to use their capacity effectively to deal with new demands of environmental governance posed
on them.
Another important change for private business has happened in the nature of competition.
According to Porter (1990), the world has shifted to so-called "new and dynamic
competitiveness paradigm based on innovation" since the 1980s, where competitiveness at the
industry level may well be achieved not only through higher productivity or lower prices but also
by ability to provide different and better quality products due to technological innovations.
Hence, technological innovations are the motor of competitiveness (Porter 1990; Porter and van
der Linde 1995).
Thus, the environments surrounding private sector business activities and cross-border
transactions have changed greatly since the beginning fo the 1980s and are still chaing rapidlly.
North-South Divide of Climate Change Technology Transfer
The privatization efforts and the process of globalization since 1980 have led the increase in
capacity and capability of private sector in international investment and technology development,
while transforming the role of public sector into the one inducing the private sector to contribute
to public welfare creation. Under such circumstances, public and private partnerships are a
requirement to advance the climate change mitigation efforts, and the incentive creation for
robust private sector participation is an essential part of this process. Despite this growing
capacity and capability of private sector and the recognition of the importance of cross-border
technology transfer, however, technology transfer remains the most conflicted aspect of climate
change negotiations between developed and developing countries. Divergent views regarding
the treatment of technology as well as the roles of government and private sector have
contributed to the conflict.
The global climate change regime such as the UNFCCC has treated climate change mitigation
technologies as public information, because they are the means of creating public goods and
reducing negative environmental externalities. General perception of the climate change
mitigation efforts in developing countries is that implementing the Convention commitments and
restricting the GHG emissions could mean limiting their economic growth. This view is
reflected in Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC, which states "the extent to which developing country
parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the
effective implementation by developed country parties of their commitment under the
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology, and will take fully into
account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and
overriding priorities of the developing country parties" (UNFCCC 1992). An augment made by
developing countries on this ground is that the technologies should be transferred to them on
favorable terms under the mandates of multinational environmental agreements to meet the
efforts necessary for climate change mitigation, and the governments of developed countries
should play a key role in creating conducive "enabling environments" that encourages and
"push" transfer of their technologies to developing countries (Forsyth 1998; UNFCCC 2003).
However, a controversy arises from the fact that it is private sector which owns most of such
climate change mitigation technologies. Under the process of globalization supported by a
notion of free market supremacy, developed countries argue that the governments of technology
providing countries should play a minimum role in transfer of technologies owned by private
sector, because transferring technologies on favorable terms pushed by public sector will
undermine the commercial basis and industrial competitiveness of private sector players who
develop and own such technologies. In this view, transfer of climate change mitigation
technologies will happen once developing countries create macroeconomic, political, technical,
institutional and social "enabling environments" conducive to technology transfer and there are
many rooms for the governments of technology receiving countries to facilitate such
environments through removal of generic market and institutional barriers and to "pull"
spontaneous technology transfer (Forsyth 1998; UNFCCC 1998; UNFCCC 2003).
Those generic barriers emphasized by developed countries are lack of macroeconomic
environment, institutional inertia, non-transparent legal system, capital constraints, absence of
accounting for negative environmental externalities, etc. International Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) identified ten dimensions of "enabling environments" that foster adequate
implementation on technology transfer and that create conducive national conditions in both
developed and developing countries as follows (IPCC 2001; IPCC Working Group III 2000;
UNFCCC 1998):
1) National Systems of Innovation (networks of institutions that initiate, modify, import and
diffuse new technologies);
2) Social Infrastructure and Participatory Approaches;
3) Human and Intuitional Capacities;
4) Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks (access and availability of capital, banking sector
development, inflation or interest rates, stability of tax and tariff policy, subsidized or
average-cost price of energy, high import duties, investment risks, risks of expropriation);
5) Sustainable Markets (functioning domestic markets promote replicable, on-going
technology development and diffusion);
6) National Legal Institutions (IPR regime, contract/property/regulatory risks, governance,
corruption);
7) Codes, Standards, and Certifications;
8) Equity Considerations (distribution of costs and benefits);
9) Rights to Productive Resources (land, natural resources, factories, and other productive
resources); and
10) Research and Technology Development.
The governments have responsibilities to provide a variety of policy tools for creating enabling
environments. Although most technology transfer case studies point out the importance of
removal of technology and sector-specific, i.e., micro-level environmental barriers, empirical
evidences on the impact of macro-level environments on environmentally sound technologies are
reportedly mixed (UNFCCC 2003).
Immediate Technology Transfer Needs and Long-term Process of
Sustainable Development
Another important gap in the current climate change mitigation regime is found between the
needs for immediate technology transfer and the long-term process necessary to achieve
sustainable development goals.
The UNFCCC and its associated bodies such as IPCC have kept encouraging an approach that
emphasizes immediate transfer of technology to rapidly industrializing developing countries to
reduce the GHG emissions as soon as and as much as possible. On the other hand, the
sustainable development criteria required in the CDM often entail a rather long-term process of
education and technological capacity and capability building for technology receivers to achieve
the goal, as technology providers are expected to bring more than mere relocation of products
and technology receivers are demanded to master technological knowledge.
Many empirical studies on technology transfer conducted during the last two decades also defy
any simple notion of technology transfer for successful economic growth, as transfer of
technology is a complex socio-economic learning process. Thus, in order to successfully attain
both the immediate technology transfer and the long-term sustainable development goals, the
process exposes technology providers to high transfer costs, long-term commitments, risks of
leaking proprietary knowledge and intellectual property rights, and potential loss of industrial
competitiveness, while requiring technology receivers to build indigenous capability and often
industrial competitiveness for relatively short term before technology agreements expire, in order
to keep up with constantly advancing technology frontier.
Thus, there is an obvious inconsistency between the pressure of immediate technology transfer
and the requirement of long-term sustainable development.
Unsolved Deep Chasms
The Kyoto Protocol developed the CDM that many hope spurring cross-border technology
transfer, and the subsequent negotiations have been making great progresses in clarifying
conceptual and administrative issues surrounding the CDM and offering some international
supports for developing countries to build institutional and human capacity and capability to
formulate and implement projects under the CDM. However, the deep chasms between
developed and developing countries described above and the inconsistency between the
immediate technology transfer and the long-term sustainable development goals have been left
unsolved, and so far, the progress in cross-border technology transfer for climate change
mitigation in the real world has been slow, compared to the speed of globalization.
Section 1.4: Research Significance and Focus of Research
1.4.1 Theoretical and Practical Relevance of Research and Scholarly
Contribution
Considering the above theoretical and practical backgrounds, this research aims to contribute to
the sustainable development and climate change mitigation fields in several ways.
Applications of General International Technology Transfer Theories on
Climate Change Mitigation Technology Transfer
The primary theoretical contribution of this research is the cross-application of general theory
and empirical evidences of international technology transfer to a case of climate change
mitigation technology transfer. Analyzing the transfer of wind energy technology within the
framework of conventional international technology transfer may produce insights for future
climate change mitigation technology transfer. Most importantly, the research applies different
theoretical frameworks on the case study findings to examine the explanatory power of the
existing theories.
Applications of Accumulation and Assimilation Theories on Climate Change
Mitigation Technology Development and Diffusion
Another theoretical contribution of this research is the examination of climate change mitigation
technology development and diffusion to developing country through the perspectives of both
accumulation and assimilation theories of economic growth and technological change. The
research applies both theoretical frameworks on the research findings to consider their potentials
to explain the case of wind energy technology transfer and development.
Additional Contribution to Literature
Another contribution of this research to literature is to generate some sector and technology
specific factors and processes that can be additional knowledge to general international
technology transfer theory as well as important evidence to the future formation of climate
change mitigation technology transfer theory. Although this case study alone cannot generate a
large volume of evidences that make the formation of theory on climate change mitigation
technology transfer, it is important to build the knowledge specific to the climate change
mitigation as well as sustainable development fields, both of which have important crossover
between traditional economic development discipline and environmental discipline.
Practical Relevance of Research
This research also has significant practical relevance. First, although private sector technology
transfer has been a great practical concern for the global climate change mitigation efforts, only
limited progresses have been made so far in reality. This research examines the causal factors
and dynamic processes behind the difficulty of private-sector climate change mitigation
technology transfer under the rapidly changing business environments, by directly studying a
long-term history of one case of international development and diffusion of climate change
mitigation technology.
Second, by examining the historical development, this research attempts to find out the policy
focus areas for the future climate change mitigation regime, in particular for distributed power
generation technologies such as wind and solar. Various efforts are already underway to remove
political and institutional barriers in order to create so-called "enabling environments," especially
in developing countries, to spur private-sector actions under the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM and
beyond. However, the question remains whether or not such efforts targeting developing country
environments alone can effectively solve the issues of industrial competitiveness management
and control between technology providers and receivers in technology transfer and the issues of
attaining both immediate technology transfer and long-term sustainable development. The
research tries to consider the role of enabling environments and policy supports in light of
intensifying firm competitiveness management, by examining the case findings against the on-
going current climate change mitigation efforts for technology transfer as much as possible.
1.4.2 Research Focus
This research has the following conceptual focuses.
Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Settings
The research places special emphasis on the role and effects of government policy and
institutional settings.
First, as mentioned already, the intensifying forces of globalization have been rapidly
transforming the nature of global and local businesses at every corner of the world since 1980,
while the policy harmonization efforts are in progress in many fields including global
environmental governance. Exploring the role of policy and institutional settings is important in
this context, as it has been transformed from commanding and restricting private business
behaviors to creating the environments that support their value creation activities through
competition and as the role and effects of policy and nation states in global environmental and
business governance are often uncertain.
The other very important reason is because development of climate change mitigation
technologies and their market and industry is strongly policy-driven as neither negative socio-
environmental externalities caused by our current mode of economic development nor positive
externalities created by the climate change mitigation efforts is incorporated into the present
market mechanism. Many factors in the macro-environments influence the processes of
international development and diffusion of climate change mitigation technologies, including:
- Market demand and its characteristics;
- Characteristics and state of technology;
" Industry characteristics and firm-level competitiveness management and; and,
- Availability of resources (physical and human resources, including infrastructure).
Because government policy plays important roles in defining the impacts of the above factors,
this research highlights the role of policy as the main driver of international development and
diffusion of climate change mitigation technologies. The examination includes the role and
effects of industrial policy, which have been controversial in developmental economics and they
can be more controversial in the field of sustainable development and climate change because of
the ambiguity in their role and effects on technological changes.
Co-evolution of Policy, Market, Industry and Technology on Both
Technology Provider and Receiver Sides
While the role and effects of policy and institutional settings are the main focus of this research,
policy alone cannot create the necessary dynamics of technology development and diffusion.
Virtuous interactions among the factors mentioned above are essential. With this reason, the
research pays strong attention to the co-evolutionary processes of policy, market, industry, and
technology by following one case of long-term process of technology development and diffusion
and engaging in more comprehensive and systemic assessment. By doing so, the research aims
to providing insights on the effects of dynamically changing factors and their transformation
processes on technology transfer results beyond the factors that influence the mode of transfer,
which is the primary focus of general international technology transfer theory, as very few
attempts have been made to follow such long-term process of cross-border development and
diffusion of one climate change mitigation technology in detail so far.
This focus on process is also connected to the concept of replicable technology transfer; because
technologies always advance and transform themselves, recurring transfer of upgraded
technologies is very important to maximize the long-term developmental and climate change
mitigation effects. By examining the factors necessary for replicable technology transfer, this
research naturally concerns the process of dynamic changes of such factors.
This research also examines such co-evolutionary processes on both technology provider side
and technology receiver side, because the interactions between them influence technology
transfer outcomes greatly. In particular, the focus on the industry and firm evolution and their
interactions with policy, market, and technology in both technology provider and receiver
countries and the examination of their effects on technology transfer outcomes are considered
unique to this research, because private firms and industry are the conduit of technology
diffusion but comprehensive examination of the effects of their evolution on technology transfer
has been rather rare. This inclusion of industry evolutionary perspective in international
technology development and diffusion is also connected greatly to the next focus of this
research, the role and effects of industrial competitiveness management.
Role and Effects of Industrial Competitiveness Management
The next focus of the research is the struggle between technology providers and receivers caused
by cross-border technology transfer in terms of enhancement and management of industrial
competitiveness. As already mentioned, developed countries argue that transfer of climate
change mitigation technologies will happen once developing countries create "enabling
environments" i.e., macroeconomic, political, technical, institutional and social environments
conducive to technology transfer. However, even with such environments, the issues of
industrial competitiveness control by technology providers will very likely remain, possibly
hindering the process of immediate transfer of best available technologies and/or technologies
most suitable to local conditions.
With this reason, this research focuses on the factors and processes that influence firm-level
industrial competitiveness management from the perspectives of technology providers and
receivers in the context of co-evolution of policy, market, industry and technology over time, as
they change through the interactions with rapidly changing business environments. In
international technology transfer literature, the factors that influence firm competitiveness
management are analyzed as one of the decisive factors that determine the mode of transfer.
However, competitiveness management continuously evolves after the mode of transfer is set.
Therefore, this research follows the evolution of competitiveness management strategies in long-
term process and examines their effects on technology transfer outcome.
Taking the industrial competitiveness issues into account, the research gives a consideration to
what kinds of policy mechanisms, including carbon finance mechanism through the CDM, can
be effective to create technology transfer that both technology providers and receivers can
enhance industrial competitiveness together through collaborations. The power of private sector
cannot be fully utilized in international development and diffusion of climate change mitigation
technologies without addressing this subject.
1.4.3 Wind Energy as Case Technology
This research takes wind energy technology, in particular wind power generation technology, as
case technology. As case study material, the research focuses on the development of the Indian
wind energy sector and its interactions with the Danish and German wind energy sector. There
are several reasons for this selection.
First, power generation technology plays the most important role for climate change mitigation,
as the system and process of energy extraction, transformation, delivery, and usage in human
activities are the primarily cause of the GHG emissions and global warming. In particular, wind
energy is a distributed power generation technology, which has been becoming to play a
significant role in electricity infrastructure. Wind energy technology, therefore, is a superb case
material for future distributed power generation technology development and diffusion.
Second, wind energy technology is one of the most successfully developed and diffused new
energy technologies since the Energy Crisis in the 1970s, and its history provides an opportunity
to follow the co-evolutionary development paths of policy, market, industry, and technology,
which has been most evident in Europe, especially in Denmark and Germany.
Third, the sector has a record of international private sector partnerships between European
companies and Indian companies. This provides excellent case study materials. Stories from the
Indian side will highlight some of successful policies as well as unsuccessful attempts to gain
technological and institutional capabilities within the dynamic context of contemporary wind
energy technology development. Stories from the European side will highlight policies that
encourage private firms to advance technology frontier and expand cross-border technology
transfer to India as a part of their global business strategies.
Lastly, the sector has the histories of public-private sector collaborations in all the three
countries. Such histories will provide materials to examine the role and effects of public policy
on both domestic and international technology development and diffusion as well as interactions
among collaborators from different institutional backgrounds.
Thus, wind energy technology provides lots of important materials and potentials for transferable
lessons and is considered as a good case technology for this research. There have been many
studies done for wind energy sector development in individual countries, including Denmark,
Germany and India. However, very little analysis has been made for the interaction between
these countries, in particular from the perspective of technology transfer from developed
countries to developing countries throughout the period of dynamic transformation occurred in
the market, industry, and technology of wind energy under the intensifying globalization. This
research, therefore, provides an interesting case material for the future of sustainable
development as well.
Section 1.5: Dissertation Outline
This dissertation composes of seven chapters as follows.
Chapter 1: The chapter discusses the motivation and significance of research, provides the
theoretical and practical context, and describes the focus of research.
Chapter 2: The chapter presents the research questions, the timeframe of the research, and the
methodologies used for the analysis.
Chapter 3: The chapter describes the basics of wind energy technology system, its value
chain/system, and wind power generation economics.
Chapter 4: The chapter briefly looks at the evolution of wind energy sector of the three
research countries before 1990.
Chapter 5: The chapter examines the evolution and the basic profiles of wind energy policy,
market, industry, and technology in Denmark, Germany and India from 1990
through 2005, and the results of technology transfer between Denmark/Germany
and India.
Chapter 6: The chapter examines the co-evolution of policy, market, industry and technology
that spurred technology development and diffusion at the technology frontier of
Denmark and Germany and in India and explores the causal factors and processes
that created technology gaps between the two sides.
Chapter 7: The chapter summaries the findings of the research, examines the explanatory
power of different theoretical frameworks introduced in Chapter 1 regarding the
case findings, and explores practical implications of the research findings on the
current and future climate change mitigation technology transfer and the role of
government policy.
Chapter 2:
Research Questions and Methodology
Chapter 1 introduced the theoretical and practical backgrounds and foundations of this research.
This chapter presents the research questions and the methodological approaches that this research
takes. The first section discusses the core and specific questions of the research. The second
section descries the research methodology and steps taken to address the research questions. The
third section explains methodological rationale and data validity and reliability.
Section 2.1: Research Questions
The goal of this research is to provide some answers to the following questions.
2.1.1 Core Questions
As introduced in Chapter 1, the core questions that motivate this research are:
Why is it so difficult to transfer more advanced climate change mitigation
technologies from developed countries to developing countries? How can we
stimulate private sector involvement further in cross-border transfer of such
technologies in order to advance not only global climate change mitigation but
also sustainable development?
The fundamental concern of the research is the factors and processes, hence the evolving
mechanisms, which promote replicable transfer of climate change mitigation technologies by
private sector from developed countries to developing countries.
2.1.2 Specific Questions
In order to gain some insights for the core questions, the research asks the following specific
questions:
+ What are the factors and processes that influenced domestic and international
development and diffusion of wind energy technology?
* How do those factors and processes evolve and how the mechanism of co-evolution
of those factors differ in technology provider (developed) versus technology
receiver (developing) country context?
+ What are the role and effects of policy and institutional settings in technology
development and diffusion, in particular cross-border transfer, of wind energy
technology by private sector?
? What is and how important is the role of industrial competitiveness management in
the outcomes of cross-border transfer of wind energy technology?
Section 2.2: Research Methodology and Procedures
This research basically follows the historical footsteps of wind energy sector of the three
research countries (Denmark, Germany and India) in order to analyze the factors and processes
of technology development and diffusion. The research mainly focuses on the timeframe after
1990 and takes the following five steps.
2.2.1 Timeframe of Research
The primary timeframe of this research is between 1990 and 2005. This is because private sector
development in India and Germany as well as Indo-European wind energy private sector
partnerships mostly started during the 1990s. However, the development before 1990 has also
impacts on the later development, and they will be briefly examined in Step 2 (Chapter 4) and
also introduced as backgrounds as necessary.
2.2.2 Step 1: Wind Energy Technology and Economics Profile
Development
The purpose of this first step is to lay out general technical backgrounds for the research by
illustrating specific attributes of wind energy technology, its value chain and system, and
economics. The analysis is based on literature review. This step consists of Chapter 3 and its
three main tasks are:
Task 1) Describe the basics of wind energy technology system, focusing mainly on horizontal
axis wind turbines and technologies that support the grid-connection
Task 2) Examine wind energy technology along its value chain/system
Task 3) Review the basics of common wind power generation economics
2.2.3 Step 2: Profile Development of Wind Energy Sector before 1990
The objective of this second step is to examine the evolution of wind energy policy, market,
industry, and technology before 1990. The step is important because the historical paths before
1990 had important implications on the later development in all of the three research countries.
The analysis is based on both literature review and the data gathered by personal interviews as
well as the government and industry statistics. This step comprises Chapter 4 and its three main
tasks include:
Task 1) Describe general wind energy sector development in Denmark, Germany and India
before 1990
Task 2) Present technology development during the 1970s and 1980s, in relation to the
government Research, Development & Demonstration (R&DD) programs and the
success factors behind the Danish technology
Task 3) Portray industry development and structure before 1990
2.2.4 Step 3: Profile Development of Wind Energy Policy, Market
Technology and Industry in Denmark, Germany and India
The purpose of the third step is to develop the basic country profiles of wind energy policy,
market, industry, and technology in Denmark, Germany and India from 1990 to 2005, and the
results of technology transfer between Denmark/Germany and India. The profiles are
constructed through both literature review and the data gathered by personal interviews as well
as the government and industry statistics. This step consists of Chapter 5 and the following six
main tasks are involved:
Task 1) Present general institutional settings surrounding wind energy sector in the three
countries, in terms of the following: 1) political and institutional settings surrounding
the wind energy sector; 2) public organizations that concern wind energy
development and their primary roles; and 3) electricity sector profiles in light of the
sector reforms and restructuring
Task 2) Review wind energy policy of the three countries, in terms of the following: 1)
technology investment and development policy and programs; 2) market investment
and development policy and programs; 3) industry investment and development
policy and programs; 4) cross-border transaction related policy and programs; and 5)
the EU-wide technology support programs
Task 3) Portray development of wind energy market of the three countries along with global
market development by examining the following: 1) market size (annual and
cumulative installed capacity); and 2) share of wind energy generated electricity in
total electricity generation or consumption
Task 4) Build general profiles and development of wind energy industry of the three countries
and the global industry, by examining the following: 1) industry expansion (domestic,
export, and total turnovers/sales in terms of installed capacity) and their growth rates;
2) the number of industry employment; 3) profiles of main manufacturers; and 4)
industry structure (market share by manufacturer)
Task 5) Establish profiles of technology commercialization and introduction to the markets at
Denmark and Germany
Stage 1: Analyze technology characteristics and their development history based on:
1) technology depreciation rate (average capacity/size of annually installed turbines
over the years, size of available models over the years in terms of rated capacity, rotor
diameter, and hub height); 2) specification of commercialized turbine models (model
size in rated capacity, rotor diameter, hub height, years of introduction in Europe and
withdrawal, rotor power regulation types, rotor speed control types, generator types,
drive mechanisms, blade materials, SCADA, etc); and 3) commercialized
technological innovation and their characteristics (engineering/science disciplines of
innovation and required technological capability, and location of innovation in value
chain/system and technology system)
Stage 2: Examine general technology trends from 1990 to 2005 by manufacturer and
by component/technology system/value activity based on the analysis of Stage 1
Staqe 3: Analyze characteristics of technology innovations and their transformation
based on system integration, pacing technologies, cost composition, and technological
complexity by synthesizing the analyses of Stage 1 and Stage 2
Task 6) Present technology evolution profiles of India as a result of technology transfer from
the frontier and construct technology gap profiles with the frontier by comparing
similarities and differences between the two sides
Staqe 1: Examine general technology trends based on: 1) turbine capacity/size; 2)
technology depreciation rate (average capacity/size of annually installed turbines over
the years and size of available models over the years in terms of rated capacity, rotor
diameter, and hub height)
Staqe 2: Build product (wind turbine) technology transfer history based on: 1)
transferred models and their technological characteristics (model size in rated
capacity and rotor diameter, years of introduction in Europe and India, rotor power
regulation types, rotor speed control types and drive mechanisms, generator types,
and the mode/pathway of transfer); and 2) non-transferred technology and their
technological characteristics
Staqe 3: Construct turbine/component production technology transfer and capability
development/indigenization history at manufacturer level
Staqe 4: Build project execution technology transfer and capacity development/
indigenization history
Staqe 5: Investigate innovation technology development by both R&D institutions
and manufacturer in-house R&D
Staqe 6: Analyze development of technology gaps between the frontier and India in
product (technology depreciation rates, turbine capacity/size, and productivity in
annual electricity production per installed turbine unit) and capability (production and
innovation)
2.2.5 Step 4: Comparative Analysis of Causal Factors and Processes
of Technology Development and Diffusion
The objectives of Step 4 is to conduct comparative analysis of the three countries, examine the
causal factors and processes that have influenced technology development and diffusion, and
explore the mechanisms, including cross-border technology transfer, which created the
similarities and differences on technology provider and receiver sides, based on the constructed
profiles of Step 3. The analysis involves both qualitative and quantitative examinations. The
data used in Step 4 derive from both literature review and the data gathered by personal
interviews, the government and industry statistics, and the figures and information published by
manufacturers. This step comprises Chapter 6 and its eight main tasks are:
Task 1) Analyze market size and location, investment mechanisms, and characteristics of
market demands of Denmark and Germany, and examine their effects and the role of
policy on technology development and diffusion at the frontier
Stage 1: Establish the data regarding market characteristics based on: 1) market size
and location and regional market-industry interaction; and 2) investment mechanism/
investor profile (funding sources, equity-debt ratio, investor characteristics,
ownership structure and characteristics of wind projects).
Stage 2: Examine the interactions between market demands and technology
development by comparing: 1) types of technology driving market demands and their
sources (policy requirements, environmental and resource-related pressures, technical
management demands, etc); and 2) technology development as a result of various
market demands (model size in rated capacity, power control types, rotor speed
operation types, generator types, drive mechanisms, blade materials, SCADA, etc)
Stage 3: Synthesize the above analyses and identify the role and effects of demand-
pull and technology-push policy as well as institutional settings on market growth and
demand-induced technology development
Task 2) Investigate the effects of changing technological characteristics on industry structure
and competitiveness management strategies at the frontier and explore the role of
policy in technology-push aspects
Staqe 1: Establish the date regarding technology and cost management demands and
examine their relationships with technology development costs and their growth rates
at manufacturer level (annual manufacturer R&D costs)
Stage 2: Build the data regarding industry structure and manufacturer
competitiveness strategy evolution in terms of the following: 1) industry structure in
general (the number of companies, entry and exit, horizontal and vertical M&A); 2)
business entry strategy; 3) organizational growth strategy; 4) domestic and
international industry collaboration system (public and private sector collaboration
frameworks, and their role as the sources of innovations and the relationship with
specific technology development and value activities); 5) market expansion strategy
(export and import share in total turnover or installed capacity, export/import
destination, global expansion level with the number of foreign sales
offices/subsidiaries/partnerships); 6) geographical management of value chain/system
and production and innovation capacity/capability (locations of production and R&D
facilities, geographical extension of backward and forward linkages and sub-supplier
locations); and 7) sourcing strategy (choice of in-house sourcing, outsourcing, and
mixed sourcing according to components/value activities)
Stage 3: Explore characteristics of competitive management strategy transformation
in terms of: 1) industry stability (degree of change in the above strategies, change
adjustment level, and level of diversification of each player); and 2) transformation of
entry/business growth barriers and their characteristics (institutional and technical
cost of building and keeping business, capital requirement for business entry,
specialist knowledge/technical know-how and easiness of learning, existence of
requirement by government, access to resources/technology/information, and
cumulativeness of the above factors), and examine their relationships with required
costs and management needs for technology development
Stage 4: Synthesize the above analyses and identify the role and effects of policy
and institutional settings on industry structure, competitiveness management, and
supply-push technology development and diffusion at the frontier
Task 3) Establish relationships between new turbine introduction and capacity (market)
development in India quantitatively, utilizing time-series econometric analysis
Stage 1: Observe relationship between annually installed capacity as market
indicator and new turbine introduction as technology transfer/diffusion indicator
Stage 2: Establish structural relationships between the two indicators by generating
and testing possible time-series regression models
Task 4) Investigate the causal factors and processes behind the relationship between cross-
border technology transfer and market development in India from the perspective of
market development by utilizing both quantitative and qualitative analysis
Stage 1: Examine the Indian market characteristics based on: 1) market size and
location and regional market-industry interaction; and 2) investment mechanism/
investor profile (funding sources, equity-debt ratio, investor characteristics,
ownership structure and characteristics of wind projects)
Staqe 2: Conduct quantitative analysis of the Indian wind energy investment and
identify the causal factors of market development by the following methods: 1)
econometric analysis of direct relationships between various policy incentive
indicators (years of tax holiday, tax depreciation rate, interest rate of IREDA finance,
import tariffs on raw materials/intermediate components/wind turbine complete sets,
national average state feed-in tariffs, MNES wind budget as R&DD indicator) and
market development (installed capacity); 2) profitability analysis by establishing the
Indian wind energy cash flow models and calculating expected national average IRR
and first-year tax saving between the 1992-93 year and the 2004-05 year; 3)
econometric analysis of relationship between market development indicator (installed
capacity) and profitability indicator (expected national average IRR); and 4)
econometric analysis of relationship between market development indicator (installed
capacity) and first-year tax saving
Stage 3: Conduct qualitative analysis of the causal factors of market development by
following historical events, especially focusing on both national and state policy and
institutional environments and market growth
Stage 4: Examine the interactions between market demands and technology
development and transfer in India by comparing: 1) technology driving market
demands (policy requirements, environmental and resource-related pressures,
technical management demands, etc); and 2) technology development and transfer as
a result of various market demands (model size in rated capacity, power control types,
rotor speed operation types, generator types, drive mechanisms, blade materials,
SCADA, etc).
Stage 5: Synthesize the above analyses and identify the role and effects of policy
and institutional settings on market growth and demand-pull technology transfer
Task 5) Investigate the effects of changing technological characteristics and industry
structure/competitiveness management at the frontier and India on cross-border
technology transfer and the growth of technology gaps in India
Stage 1: Establish the data regarding the Indian industry formation and structural
modification (manufacturer entry and exit and their foreign collaboration history)
Stage 2: Examine the effects of Indian policy as well as competitive strategy and
industry modification at the frontier on the Indian industry by: 1) comparing industry
structural modifications at the frontier and in India; 2) analyzing the direct role and
effects of policy on the industry formation and structural modification in India; and 3)
contrasting industry transformation with the structural break in capacity-turbine
introduction relationship established in Task 4
Stage 3: Establish the data regarding technology transfer and development in India
by manufacturer to: 1) examine the effects of technology control by technology
providers (type of technology agreements/technology ownership) on the technology
transfer results by comparing the two; and 2) investigate the strategic role of Indian
partners/manufacturers in geographical capacity and capability management of their
technology providers and sourcing by examining the export activities from the Indian
side
Stage 4: Examine the effects of transformed technological characteristics at the
frontier on the technology transfer results by investigating: 1) easiness of cross-border
transfer according to technology system and components; and 2) cost change
potentials by cross-border technology transfer
Stage 5: Analyze the effects of the Indian manufacturing incentives (import duty and
exercise duty) on cost reduction and technological capability building by tracking
their evolution and manufacturing capability building
Stage 6: Synthesize the above analyses and identify 1) the effects of technology and
competitiveness management transformations at the frontier on technology
development and diffusion in India; and 2) the role and effects of policy and
institutional settings on supply-push technology transfer
Task 6) Explore appropriateness and suitability of the European technology to the Indian
specific conditions and their effects on cross-border technology transfer
Staqe 1: Establish the data regarding the Indian specific conditions (wind resources,
electricity grid system and quality, and transportation infrastructure) and examine
their difference from the frontier
Staqe 2: Examine suitability of the frontier technology to the above Indian specific
conditions and its effects on technology transfer by: 1) examining suitability and
availability of the ready-available European technologies to the Indian conditions; 2)
examining the R&D efforts for technology adjustment and development of the
Indian-specific solutions; and 3) investigating the nature of infrastructure deficiency
(transportation and electricity grid) and identify its effects on upgraded wind turbine
introduction
Staqe 3: Synthesize the above analyses and identify the role and effects of policy
and institutional settings for technology adjustment and transfer
Task 7) Examine the effects of characteristics of different technology partnerships on the
cross-border technology transfer. Establish detailed histories and profiles of six Indo-
European partnerships (Vestas RRB Ltd., NEPC Micon Ltd., BHEL-Nordex, Pioneer
Asia Group, Enercon India Ltd., and Suzlon Energy Group) and their technology
transfer outcomes in product, project execution, and innovation technology through
case study method
Task 8) Synthesize the findings of the analyses from Task 1 to Task 7, using value chain
policy analysis and causal loop diagram analysis
Staqe 1: Establish the frameworks of value chain policy analysis and causal loop
diagrams
Staqe 2: Conduct value chain policy analysis and construct causal loop diagrams on
technology development and diffusion mechanisms of the frontier and India, and
compare the causal loop structures between the frontier and India and evaluate the
role and effects of policy measures in creating the mechanisms and their differences
2.2.6 Step 5: Application of General Theories on the Research
Findings and Future Implication of the Research
The purposes of Step 5 are to summary the key research findings and draw some implications for
the future. This step consists of Chapter 7.
Task 1) Review the key research findings according to the conceptual focus and theoretical
and practical context of the research introduced in Chapter 1, which are: 1) the direct
role and effects of government policy and institutional settings on technology
development and diffusion; 2) the co-evolution of policy, market, industry and
technology development mechanisms; 3) application of general theories of
technological change on wind energy technology development; 4) application of
general theories of international technology transfer on wind energy technology
transfer case from Denmark/Germany to India; 5) the role and effects of industrial
competitiveness management on technology transfer outcomes; 6) sector specific
aspects of wind energy technology transfer; and 7) examination of enabling
environments in the wind energy technology transfer case.
Task 2) Draw practical implications for the future climate change mitigation technology
transfer based on the research findings, in terms of: 1) specific implications for the
Indian wind energy sector; 2) the roles of government and firm in building enabling
environments in light of intensifying competitiveness management; 3) the role of
government for further business involvement; 4) potentials of the CDM for
technology transfer; and 5) suggestions for future distributed power generation
technology transfer.
Section 2.3: Rationale, Validity, and Reliability of Research
2.3.1 Methodological Rationale
While international technology transfer has been studied by numerous researchers, scholarly
products that followed the long-term process of one climate change mitigation technology still
remain limited. Most of the studies for climate change mitigation technology transfer have been
the assemblage of short-term technology transfer case studies of different types of technologies.
Because this research concerns not only the immediate needs of transfer of climate change
mitigation technologies but also the long-term sustainable development prompted by the transfer
of such technologies, the analysis of long-term processes and technology transfer outcomes is
very important. The limited availability of scholarly products prompted this research to take in-
depth case study approach, which also enabled this study to examine the role and effects of
policy within the entire mechanisms of market, industry and technology development and
interactions.
Case-study approach has been proven as an effective research method for investigating questions
of 'how' and 'why' and when the researcher has no control over events and is not able to
manipulate the relevant behaviors. However, there are also disadvantages. The most significant
shortcoming is the indeterminacy of causal mechanisms. In order to overcome this disadvantage,
this research took several measures. First, the research included a number of observations within
the 15-year timeframe to analyze chronological change. Second, the research addressed
comparability of cases by focusing on technologies in one field (wind energy sector) and on
technology transfer from one strongly-tied geographical region (Denmark and Germany) to
another (India). Lastly, process tracking procedure, which is a method to identify causal
mechanisms by investigating the process of how various initial conditions cause the observed
outcomes (George and McKeown 1985), was used in individual analysis.
2.3.2 Data Validity and Reliability
Used Variables
This research used variables that have been identified and accepted as effective market, industry,
and technology indicators in the existing wind energy literatures, in order to improve the
research validity. Multiple indicators were used to increase the comprehensiveness of the
analysis, which is one of the important objectives of the research that aims to examine the
relationships in the entire policy, market, industry, and technology development mechanisms.
Data Materials and Data Collection
In order to maximize the reliability of the research, a wide range of materials are used from both
primary and secondary sources. Data were collected from both the first-hand interviews and
documentation in the three countries and the second-hand data.
Primary Data Sources
The primary data collection mainly relied upon both policy documents and personal interviews
in the three countries. Industry professionals as well as public sector actors including
government officials, researchers at national laboratories and research organizations, and
officials at professional and industry associations in the three countries were interviewed to
gather necessary data. The first round of field research/data collection was conducted in summer
2002 in India. The second round of field research/data collection was carried out in November
2005 in Denmark and Germany. Then, the contacts made during the trip were followed up
afterward for further data collection and verification.
One weakness of the primary data comes from the unavailability of personal contacts with the
Danish and German wind turbine manufacturers, which denied interview access in order to
protect their proprietary information. This weakness, therefore, was covered with the data
attained from other industry insiders such as consultants and industry association officials as well
as from the secondary sources.
Secondary Data Sources
There have been numerous literatures published regarding the Danish, German, and Indian wind
energy sector developments as well as wind energy technology in general. The dissertation
utilizes these journal articles, books, reports and analyses from international organizations, the
governments, and other sources. In addition, all the three countries have detailed statistical data,
gathered and published by the governments and industry associations as well as private wind
energy consulting firms. In particular, the research makes the use of complied statistical as well
as raw installation data from the Danish Wind Industry Association (DWIA), the Danish Energy
Authority (DEA), Deutshce Wind Energie Institut (DEWI), Bundesverband Windenergie (BWE,
German Wind Energy Association), BTM Consults ApS, and Consolidated Energy Consultants
Ltd., all of which are considered authoritative as wind energy data materials.
Chapter 3:
Wind Energy Technology and Economics Profile
This chapter depicts basic characteristics of wind energy technology9 and economics. The
purpose of this chapter is to lay out general technical backgrounds for the analysis of the later
chapters by illustrating specific attributes of wind energy technology and economics, because
characteristics of technology are an important factor that influences the pattern and speed of
development and diffusion of the technology.
Almost all contemporary industrial technologies are system technology that consists of various
subsystem components. In a system technology, both system-wide and component-specific
perspectives are important to understand the characteristics of technology, industry, and
economics. The larger the system, the greater the roles of component producers, and the
effective incorporations of better components into a system often require significant R&D work
by system assemblers (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993). Complexity and extent of technology
system has significant impacts on the extent and composition of value chain/system and business
strategies to manage the value chain/system, industry structure and competition, and economics
of innovation, production, and project execution.
The first section of this chapter describes the basics of wind energy technology system, focusing
mainly on horizontal axis wind turbines and technologies that support their grid-connection, as
they are the main focus of this research. The second section describes wind energy technology
along value chain/system. The third section summaries the basics of wind power generation
economics.
Section 3.1: Basics of Wind Energy Technology
3.1.1 Fundamentals of Wind Power Generation
Basic Physics
The basic concept of wind power is straightforward: converting wind's kinetic energy into
mechanical-rotational energy of turbine blades, which is then converted to electrical energy by a
generator (Figure 3-1).
Generator/ Use/Wind ---- > Rotor -- + Transmission Power Conditioning -- Storage/
Electricity Grid
Figure 3-1: Block Diagram of Wind Energy System
Source: (Deutch and Lester 2004)
9 Although wind energy can generate mechanical power to pump water or to grind grain, this research only focuses
on the technology used for electrical power generation. Therefore, the term "wind energy technology" used in this
research is synonymous to wind electrical power generation technology.
Power is energy per unit time, and energy is power available over a given period of time. The
power output of a wind turbine is estimated by the kinetic energy in a flow of air through a unit
area of the blades perpendicular to the wind direction. The Power, P, delivered is given by:
Power, P = 1/2pAV 3,
where p is the density of air (kg/m3), A is the area swept by the rotor blades, V is the wind speed
(m/s), and P is the power (watts or joules/second).10
The important point is that the amount of power produced by a wind turbine depends on both the
speed of the wind and the size of turbine blades. 1 As a general characteristic, turbines with
larger rotor generate more power at low wind speeds.
Rated Power of Wind Turbine
Performance of power generation technology is important because the economics depends on it.
As an indicator of performance, turbine rating in kilo- or megawatts or rated power is usually
used. Rated power is maximum continuous power output at the electrical connection point.12
3.1.2 Wind Energy Technology Basic Sub-systems and Components
While wind energy technology is fundamentally based on mechanical and electrical engineering,
numerous other engineering and scientific disciplines are employed to compose contemporary
wind energy technology system.
Power generation technology has both modular aspect (related to power generation aspect) and
system aspect (related to grid-connection, transmission and distribution infrastructure), unless it
is stand-alone. Although transmission and distribution (T&D) of electricity produced by wind is
important parts of wind energy system technology, they concern the entire power industry and
beyond the boundary of this research. This research focuses mainly on power generation and
grid connection functions of wind energy technology, i.e., wind turbine technology.
Wind turbine consists of the following subsystems and components: rotor (rotor blades and hub);
transmission system (gearbox and rotor braking); electrical power generation system (generator);
yaw system; tower; control and monitoring system (controller); foundation; and transformer.
Transmission system and electrical power generation system are contained within a nacelle
(Figure 3-2).
10 The volume of air AV delivered in time period At is given by: AV = vAAt, where v is the incoming wind speed.
The kinetic energy of a moving body is proportional to its mass. The kinetic energy in a parcel of air of unit volume
traveling at speed v = (pv 2/2). Thus, the kinetic energy delivered in time period At = (pv 3/2)AAt. Therefore, the
Power, P = 1/2pAV 3.
" The power P is proportional to V3 and the area A swept by rotor blades, that is, P oc D2 where D is the rotor
diameter.
12 However, it is important to keep in mind that the ratings are only crude indicator of how much electricity the
turbine can produce. Unlike conventional power plants such as fossil fuel and nuclear power plants, where the
operator controls the fuels, wind turbines rarely operate for long periods at their rated power because the operator
has no control over availability of fuel.
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Figure 3-2: Cross-section of a Typical Grid-connected
Horizontal Axis Wind Turbine
Drawn by the author based on (Redlinger, Dannemand Andersen, and
Morthorst 2002; Walker and Jenkins 1997)
Rotor
Rotor continuously extracts kinetic energy from wind and transforms it into useful mechanical
power in the rotor shaft. A rotor includes blades and a hub. The blades are attached to the hub,
which connects them to the main shaft. Blade-pitch mechanisms (hydraulic, mechanical or
electrical equipment to drive the pitch setting of the blades or emergency aerodynamics brakes)
are often mounted in the hub. The number of design and engineering options available for rotor
is quite large. In order to increase performance and productivity, a suitable concept in each of
the following items is selected, considering wind characteristics and costs as well as their
combination effects and trade-off:
- Rotor Axis: there are two options for wind turbine rotor axis; vertical and horizontal. 13
- Number of Rotor Blades: Wind turbine rotor can be designed with one, two, or three
blades.
- Rotor Orientation: Rotor orientation has two options; upwind or downwind. Rotors of
upwind machines face wind and must have a yaw mechanism to do so.
- Rotor Power Regulation: Rotor power regulation systems limit and condition the rotor
output power at high wind speeds aerodynamically in order to avoid very high drive train
powers and torques. Without the control, these occasional high powers dominate the
design and drive up the costs of turbine. Rotor power can be controlled by: blade pitch
regulation, stall regulation, and active stall regulation.
- Rotational Speed: Wind turbines can be operated at fixed speeds or at variable speeds.
The options are predominated by the electrical power generation system. While larger
turbines with longer blades rotate slowly, small turbines with shorter blades have quicker
rotations.
- Rotor Blade Materials: Blade materials can change rotor weight and rotor cost
significantly.14 Lighter and more flexible blades materials reduce blade loads, avoid strain,
and reduce rotor weight and cost. Current choices'5 include: glass-fiber reinforced plastic,
(GFRP); glass-fiber reinforced epoxy (GFRE); carbon-fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP); and
wood epoxy.
- Rotor Blade Profile/Configuration: A typical structural architecture of wind turbine
blades has spar cap that is a relatively thick laminate with primarily unidirectional fibers to
carry the flap-wise bending loads. However, proportional relationships vary greatly and
the number of design options available for blade profile is countless.
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2003; Redlinger, Dannemand Andersen, and Morthorst
2002)
Transmission System -Drivetrain, Gearbox, and Rotor Braking
Mechanical power generated by the rotor blades is transmitted to a generator through the rotor
hub and by a transmission system placed in nacelle. The major components of transmission
system are a gearbox, sometimes a clutch, and a braking system, and they are fixed inside nacelle
that is mounted on the tower and can rotate or yaw according to wind direction.
The arrangement of shaft, gearbox, and generator, and other components of transmission and
electrical systems within the nacelle is called mechanical drivetrain. Many different drivetrain
layouts are developed by different manufacturers. The basic concept is divided into two:
13 The descriptions of technology in this research are about horizontal-axis upwind turbines, unless otherwise noted.
14 Material parameters that influence these two factors are the specific strength (defined as the ratio of admissible
tensile strength and density) and the specific manufacturing costs (the cost per kg of materials used). The weight of
the rotor blade is inversely proportional to the specific strength, while the cost will be proportional to the quotient of
the specific manufacturing cost factor and the specific strength (Harrison, Hau, and Snel. 2000).
IS Wood, aluminum, steel have been used in the past. However, they all have problems as blade materials for
medium- and large-sized wind turbines in terms of strength and cost, and no longer materials of choice.
- Geared Drivetrain: a gearbox is used to increase the speed of rotor from typically 20 to 50
revolutions per minute (rpm) to 1000 to 1500 rpm that is required for driving most types of
generators.
- Direct (Gearless) Drivetrain: low speed generators are coupled directly to the rotor shaft,
avoiding the need of a gearbox.
Mechanical barking system is fitted to the main transmission shaft in order to bring the rotor to
rest in emergency and when not in operation. Fail safe mechanisms 16 are critical for safe
operation of wind turbine. Aerodynamic braking systems are used as the primary braking system
by all modem turbines, and mechanical brake systems are usually employed as the secondary
system (Gipe 1995; Walker and Jenkins 1997).
Electrical Power Generation System - Generator
A generator is a coil of wire spinning in a magnetic field and converts the torque of spinning
rotor into electricity. Generator of wind turbine converts mechanical power of the rotor
transmitted by the transmission system into electrical power and transfers this to the power grid.
Non-rotating parts of generator are called the stator; the stator consists of a three-part winding on
a laminated iron core, which produces a magnetic field rotating at a constant speed. The moving
parts of generator are called the rotor. Wind turbines use two main classes of generators,
induction and synchronous, and their differences come from the rotors while their stators are
quite similar:
- Induction Generators: In induction generators, the rotor is not connected electrically.
However, once placed in the middle of the stator, the rotor currents are induced by the
relative motion of the rotor against the rotating magnetic field produced by the stator.
Induction generators operate at a slightly higher frequency than the grid frequency, and the
speed difference between the rotor and the rotating field created by the stator induces the
rotor currents. They need to be connected to the power grid because starting them requires
the stator to be magnetized from the grid at the grid frequency. Two types of induction
generators have been used in wind turbines.
o Squirrel Cage Induction Generator (SCIG): This type of induction generators uses
so-called a squirrel cage rotor, which consists of aluminum ring at each end of the
armature with a number of copper or aluminum bars connecting the rings running the
length of the rotor.
o Wound Rotor Induction Generator (WRIG): An alternate design is to use a wound
rotor, which is used for variable speed operation. Wound rotor has the same number of
poles as the stator and the windings are made of wire, connected to slip rings on the
shaft. The slip rings are connected by carbon brushes to an external controller such as a
variable resistor that allows changing the motor's slip rate. Wound rotors are more
expensive than squirrel cage rotors and require maintenance of slip rings and brushes.
16 Regulations of many countries require redundancy in the form of two independent systems.
- Synchronous Generators: In synchronous generators, the rotor has a so-called field
winding. As direct current (DC) passes the rotor field winding, it magnetized the rotor and
creates a constant magnetic field that locks into the stator rotating field and always rotates
at a constant speed in synchronous with the stator field and the grid frequency. In other
words, synchronous generators operate at exactly the same frequency with the power grid
they are connected. Synchronous generators are connected to the grid indirectly through
electronic device that adjust the rotor current to match the grid current. The sources of
magnetic field determine the sub-categories of synchronous generators.
o Wound Rotor Synchronous Generator (WRSG): This type of synchronous
generators uses electromagnets (poles) in the coil winding of wound rotor to create
magnetic field. The rotor electromagnetic poles are fed by DC, which is fed by slip
rings or other means on the rotor. Turbines convert alternate current (AC) of the power
grid to DC before feeding it to the poles.
o Permanent Magnet Synchronous Generator (PMSG): This type of generators does
do not require to be connected to the grid because they have a small permanent exciter
connected to the rotor that produces the magnetic field for the stator.
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2003; Walker and Jenkins 1997)
Yaw System
Wind direction must be perpendicular to the swept rotor area during normal operation of
turbines. A yaw system turns the nacelle of a horizontal-axis wind turbine to the actual wind
direction, using a rotary actuator engaging on a gear ring at the top of the tower. A wind vane
senses the relative wind direction and the wind turbine controller operates the yaw drives, which
are controlled by a closed loop control system. Almost all horizontal axis turbines use active
yawing, which is activated by an electronic controller that has a sensor to monitor wind direction
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2003; Walker and Jenkins 1997).
Tower
Tower elevates the main components of wind turbine up into the air; it supports them and needs
to withstand both gravity loads and wind loads. At minimum, tower of horizontal axis turbine
needs to be high enough to keep the blade tip from touching the ground, but tower height is
usually set much higher than the minimum because wind is usually stronger and less turbulent as
elevation increases. The height is commonly one to one-and-a half the rotor diameter and it
needs to be decided based on economic trade-off of increased energy capture and increased cost
of materials, construction, and maintenance. Tower must be designed so that either its resonant
frequencies do not coincide with induced frequencies for the rotor or they can be damped out.
The choices of construction materials of towers are limited to steel and concrete in practical
terms. Steel is more common. Concrete tower is much heavier than steel tower. In terms of
design, either lattice or tubular or cylindrical design is used. Lattice tower requires much less
material and foundation costs than tubular towers, and more common in earlier machines.
Tubular towers allow access from inside the tower to the nacelle during bad weather conditions
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2003; Walker and Jenkins 1997).
Control and Monitoring System
A control system is required for contemporary wind turbine to monitor various parameters to
ensure automatic and safe operation and protection of the turbine, control turbine behaviors, and
enable communication between turbines and the operator. Electronic wind turbine controllers
are used to control a large number of switches, hydraulic pumps, valves, and motors within the
turbines. The main functions of the control system are as follows:
- Supervisory Controllers of Individual Turbine: Supervisory controllers perform
functions such as sequencing control for start-up and shutdown, monitoring of wind and
faults conditions, and providing inputs to the turbine dynamic controllers.
o Monitoring Controller: Monitoring controller monitors or sets parameter values for the
following items:
" Checking rotational speeds of rotor/generators, and its voltage and current;
e Registering lightening strikes and their charges; and
e Measuring outside air temperature, oil temperature in the gearbox, temperatures in
the electronic cabinets/of the generator windings/in the gearbox bearings,
hydraulic pressure, pitch angle of each rotor blade, yaw angle, the number of
power cable twists, wind direction, wind speed from the anemometer, size and
frequency of vibrations in the nacelle and the rotor blades, thickness of the brake
linings, and whether the tower door is open or closed (Danish Wind Industry
Association 2003).
o Power Quality Controller: This type of controller looks after power quality of the
current generated by the turbine to ensure not to degrade power quality of local utility
system:
" Soft-start Grid Connection: a power semiconductor ensures gradual connection
and disconnection of turbines to the grid to prevent sudden power surge from
them to the grid; and
" Reactive Power Control: A processor calculates the stability of grid frequency
and active and reactive power of the turbine, and orders a dynamic component
controller to switch on or off electrical capacitors to adjust reactive power
(consumption of power from the grid to create a magnetic field inside induction
generator at low loading stage) if necessary.
- Dynamic Component Controllers within Each Turbine: These controllers make
continuous adjustment to turbine actuators and components according to the input provided
by the supervisory controller. One dynamic controller manages only one specific system.
Separate dynamic controllers perform functions such as slow closed-loop control of the
yaw system, and fast closed-loop control of pitch mechanism for pitch regulated turbines.
- Wind Farm Controller: It coordinates and controls all turbines within a farm and
communicates with the supervisory controllers of each turbine.
- Communication Controllers: They enable communication between turbines and their
owner and/or operator outside, e.g., sending requests of services, through telephone or
radio link. A PC unit in one turbine is used to communicate the rest of the turbines in a
wind farm, and fiber optics communication units are usually used for internal
communication between the controllers within a turbine.
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2003; McGowan and Connors 2000; Walker and Jenkins
1997)
Foundation
For onshore applications of wind turbines, the foundation is typically made of concrete poured
into the ground and supports the tower that is bolted to it. The offshore wind turbines require
specially engineered foundations according to economic and environmental requirements. The
options are still developing, including: mono-piles, multi-piles (tripod), concrete gravity base,
steel gravity base, mono-suction caisson, multiple suction caisson, and floating base (European
Wind Energy Association 2003).
Transformer
Transformer steppes up low level voltage electricity output from wind turbines to high voltage
electricity that fit to the grid level. A high voltage cable or overhead line feeds the transformed
electricity to the main power grid (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003).
Section 3.2: Basics of Wind Energy Value Chain
The concept of value chain and value system (Porter 1985) is used as one of the analytical tools
in this research. The research tries to expand the concept and modifies the original method to
analyze policy and regulations as well as evolutionary relationship between development of
technology and industry, utilizing the ability of value chain/system that easily captures the
complex nature of policy, technology, and industry, as each value activity in the chain/ system
embodies technology and knowledge that support the specific activity as well as the entire
technology system and industry.
The original value chain analysis of sources of cost and technological competitive advantages as
intended by Porter will be expanded to explain the evolutionary relationship between
technological characteristics and industry competitiveness management; the research follows
technological and managerial characteristics along value chain activities to reveal the evolution
of technology holders and geographical and strategic management decisions made by firms in
the industry, as value chain/system helps clarify different scientific and engineering disciplines
involved in development and management of technology. Also, the method will be used to
analyze various technology transfer decisions made by firms by illuminating the governance of
specific value chain activities and division of labor that are shifting within the value chain
(Memedovic 2004) and highlighting the nature and determinants of technological capabilities.
A new way of value chain analysis will be attempted for policy and regulation analysis; various
policy instruments will be categorized along value chain/system in order to make policy targets
and their resulting effects clear.
3.2.1 Functions of Wind Energy Project Value Chain
As all other industries, wind energy industry has specific value chain and system. Although
where the boundary of the industry can be debatable, this research uses a broad boundary that
includes sub-industries and activities of wind electricity generation and delivery. Figure 3-3
describes broad functions of wind energy project value chain in general.
Innovation - Research, Development and Demonstration
(RD&D)
Production - Manufacturing of Wind Power Generator System
Order Marketing and Salesl
Project Execution -Wind Power Generation Project
Development & Investment Planning
Project Execution - Wind Power Generation Project
Implementation and Commission
Project Execution - Wind Power Generation/Production
P- Wind Power Transmission & Distribution (T&D)
I Electricity Consumption I
Figure 3-3: Wind Energy Project Value Chain (Broad Functions)
3.2.2 Value Activities in Each Function
The following identifies different value activities performed in each function:
Innovation - Research, Development & Demonstration (RD&D):
o Pure basic research17
o Use-inspired basic research/purely applied research and development 8 for various
components and systems
o Product design and development
o Demonstration
17 Stokes (1997) created a quadrant model of scientific research for the analysis of R&D. He defines pure basic
research as basic research that is guided solely by the quest for understanding without thought of practical use, and
named this group Bohr's quadrant. See (Stokes, 1997).
18 On the other hand, use-inspired basic research as basic research seeks to extend the frontiers of understanding but
is also inspired by consideration of use, and purely applied research and development is defined as research that is
guided solely by applied goals without seeking a more general understanding of the phenomena of a scientific field.
The former is named as Pasteur's quadrant and the latter Edison's quadrant by Stokes (1997).
- Production - Manufacturing of Wind Power Generation System (Wind Turbine):
o Manufacturing of components:
e rotor blades (materials science, aerodynamics, structural engineering)
* nacelle (mechanical engineering, structural engineering)
* drivetrain/gear/transmission (mechanical engineering)
e generator (electrical engineering)
" tower (materials science, structural engineering)
e electronics control system (electronics, computer science and engineering)
e software for power control/simulation/wind data analysis/grid management
(computer science and engineering)
o Assembly of the above components
- Marketing and Sales:
- Project Execution - Wind Power Generation Project Development & Investment
Planning:
o Pre-development (site selection):
* data gathering (ownership and land lease agreement, search for potential
investors, available policy incentives, geographical conditions, ground conditions,
wind conditions, grid accessibility, infrastructure accessibility, opinions of
planning authority and surrounding communities, commercially available turbine
models)
o Technical and economic risk analysis:
" data analysis and evaluation
" turbine selection and micrositing
e project economic analysis (cost estimates, financial planning and analysis, and
confirmation of economic viability)
e legal check
o Planning and project permission:
" grid connection, infrastructure and cabling planning and confirmation
" preparation of environmental impact report and other export reports
* confirmation of power purchase agreement and delivery
* specifications for tenders
* contract with investors and insurers
e application and attainment of planning permission
- Project Execution - Wind Power Generation Project Implementation and
Commission:
o Logistical coordination in turbine transportation
o Infrastructure building
o Civil works (ground works and foundations)
Turbine erection
Electrical works (grid connection)
- Project Execution - Electricity Generation:
Operation and maintenance
Repair services
Power control for T& D
- Electricity Transmission & Distribution (T&D):
o Grid load management
- Electricity Consumption
Section 3.3: Basics of Wind Energy Economics
3.3.1 Wind Energy Cost
Cost of electricity generated from wind and the economics of wind energy are the functions of
many factors. A wind project incurs the following three major costs.
- Wind Turbine Cost: cost of wind power generator equipment
- Installation Costs: costs for site preparation, foundations,
erection and commissioning, and other miscellaneous costs
planning and engineering, permission, and transport)
- O&M Costs: costs for regular operation/maintenance/repairs
management of wind farms
Cost of Electricity Generated
from a Wind Project
- Interests rate
- Wind project investment costs
- Average wind speed
- O&M costs
- Decommissioning costs
- Etc.
grid connection, turbine
(expenses for financing,
as well as insurance and
Wind Project Investment
Costs
- Installation costs
- Wind turbine costs
- Overhead costs
- Etc.
Figure 3-4: System Boundaries for Wind Energy Cost Economics
adapted from wind energy learning systems described
in (Junginger, Faaij, and Turkenburg 2005)
Figure 3-4 shows system boundaries of wind energy technology cost economics. Wind turbine
costs are a subsystem of wind project investment costs, which are a subsystem of costs of
electricity generated from a wind project.
3.3.2 Revenue from Electricity generated from a Wind Power Project
The following is typical revenue sources for private wind power projects:
- Feed-in Electricity Tariffs (Purchase Price of Electricity): the price paid by local
utility for wind power delivered to the grid and the most important revenue source for the
owner of the project.
- Capacity Credit: a certain amount per year paid to wind project owner as the project
contributes to peak demands of a power system and it postpones the need to install other
new generation capacities for the utility.
- Environmental Credit or Premium: an additional revenue source, sometimes given to
wind energy either by the governments or utilities for the use of renewable energy on top
of normal rates paid for electricity delivered to the grid.
The revenue can be reduced by:
- Utility Charges: charges posed by the utilities, e.g., charges for connection and
maintenance and reactive power charge in case that the turbines cannot compensate the
reactive power in accordance with the utility specification.
3.3.3 Project Finance and Investment Economics of Grid-connected
Wind Power Generation
Project Finance and Debt Finance
Many public infrastructure projects and typical wind power projects use project financing
method. Project finance is defined as an investment structure in which lenders look to cash
flows from a project as the source of funds to service their loans and provide the return on their
equity invested in the project. Lenders look to the assets of the project as the underlying security
(collateral) for the loan. Typical financing structure of project finance is a mixture of debt and
equity, but debt is the primary funding source. Equity commitments are used to attract debt. The
method requires high degree of commitment from project sponsors, who must subordinate to
lenders.
With project financing, it becomes easier for project owner or sponsor to finance the project with
loans. Debt financing can make the project more profitable. Although Net Present Value (NPV)
of the project remains the same, the investor puts less of his or her capital to the project and can
realize a higher Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Also, it requires less time period to make the
project profitable as the NPV of the project to turn positive in shorter time. Although the
investor is exposed to greater risks by taking debt, most of wind power projects are financed with
debt financing method.
Investment Economics
As any other power plant projects, a typical wind power project has three phases. Typical cash
flow (different expenses and revenues occur in each phase) is as follows:
- Pre-construction: expenses for feasibility studies, planning, permits, specifications, and
project development contract, e.g., contracts for input and output, fmancing;
- Construction: expenses for paying contractors and equipment providers, interest and
dividends in case of delay; and
- Post-construction: revenue from the output, expenses for paying O&M, debt service,
taxes, and depreciation
Typical system lifetime of wind power project is 20 years. As any other investment assessments,
a wind power plant uses discounted cash flow analysis, which discounts all costs and revenues in
the future to a fixed starting date (usually the beginning of the investment) to derive a single
present value of the project, using an interests rate or discount rate. Figure 3-5 illustrates a
typical wind project cash flow.
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Figure 3-5: Undiscounted and Discounted Net Cash Flow
for a typical Wind Power Project (1 MW, r = 7%)
Sensitivity Factors of Project Investment Mechanism
Various sensitivity factors governing wind project investment economics can be divided into
policy/institutional sensitivity factors and technology-related sensitivity factors.
Policy/Institutional Sensitivity Factors
The following sensitivity factors are related to policy and institutional settings.
- Revenue Sources: electricity tariffs, capacity credits, and environmental credits
-W
- Fiscal Measures: measures that influence costs and revenue such as:
o capital subsidies: reduced capital costs;
o tax credits: increases the revenue flow; and
o tax depreciation schedule: accelerated depreciation schedule that reduces costs
- Cost of Financing:
o discount or interests rate: influenced by general trend of interest rate, financing term
for the project, and risk perception
o project period: different from technical lifetime, but still longer is favorable
- Purchase Agreements: longer agreement, along with secure transmission and market
access, is favorable
Technology Related Sensitivity Factors
The following sensitivity factors are technology-related.
- Investment Costs: wind turbine cost and installation costs
- O&M Costs
- Amount of Electricity Generated and Sold: wind capture influenced by wind speed,
location, hub height, micro-siting of turbines, and turbine configuration in the project
- Technical System Lifetime: longer system lifetime is favorable
- Size Effects of Wind Project/Farm: larger projects are favorable as transaction costs and
O&M costs per unit can be spread and the efficiency of management increases due to
economies of scale
Chapter 4:
Wind Energy Sector before 1990
Chapter 3 presented the basic profiles of wind energy technology and economics. This chapter
examines the evolution of wind energy policy, market, industry, and technology before 1990 in
the three research countries.
This chapter consists of three parts. The first section describes wind energy sector development
in Denmark, Germany and India in general before 1990. The second section presents technology
development during the 1970s and 1980s. The third section presents industry development
before 1990.
Section 4.1: Wind Energy Sector in Denmark, Germany and
India before 199019
Wind energy is an ancient technology, which has been utilized for more than 3,000 years. For
the most of its history, however, it was only used to provide mechanical power to pump water or
mill grains. It was Charles Bruch, one of the founders of the American electrical industry, who
developed the first automatically operating wind turbine for electricity generation during the
winter of 1887-88. His turbine was 17m high and had a 12kW generator and 144 cedar-wood
rotor blades. In 1891, a Dane named Poul la Cour discovered that fast-rotating wind turbines
with a few rotor blades are more efficient for electricity generation than slow-moving wind
turbines (Ackermann and Sober 2000; Danish Wind Industry Association 2003). The Danish
engineers continuously improved the technology during World War I and II to overcome energy
shortage. After World War II, however, the interests in large-scale electricity generation by
wind declined despite the innovative designs by another Dane Johannes Juul in the 1950s and a
German Ulrich Htitter in the early 1960s, because fossil-fuel fired electricity generation
technologies could provide more consistent power than intermittent wind energy resources did.
This situation began to change rapidly in the early 1970s.
4.1.1 The Energy Crisis, Opposition against Nuclear Power, and
Environmental Concerns
It was the first Energy Crisis of 1973 that reinitiated the interests in wind energy as large-scale
electricity generation resource; the government supports for wind energy technology became
available in many countries. During the 1980s several national and international studies evoked
the attentions to rapidly changing global climate for the first time. Local and regional
environmental problems caused by conventional energy sources were mounting throughout all
these years too. In some European countries, concerns over further nuclear energy development
were growing as well, even before the 1986 nuclear reactor accident in Chernobyl. They all
together pushed public opinions further toward renewable energy development.
19 This section only follows historical development of government supports and market development during the
1970s and 1980s. More detailed description of the government supports will be provided in Section 5.2.
Most of the supports during the 1970s and 1980s were oriented toward technology development
through government sponsored R&D programs. Germany, Sweden, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were among those which tried to develop large MW-class wind
turbines. However, the most significant commercial technology development during the 1970s
and 1980s emerged not from any of these countries but from Denmark.
4.1.2 Denmark
Denmark experienced a massive wave of industrialization from the end of the 1950s, particularly
in construction, chemical, electronics and pharmaceutical industries as well as oil refineries and
power stations. Besides local pollution problems caused by the rapid industrialization, energy
was a big concern during the 1970s; electricity in Denmark was mainly generated by oil
throughout this industrialization period, and the first oil shock of 1973 hit the country very hard
as it did other industrialized countries. While the Danish power sector successfully reduced its
oil consumption by 40% within two years of the first crisis by switching fuel to coal, it also
explicitly expressed a strong desire to increase nuclear power generation in the future. This
generated intense public debates regarding nuclear power generation.
Government Programs during the 1970s and 1980s
The government responded to the public debates for and against nuclear power generation by
creating two scenarios for long-term future: one with nuclear power generation and the other for
alternative energy future without nuclear. Ideas to push renewable energy, including wind
energy, were developed under these circumstances: the environmental concerns on one hand and
the reaction to nuclear power generation on the other. A comprehensive energy plan called the
Alternative Energy Plan of 76 was published in 1976 with the main objectives to make Denmark
less dependent on foreign oil.
The 1976 plan had several different support mechanisms for wind energy. The R&DD supports
for large wind turbine development and demonstration started in 1976. In 1978, Wind Energy
Department was created at the RISO National Laboratory. The capital subsidy incentive was
introduced to provide 30% of investment costs of wind turbine in 1979 and lasted until 1989.
The wind turbine type approval scheme to issue a safety certification also began in 1979 to
provide eligibility for the government capital subsidy and to protect buyers of wind turbines with
strict safety regulations including the requirements for dual breaking systems.
During the late 1980s environmental concerns began increasing its importance again with the
surge of regional acid rain controversy and global issues of sustainable development. The
Danish energy policy began taking a very tight coupling with environmental policy, and taxes
began gaining its importance in environmental policy. Electricity taxes on power generated by
fossil fuel were introduced first in spring of 1986 for non-business sectors. Taxes on emissions
from SO2 and NOx were adopted in March 1989.
Grassroots Activities and Wind Cooperatives (Wind Guilds)
Strong grassroots activities and wind cooperatives (cooperative private owners of windmills,
developed based on the concept of agricultural cooperatives) have played significant roles in the
Danish wind development.
In 1975 it was not utilities or government researchers but a former carpenter Christian Riisager
who succeeded in connecting a wind turbine to the utility power grid for the first time, although
it was done without any utility permission. The success of the Riisager turbine connection to the
grid triggered many business interests in wind. While he continued to build additional 50
turbines with 30kW capacity between 1976 and 1978 (Van Est 1999), the Organization for
Renewable Energy established in 1975 began supplementing the formal government R&D
programs with grassroots activities, which enabled many amateurs and professionals to meet
each other and discuss ideas and experiences in construction of wind turbines. A network of
Energy Offices was also set up, in order to disseminate the information and advice about how to
use renewable energy systems across the country.
The growing interests in wind energy created a necessity of setting up the rules for grid
connection, and this led to the Association of Danish Electric Utilities to publish its provisional
guidelines and recommendation to buy surplus electricity production for the costs avoided by
utilities in August 1976. However, the utilities did not pay wind turbine owners for the
electricity they delivered to the grid, and this led to the establishment of the Danish Wind
Turbine Owners Association (DWTOA) and the Danish Wind Turbine Manufacturers
Association (DWTMA) in 1978; they worked together to bring this issue to political arena. By
the end of 1979, the Ministry of Environment ordered the utilities to connect system-approved
wind turbines to their grid and to pay fair rates for electricity fed into the grid in addition to 30%
of grid connection costs. The Association of Danish Electric Utilities published new rules and
accepted private projects by both individuals and cooperatively-owned wind turbines, but not the
30% grid connection cost payment.
Local Ownership Regulations and the First 100MW Agreement
The conflicts between the utilities and the wind energy supporters continued throughout the
1980s. Although the utilities accepted the grid connection term of wind turbines by the 1979
rules, they perceived private owners as self-suppliers and began forcing wind cooperatives to
adjust their electricity production to their joint consumption. This resulted in the establishment
of the so-called 3km rule, which required the member owners of cooperatives to live within 3km
of the site. In 1984, this first ownership rule was modified after the five years of negotiations
between DWTOA and the utilities; the utilities finally agreed: 1) to pay 35% of grid connection
costs; 2) to replace the 3km rule with the demand that wind turbines should be sited within the
supply area of the utility company that serves the turbine owners; 3) to place no limitation on
maximum installed capacity; and 4) to purchase all surplus power from cooperative wind
turbines at a rate of 85% of consumer price.
During the domestic market boom during 1984 and 1985, however, wind investments became
profitable for institutions and local municipalities as well. The utilities complained this
threatened the planning of electricity system, and negotiated with the government without
involving DWTOA and DWTMA. In 1985, the negotiations resulted in another modification of
the ownership rules, which required the owners to live within 10km of the project site and to
limit the share of any individual owner to less than 6,OOOkWh per year or 135% of the person's
electricity consumption. In return, however, the Ministry of Energy forced two utility companies
Elsam and Elkraft to install 55MW and 45MW of wind power capacity, respectively, between
1986 and 1990, in order to secure a stable domestic market (the first 100MW agreement).
Califomia Boom and Export
In November 1978 the United States Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA), which aimed at decreasing the dependence on foreign oil by increasing domestic
energy conservation and efficiency. By 1980 PURPA created a huge wind energy boom,
especially in California, where both the federal and state energy and investment tax credits for
renewable energy accumulated close to 50%. This California boom had tremendous impacts on
the Danish wind turbine technology and industry development.
In the early 1980s the Danish wind turbine industry was searching for ways to increase its
turnover. Their eyes were caught by the growing market in California. The export immediately
took off with the delivery of some 40 wind turbines by the end of 1982. Between 1984 and
1987, the Danish wind turbine exports to oversea exceeded the delivery to the domestic market
(Table 4-1). Most of them went to California. The Danish models were popular, simply because
they were more reliable than the American counterparts. About 1,600 turbines were sold in
California in 1984, and the profit rate in the United States was twice as much as that in Denmark.
The peak came in 1985, when the export of almost 3,500 wind turbines created an export value
of more than DKK two billion (Van Est 1999).
However, this boom did not last long. At the end of 1985 the California tax credits were expired.
Around the same time, oil prices in the United States plummeted and the competitiveness of
wind energy was diminished. The California market crashed. Although the US demand was not
completely wiped out, the number of exported turbines from Denmark was reduced by almost a
half and the dollar exchange rate also fell. Seven turbine manufacturers filed bankruptcy
between 1986 and 1989 as a result. One of the lessons of this crash was the importance of
diversification of market, which led to the market expansion of the Danish manufacturers to
other countries from the 1990s.
Table 4-1: Danish Manufacturer Sales in MW 1983-1989
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Domestic Market 20.6 7.2 23.1 31.7 33.0 82.0 65.7
Oversea Market 20.0 110.0 220.0 180.0 55.0 20.0 70.0
Total 40.6 117.2 243.1 211.7 88.0 102.0 135.7
The statistics do not include component kits with a value below 1/3 of the value of a complete
wind turbine.
Source: (Danish Wind Industry Association 2006)
Export Support
Although there were no direct export policy, Denmark initiated several schemes that resulted in
supporting the export of Danish turbines during the mid 1980s. One was a policy that the Danish
investors in the US wind projects could receive tax benefits, which the Danish government
started in 1986 and lasted until 1989. A Danish firm TIFCO helped the tax arrangement for the
Danish investors. This policy contributed to the continuous export to the United States after the
California market crash. Around the same time, the Wind Turbine Guarantee Company was set
up to guarantee long-term financing of large export projects (Madsen 2005; Van Est 1999). In
addition, the Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) began supporting wind
demonstration projects in developing countries, resulting in the export of Danish products and
technologies to those countries.
Danish Market and Export during the 1980s
With several strong demand-pull government incentives and the grassroots support for wind
energy development, Denmark successfully established the wind market early on. At the same
time, the California boom created strong export demand that helped the Danish industry expand.
Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1 show that annually installed capacity within the country match
domestic sales by the Danish manufacturers; the domestic manufacturers had 100% of domestic
market share and this has never changed until this day.
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Figure 4-1: Wind Energy Installed Capacity in Denmark in MW 1983-1989
4.1.3 Germany
The first Energy Crises of 1973 led to refocus on renewable energy in Germany, as it did in
Denmark and many other countries. At first, the country emphasized on hard coal and nuclear
development to avoid the dependence on foreign oil. However, nuclear power became rapidly
controversial with the public by the end of the decade, as the similar situation happened in
Denmark. In 1981, the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) commissioned a
five-year study about the energy future of the country, which was published in 1986, around the
Chernobyl accident. The conclusion was that the only choice that would be compatible with the
basic value of a free society was renewables and energy efficiency (Meyer-Abich and Schefold,
1986, cited in Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).
Federal Program for Energy Research and Development
The Federal R&D program for renewable energy started in 1974. As for wind energy, a large
amount of spending went to development of large MW-class turbines. The most notable project
was the Growian project.2 0 At the same time, the German R&D funding was large enough to
fund most projects applied for: about 46 R&D projects and as many as 19 industrial firms and a
range of academic organizations were granted the funding for testing or development of small- to
medium-capacity turbines between 1977 and 1991 (Windheim, 2000b, cited in Johnson and
Jacobsson 2000).
Demonstration Programs and Development of Small Market
During the 1980s the R&D program began including demonstration projects, which were
subsidized by several programs (Hemmelskamp, 1998, cited in Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). At
least 14 German turbine manufacturers received the funding for demonstration of 124 turbines2 1
between 1983 and 1991 (Windheim, 2000, cited in Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). These
government-led demonstration programs created small but very important domestic market in
Germany during the 1980s. Despite the niche market created by environmentally concerned
farmers and green demands from some utilities, however, total installed capacity in Germany by
the end of 1989 was just under 20MW (Schult and Barger, 2000, Tacke, 2000, Reeker, 1999,
Durstewitz, 2000, all cited in Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).
Table 4-2: German Market between 1982 and 1989 (capacity in MW)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
# of New Turbines 1 1 4 12 15 44 61 87
Accumulated # of Turbines 1 2 6 18 33 77 138 225
Newly Installed Capacity 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.24 0.52 1.94 4.99 11.8
Accumulated Installed Capacity 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.42 0.94 2.88 7.87 19.67
Source: (Durstewitz, 2000, cited in Johnson and Jacobsson 2000)
20 See the description under German Attempts in the part 4.1.5.
21 Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) notes Hemmelskamp (1998) mentioned the number was 214 turbines.
4.1.4 India
India also began taking renewable energy seriously during the 1970s. The Ministry of
Agricultural and Rural Development began administering biogas and cook stove programs, while
the Department of Science and Technology started overseeing implementation of solar and wind
programs.
Department of Non-conventional Energy Sources (DNES)
More focused and intensive programs on renewable energy started with the formation of the
Department of Non-conventional Energy Sources (DNES) in 1982, which concentrated on
coordination, development and promotion of a wide range of renewable energy programs and
technologies.2 For wind energy sector, the main focus of DNES was the development of large-
scale government-own demonstration projects and the wind resource assessment program.
Demonstration Project and International Collaborations
The program for wind farm demonstration started in 1985 by DNES. In 1982, a separate
provision and a technical committee were created for wind energy R&D within DNES.
However, in order to start large-scale demonstration projects, DNES needed helps from foreign
technology providers. The limited liberalization in industrial policy happened during the
1980s, 23 which began allowing the import of state-of-art foreign technology that was not
available indigenously, helped technology collaborations from abroad.
In December 1986 DNES requested DANIDA to help DNES, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board
(TNEB) and the Gujarat Energy Development Agency (GEDA) to develop three demonstration
wind farms with total capacity of 20MW. The purpose of the collaboration was to build up the
capacity of utilities to integrate wind power projects into their grid system. One year later, after
DANIDA created the appraisal for the projects, the Danish assistance retained an experienced
Danish wind energy consulting firm (T. Bak-Jensen/PA Consulting Group) to plan, design, and
oversee the implementation of three wind farms and contracted with two well-established Danish
wind turbine manufacturers (Micon and Vestas) to supply and install wind turbines. All three
Danish firms were required to work closely with local partners to develop indigenous technical
capability and share responsibilities. While all turbine components and 90% of towers were
imported from Denmark and the Indian partners assembled them on site, the Danish firms not
only instructed construction and replacement of wind turbines and central monitoring systems
but also offered training in planning, implementation, operation, and maintenance. The
22 DNES was then located within the Ministry of Energy, and was hierarchically organized by specific technology.
Every division looked after one technology such as solar PV, wind, or improved cook stoves, which were promoted
through design and development support and through the establishment of large-scale demonstration programs.
23 Before 1991, the Indian business was heavily regulated, and the industrial licensing, the complex import licensing
procedures, and the high tariffs severely restricted foreign investment and created inefficiencies in many sectors.
India suffered from a lack of technological progress, the excessive governmental spending on largely inefficient
public companies and the extreme bureaucratic control. Prompted by this situation, the Government of India (GOI)
began a liberalization process during the 1980s to attract foreign equity capital, however, on the very limited bases.
The government considered foreign investments on a case-by-case basis and placed a ceiling of 40% of total equity
investment on the amount of control that a foreign interest could have in a project. Imported technology was
allowed only if it was state-of-art and not available indigenously (Bath, 1998).
reminders of towers were manufactured in India (Kozloff 1995). This collaboration eventually
produced two joint venture firms in India, NEPC-Micon and Vestas RRB in 1987.
Meanwhile, DNES also began exploring a possibility to develop fully indigenous wind turbines;
it assigned the state-own enterprise, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) for the R&D project.
This project successfully produced 20kW and 50kW models, which had reasonably good
domestic market in demonstration projects. By 1992 the BHEL R&D division developed 200kW
models (BHEL 2002).
These early demonstration projects by the governments were the only market available in India
throughout the 1980s. However, they prompted building the initial manufacturing base with help
from foreign technology collaborators and supported the governments and the infant industry to
understand important technical and project execution issues (TERI 2001).
National Wind Resource Assessment Program
Another important programs initiated by DNES during the 1980s was the National Wind
Resource Assessment Program started in 1983. The network of meteorological laboratories
gathered information and analyzed data on wind availability. The first Wind Energy Data book
was published in 1983 (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002).
Section 4.2: Technology Development before 1990
Wind energy technology development during the 1970s and 1980s took two very different paths:
one was radical innovation approach taken by many developed countries to build large-capacity
turbines under massive government R&D programs; and the other was incremental innovation
approach taken by the Danes with their grassroots and craftsmanship tradition that gradually
upgraded small-capacity turbine technologies.
4.2.1. Large Turbine Development under Government R&D Programs
The majority of the government supports for wind energy started after the first Energy Crisis of
1973 was financial supports for R&D. Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and Sweden, Canada, and the United States took this approach, aiming to develop
MW-class wind turbines. In Germany and the United States alone, between 1975 and 1988, total
R&D expenditure for wind reached USD 103.3 million and USD 427.4 million, respectively
(Heymann 1998). At the end, however, all the prototype turbines developed under these
government R&D programs did not perform well, became extremely expensive, and hence did
not succeed commercially.
24 This data served as preliminary date source of the early initiatives in India during the Seventh Five Year Plan
(1985-1990). See (MNES. 1997a).
United States Modification (MOD) Program
In the United States, the development of MW-class turbines was managed by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and coordinated by the NASA Lewis Research
Center, which hired subcontractors, mainly large companies in the aerospace industry such as
Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, Grumman Aerospace, General Electric (GE) Space
Division, Kaman, and Westinghouse. During the mid 1970s, those subcontractors started to
develop large-capacity turbines under the NASA modification (MOD) program.
MOD supported the development of five turbines: MOD-0 (100kW, field test 1975-78, 450
operations hours), MOD-GA (200kW, field test 1977-82, 13,045 operation hours), MOD-1
(2MW, field test 1979-83), MOD-2 (2.5MW, field test 1982-88, 8,658 operation hours), and
MOD-5B (3.2MW, field test 1987-92, 20,561 operation hours). Despite the intensive efforts of
the top aerospace companies, all of them failed with severe problems and short operation hours.
Although MOD-5B lasted more than 20,000 hours of operation, it was shut down due to chronic
malfunction and poor economic performance (Gipe 1995; Heymann 1998). The US R&D
program during the 1970s and 1980s produced no commercial outcome of large-capacity
turbines.
German Attempts
The German R&D program also focused on the development of large-capacity turbines. The
program was mainly shaped by Ulrich HUtter who successfully developed two-bladed 100kW
turbine in the early 1960s. BMFT sponsored the construction of the world largest wind turbine,
Growian, which had 3MW capacity with 100m rotor diameter and 100m tower height. Although
the construction took four years from 1979 to 1983, the turbine failed with severe fatigue
problems, faulty bearing and brakes, and frost damage from the beginning. After only 420 hours
of operation in four years, it was dismantled in 1988 (Heymann 1998).
The second German project was to build one-bladed 10MW Growian II turbine through the
funding from the European Community and BMFT. After an aviation and aircraft company
Messerschmidt-B6lkow-Blohm (MBB) spent more than ten years for the development, the firm
could only develop economically unprofitable 640kW models, production of which was stopped
in the early 1990s. A machinery company Voith also developed a 270kW model, which also
failed with severe stability problems. The German R&D program too left very little commercial
impact, and the major German companies in the government-sponsored R&D program left wind
turbine development business by the early 1990s (Heymann 1998).
Danish Wind Power Program
The first large-scale wind power R&D program by the Danish government was the restoration of
the Gedser turbine built by Johannes Juul in 1956 and put it into test operation from 1977 to
1979. With the Gedser's positive test operation results, a Danish utility Elsam constructed two
630kW turbines, one with stall regulation and another with pitch regulation in order to compare
one with the other. These so-called Nibe twins were three-bladed, upwind turbines with 40m
rotor diameter. Nibe B with pitch regulation outperformed Nibe A with stall regulation in more
than 18,000-hour test operation by the fall of 1988. However, both the turbines never performed
better than much smaller commercially manufactured turbines throughout their operation period.
During the 1980s the Danish wind R&D program continued to develop large-capacity turbines.
Although the Danish attempts aimed much smaller-capacity turbines compared to the US and
German programs, they also suffer numerous malfunctions and did not produce commercially
successful turbines at the end.
4.2.2 Danish Innovations and Successful Commercialization
While all the government-sponsored R&D programs took strong top-down, radical approaches
for development of wind turbines, the Danes were simultaneously taking another very different
approach. The most successful Danish innovations and commercialization happened
independent of the government program; the Danish grassroots tradition and craftsman approach
were the driving force behind the successfully technology development and commercialization,
whichcurrent wind turbines are based on.
Danish Classical Concept
While many wind turbines design concepts developed under the government-sponsored R&D
programs in various countries failed, Danish designers succeeded to develop commercially
viable turbines by combining certain types of components and design concepts, which is called
the "Danish Classical Concept." The name is applied to wind turbines with the following
technical features:
- three-bladed upwind rotor;
stall power control regulation;
- constant (fixed) rotor speed;
- induction AC generator, coupled directly to the grid; and
- two independent, fail-safe brake systems
The 200kW turbine developed by Johannes Juul in 1956 in Gedser was the first wind turbine to
combine three of the Danish concept (three-bladed upwind rotor, induction AC generator with
direct grid connection, and stall regulation) (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003).
Electromechanical yawing was also first used in this turbine. Between 1956 and 1967 the
Gedser turbine generated about 2.2 million kWh of electricity (Ackermann and Sober 2000) and
became the model of present wind turbines.
During the 1970s Danish technicians began incorporating many other engineering methods and
components used in later commercial turbines. Smaller versions of the Gedser turbines, rated
from 5kW to 11kW developed by amateur technicians, began using hydraulics for transmission
systems. The 1975 Riisager turbine with 22kW capacity, which was also based on the Gedser
model, used glassfiber blade. The HVK turbine developed in 1979 incorporated the blades with
cantilever glassfiber arms reinforced with revolving tip brakes and galvanized steel towers that
replaced galvanized lattice tower (NEG Micon 2002). Thus, the Danes gradually developed
prototype technology of current wind turbines during the 1970s. By 1979, all principle Danish
wind turbine manufacturers were using the "Danish Classical Concept."
Turbine Upscaling
Although Danish designers also tested other concepts, they kept using the Classical Concept due
to its simplicity and reliability. Soon they began focusing on turbine upscaling in order to
increase energy capture and efficiency. The target of turbine upscaling was to develop larger and
more economically efficient turbines due to decreasing number of sites with good wind resources
in California and a pursuit of economies of scale in installation and O&M costs in general (Van
Est 1999).
The largest capacity of commercialized Danish turbines was around 20-30kW in the late 1970s.
This, however, quickly changed. In 1978 55kW turbines was developed by Vestas (Vestas
V16/15-55kW) and Windmatic (VVM715-S). They were the new generation of wind turbines,
and other Danish manufacturers such as Bonus, Micon, and Nordtank, also promptly
commercialized 55kW-class turbines. Series productions of these 55kW turbines started in 1980
and 1981. Together with the development of the European Wind Atlas Methods by the RISO
National Laboratory, they succeeded in reducing cost per kWh around 50% (Danish Wind
Industry Association 2003).
The Danish turbines were continuously upscaled during the 1980s; turbine rating increased from
55kW to 65kW, 75kW, 95kW, 100kW, 120kW, 150kW, 225kW, 250kW, 400kW, 450kW, to
500kW. The installation record in Denmark shows the following introduction of turbines: 65kW
turbines (Nordtank 85-208) in 1981; 75kW turbines (Vestas V17-75) in 1982; 90kW turbines
(Vestas V19-90) and 95kW turbines (Bonus 95kW) in 1984; 150kW turbines (Bonus 150kW) in
1985; 130kW turbines (Nordtank NTK-99/130, Vind-syssel VS-130) and 250kW turbines
(Micon M530-250/50) in 1986; 160kW turbines (Wind World W2320), 200kW turbines (Dencon
200/50, Vestas V25-200), 225kW turbines (Nordtank N27/250), and 250kW turbines (Micon
M250) in 1987; 300kW turbines (Nordtank NTK300) and 400kW turbines (Windane 34) in
1988; and 450kW turbines (Bonus 450kW) in 1989 (interpolated from Danish Energy Authority
2006). Table 4-3 shows that the average rating sold by the Danish manufacturers increased six-
fold between 1983 and 1989.
The Danish turbine upscaling was also evident in the US market. The Bonus installation record
shows that the firm began installing its 65kW turbines in 1982, 120kW turbines in 1985 and
150kW turbines in 1987 in the United States (Bonus Energy A/S 2004a).
The extent of turbine upscaling was greater during the late 1980s than during the early and mid
1980s, despite the collapse of the California market in 1986. The tax benefits to the Danish
investors to the US wind projects between 1986 and 1989 supported the Danish manufacturers to
push turbine upscaling for the US market to the level which had never been seen before (Madsen
2005). The upscaling demand also emerged in the home market. After the first 100MW
agreement was formed in 1985, the utilities demanded the manufacturers to develop larger and
more cost effective wind turbines to fulfill the agreement within five years.
Table 4-3: Average Turbine Size sold by Danish Manufacturers in kW
1983-1989
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Domestic Market 22 57 71 89 106 179 140
Oversea Market 56 70 63 95 121 143 246
Total 31 69 64 94 115 171 180
Source: (Danish Wind Industry Association 2006)
Major Danish Innovations and Commercialization
Electronics Main Processing Unit Controller
Main processing unit of wind turbine checks the power output of turbine and if it became too
high, the controller sends an order to pitch rotor blades slightly out of the wind. It is done by
electronics.
Electronics controller was already used in many industries in the 1980s. Using electronics to
control mechanical components, however, was a new idea. The Danish wind turbine
manufacturers were the first to use electronics for mechanical controlling purpose. Computer
chips and other necessary electronics components were readily available in Denmark, as the
country had all manufacturers of those components. By the mid to late 1980s, all the Danish
manufacturers were using micro-processor and integrated circuits for turbine control. It was very
high-tech technology at the time, but technology development was not driven by the wind
turbine industry which was just clever enough to use it for wind turbines. Vestas was the first
company to export the machines with main processing unit to the United States (Madsen 2005).
Drivetrain
Drivetrain also advanced during the 1980s. The Danish manufacturers developed a metal frame
or bed plat, to which they mounted the main shaft, transmission, generator and other
components, rather than integrating the drivetrain. The Danes chose modular drivetrain, instead
of integrated ones, in order to allow the components to be replaced readily without the removal
of rotor. Nacelle became enclosed during the 1980s in order to reduce noise too (Gipe 1995).
Turbine Safety and Reliability
During the 1970s and 1980s, the safety and reliability of wind turbines increased greatly. The
important contributing factors were the demands and requirements for dual breaking systems
made by DWTOA and by the safety regulations under the Danish type approval scheme. As a
result, aerodynamic methods became used to limit rotor speed when the brake failed (Gipe
1995).
SCADA (Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition) Technology
SCADA (Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition) system is a monitoring system that allows
a remote operator to log in and control wind turbines and wind farm with great precision.
SCADA is a Danish innovation; its development was forced by the Danish utilities who became
the buyers of wind turbines as a result of the 100MW agreement in 1985. In return to accept the
agreement, the utilities demanded the wind industry to develop wind turbines that can talk to
their grid system. As a result, the SCADA protocol was developed by the collaboration of all
industry players (Madsen 2005).
SCADA manages overall transmission of information between wind turbines and the grid
system. Parameters include: energy yield, faults, component temperatures, wind speeds and
directions, and detailed log of all maintenance tasks and spare parts. Each Danish manufacturer
has developed its own, unique SCADA system based on the protocol. However, the protocol
made all information exchangeable from one company's SCADA to another company's
SCADA. The system is used now worldwide and has greatly advanced since its innovation.
Wind Power Meteoroloqy - European Wind Atlas and WAsP (Wind Atlas Analysis and
Application Program) Model
Early on, the Danes also realized the importance of precise wind resource estimation data for
wind turbine siting and for increasing energy capture through more accurate estimation.
From 1976 the RISO National Laboratory began creating wind atlas of Denmark, then Europe.
The efforts resulted in the European Wind Atlas. In order to create the atlas, RISO developed a
topographical wind flow model called Wind Atlas Analysis and Application Program (WAsP) in
1987. WAsP is a model of wind flow over topography and roughness change. WAsP was used
for the Atlas development to remove local roughness and topographic effects from measurements
in order to make them representative of the broader background wind resource (Windlab
Systems 2005).
Project Execution Technology - WindPRO
Another important innovation by the Danes was the development of wind power project
execution software WindPRO, used for project design and planning of wind turbines and wind
farms. The first main frame tools for wind energy calculations and wind turbine construction
were developed in 1986. Since then, the software has been continuously updated and has been
used worldwide.
The development of WindPRO was rather accidental; it was not targeted to help the wind energy
industry originally. The project was initiated by the Danish Ministry of Communication, which
wanted to market communication resources. This was before the Internet era, and the Ministry
was the only organization in Denmark in the 1980s to permit communication rights. The
Ministry first formed several different industry groups and gathered consultants, utilities,
manufacturers and research institutions and universities, which can work on the communication
project. Within these groups, the wind energy sector was selected to test the communication
system project by coincident. The Ministry of Communication was running the project first, and
the period between 1980 and 1983 was the trial phase. After this period was over, the Ministry
found the project has been successful and wanted to continue. Per Nielsen was selected to
continue the project, as he had the knowledge in both wind power technology and data
communication skills at the same time. The project was classified as a university research
project for two years between 1984 and 1985. In 1986 an independent institution Energi-og-
Miljedata (EMD) was founded and the project became commercial, but it has received public
funding during the first years (Nielsen 2005).
25 A proposal was made during the year 1986 for the system. Then a three-year funding was granted for the
proposal in 1987 and became four-person projects. Since then, it has gradually converted into commercial activities
(Nielsen, 2005).
The first main frame tools for wind energy calculations and wind turbine construction developed
in 1986 included Basis, Atlas (wind atlas calculation), Park (wind farm energy calculation) and
Decibel (noise calculation). Noise calculation was important from the very beginning and the
module came even before the first noise regulation in 1991 in Denmark. These first modules
were closely followed by the incorporation of the WAsP module. In 1988, the Basis, Atlas,
Park, Decibel and WAsP became the DOS version for the first time (Nielsen 2005).
Other Commercial Technology Developments Incorporated into Danish
Turbines
There were many other important technological innovations during the 1970s and 1980s.
Although the following technologies were not necessary innovated first by the Danish designers
and engineers, they were successfully incorporated by the Danes into their commercial turbines.
Blade Materials - Composite and Fiberglass
During the early 1980s many issues concerning blade materials were investigated. On the course
of events, steel and aluminum were rejected as rotor blade material due to heavy self-weight and
uncertain fatigue endurance, respectively. As any blades made of a single material turned out to
be inadequate, "composite" became a key word for blade materials construction. Among several
materials choice, it was glass fiber reinforced plastic (GFRP) construction that became
commercially dominant during the 1980s. GFRP consists of glass fibers and polyester resin.
Although it was very labor intensive technology, GFRP is strong and relatively inexpensive and
suitable for variety of design and manufacturing processes while having good fatigue strength.
The material has originally evolved from boat building and became the industry standard as most
Danish turbines during the 1980s had become using it.
Full-span Pitch Regulation
Pitch regulation method captures energy more effectively than stall regulation does. Full-scale
pitch regulation uses the blades to regulate the power delivered by the rotor by pitching them to
reduce the lifting forces generated by blade aerofoil sections. Their pitch only varies after they
reach the rated power to dump the excess power.
The technology was first developed by US Windpower during the late 1970s, and used widely by
small American manufacturers during the 1980s. The first Danish pitch regulated turbines were
developed by Vestas for its V25 series in 1985. Pitch regulation was too expensive to justify the
cost for turbines less than 25m rotor diameter (Gipe 1995), and this also made more American
turbines used the technology in the beginning as they were larger than the Danish counterparts.
Dual Generators and Two Fixed-speed Operation
Generators often operate at partial loads, but the efficiency drops rapidly when generators are
operated at less than one-third of its rated power during periods of low winds (Gipe 1995). To
avoid this efficiency loss, dual generators were begun used to make wind turbines operate at two
fixed-speeds during the 1980s. Turbines with dual generators have one large main generator for
periods of high winds and one small generator (one-fifth to one-third that capacity of the main
generator) for periods of low winds. The use of dual generators allows turbines to operate at two
speeds and enable the rotor to be driven at a higher aerodynamic efficiency over a wide range of
wind speeds. In Denmark, the manufacturers, Bonus, Micon, and Nordtank, began using dual
generators during the mid 1980s.
Soft Start Electronics
In order to avoid sudden connection of wind turbines to the power grid that causes a large
voltage fluctuation, soft start method is necessary to connect turbines with induction generator to
the grid gradually (1/10 of a second). Soft start electronics was innovated in the beginning of the
1980s (Hjuler Jensen 2005). Thyristors was the earliest device and most commonly used. The
Danish manufacturers begin using soft start electronics in their commercial turbines during the
early 1980s.
4.2.3 Danish Success in Technology Development and Diffusion
As examined above, the Danes succeeded in innovating many commercially and technically
viable technologies that became the basis of the further development of wind energy technology
in the 1990s and beyond. Several reasons were pointed out for this Danish success.
Continuous Market Pressure for Technology Development
The most important reason was the continuous market demand that the industry had throughout
the 1980s. The Danish market was developed earlier than any other countries as a result of the
government investment subsidies introduced in 1979. This home market base made the Danish
manufacturers to produce a relatively large number of turbines from the beginning. The
investment subsides also required the manufacturers produce wind turbines good enough to pass
the turbine approval scheme.
In the early 1980s when the domestic demand decreased, the California boom started. The US
market was also constantly demanding larger and cost effective turbines. When the California
market crashed at the end of 1985, the domestic market gained the strength again. This time the
Danish utilities demanded turbine upscaling. The Wind Turbine Guarantee Company set up to
guarantee long-term financing of large export projects in the late 1980s also forced the
manufacturers to improve their turbines, because the financing required the turbines pass a new
and more demanding approval scheme (Hvidtfelt Nielsen 2001, cited in Kamp, Smits, and
Andriesse 2004).
Grassroots Networks
Strong grassroots networks formed by manufacturers, turbine owners, government officials, and
researchers were also behind the successful turbine development by the Danish manufacturers,
by providing valuable feedbacks to technology development in the process.
Wind cooperatives and DWTOA have played significant roles in technology development in
many ways. The most notable contribution was providing a list of all turbines and regular
reports of their performance and technical problems in the DWTOA monthly membership
magazine, Naturlig Energi. In this way, any technical problems were quickly worked upon and
the manufacturers were constantly under the pressure to improve their turbine performance. This
helped establishing credibility and eliminating myths of unreliability and high costs of wind
power. It also helped create the insurance market and free-standing firms to supply insurance.
In Denmark, even the RISO National Laboratory was a part of the networks rather than the
symbol of ivory tower. When its Wind Energy Department was conceived in 1978, the original
finance was only for three years. This made the lab assist the immediate needs of the
manufacturers rather than engaging in long-term R&D projects. The future of the department
depended on the manufacturers' evaluation after the three years. The department survived and
has continuously thrived as the role of RISO changed into more formal ones, as the
manufacturers needed to meet technical demands from the utilities and the export market during
the late 1980s (Dennemand Anderson, 1993, cited in Kamp, Smits, and Andriesse 2004).
The grassroots collaborations were also evident in the development of WindPRO. From the
beginning, small group of wind energy industry people and supporters, i.e., manufacturers,
turbine owners, and students, gathered together for informal meetings, once or twice a year.
Green organizations usually arrange these meetings, and they have been an important feedback
source until this day (Nielsen 2005).
Triumph of Craftsman Tradition
The other important reason was a bottom-up, incremental innovation approach taken by the
Danes. Karnoe (1993) points out that the success of the Danish wind technology development
was due to the absence of handicap that could be posed by sophisticated knowledge of
aerodynamics. The failures of the large-scale wind R&D programs by the United States and
other countries showed that technical challenges posed by wind turbine design were badly
misjudged by academic engineers engaged in those government programs; aerodynamics around
wind turbine blades is far more complicated than that around aircraft wings. The sophisticated
aeronautical models could not substitute the knowledge stemmed from long-term field
experiences. On the other hand, with empirical and hand-on knowledge that had its root in
agricultural machinery manufacturing, the Danish turbine manufacturers relied upon simple and
pragmatic principles, did not try understanding the theory of complex force fields around wind
turbine, and simply took well-known measures to increase structural stability and security.26
They built robust machines that worked sufficiently and kept on refining them in response to
market demand. In this way, they avoided time-consuming R&D in building up necessary
knowledge (BTM Consult ApS 2005b; Heymann 1998; Karnoe 1993).
Although the designs proposed by academic engineers under the large government R&D
programs did not produce commercially viable turbines, they also made some contributions to
the advancement of wind turbine technology. Technologies such as pitch regulation method, the
use of composite blade materials, and the design principles such as optimization of aerodynamic
efficiency and light weight construction were all originated from aerospace engineering, which
was the main business area of companies participated in the US and the German R&D programs
(Heymann 1998). The sophisticated engineering knowledge such as these could not be possibly
come out of the Danish craftsmen.
However, it was then the Danish manufacturers who incorporated these technologies and crafted
them into successful commercial products at the end. There was a virtuous cycle of knowledge
accumulation; the Danish manufacturers gained empirical knowledge from their commercial
26 In general, the Danish turbines in the 1980s were much more massive in weight than their American larger
counterparts because Danish designers simply put more weight to increase structural stability (Heymann, 1998).
experiences in the markets in California and Denmark, combined it with new engineering
solutions from the research programs only after they showed satisfactory test operation results,
and tried them out again in the commercial markets. This process helped the Danish
manufacturers synthesize the results from R&D, learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and
learning-by-interacting (Kamp, Smits, and Andriesse 2004) into a new layer of practical
knowledge.
Section 4.3: Industry Development before 1990
The wind turbine industry structure changed a great deal during the 1980s. In the countries that
engaged in the strong national R&D programs during the late 1970s and 1980s, large firms with
power generator or aerospace industry backgrounds entered into wind turbine business and
focused on MW-class turbine development. On the other hand, many small firms also entered
into wind turbine development business in European countries and the United States during the
same time period. They were either entrepreneur start-ups or diversification from mechanical
engineering firms, and focused on development of small turbines.
BTM Consult ApS (2005b) listed total 66 of wind turbine manufacturers, which sold more than
one wind turbines to the market by the end of 1989. The list includes 16 American, 15 Danish,
ten West German, nine British, six Dutch, three Swedish, two Japanese, one Belgian, one Irish,
one Swiss, one Spanish, and one Austrian firms. The American and Danish manufacturers
occupied the top ten company list (Table 4-4).
Table 4-4: Top Ten Manufacturers in terms of Total Number of Sales
by the end of 1989
Manufacturer # of Turbines Total Capacity Domestic Export NationalitySold Sold (MW)
US Windpower 3,272 327.2 3,272 0 USA
Vestas 2,672 227.73 526 2,146 Denmark
Micon 1,587 144.157 44 1,543 Denmark
Fayette 1,370 137.27 1,370 0 USA
Bonus 1,190 119.652 317 873 Denmark
Nordtank 1,097 95.959 235 862 Denmark
Jacobs 630 11.705 630 0 USA
Flowind 511 94.715 511 0 USA
Enertech 485 20.51 485 0 USA
Windmatics 368 29.126 135 233 Denmark
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
4.3.1 Danish Industry
Establishment of Wind Turbine Industry
By 1978 about ten small wind turbine companies were established in Denmark (Kamp, Smits,
and Andriesse 2004). These small entrants during the 1970s were private carpenters and
craftsmen who were enthusiastic about renewable energy development. Around 1980 this
situation changed; the industry became professionalized as enterprises began taking over the
turbine development role. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, enterprise manufacturers
continuously entered into the business; they included some manufacturers that formed the core of
the industry later: Vestas and Nordtank in 1979; Danregn Vindkraft (later Bonus) in 1981; Micon
in 1983; and Nordex in 1985. The number of entrants exceeded 20 during the 1980s.
Many entrants had the backgrounds in building agricultural equipments. Equipment builders, not
theoretical engineers, were engaging in developing wind turbines based on their experiences in
agricultural and irrigational machinery development. There were also no legal and political entry
barriers in Denmark at the time that restricted the business entry of any kinds of firms to the
industry.2 7  Thus, both technical and legal entry barriers to the wind turbine industry were
relatively low.
Danish Industry Competition and Consolidation during the 1980s
The Danish manufacturers enjoyed the domestic market development supported by the
government investment subsidies from the beginning. When the Danish market demand was
reduced in the beginning of the 1980s, the California boom began. However, this industry
expansion mode supported by both the Danish and US markets changed around 1986. The
nature of competition and the logic to control the industry structure did rapidly change during the
mid 1980s, along with technological and financial entry and growth barriers.
The exports started in 1982 to the United States changed the logic governing the industry
structure with business entry and exit. In the beginning, the Danish turbines were competing
with their American counterparts for market share. However, once the Danish turbines proved
their superior reliability and outperformed the American competitors, they began competing with
each other in the California market. Turbine upscaling competition began. This competition of
domestic manufacturers oversea made the innovation process so fast that many models
disappeared from the market within one year, replaced with newer and larger models, and made
the obsolete models need to be sold with discounted prices. Although the exponentially
increasing demands made the production to be moved from batch to series quickly, cost
reduction by series production was insufficient to compensate the price reduction as a result of
new product introduction. By 1985, a quarter of the industry turnover involved a loss, and seven
out of 12 Danish firms reported negative trade results. By this time, approximately 50% of
generating capacity in California came from European-made wind turbines, especially Danish
ones (Van Est 1999).
As the California market reduced, 11 out of 12 Danish firms suffered from negative running
costs in 1986 (Kjor, 1988, cited in van Est, 1999), and all of production facilities of the Danish
manufacturers in the United States were closed (JETRO Copenhagen Office 2003). Many
manufacturers filed bankruptcy and exited the business after 1986. However, some of the
bankrupted companies simply reestablished again due to the Danish legal system that allowed
such reinstatement (Heymann 1998).
27 There was only one exception. In the early 1980s, the Ministry of Energy could have the ownership of firms that
are environmentally important, and the Ministry was one of the shareholders of Danish Wind Technology (DWT)
under this rule. However, the complications for the national government to support one firm while others not
receiving such support in a competitive sector cancelled the rule in 1986 (Madsen, 2005).
Even after this crash, however, the pressure on turbine upscaling continued. The still-existed
weak US market and the 1986-1989 Danish tax incentive policy for the Danish investors in the
US wind projects let the technological competition continue. Between 1986 and 1989, almost all
small manufacturers exited the business because they could not afford turbine upscaling. At the
point of 1990, only seven Danish manufacturers, Vestas, Nordex, Bonus, Micon, Nordtank,
Wincon West Wind, and Wind World, remained in the business (Madsen 2005).
Changing Strategies of the Danish Manufacturers
The experiences in California have influenced greatly competitive business strategies of the
Danish manufacturers from the late 1980s.
The forced upscaling of turbines in California and the hasty serial production caused many
problems with gearboxes, generators, oil-cooling, and blades for the exported, unproven turbine
designs by the Danish manufacturers. In addition, although the wind and weather regime of
California is very different from the one in Denmark, the manufacturers lacked the advantages of
geographical proximity to fix them quickly. Technology was not easily transferred. The
California boom showed the lack of managerial skills and technological and organizational
capability. In addition, most companies were small and undercapitalized, and lacked financial
resources to offer project security. Wind power projects in California were financed by shared
financing, the shares of which were sold to the Danish institutional investors. However, this
method of financing could not live up with the expectations from the investors (Van Est 1999).
Lessons from the California experiences were reflected to the domestic market though the
change of business strategies and a new method of finance. First, the manufacturers began
reducing business risks by: 1) diversifying their marketing efforts over several political markets;
2) hedging against exchange rate risks; and 3) having at least two reliable suppliers in order to
ensure stable supply of components (Van Est 1999). These changes were exercised in new
European markets from the 1990s, especially Germany and Spain, which showed string
resemblance with the Danish domestic market. Second, in order to find investors, there were the
necessities of controlled development of new turbines, certification of a uniform turbine quality,
and guarantee of project performance and insurance. A private Wind Turbine Guarantee
Company was established with a state guarantee of DKK 750 million in order to warrant long-
term finance of large projects with Danish wind turbines outside Denmark (Van Est 1999).
4.3.2 German Industry
Like the United States, there were two types of firms engaged in wind turbine development
business in Germany early on: one was large firms such as MBB entered into the business on the
basis of government contracts to develop MW-class turbines; and the other was small idealistic
developers that focused on development of smaller turbines. While the former mostly left the
business by the late 1980s due to the non-feasibility of their MW-class machines, the latter faced
huge obstacles with very small domestic market. Total of 14 small German firms sold turbines
during the 1980s, and 11 out of those 14 firms still existed in 1989 (Durstewits, 2000, cited in
Johnson and Jacobsson 2000). They survived with the government funding for small- to
medium-capacity turbine R&DD projects. Some manufacturers also exported their turbines to
the United States and other European markets except Denmark. However, their presence in the
global scene was very limited.
4.3.3 Indian Industry
As mentioned, there was no market demand for wind turbines in India except the government
demonstration projects during the 1980s. The Indian industry was also largely cut out from the
development made in developed countries except Denmark, which was the main technology
provider at the time. However, the country succeeded in establishing three pioneer companies.
The wind farm demonstration program in 1986 resulted in the establishment of two joint venture
companies, NEPC-Micon and Vestas RRB, while BHEL succeeded in developing the first Indian
turbine prototypes on its own with the government R&D support.
4.3.4 Other Country Industry
American Industry
The US market boom during the early to mid 1980s nurtured not only the Danish industry but
also the American industry. There were many entrants which were not supported by the
government R&D program but tried smaller turbine development on their own.
These small commercial American manufacturers in the 1980s used two- or three-bladed,
downwind rotor turbines with pitch or semi-pitch regulations. Due to the lack of sufficient
financial resources, however, they needed to develop turbines quickly and did not have time to
test them in operation. Although their combined market share during the mid 1980s in California
was larger than that of the Danish manufacturers, their turbines installed without proper testing
were doomed to fail. Almost all designs along with their creators did not survive by the late
1980s. By 1990 only one major commercial manufacturer, US Windpower survived (Heymann
1998).
US Windpower became the world market leader by the end of 1980s (Table 4-4). This firm was
the only wind turbine manufacture, seriously competing with the Danish manufacturers. US
Windpower engaged in all activities of wind business value chain: production, development,
finance, and operation or of wind turbines and projects. This was a distinctively different
strategy from the one taken by Vestas that was the other largest firm on the market. Several
hundred employees involved in manufacturing and maintaining wind turbines, and the
maintenance and financing fees provided cash flow for technology and project development
(U.S. Department of Energy 2003). However, US Windpower could not compete against The
Danish manufacturers, because it had never faced a competition within the United States and did
not move fast enough to compete against the turbine upscaling by the Danes. The firm spent
USD 30 millions to the project of upscaling of turbines from 100kW to 300kW class. When the
project was close to the completion, several European manufacturers were already making
500kW turbines. This caused a serious financial trouble to the firm, which was subsequently
taken over by Kenetech in 1994 (Madsen 2005).
Other European Manufacturers
Several manufacturers survived the 1980s. In particular, a Belgian manufacturer HMZ and a
Dutch manufacturer Lagerwey were the notable examples. HMZ showed strong export
performance, while Lagerwey and other Dutch manufacturers relied upon the domestic market.
4.3.5 Industry Consolidation Logic of the 1980s
As seen, the industry gradually consolidated by the end of the 1980s. Two different logics were
working on the consolidation trend simultaneously for different kinds of manufacturers during
the 1980s.
One was for the firms who engaged in the government programs to develop large MW-class
turbines. They exited from wind business during the 1980s or by the early 1990s because they
could not produce commercially viable turbines. The other was smaller manufacturers that
started with small-capacity turbines. They were facing a different industry consolidation logic
during the 1980s; the incremental but rapid turbine upscaling and technological improvement
pressure occurred in California and Denmark to increase economic efficiency. The pressure
raised both technical and financial requirements for manufacturers and resulted in the rapid
industry consolidation.
Chapter 5:
Wind Energy Policy, Market, Industry, and
Technology Profile 1990-2005
Chapter 4 presented the wind energy sector development before 1990. This chapter examines
the evolution and the basic profiles of wind energy policy, market, industry, and technology in
Denmark, Germany and India since 1990, and the results of technology transfer between
Denmark/Germany and India.
This chapter consists of six sections. The first section presents the institutional settings
surrounding wind energy sector in the three countries. The second section summaries wind
energy policy of the three countries. The third section presents the development of wind energy
market of the three countries and the global market. The fourth section describes the general
profiles and development of wind energy industry of the three countries and the global industry.
The fifth section summaries the technology profile and evolution at technology frontier of
Denmark and Germany. The sixth section presents the technology profile and evolution of India
by focusing on technology transfer from Europe and explores technology gaps with the frontier.
Section 5.1: Institutional Setting surrounding Wind Energy in
Denmark, Germany and India
North (1994) defines institutions as humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction. They include both formal and informal constraints such as laws, regulations, market
and organizational norms. Institutional evolution is determined by the interaction between
institutions that are the rule of the game and organizations such as group of individuals and
players (North 1994).
This section describes the formal side of institutional settings regarding the electricity and wind
energy sector of Denmark, Germany and India. The section also briefly portrays the structure of
their electricity sector and government organizations that concern wind energy policy and
institutions. At first, the European Union (EU) electricity liberalization will be explained, as it
has had a large impact on the Danish and German electricity sector structures and institutional
settings as well as wind energy policy in recent years.
5.1.1 EU Electricity Liberalization
The European Commission (EC) initiated a single and competitive energy market policy for the
region in 1990 by harmonizing the existing rules and identifying complementary measures to
unify 15 separate markets. After the Treaty of Maastricht and the establishment of the EU in
1992, the integration of energy policy among its member states accelerated. Directives
96/92/EEC and 98/30/EEC were introduced in 1996 and 1998, respectively, which required its
member states to: 1) dismantle their electricity monopolies to separate them into electricity
generation, transmission and distribution, except System Operators; 2) fully liberalize and create
an open and competitive electricity market that allows electricity trading, and incorporate
domestic necessary regulatory changes by February 20, 1999; and 3) incorporate the EU
provisions into domestic legislation by August 2000. While these directives were to seek to
abolish exclusive rights, the member states are allowed to include extra costs for environmental
requirements and other national strategic requirements such as security of supply. This
allowance is called Public Service Obligation (PSO), which is not governed by free market
competition.
One June 26, 2003, a new Directive was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.
The Directive aims at: 1) achieving complete opening of the EU electricity market by July 2007;
2) reducing risks of market dominance and predatory behaviors; 3) ensuring non-discriminatory
transmission and distribution tariffs and network access; 4) establishing the provisions for
unbundling of transmission and distribution operators; and 5) establishing labeling requirements
for electricity suppliers regarding CO 2 emissions and radioactive waste for electricity generation
as well as for the contribution of energy mix of each energy source in the supplier's fuel mix.
5.1.2 Denmark
General Institutional Setting surrounding Wind Energy
Denmark has a unicameral system. While both the national government and the regional/local
governments exercise administrative power, 13 counties and 271 local municipalities have a high
degree of regional autonomy and many of the administrative powers are delegated to them.
In terms of energy policy, until the first Energy Crisis of 1973, Denmark had no economic
regulation of the energy sector. The first of such regulations were Electricity Supply Act of
1976, which governed the development and structure of the electricity sector, and the Danish
Energy Plan of 1976, which decided the national objectives regarding security of supply, energy
savings, and most importantly reduction of dependence on imported oil.
As a result of the 1976 plan, Denmark reduced its oil dependency by switching oil to coal for
electricity generation. While the fuel switching was done in extraordinary speed,28 it increased
the emissions of noxious pollutants and GHGs. The Energy Plan of 1981 updated the Energy
Plan of 1976 and stipulated to switch large power plants from oil to gas and install more
renewables and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants. In 1990, Energy 2000 was passed to
add a goal of sustainability to energy policy, set targets for C0 2 , SO 2 and NOx emission
reductions, and place a plan for R&D, energy savings and the increased use of CHP and cleaner
fuels. The next major policy statement was Energy 21 of 1996, which tightened the targets for
the CO2 reductions for 200529, set a target for 2030, and promoted further introduction of CHP
and renewable energy to cover 12-14% of primary energy by renewable energy by 2005 and
35% by 2030. Wind energy is given a primary role in these plans with targets for installed
capacity of 1,500MW by 2005 and 5,500MW by 2030, covering 10% and up to 50% of
electricity consumption of the country, respectively.
28 From 1973 to 1979, the percentage of electricity generated from oil declined from 64% to 37%, and then to 5% in
1983 (OECD/IEA. 2000).
29 Reduce CO 2 emissions from 1988 levels by 20% by 2005.
In 1996 the Electricity Supply Act was amended to change the structure and economic
regulations of the electricity sector in order to promote environmentally benign utilization of
energy. The Act came into force in January 1998. In 1999 the Electricity Reform Act was
adopted to introduce competition into electricity production and trade while maintaining the
objectives of the 1996 Act. The 1999 Act also introduced the quota for annual CO 2 emission for
Danish utilities as well as a special green market for trade of green certificates in combination
with consumer quota for green electricity.30 Also the 1999 Act mandated the Danish electricity
market to become fully open for all the EU consumers in January 2003.
Public Organizations that concern Wind Energy Sector
Key public organizations related to wind energy are as follows, although various ministries
(Ministry of Trade, Ministry of the Environment, and Ministry of Economics and Business
Affairs, etc) directly and indirectly concerned wind-energy-related policy and projects.
Danish Energy Authority (DEA)
The Danish Energy Authority (DEA), established in 1976, is the key government organization
concerning wind energy technology development. 31 DEA is responsible for: 1) administering
the Danish energy legislations and conducting analyses and assessments of the development in
the field of energy, nationally and internationally, as well as implementing policy through
agreements with utilities; 2) administering the Electricity Supply Act and the legislation
concerning CO2 quotas for electricity production and the reform of energy structure from
monopoly to competition; 3) administering subsidies for environmentally friendly electricity
production as well as key R&D grants/subsidies/programs in the area of cleaner and more energy
efficient technologies; and 4) promoting the export of energy technology and know-how
possessed by Danish enterprises and participating in systems export projects, conducting export
promotion activities, and creating a platform for Danish industry and know-how and developing
the link between bilateral support and export, in cooperation with industry (Danish Energy
Authority 2005a).
Spatial Planning Department under Ministry of the Environment
Spatial Planning Department under the Ministry of the Environment coordinates spatial planning
concerning the location of wind turbines at local and municipal, regional, and national levels.
RISO National Laboratory
Wind Energy Department at the RISO National Laboratory was created in 1978. The department
has dealt with type approval under the turbine certificate program from 1979. Its responsibilities
in R&D became more formalized and increased during the 1980s (Dannermand Anderson, 1993,
cited in Kamp, Smits, and Andriesse, 2004). From the 1990s both Wind Energy and
Atmospheric Physics Departments are mainly working on basic research on aero-elastics, i.e., the
interaction between aerodynamics and structural dynamics, on wind turbine technology, and on
wind resource assessment.
30 Trading of quota with the American and German utilities has started in 2001.
3 DEA was under the Ministry of Environment and Energy, and then under the Ministry of Economic and Business
Affairs, until it became an agency under the Ministry of Transport and Energy on February 18, 2005.
Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA)
The Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) is a grant program under the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, starting its operation in 1963. The grant is for both bilateral and
multilateral development assistances, and it must constitute 1% of Denmark's GNP according to
the 1963 parliamentary decision. DANIDA focus on a selected number of developing countries
(program countries). The agency helped a number of wind demonstration projects during the
1980s and the 1990s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2006).
Industrialization Fund for Developinq Countries (IFU)
IFU was established in 1967 under the Government of Denmark to promote economic activity in
developing countries by promoting investments with Danish enterprises. Although the Minister
for Development Cooperation appoints the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director, it is
an independent, self-governing entity, participating as a partner in joint ventures in developing
countries through committing equity capital and/or loans and through board membership. The
Fund's revenues consist of interest, dividends and profits from sale of shares (Industrialization
Fund for Developing Countries 2006).
Danish Electricity Sector
Denmark has developed two separate electricity grid after WWII: one grid covers the Jutland and
Funen area and runs synchronous with the European continental system; and the other covers
Sealand and Lolland-Falster and runs synchronous with the Scandinavian grid. Regional power
companies under these two grids established two power pools in the mid 1950s: one was Elsam
that dominated the western Denmark, and the other was Elkraft32 that dominated the eastern
Denmark. These two associations had played various roles of utilities, i.e., planning/design/
construction of new power plants, load dispatching, fuel purchases, and operation of
transmission grid, etc., in the country. Elsam had six generation companies under its control and
Elkraft had two; however, the control over the eight generation companies was centralized to the
two associations, which have been the strategic players of the country's electricity sector.
With the introduction of the EU directives for electricity liberalization, Denmark prepared for
market liberalization. The Electricity Supply Act of 1999 introduced competition into electricity
generation and trade; final consumers could become choose their electricity supplier 33 and
electricity supply activities were unbundled so that each of electricity generation, ownership of
the transmission grid, operation of the grid, distribution, and electricity supply must be organized
in separate legal entities. The transmission system operators became responsible to ensure the
function of the 400kV transmission network of the country and proper support for producers of
environmentally-friendly electricity. As a result, Eltra was founded to take over Elsam's
activities regarding the transmission networks in Jutland and Funen from January 1998. Elsam
remained as a generation utility. Elkraft System that was responsible for system operation of
Zealand was established as a unit of Elkraft with separate accounts and information system from
32 Elkraft was called as Kraftimport until 1978.
3 The liberalization was done step by step. At first, final customers of 10 GWh or more per year have been eligible
to choose their electricity supplier in the free market from April 2000. On January 2001, the threshold was lowered
to 1 GWh, and on January 2003, all final consumers became eligible as the Danish electricity market was opened for
all EU consumers.
those of the remainder of Elkraft. This changed in 2004 when the Act on Energinet Danmark
was passed; from January 2005 the Danish state took over and merged Elkraft System, Elkraft
Transmission, Eltra and Gastra into Energinet.dk, an independent public corporation owned by
the Danish state under the Ministry of Transport and Energy and with its own Supervisory
Board. Energinet.dk became responsible for the electricity and natural gas systems in Denmark.
Another important feature of the Danish electricity structure is that the western Denmark has
been a part of the Nordic Power Exchange (NordPool), which is a series of markets for the
trading of electricity, incorporating Norway, Sweden, Finland (since 1997) and the western part
of Denmark (since 1999). Trading companies trade electricity on a purely commercial basis.
5.1.3 Germany
General Institutional Setting surrounding Wind Energy
Germany is a federal republic comprised of 16 sovereign states (Lander). While the federal
government decides general legislative framework through the constitution as well as national
laws and acts, the states have their own state constitution, legislatures, and governments, which
can pass laws on all matters. The federal government has the exclusive right for defense, foreign
affairs, and finance, while education, local law enforcement, culture, and environmental
protection are controlled by the state. Both the federal government and the state governments
exercise their original legislative power over renewable energy.
In terms of economic regulations on the electricity market, the German electricity sector was
structured based on the Energy Industry Act of 1935 prior to the market liberalization of 1998.
While power generation, transmission, distribution and supply were monopolized and the sector
was under the state control under the Act of 1935, private laws dictated contracts for
concessions, territorial boundaries, supply to special customers, technical conditions for feeding
surplus electricity to the grid, and reserve deliveries. The situation changed when the Act on the
Supply of Gas and Electricity liberalized the German gas and electricity markets in April 1998.
There have been several important legislations for renewable energy. The first legislation, the
Electricity Feed Law (EFL) that guaranteed feed-in tariffs available to electricity generated from
renewable energy sources, came into force in January 1991. After it was amended in 1998, the
act was updated into Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) in October 2000, which was
amended in July 2004. In 1998 the country also set the national targets to double the share of
renewable energy sources excluding large hydro in the primary energy consumption to 4% by
2010 and to further increase the share to 25% by 2030 and to 50% by 2050.
Public Organizations that concern Wind Energy
Unlike DEA of Denmark, Germany does not have a single federal energy agency, responsible for
formulation and administration of energy policy and legislations. The ministerial responsibilities
over energy related issues spread across several different ministries. Currently both the Federal
Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) and the Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) share the overall responsibility for energy policy within
the government, but BMU has the responsibility for renewable energy from autumn of 2002.
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMVi)
BMWi and its predecessor the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor have been responsible
for economic efficiency, supply safeguards, and environmental sustaibility aspects of the
German energy policy, carrying out the market liberalization and the introduction of competition
(BMWi 2006).
Federal Environmental Agency (UBA) under Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)
The Federal Environmental Ministry has played significant roles in environmental aspects of
energy policy making and legislation. Currently the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA)
under BMU is responsible for environmental aspect of energy. BMU holds the overall
responsibilities of the German government to satisfy its international responsibilities and fulfill
the targets that it has set itself for climate change (BMU 2006).
R&D Organizations
In Germany, the federal agencies sponsor the majority of non-university based R&D, and several
Ministries (Research, Economics, Environment, Building, and Agriculture) are held responsible
for research in respect of energy and the climate. In addition, the individual states have
established their own specialized institutes. Before 1994 the R&D programs were carried out by
the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT). After BMFT was reformulated into
the Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology (BMBF), BMBF and
BMWi have carried out the R&D programs for wind energy. BMBF coordinates all federal
R&D activities and supports most of energy related R&D projects. Public research infrastructure
of Germany is large and decentralized; the country does not have a centralized single R&D
organization for wind energy, but the federal programs frequently meet the state governments to
coordinate the industry and the research community.
Kreditanstalt fOr Wiederaufbau (KfW) Development Bank/Deutche Ausgleichsbank (DtA)
KfW Development Bank finances investments in developing countries and consulting services
related to the investments. It works on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development through its Financial Cooperation (KfW 2006). Meanwhile, Deutche
Ausgleichsbank (DtA) has financed economic measures for commercial middleclass and free
occupations as well as measures for environmental protection since the mid 1980s. 34 DtA was
under the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry of Economics but was absorbed
by KfW Mittelstandsbank (a part of KfW Group), which continues the works of DtA since July
2003.
German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)
The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), established in 1975, is a closed limited
company in private sector, owned by the German Federal Government 35 as an international
cooperation enterprise for sustainable development. The agency mainly works for the German
Federal Government, especially the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
34 It was originally created to support people suffered from WWII such as refugees in 1950.
3 The GTZ Supervisory Board has representatives of four Federal Ministries: BMZ, Federal Foreign Office, Federal
Ministry of Finance, and Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology.
Development, and implements development projects and programmes in developing countries.
The main focus is technical cooperation: technical knowledge transfer and capability building of
people and organizations to form a basis of stable development. In renewable energy sector, it
provides technical and advisory support of renewable energy projects in developing countries
and shares annual funds with KfW for this purpose (GTZ 2006).
German Electricity Sector
The reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 brought a major task to the country to
merge the radically different energy sectors of the two sides. West Germany had mainly
privately owned energy supply with high level of energy efficiency and environmental
protection. In contrast, East Germany had highly centralized and state-owned utilities with low
energy efficiency and environmental standards. Much progress has been made to privatize the
former East Germany energy sector and improve its environmental performance.
Before the market liberalization of 1998, about 1,000 utilities provided monopolies in power
generation, transmission and distribution in Germany. Eight were involved in large-scale power
generation and high-voltage transmission, about 80 engaged in regional distribution with some
generation, and local distribution was carried out by more than 900 utilities. The large utilities
were mostly privately owned, while the local utilities were often owned by the communities. In
April 1998 the German gas and electricity markets were liberalized according to the Act on the
Supply of Gas and Electricity. Due to intense price competition and erosion of profit margins
that followed the liberalization, a great number of M&A occurred in a few years and the number
of large utilities reduced into four (RWE AG, E.On, Vattenfall Europe, and EnBW).36 These
four utilities also merged and acquired local and regional utilities as well as horizontally
diversified by acquiring gas companies. Many new entrants did not survive (Wustenhagen and
Bilharz 2006).
Germany has the largest electricity market in Europe. Nearly 100% of electricity demands in
Germany are met domestically, but the country imports electricity due to transmission loss and
the proximity to foreign sources. According to Statistisches Bundesamt, about 80% of electricity
is generated from coal and lignite (48.9%) and nuclear (27.5%), followed by natural gas (10.2%),
hydro (4.5%) and non-hydro-renewables (7.3% - 4.1% by wind) in 2004.
5.1.4 India
General Institutional Setting surrounding Wind Energy
India is also a federal republic, constitutes 25 states and seven union territories. The Constitution
of India divides the power of the Government of India (GOI) and the state governments into
three lists: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. The Union List consists of any
matter that the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws such as defense, foreign affairs,
currency, income tax, excise duty, railways, shipping, posts and telegraphs, etc. The State List is
made of items over which the relevant state has responsibility and power to make laws such as
36 They are known as "supra-regional companies." The four companies operate in the following regions: RWE in
western Germany; E.On in central Germany; Vattenfall Europe in New Lander and Berlin; and EnBW in south-
western Germany.
public order, police, public health, communications, agriculture, taxes on entertainment and
wealth, and sales tax, etc. Both the central and state governments can enforce their power over
the items listed in the Concurrent List, which the national legislation prevails in the case of any
conflict between the legislations passed by the central and the state governments, including
newspapers, criminal law, marriage and divorce, stamp duties, trade unions, price controls, etc.
Supply of electric power is on the Concurrent List.
As a Concurrent subject, the Indian electricity sector possesses a federal structure; GOI
formulates the national power policy through several ministries and agencies but the extend of
implementation of the national policy is determined by decisions of individual states, because the
final decision to approve any private sector projects, levels of tariffs and related issues as well as
all commercial aspects, including power purchase agreements, are within the jurisdiction of the
state governments. The electricity market is also segregated by state border; the power generated
in one state is not transmitted or wheeled to another state in general.
Until 2003, there were three acts that provided the statuary framework for regulation of
electricity in India, and the state level legislations also existed in several states. The Electricity
Act of 1910 provided the basic framework of the electricity sector. The Electricity (Supply) Act
of 1948 established State Electricity Boards (SEBs) as vertically-integrated, monopoly utilities.
In 1991 both the Acts were amended to restructure the electricity sector. In 1998 the Electricity
Regulatory Act was introduced to mandate the creation of the Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission (CERC) at the central level and the State Electricity Regulatory Commission
(SERC) at the state level to facilitate the power sector reform further. In June 2003, the
Electricity Act of 2003 was enacted to replace the above three acts.
Public Organizations that concern Wind Energy
India has developed various unique support organizations for renewable energy over the years.
Ministry of Non-conventional Energy Sources (MNES)
GOI upgraded DNES to the status of a full-fledged Ministry of Non-conventional Energy
Sources (MNES) in 1993 with renewed emphasis on policy, planning, and institutional linkages
and gave it more autonomy and stronger decision-making and resource allocation power. MNES
is responsible for all matters related to non-conventional/renewable energy, which include:
policy making and planning; promotion and coordination of functions related to all aspects of
renewable energy, including fiscal and financial incentives; creation of industrial capacity;
promotion of demonstration and commercial programs; R&D and technology development;
intellectual property protection; human resource development; and international relation.
Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA)
Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited (IREDA) was established in March
1987, as a public limited government company to promote and develop renewable energy and
energy efficiency/conservation projects by providing short-term financial assistance in the forms
of soft loans through the operation of revolving fund. The revolving fund has been created by
the funds received through various international institutions as assistance, including the World
Bank and GEF, the Asian Development Bank, DANIDA, KFW, etc (Table 5-1).
Table 5-1: Cumulative International Assistance Received
for Revolving Fund by IREDA as of December 2005
Institutions Cumulative Assistance
World Bank/GEF/SDC 145 million USD
World Bank line of credit 130 million USD
GEF Grant 5million USD
Asian Development Bank line of credit 100 million USD
DANIDA mixed credit 15 million USD
KFW Germany 120 million DM
Government of the Netherlands 18 Million Dutch Guilders
JBIC Japan (Pipeline) 85 million USD
US EXIM Bank (Pipeline) 100 million USD
Sources: (IREDA 2001 and 2006)
State Nodal Aqencies (SNAs)
State Nodal Agencies (SNAs) were created since the 1980s in order to implement demonstration
projects and channel devices, loans and subsidies to consumers as well as to take care of after-
sales services and consumer support for renewable energy projects. In the 1990s SNAs began
formulating state specific renewable energy policy and programs and implementing them
through providing necessary clearances, allotment of land, power purchase agreements, etc.
Although SNAs receive financial support from GOI (DNES and later MNES), they are
administratively under the control of their respective state governments. The organizational
setting of SNAs varies among states.37
Center for Wind Enemy Technoloqy (C-WET)
The Center for Wind Energy Technology (C-WET) was established by MNES in Chennai in
1999 as an autonomous institution of GOI to serve as the technical focal point for wind power
development, with technical and financial support from DANIDA. C-WET aims to assist all
players in the field by providing value-added services on all scientific and technical fronts as
well as to support the promotion of exports of products and services to other countries. The
Center has a comprehensive program with five units: Research and Development unit; Wind
Resource Assessment unit; Wind Turbine Testing unit; Standards and Certification unit; and
Information Training and Commercial Services unit (MNES 2000a).
State Electricity Boards (SEBs) and State Electricity Requlatory Boards (SERCs)
The Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 established State Electricity Boards (SEBs) as vertically-
integrated monopoly power generation and distribution agencies owned by the state
governments. SEBs held responsibilities of actual development works within the framework of
national policy, but the Electricity Regulatory Act of 1998 introduced unbundling of their
electricity generation, transmission and distribution activities into separate legal entities and took
the authority to decide tariffs from SEBs and handed it to State Electricity Regulatory Boards
(SERCs). Some of SEBs have acted as SNAs.
3 While many states have SNAs as independent agency, some undertake the role as SNA without any specifically
assigned department or by designating Department of Electricity or Power as SNAs. In the case of Tamil Nadu, the
programs for non-grid connected renewable energy projects are carried out by Tamil Nadu Energy development
Agency (TNEDA) and all gird-connected projects are under the responsibility of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board
(TNEB). (TNEB, 2002.)
Indian Electricity Sector
The Indian power grid system is divided into four subsystems, which are only interconnected
through DC links and are not operated synchronously. The southern Indian grid includes Tamil
Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. The western grid has Gujarat, Maharastra, and
Madhya Pradesh. GOI has exclusive responsibility for high-voltage interstate transmission.
Until 1991, the power sector of India was under the direct control of the government. Various
state and central sector utilities owned 98% of generation and 95% of distribution (Prayas 2001).
Power generation, distribution, and transmission within states were in hands of SEBs. In 1991
GOI was facing urgent necessity of a profound reform of its power sector because of the ever-
widening demand and supply gap, 38 poor technical and financial performance of SEBs, and the
incapacity of GOI and the state governments to finance power generation expansion. The Indian
Electricity Act of 1910 and the Electricity Supply Act of 1948 were amended in October 1991, in
order to allow private sector, including foreign investments, to establish power generation or
undertake distribution as licensees. To induce private participation, GOI offered various
concessions. 39 The reforms have also relaxed the requirements of Central Electricity Authority
(CEA) for project approval. This amendment also enabled set-up of non-conventional energy-
based power projects by private sector (Bath 1998; Prayas 2001)
Despite the reforms since 1991, the financial situations of SEBs were not improved due to the
huge accumulated financial deficits caused by large transmission and distribution (T&D) losses
and highly cross-subsidized tariff structures from industry/commerce/railways to agricultural and
residential consumers. The problem of under-pricing worsened progressively throughout the
early 1990s and the average retail price of electricity represented approximately 75% of real
average costs in the mid 1990s (IEA 2002b). Also out of total electricity generated, only 55%
was billed and 41% was regularly paid (GOI 2001, cited in IEA2002b). T&D losses due to the
inadequacy of the system vary between 20% and 45% but the average T&D losses increased
during the 1990s (IEA 2002b) All of these factors had deterred the involvement of Independent
Power Producers (IPPs) and the private market power sector development.
In order to address these issues, GOI enacted the Electricity Regulatory Act in 1998 to create
CERC and SERCs to rationalize tariffs among different sets of consumers, remove cross-
subsidies, and bring efficiency to the sector. CERC has a mandate to introduce competition and
efficiency in the electricity-supply industry at both the central and interstate levels and to set
38 Final consumption of electricity has increased by average of 7% per year since the independence of 1947.
However, electricity supply has been less than demand for many years, and the duration and the number of
blackouts were beyond acceptable limits (IEA. 2002b).
39 Concessions such as 100% equity participation by foreign private investors and long-term purchase agreement
were offered. It also allowed a required minimum of 11% of the total outlay for promoter's contribution and a
required minimum of 60% of the total project cost from sources other than Indian public financial institutions.
Fiscal incentives were also provided to private sector investors to assure profits: a five-year tax holiday on profits
and gains of new projects for generation or generation and distribution of power; faster depreciation on assets; and
reduction in customs and excise duty on equipment. Other incentives included the two-part tariff with guaranteed
16% return on equity for a minimum 68.5% plant load factor (Sinha, C. S. , and P. Venkata Ramana. 1995). Non-
competitive contracts with SEBs were also allowed for independent power producers (IPPs) between 1991 and
1994, although GOI enforced competitive bidding after 1995.
tariffs and conditions of supply and services for interstate exchange and multi-state generation.
SERCs have a mandate to promote competition, efficiency and economy in the electricity
industry and to rationalize and regulate wholesale (from producers to dispatchers), bulk (from
dispatchers to distributors) and grid tariffs (transmission) and retail prices at state level. This Act
started unbundling and restructuring of SEBs in some states (CERC 2002; Indianelectricity
2002).
In June 2003 the Electricity Act of 2003 came into force to replace all of the three previous acts.
The objectives of the Act are to advance the reform efforts since 1991 and to show a clear
direction toward a market-based regime by providing measures to promote competition,
rationalize tariffs, protect consumer interests, not the interests of SEBs, and promote
environmentally-friendly electricity policies.
This Act changed some fundamental aspects of the electricity sector of India, including the
following: 1) completely de-licensing power generation, except interstate hydro projects, and
give free entry to power generation business; 2) freely permitting captive generation by
removing all licensing and permissions; 3) providing any power generation plants open access to
the transmission grid as well as rights to build transmission lines at a fee in order to wheel power
for self-usage or for third-party sales; 4) obligating all state governments to separate transmission
activity from SEBs and establish state-owned State Transmission Utilities as well as SERCs,
while providing the state governments freedom to decide sequence and phases of restructuring;
5) ordering SERCs to determine tariffs based on commercial principles and gradually eliminating
cross-subsides; 6) permitting consumers to freely enter direct commercial relationships with
generating company or trader after open access is allowed; 7) introducing power trading;40 and
8) obligating GOI to formulate National Electricity Plan and CEA to prepare the National
Electricity Plan (Prayas 2003).
As for renewable energy, the Act of 2003 limits the role of state governments to only formulate
policies related to: 1) providing the government lands at nominal cost for renewable energy
projects; 2) providing subsidy to the cost of infrastructure development; and 3) providing the cost
of electricity purchase by licensees from renewable energy plants. Tariffs and charges now are
decided not by the state governments or SEBs but by SERCs. The predominant roles of SERCs
are: 1) to determine tariffs for generation, supply, transmission, and wheeling of electricity
within the state as well as surcharges for open access to consume power from a source other than
a licensee; 2) to regulate electricity purchase and procurement process of distribution; 3) to
facilitate wheeling of electricity within the state; and 4) to promote electricity generation from
renewable energy sources by providing suitable measures for grid connection and power sales to
any person and measures that specify a percentage of total consumption of electricity in the area
of distribution licensees for purchase of electricity from such sources (Consolidated Energy
Consultants Ltd. 2005).
40 Power trading needs to be authorized by the Regulatory Commissions. Although distribution companies and the
state governments do not need licensing for power trading, State Transmission Utilities cannot engage in power
trading.
Section 5.2 Wind Energy Policy Instruments of Denmark,
Germany, and India
This section follows wind energy policy development of the three countries. Although politics
behind the policy development is important, the section tried to contain political aspects at
minimum as they are not the primary focus of this research.
5.2.1 Denmark
Denmark has provided both technology-push policies and demand-pull incentives from the
beginning. The main policy instruments to promote wind energy in Denmark have been feed-in-
tariff system, political obligations, investment and production subsidies, tax refunds, R&D
programs, along with ownership and investment regulations and technical certification
requirements.
Research, Development and Demonstration (R&DD) (1977 - Present)
The government-supported wind energy R&DD program started in 1977 as a part of the Energy
Plan of 1976, which was financed by the Ministry of Trade. Two major wind energy R&DD
programs since then are: Energy Research Program (EEP), which was created under the Energy
Plan of 1981; and Development Program for Renewable Energy (UVE), established in 1982 by
the Danish Industry and Trade Agency. Both the programs were transferred to DEA later. EEP
continues today, but UVE ended in 2002. Table 5-2 shows other R&DD programs as well.
Recent R&DD focus has been the development of offshore and system operation technology.
An important difference in wind energy R&DD between Denmark and other countries is that the
Danish support has primarily been directed towards basic research, whereas other governments
tend to support wind turbine development. The difference is also remarkable when looking at
the Ministry of Energy funding of energy research. More budgets in other energy technology
research tend to be allocated to product development phase than in the case for wind energy.
The other important feature of the Danish budgets is that the country has been spending a high
amount of the budget (average 16.0% of total energy R&D and average 47.8% of renewable
energy R&D) to wind energy technology development since the late 1970s. Although there are
some yearly fluctuations, the importance of wind energy in energy R&DD increased from the
1980s and the support was fairly constant during the 1990s (Appendix A-1).
Besides the government R&D programs, transmission system operators have PSO-subsidized
R&D programs for non-commercial projects, concerning new and environmentally-friendly
energy technologies. The PSO programs are financed by electricity consumers, but their final
approval rests with DEA and the responsible minister determines the budgets. Total 31 wind
projects were funded with a total support of DKK 91 million since 1998 (Table 5-3) (IEA 2004;
IEA 2005).
Table 5-2: Government Wind Energy R&DD Programs in Denmark
Programs Program Contents
First wind energy R&D projects (1977-1979)
- Two Nibe turbines
- Establishment of the RISO test station (1978)
EEP under Energy Plan of 1981
- Creation of large turbine program and small turbine program to
pursued wind turbines of all sizes to be developed for electricity
Energy Research generation. Merger of the two programs in 1989
Program EEP by DEA (1980s - Present)
(EEP, 1976 - present) - Focus on technological possibilities for practical implementation of
the national energy policy, reinforcement of exports of Danish
technologies and expertise, and international standardization
- All project initiated through the annual call for proposal and almost
all of them have several partners, industrial participation and co-
financing is encouraged. DEA typically finance 50% to 85% of
total cost
Programs renew every three year, focusing on the following:
- R&DD for new, improved technology
*Optimum utilization of the available sites
- Removing barriers for sustainable utilization of wind energy
- Enhance Danish contribution to international cooperation
Development Program *Stimulate Danish industry and export
for Renewable Energy Operation of the test station at RISO from 1982 to 2002
(UVE, 1982 - 2002) - Secretariat for Danish type-approval and certification scheme
*Spot check of type-approved turbines
- Inspection of major breakdown
- International standardization
*Development of test methods for turbines and blades
- International cooperation with other test stations for turbines
New Energy Stimulate commercial manufacturing of new energy technology,
Technologies Program focusing on industrial development project. Between 1980 and 1990,
(1980-1990) the Danish wind turbine industries received DKK 42 million.
Individual Energy Establishment of series of demonstration wind farmsProjects (1982-1989)
and RIS (20 prese t) Administration of type approval scheme
Renewable Energy R&D DKK 100 million support for three years for renewable energy research
(2003 - 2005) projects, administered by the Danish Research Agency
Sources: (Dannemand Andersen 1999; IEA 2004; IEA 2005)
Table 5-3: Non-Government Wind Energy R&DD Programs in Denmark
Programs Program Contents
R&DD for non-commercial projects concerning clean energy technologies.
EU Public Service Focus is efficiency, costs, reliability of turbines, regulation and forecasting
Obligation (PSO) of production, environmental impact, maintenance, and interaction
subsidized R&D between wind turbines and the power system (e.g., wind plants' abilities to
Program (1998 -) contribute to grid regulation and stability), and environmental offshore
demonstration study.
Source: (European Commission 1999; IEA 2005; Krohn 2003b)
Turbine Type Approval and Certification (1979 - Present)
Wind turbine type certification confirms that the particular type of wind turbines in terms of size,
form, and use are designed, documented, and manufactured in conformity with design
assumptions, specific standards, and other technical requirements. It also demonstrates that it is
possible to install, operate, and maintain the turbines in accordance with the design assumptions
at a site appropriate for the type. Type certification is applied to a series of wind turbines of the
same type, and required for the verification of design for their serial production. It has
expiration. Wind turbine manufacturers obtain the certifications in order to demonstrate that a
specific wind turbine system or installation (facility) meets the specified standards for key
elements such as identification and labeling, design, power performance, noise emissions, and
structural integrity.
Table 5-4: Danish Turbine Approval and Certification Scheme
Programs Contents of the Scheme
Type Approval and
System Certificate - Require general design review
Program - Require review of load and strength calculations(1979-1990)
For all turbines installed in Denmark after July 1, 1992, and all turbines
exported from Denmark in order to obtain export guarantee from the Danish
Wind Turbine Guarantee A/S.
Type Approval and * Require documentation of basic text results for all design criteria of: load
Turbine Certificate cases and loads; fatigue evaluation; safely level; power curves; and
Program noise emissions
(1991 - December - Provide production and installation certification
2004) o quality procedures for manufacturing, transportation, installation and
subsequent servicing of wind turbines
o require manufacturers to have a fully introduced and certified quality
assurance system according to ISO 9000 quality system
Scheme for design, manufacture and installation of both on-shore and off-
shore wind turbines, based on IEC system. There are two main elements:
Type Approval Require type certification (including component certification) based on
Scheme the following elements: design evaluation; type testing; manufacturing
(December 2004 - evaluation; foundation design evaluation; type characteristic
present) measurements; final evaluation report; and type certificate
" Require project certification based on the following elements: site
assessment; foundation design evaluation; installation evaluation;
project certificate; and operational and maintenance (O&M) surveillance
Sources: (Danish Energy Authority 2005b; Dannemand Andersen 1999; lEA 1997)
The Danish type approval of wind turbine became the obligation for eligibility for the
government investment subsidy in 1979 and for connection to the power grid, and has been
performed at the RISO Test Station since 1978. After the repeal of the investment subsidy in
1989, the turbine certification became a requirement for connection to the grid. The 1991
turbine approval scheme required all installed turbines in Denmark and exported turbines to be
certified. The most recent type approval is based on the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC)41 61400 series of standards for wind turbines, which is the mutual basis of
4 IEC is the international standards and conformity assessment body for all fields of electrotechnology.
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international recognition of certification and type testing performed at national level; as a result,
the Danish type approval scheme now has a higher degree of international recognition of
certificates from all over the world and provides easier access for all manufacturers to sell their
products internationally (Table 5-4).
The Danish type approval schemes define three approval classes: A-type approval is issued for
turbine types that obtained a production and installation certificate and documented loads and
strength/service life; B-type approval is issued for turbine types that obtained the same
certification and documentation as A-type approval plus documentation of items judged to have
no essential influence on primary safety could be listed as outstanding items; and C-type
approval is used for test and demonstration wind turbines in connection with development of
new turbine type and for renovation of old turbines in connection with tests (Danish Energy
Authority 2005b; Dannemand Andersen 1999). DEA has been responsible for administration of
all the schemes and RISO manages the approval and certification system as secretariat.
Turbine Ownership Regulations with Criteria for Electricity Consumption
(1976-2000)
Denmark placed ownership regulations from the beginning to ensure that local inhabitants were
the beneficiary of wind turbines and to remove environmental oppositions and encourage wide
acceptance from the neighbors.
Table 5-5: Turbine Ownership Regulations in Denmark
Time Period Contents of the Regulations
Allow turbine ownership by wind cooperative but require geographical area of1979 Rule residency of the member owners to live within 3km of the site
Replace the 3km rule with the demand that wind turbines should be sited
1984 Rule within the supply area of the utility company that serves their owners with no
limitation to the maximum installed capacity
Expand the geographical area of residency of wind turbine owners to 10km of
1985 Rule the site but limit the share of any individual owner to less than 6,000kWh/year
or 135% of the person's electricity consumption
Expand the required geographical area of residency to the neighboring1993- community and the ownership share to 150% of their own yearly consumption
Wind Mill Law Abolish the capacity limit of 150kW
Not all the members of a wind cooperative to be required to live near the wind
plant, just half of them to allow the utilities and townspeople to participate in a
1994 - 1995 wind project.
Expand the size of a cooperative member's share in a wind plant to 20,000
kWh/year, equivalent to an average household's total energy consumption
Expand the cooperative ownership of up to 30,O0OkWh/year by any person1996- who lives or worked in the community or who owns a house or real estate
Transmission Expand turbine ownership to individuals, including farmers, but require to
Rules install turbines on the land owned by the owner
May 21, 2000 Lift all its geographical and quantitative restrictions on wind turbine ownership
Sources: (Guey-Lee 1998; JETRO Copenhagen Office 2003; Moore and Ihle 1999; Van Est 1999)
42 The process evolved into a commercial activity for RISO, by manufacturers paying the full cost of testing and
certification fee. Over the years, the government extended the authority to other organizations such as Norske
Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd.
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The local ownership of turbines was a central part of national policy for the subsidized wind
power development during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s the criteria for electricity
consumption began being coupled with the ownership regulations, in order to prevent anyone
making enormous amount of profit by abusing the government incentives. The ownership rules
were continuously updated until May 21, 2000, when all of such regulations were lifted to open
up the market for investment by any citizen of the EU in any amount of wind power capacity, as
the Danish electricity market was fully liberalized (Table 5-5).
Investment Incentives (1976 - Present)
The Danish government used investment incentives in the form of both direct subsidy and tax
reduction from the beginning. In 1979 a direct subsidy was introduced by the Ministry of Trade
with the collaboration with the Department of Housing as the first concrete support measure for
wind energy. 43 The subsidy was gradually reduced during the following years and repealed in
August 1989 after Danish wind turbines steadily increased their reliability and cost-
effectiveness.44 Tax incentives to support investment for private wind turbine installations were
also employed from the beginning (Table 5-6).
Table 5-6: Investment Incentives on Domestic Wind Investment in Denmark
Programs Contents
InvestmentSubsidy covers certain % of investment cost of wind turbine
(1976 - 1989) 30% (1976-1979), 20% (1980-1981), 30% (1982), 25% (1983-1984),(1976-1989) 20% (1985-1986), 15% (1987-1988), Repealed in 1989
Full Tax Deduction Investment in wind turbines and income from wind investment were
(1976 - 1996) fully tax deductible
Income from wind investment became fully taxable
For owners of individually-owned or company-owned turbines
- Full tax on the income but tax deductions for 30% annual
Reduced Tax Incentives depreciation of the investment and expenditures on O&M costs(1997 - Present) For Shareholders in private cooperative
- The first DKK 3,000 income from selling electricity from wind
plants is tax free and the 60% of the rest is taxed with the usual
marginal income tax percentage 45
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 1998b; Dannemand Andersen 1999; Guey-Lee 1998; Matsuoka 2004;
Moore and Ihle 1999), and Kanoe (1991) cited in BTM Consult ApS 1998b)
43 The goal was to create opportunities for the Danish industry to make series production capacity. The Energy Plan
of 81 shifted the R&D efforts toward smaller turbines as this subsidy stemmed from employment policy.
44Cumulative amount of the support for total of 2,567 turbines installed under this subsidy program was about DKK
275 million (Dannemand Andersen, 1999).
41 Since an individual can own up to 20,000 kWh/year-worth of shares in the cooperatives, this creates a preferable
tax condition for cooperative owners who own fewer turbine shares, and used to spread the ownership to as many
citizens as possible.
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Production Incentives before 2000
The Danish government used production subsidy and feed-in tariff mechanism, which guarantees
the long-term minimum price for wind-generated electricity, in order to stimulate wind power
production.
The Danish production incentives are closely related to the environmental tax system, as tax
began increasing its importance in environmental policy and taking a very tight coupling with
energy policy during the late 1980s. Among the three environment-related taxes, energy tax and
CO 2 tax directly concern wind energy development.46 The first production subsidy started in
1981 and gradually increased; it was set at DKK 0.23/kWh in late 1986. This rate was a refund
of energy tax on electricity produced by fossil fuels outside the business sector. It was reduced
to DKK 0.17/kW in December 1991 but reinforced by the CO2 tax refund of DKK 0.1 0/kWh 47 at
the same time, which made the total production subsidy DKK 0.27/kWh.
Since 1979, the payment for wind power fed into the power grid and the grid connection costs
depended on case-by-case negotiations between the utilities and the wind turbine owners. In
1984 DEA, DWTOA, and DWTMA reached a voluntary agreement on the payment for wind
power to be equal to 85% of the retail electricity price and a set of rules for grid connection cost
calculation and reinforcement of the distribution grid. The Wind Mill Law of 1992 made this
condition mandate, ordering the utilities to pay 85% of the electricity price for household
customers to the wind turbine owners who feed wind-generated electricity to the power grid.
These production incentives were cumulative. The Wind Mill Law and direct production
subsidy ended on December 31, 1999 as the new mechanism was introduced from January 2000,
but the CO2 tax refund continues.
Table 5-7: Production Incentives before 2000 in Denmark
Programs Program Contents
Direct Production To private turbine owners
Subsidy (1981-1999) DKK 0.23/kWh (1987-1991) and DKK 0.17/kWh (1992-1999)
CO2 Tax Refund Refund of CO2 tax of DKK 0.10/kWh(1992 - Present) Utilities became eligible for the refund from 1996
Mandate Danish utilities to pay 85% of the electricity price for
household customers, excluding charges (electricity tax, CO2 tax and
Wind Mill Law S02 tax from 1996 and VAT and administrative costs) for the wind
(1992 - 1999) energy purchased from co-operative and privately owned wind
turbines
Sources: (Dannemand Andersen 1999; Guey-Lee 1998; Moore and Ihle 1999)
46 The other is the SNOX-law, which aims to reduce SO 2 and NOx emissions by 2005, 60 and 50%, respectively
from 1985 levels, was adopted in March 1989.
47 Utilities that generate wind power only received DKK 0.10/kWh reimbursement of the general CO 2 tax on
electricity from 1996.
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Transitional Tariff Rules for Green Electricity and Certificate
(2000 - Present)
Considering the strong trend of the EU favoring a market-based model, Denmark passed the
Danish Electricity Reform Act in June 1999 to change the renewable energy support mechanism
upon an assumption that the feed-in tariff mechanism that uses fixed-price instruments does not
conform the market principles and the liberalization pursued by the EU; the country decided to
shift to a competitive system for wind energy, using the green certificates traded in a special
green market in combination with consumer quota for green electricity specified by the
government from January 2003, as the Danish electricity market was to open to all EU
consumers.
Denmark decided the introduction of the certificate to avoid a conflict between the old feed-in
mechanism and the new liberalized competitive market system of Europe. The new mechanism
is considered as not a state support in legal terms because the premium is financed as an addition
to electricity price per kWh and shared equally among all electricity consumers in relation to
their electricity use and the excess cost of renewable energy has been internalized in the
electricity price. The scheme was confirmed by the EU in September 2000. Meanwhile the
Danish government introduced transitional rules from January 2000 for the introduction of the
certificate.
However, the situation did not turned out as the country expected. The EU approval of the
continuation of the German feed-in tariff mechanism in 2002 under the liberalized market and
the halt of new domestic onshore projects since 2000 under the transitional rules prompted the
government to change the rules frequently and the introduction of green certificate has been
postponed several times.
The interim tariff schemes were elaborate ones, combining the timing of turbine commission, the
age of turbines, and the number of load hours. In general, the interim scheme reduced the
purchase tariffs about 28% (DKK 0.60/kWh of rate at the end of 1999 to DKK 0.43/kWh from
January 2000) for turbines installed on and after January 1, 2000. Upon the establishment of the
green certificate market in 2003, the government was planning to replace the 0.43/kWh of tariffs
with the market price of the certificate (Appendix A-2).
With the poor market responses to the new mechanism, however, the Danish government
concluded that the scheme was impracticable for the time being, and the introduction of the
certificates have been temporarily replaced by a premium of DKK 0.10/kWh in 2003. The
scheme up on the DEA web site as of May 30, 2005 states total of the market price and the
subsidy as the tariff (Appendix A-3). The market price for electricity is defined as the spot
market price at NordPool in the area that the turbine is connected.
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Turbine Repowering Schemes
Denmark has placed the incentives to reduce the number of smaller-capacity turbines while
increasing the country's wind generation capacity by replacing older and less efficient turbines
with newer and more cost effective models (Table 5-8).
Table 5-8: Danish Turbine Repowering Scheme
Programs Contents
Direct subsidy to replace old small turbines (55kW) with new large onesFirst Replacement 48 (600-750kW) and remove the first generation turbines placed before
Program (1 994-1997) planning and zoning requirements to avoid noise and visual pollution
Set aside up to DKK 10 million ($1.5 million) annually. Measures were:
- Lower the price for electricity produced by turbines older than ten
years
- Issue scrap guarantees for machines taken off line between March
1999 and December 2003. For a scrapped turbine of 100kW or
Danish Electricity less, an owner can receive a guaranteed payment of DKK
Reform Act of 1999 0.60/kWh for 12,000 full load hours from a machine with three
(Spring 2001 - times the capacity. For turbines of 100 to 150kW investment under
December 2003) the same conditions can be made in a turbine of twice the old
unit's capacity.
- In addition to their guaranteed ten year base payment, turbines
built from 2000-2002 receive at least DKK 0.10/kWh from sales of
green credits to consumers or utilities. They will not receive the
DKK 0.17/kWh production subsidy.
Turbines connected to the grid between 4/1/2000 and 1/1/2004.
- An extra premium of DKK 0.17/kWh for 12,000 full load hours for
the production covered by a removing certificate from a 150 kW or
less turbine decommissioned between 3/3/1999 and 12/31/2003.
Turbines on land connected to the grid between 1/1/2005 and
Replacement Program 12.31/2009
(late 2004-2009) - An extra premium up to DKK 0.12/kWh for 12,000 full load hours
for production covered by a removing certificate from a 450 kW or
less turbine decommissioned between 12/15/2004 and
12/15/2009. The premium is regulated in relation to the market
price as the total of premiums and market price must not exceed
DKK 0.48/kWh.
Sources, DEA (www.end.dk) (Dannemand Andersen 1999)
Spatial Planning Regulations
Denmark has three levels of spatial planning: 1) location of turbines, how to be located
(individuals, clusters, parks), tower types, color, and distance to roads and dwellings, which are
decided at municipality level; 2) issuance of zoning and installation permit and guidelines, which
are decide at regional planning at county level; and 3) national planning, which is coordinated by
the Ministry of Environment and Energy. There was no consistent planning or siting procedure
for wind turbine installation until 1995. Spatial planning regulations began implemented from
the mid 1990s to balance wind energy interests against other interests (Table 5-9).
48 The scheme was not attractive enough; only 36 turbines were replaced with 31 new turbines (Dannemand
Andersen, 1999).
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Table 5-9: Spatial Planning Regulations in Denmark
Regulations Contents
Municipality Planning All Danish municipalities to have planning for siting of reasonable(1995 - Present) number of wind turbines within their districts as of July 1, 1995
Building Legislation Installation of wind turbines does not presuppose permission in terms ofbuilding codes but type approval
Environmental Wind turbine proximity guidelines decide distance between: turbines
Protection Act and coastlines (300m); lakes and streams (150m); forests (300m),ancient monuments (100m); and churches (300m)
Source: (Dannemand Andersen 1999)
Noise Regulations (1991 - Present)
Noise has been a strong concern over wind energy development from the beginning. The first
special legislation on wind turbine noise emission was introduced in May 1991. The Ministry of
Environment and Energy Executive Order no. 304 regulates that noise must not exceed 45dB
outdoors at the nearest habitation in rural areas and 40dB in residential areas and other noise
sensitive areas planned for institutions, non-permanent dwellings or allotment-gardens, or for
recreation. In case of complaints, emission measurements are performed according to the
legislation, i.e., on a plate on the ground at a distance of 1-2 times the hub height of the turbine.
Noise imission at the dwelling of the complainant is then calculated (Dannemand Andersen
1999).
Grid Connection and Reinforcement Policy
In 1979 the Ministry of Environment ordered the utilities to provide system-approved wind
turbines to the power grid and to pay fair rates for electricity fed into the grid. In 1984, the
utilities began paying 35% of the grid connection costs.
The Executive Order on Grid Connection of Wind Turbines was issued in 1996, and then the
Danish Electricity Reform Act of 1999 formalized the areas of existing practice with regard to
the grid connection. According to the Order and the regulations, local power distribution
companies are obliged to provide grid connection facilities at any site that municipal planning
designated for wind turbine installation. In other cases, power companies are obliged to allow
wind projects grid access to the local gird, but the extension to the grid is to be paid by the owner
up to the point of connection. Necessary reinforcement of the gird must be paid by the power
companies, but the wind turbine owners must pay for transformer and rental fee of electricity
meter. Reactive power consumption is not charged.
Agreement with Utilities
The Danish government has forced the utilities to participate in wind development by forming
agreements that obligate them to install wind power projects from 1985. The agreements were
replaced with new ones over years, as the targets of the old ones were met (Table 5-10).
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Table 5-10: Utility Agreements in Denmark
Agreements Contents
First 100MW agreement Mandated to be fulfilled within five years. Fully implemented in 1992,
(1985) including Vindeby Offshore Wind Farm (1991)
Second 100MW
Agreement Mandated to be fulfilled by the end of 1993. Fully implemented in 1996,
(Energy 2000, 1990- including Tuno Knob Offshore Wind Farm (1995)
1995)
Agreent (196) Mandate to fulfill by the end of 1999
Reaching a target of 1500MW owned by private sector and utilities by
Energy Plan of 1996 2005. Targeted to be reached by the end of 2000
First 750MW Offshore Five large offshore farms to fulfill 750MW installation between 2001 and
Agreement (1997) 2008
Offshore Policy and Regulations
Denmark started exploring the opportunities for offshore wind farm from 1977. The effort
accelerated during the 1980s, as the first 100MW agreement between the utilities and the
government in 1985 soon encountered the difficulties of securing land and gaining permission to
site large scale wind farms on land. The Ministry of Energy set up a Committee for Offshore
Wind Farms in November 1987 and began searching for suitable sites and technology. Two
studies (1987, 1995) were conducted to explore regulatory condition for offshore development
and to create a mapping of potential sites.
After two demonstration farms were constructed as a part of the government-utility installation
agreement during the 1990s, the Danish Electricity Reform Act of 1999 formalized the following
regarding the future offshore wind farm development: 1) the right to exploit energy from water
and wind within the territorial waters and the economical zone (up to 200 miles nautical miles)
around Denmark belongs to the Danish Government; 2) procedure for the approval of electricity
production from water and wind and pre-investigation of such within the national territorial
waters and within the economical zone belong to Denmark; and 3) establishment of a central
tender procedure as well as an alternative procedure.
The establishment of offshore wind farm requires a permit and license for operation after
submitting Environmental Impact Assessment and going through public hearings. The six
offshore wind farms built since 1991 have demonstration status, which obligates the
comprehensive environmental measurement and monitoring; in particular, investigation of the
effects of the marine environment has been conducted in these farms, along with evaluation of
economic and technical aspects (IEA 2003).
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Export Assistance/Development Assistance Programs
Both DANIDA and RISO have been actively involved wind energy technology transfer and
development in developing countries since the early 1980s. In terms of export policy, a couple
of export assistances have been provided for the Danish companies to seek opportunities oversea,
in order to strengthen the Danish industry position in the world. However, the support has been
indirect; there have never been official direct export policy or financial schemes to support
export of Danish turbines (Krohn 1998).
Tax benefits on oversea wind project investment was provided to increase Danish investments in
the United States between 1986 and 1989, which helped the Danish manufacturers continue to
export their turbines to the US market after the California market crash of 1986. In this scheme,
the Danish investors in the US wind projects received tax benefits and a Danish firm TIFCO
helped the tax arrangement for those Danish investors (Madsen 2005).
Table 5-11: Danish Export/Development Assistance Programs
Schemes Contents
Wind Turbine The private company warrants long-term finance of large projects with
Guarantee Company Danish wind turbines outside Denmark, in order to guarantee project(late 1980s -) performance and insurance to find willing investors to oversea projects.
Providing bilateral grants and project development loans to qualified
importing developing countries in order to strengthen the Danish
industry position. The grants are typically tied aids that require using
Danish technologies; 50% of contract value must be of Danish origin,
ANidA Dome and the grants are provided to form joint ventures that pave a way for
future development using soft loans tied to the purchase of Danish
equipment directly or setting up a licensing agreement with Danish
firms to manufacture locally. Such loans have lower interest rates and
longer payback periods than market loans, but the exact terms are
determined by importing country government.
RISO help international wind energy projects and engage in direct
technology transfer activities. The services include:
- engage in design and supply of equipment for technology centres
and in building type approval and certification schemes
- offer wind turbine tests and measurements
RISO WindConsult offer consulting services and technical assistance in all technical
(1980-) phases of wind farm development and implementation in closecollaboration with recipients on contract with DANIDA, UNDP, the
World Bank, and EU-programmes, as well as private investors,
industry, power companies, banks and others
- study the feasibility of various types of wind power projects
- provide dedicated training based on training needs assessment for
capacity building at RISO or on location
Sources: (Guey-Lee 1998; Van Est 1999), http://www.risoe.dk/windconsult/
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5.2.2 Germany
The main wind energy policy instruments in Germany have been feed-in-tariff system,
investment subsidies, R&D supports, the 100MW/250MW programs, and investment assistances
through loan programs. There had been also tax benefits through linear depreciation as well as
promotion policies by several states.
Research, Development and Demonstration (R&DD) (1977 - Present)
Wind energy R&DD program in Germany started in 1974. R&DD programs were the only
substantial measure in Germany to push renewable energy during the 1970s and 1980s.
The failure of the Growian projects led the government to concentrate on smaller-scale turbine
development from 1986 to 1989. Demonstration projects became a part of the R&D program in
the 1980s, and several of them subsidized the investments in wind turbines (Hemmelskamp,
1998 cited in Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). During the 1990s, the federal R&D program became
co-financed by the industry and the supports for diverse types of projects continue until today
(Appendix A-4), but in general, the German renewable energy R&DD has shifted its focus from
R&D to demonstration.
Wind energy R&DD is a part of Energy Research and Energy Technology Program by the
federal government. The fourth phase of the program has been administered by BMBF since
1996 and by BMWi since December, 1998. In addition, BMWi initiated Investment Program for
the Future (ZIP) from 2001, and BMU published a new R&D strategy for renewable energy in
November 2004 (Table 5-12).
Total R&DD budget goes to wind energy in Germany is larger than that of Denmark. However,
the ratio of wind energy R&DD to the total budget is much smaller (average 3.5% of total energy
R&DD and average 18.6% of renewable energy), as Germany has much larger total budget for
energy R&DD in general than Denmark. The annual growth rate of wind energy R&DD is
4.1%, compared to 16.5% of Denmark. The large budget was allocated to wind in the early
1980s when the total energy R&DD increased, but the amount decreased in the late 1980s. The
importance of wind energy in energy R&DD definitely increased in the 1990s again; the ratio of
wind energy budget in total energy R&DD increased gradually from 1993 and the fourth phase
of Energy Research and Energy Technology Program from 1996 pushed the budget to over USD
30 million, while the total energy R&DD budget was reduced. In recent years the wind energy
R&DD budget has been decreased, compared to that of 1990s (Appendix A-5).
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Table 5-12: Government Wind Energy R&DD Programs in Germany
Programs Program Contents
3MW Growian 1 (1979 -1988) funded by BMFT
R&DD in the 1970s 10MW Growian 11 funded by BMFT and the European Community
and 1980s 46 projects for turbine development in various scale (1977 - 1991)
Demonstration programs from the 1980s
Aim of the 4th Phase (1996 -) - Support of basic research for:
- Improvement of performance and reliability of existing techniques;
Energy Research - Development and demonstration of technological concepts for the future
and Energy 250MW Wind Programandcnergy El Dorado (see Oversea Development Assistance program)Technology Scientific Measurement and Evaluation Program (WMEP) (1991- 2006)
Program - Data measurement of turbines installed under the 100MW/250MW Wind
Program through the contract with ISET. Phase IV (July 2000-) covers
operation of turbines that were not installed by the 250MW Program
Support for R&D projects of environment-saving energy technologies during
Investment a limited period of three years by annual budgets of EUR 41 million.
Program for the Offshore Measuring Platform ProgramPturoa fr h 3-4 Platforms in the North and Baltic Sea to collect offshore data for the
(2001-) certification of offshore wind systems and operatorso Part A - technical and meteorological measurement
o Part B - biological investigations
Main goals for wind are as follows:
- Reduce the costs and to increase the yield of electricity from wind
energy by: improving adjustment and monitoring technology; using new
materials; optimizing offshore foundations; reducing mass of wind
turbines; reducing mechanical loads on wind turbine structures/
New R&D foundations; upgrading automation in the production process of wind
Measures by BMU turbines; and improving measuring and testing technologies
(November 2004 - * Integrate large amounts of electrical energy produced from wind:
Present) o conceptions for grid integration of offshore wind farms
o technologies for power management in the grid
o improvement of yield prognosis
o specific aspects of energy storage with respect to wind energy
" Conduct ecological research along with offshore wind energy
deployment
Sources: (IEA 2001; IEA 2002a; IEA 2003; IEA 2004; lEA 2005)
Federal Combination Program - IOOMW/250MW Wind Program
(1989 - 1996 for subsidy and data analysis, the latter continues until 2006)
The technology-push only policy for wind energy changed in 1989; the federal government
began providing the first combination program of market stimulation and scientific program.
The 100MW Wind Program was created to stimulate technology development and the
manufacturing industry building and to acquire statistical data on the operation of wind turbines
simultaneously. The target of the program was upgraded in 1991 to 250MW and their statistical
measurement was operated until 2006.
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The program provided the investment subsidy grants for installation and operation of wind
turbines at suitable sites, but only for private investors, not for utilities. In addition to a
guaranteed production subsidy per kWh (DM 0.06-0.08/kWh), the subsidies up to 25% of the
investment costs with a maximum ceiling49 were available to private investors. The last grants
were approved in 1996 for the turbines to be connected to the grid by the mid 1998.
The projects were selected in order to encourage a wide range of experiments from different
applicants for various types of turbines. All turbines installed under the program by receiving
the financial support were required to be monitored and analyzed for ten years under the
Scientific Measurement and Evaluation Program (WMEP) (Table 5-12).
Production Incentives (1991 - Present)
The Law on Feeding Electricity from Renewable Sources into the Public Network (Electricity
Feed-in Law, EFL) came into effects on January 1, 1991, in order to increase the share of
electricity produced by renewable energy sources. The law mandated the utilities to accept
electricity produced by independent wind turbines and to pay a fixed rate to it, equal to 90% of
the retail residential price.5 0 The payment was put on top of the 100/250MW program subsidy
as well as various state program benefits. The Amendment of the EFL came into force in April
1998; it did not influence the tariff structure but specified financial charges by different utilities
and set a date for reconsideration. The EFL was effect until March 31, 2000.
Although the EFL was a very effective measure to start and flourish the German wind energy
market, the law had a few difficulties: 1) the tariffs were not financed from taxes but from
revenues of the utilities, which distorted the competition among the utilities; 2) the premiums
were applied only to the non-utility sector and the utilities were not eligible; and 3) because the
tariffs were based on the utility revenues, they went down when electricity prices, hence the
revenues, went down, and this was especially evident after the market liberalization of 1998.
There features of the EFL caused prolonged oppositions from the utilities and some regional rate
payers.
A new law, the Renewable Energy Source Act (EEG) replaced this original feed-in law and
became operational on April 1, 2000. The EEG continues and strengthens the basic principles
from the EFL, while aiming to double the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption
by 2010, committing strongly toward climate change mitigation, addressing the liberalization of
the EU electricity market, and easing the problems of the EFL mentioned above. The biggest
controversy was whether or not the feed-in mechanism is in conflict with the EU State Aid rules
or with the rules of the Single Market. In March 2001, the EU Court confirmed that the feed-in
mechanisms are not in conflict with either rules and the feed-in schemes are being preserved in
both Germany and Spain.
49 The amount of ceiling changed over the years.
50 Tariffs for biomass, hydro, sewage and landfill gas installation under 0.5MW are 80% of retail residential prices,
and tariffs for hydro, sewage and landfill gas installation between 0.5 and 5MW are 65% of retail residential prices.
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Table 5-13: Production Incentives in Germany
Programs Program Contents
Mandated German utilities to accept electricity produced by independent wind
turbines and to pay a fixed rate, equal to 90% of the retail residential price, forElectricit Feed- electricity from wind and solar power, putting on top of the 100/250MW
1991- 3/2000) program subsidy as well as various state program benefits.The regulatory authority fixed tariffs for one-year period based on the value of
the average utility revenue per kWh sold, drawn from an official statistics.
1998 EFL Not influence the tariff structure but specified the financial charges of different
Amendment utilities and set a date for reconsideration. 5% cap on electricity generated by
(1998- 3/2000) renewable resources
Require grid operators, not utilities, to pay the feed-in tariffs, but the utilities still
have obligations to take the electricity produced from renewable energy
sources. The payment is put on top of the 100/250MW program subsidy as
Renewable well as various state program benefits.
Energy Source Wind energy premium tariffs are EUR 0.091/kWh (DM 0.178/kWh) for five
Act (EEG, 4/2000 years (nine years for offshore wind farms commissioned before 2007) from theA (ee, 4 date of commissioning, and the possible extension above five years will be
- Present ) decided by an algorism.51 From January 1, 2002, the tariffs will be reduced by
1.5% annually for new installations commissioned between 2002 and 2004,
52and reduced 2% annually for new installation after 2005. The expiration date
of the tariffs is 20 years from the installation.
2004 EEG Make it compulsory for grid operators to give priority to feeding electricity from
Amendment renewable energies into the grid and to pay fixed prices
(7/21/2004 - Reduction of onshore wind premium, but improvement of offshore premium
Present) tariffs from nine years to 12 years for projects commissioned before 2010
Sources: (Lauber and Mez 2004; Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006)
The EEG has the following important features: 1) the tariffs are not dependent on the market
price of energy but are defined by the law for the period of 20 years; 2) the grid operators whose
grid is closest to the renewable energy installation pay the tariffs and their costs are covered by
an additional fee aided by all consumers, although the utilities still have obligations to take the
electricity produced by renewable energy sources; 3) the same premium tariffs are applied to
both utilities and private investors; and 4) the tariffs are different for different renewable energy
sources, and are decreased over the years in order to take technological learning curves into
account.
The EEG was amended on July 21, 2004 to differentiate and develop the framework for
electricity from renewable energies further. The Amendament grants priority to renewable
energy sources and makes it compulsory for the grid operators to give a priority and pay the
fixed prices to electricity fed by renewable energies into the grid.
" The algorism favors sites with less wind resources in relation to a reference site (mean wind speed of 5.5m/s at
30m above ground, a logarithmic wind shear profile and a roughness length of 0. 1m for each site.
52 The tariffs are only paid to the generators within the territorial scope of the Act, or within Germany's exclusive
economic zone, and cover both on-shore and off-shore projects.
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Table 5-14: Feed-in Tariff Rates for Wind under EFL (DM/kWh)
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1 1995 1996 1997 1 1998 1 1999 1 2000
Rate 0.1661 0.1653 0.1657 0.1693 0.1728 0.1721 0.1715 0.1679 0.1652 0.1613
Source: (Lauber and Mez 2004)
Table 5-15: Feed-in Tariff Rates for Wind under EEG (EUR cents/kWh)
2004 EEG Annual Reduction2000-01 2002 2003 Amend. From From
2002 2005
Onshore < 5 yrs 9.1* 9.0 8.87 8.7
> 5 yrs 6.19 6.1 6.01 5.5
Offshore < 9 yrs 9.1 9.0 8.87 9.1** 1.5% 2%
> 9 yrs 6.19 6.1 6.01 6.19***
* 9.1 EUR cents = 0.178 DM/kWh
** applied for 12 years to offshore projects commissioned before 2010.
*** applied to all other offshore projects.
Source: (Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006)
Investment Assistance - Federal Loan Programs for Renewable Energy
Projects (1990 - Present)
Investment assistance, providing low interest loans for renewable energy projects, has been also
available to address capital market failure.
Table 5-16: Low Interests Loans by National Banks in Germany
Loan Programs Contents
Environment and Available for up to 50% of the cost of a wind project, provided to the
Energy Saving Program project undertaken by small companies with an annual turnover up toEn herg Sairoram EUR 250 million, self employed people or public-private partnerships.of the European Private households can apply up to 100% of qualifying costs up to 20
RecoERy 1Program years. Interest is 0% for the first two years, increasing by 1% each year(ERP, 1990 ) thraer 53
Available over ten, 15, and 20 years at interest rates 1-2% lower thanEnvironmental Fund by market rates for up to 75% of the capital investment, or 100% for smallDtA and KfW (1990 -) and medium-capacity companies.
Sources: (Lauber and Mez 2004; Moore and Ihle 1999; Wind Power Monthly 2002a)
Two federal loans have been administered by the state-owned Deutch Ausgleichsbank (DtA)
(Table 5-16). One is the environment and energy saving program of the European Recovery
Program (ERP), which taps into the funds created under the Marshall Plan. The other is the
environmental program under DtA and KfW. Small farmers and cooperatives are encouraged to
use the latter. Between 1990 and 1995, more than 1,500 wind projects were granted the ERP
loan and the Kfw and DtA loan, and about 80% of all turbines installed by 1998 were supported
by these loan programs (Krohn 1998). In addition, the agricultural financing institutes offer low
5 In western Germany, up to ten year loans are available (15 years for construction projects) with up to two years of
grace on repayments. Loans in the east are for 15 and 20 years, respectively, with up to five years grace before
repayment. The loan limit is EUR 0.5 million in western Germany and EUR 1 million in the east. The limits can be
exceeded for environmental projects (Wind Power Monthly. 2002a).
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interest loans for wind turbine investment by farmers. Up to 90% of the investment can be
financed by the loan.
Fiscal Incentives
Fiscal incentives for wind project investments were also provided in a form of tax benefits.
However, the government reduced the benefits over the years in order to shift the source of an
investor's earning from tax savings to power generation (Table 5-17).
Table 5-17: Tax Incentives for Wind Projects in Germany
Regulations Contents
Reduce investor taxable income by about 10% of the turnkey cost per year
with a linear depreciation
Depreciation - Until the end of June 1997: linear depreciation of ten years
- From July 1997: linear depreciation of 12 years
- From January 2000: linear depreciation of 16 years
" Projects applied before March 5, 1999: No limits on the amount of income
tax deduction (All losses could be subtracted)
" Projects applied after March 5, 1999:
o A DM 200,000 cap on total deduction in all investments (wind
Taxable Income investment losses can be fully offset against gains in other investment
Deduction earning). Beyond the cap, only 50% of wind investment losses can be
tax deductible.
o Special tax write-off rules allowing artificially high accounting losses,
applicable only in eastern Germany, have been abolished.
o Wind project financing companies are no longer allowed to actively
advertise wind investment as tax write-off.
Sources: (Guey-Lee 1998; lEA 2001; Wind Power Monthly 1999a)
Eco-tax (1999 - Present)
The eco-tax reform, passed in April, 1999, introduced a tax on consumption of electricity except
that from renewable energy sources and raised the exiting mineral oil taxes on petrol, diesel,
natural gas and various mineral oils. DM 0.02/kWh of the tax was added to the overall prices of
electricity, but did not raise the wind feed-in tariffs. Tax levels increased in five steps by 2003,
and a part of the revenues is used for promotion of renewable energy (Lauber and Mez 2004).
Spatial Planning Regulations (1994 - Present)
Before 1994 there was no ways for communities to stop turbine siting, as most of wind
installations were built under the utility privilege permitted to the facilities for public electricity
generation or the farm-related buildings built freely by farmers. In 1994, the first spatial
planning restrictions and regulations were introduced in order to create ease for large wind
projects in terms of land development as well as encourage harmonious development with their
neighbors. In the same year, a court order blocked installation of single turbine over 100kW in
non-built up areas, denying the wind turbine privilege. However, the 1997 Building Statue Book
Amendment restored the wind turbines privilege, made it easier to gain building permission, and
forced every local community to create wind turbine zoning.
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Table 5-18: Spatial Regulations in Germany
Regulations Contents
Block the installation of single turbine over 100kW in non-built up areas.
1994 Court Single turbines with rated capacities higher than around 80 kW can only be
Restriction installed after a building plan or area usage plan has been drawn up and
passed by local government.
Reintroduction of privileged status to single wind turbines in open countryside
1997 Amendment by giving single wind turbines the same status in planning law as farm
to Building Statue building, radio masts and nuclear power stations, making it easier to gain
Book building permission from the beginning of 1997.Local authorities are given the greatest decision making power, and every
local community is mandated to present zoning plan appropriate for wind
turbines. Without wind turbine zoning, privilege is given to wind turbine.
Require wind installations of three or more turbines to be approved under the
.i n . Protection against Emissions Act. Projects under five turbines undergo aLicensing simplified procedure, while stations of 6 to 19 machines must undergo the fullProcedure procedure. Projects of 20 or more turbines must always have an EIA.(2001 - present) Individual or a pair of turbines needs to be licensed under the old building law
system.
Sources: (Wind Power Monthly 1996g; Wind Power Monthly 2001d)
Grid Connection and Reinforcement Policy
The turbine owners in Germany must pay for any costs incurred by grid reinforcement or
extension caused by wind turbine installation. A new rule from January 2000 decided that power
stations including wind plants will not have to pay the grid use charges like other electricity
market players. In addition, the grid users have become to pay a single, all inclusive annual
charge, and the distance dependent components, where extra charges were levied for
transmission over longer distance, were dropped.
Noise Regulation
The Federal Clean Air Act of 1974 forms the legal base for noise pollution in Germany.
Table 5-19: Noise Regulations in Germany
Area Day Night
Industrial Area (industriallbusiness & commercial) 70 dB / 65 dB 70 dB / 50 dB
Mixed residential area and Industry or Residential 60 dB 45 dBareas mixed with industry
Purely residential areas with no commercial 55 dB/ 50 dB 40 dB/ 35 dBdevelopments (General Residential/Pure Residential)
Areas with hospitals, health resorts, etc. 45 dB 35 dB
Note: Calculation of sound propagation is done according to DIN ISO 9613-2. All calculations
have to be done with a reference wind speed of 1Oin/s at 1Om heights.
Sources: (Pedersen and Halmstad 2003)
Environmental Regulation on Blade Materials (1995 -Present)
From January 1995, styrol emissions during the production of rotor blades using polyester have
to be 20 parts per million (ppm) or below.
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Turbine Certification and Approval (1992 - Present)
The turbine certification is governed not by the federal laws but by the state laws in Germany.
However, there are a common set of regulations for loads, towers, and foundations, as there is
general consensus among the states on requirements for building structures and loads even
though the building laws are not a federal law. On the other hand, the rules for safety systems
and requirements on machinery and electrics may vary among states. A type approval granted in
one state is valid in other states. The German Institute for Civil Engineering is responsible for
development of new regulations.
The German type approval has two components: examination of loads and machinery that is
carried out only by the testing bodies approved in accordance with legal regulation such as
CIWI/ECN, Germanischer Lloyd, RISO, and TUV; and approval of tower and foundations that
can only be carried out by the authorities. Electrical systems are not checked by a third party.
There is no commonly agreed set of rules and standards on examination of machinery. In 1993
the standards requiring power curves to be determined by the qualified organization were
adopted, and the grid compatibility testing was added in the mid 1990s (Sawin 2001). Many
designs were approved with reference to Germanischer Lloyd's Regulations (Nath et al. 1999).
Table 5-20: An Example of Approval and Certification Service in Germany
Policy Contents
Verification of the fatigue and extreme loads
- Assessment of the safety and control system
- Safety configuration and operational assumptions
Certification and Design assessment by thorough recalculation for: rotor blades and
machinery components; tower and foundations; electrical
components and control system
Power curve measurement
Grid compatibility testing
Review of the operating and maintenance instructions
Approval of Tower and Evaluation of the structural components includes investigation of
Foundation strength and of the service life of these key components
Product certification - Inspection and approval of materials and components
and manufacturing - Review of material and quality assurance records
inspections - Production supervision for blades, machine components, tower andfoundations
Source: (TUV Industrie Service GmbH)
Federal and State Industrial Policy
After the reunification of 1990, the federal government offered subsidies for industries in the
former East Germany to build up production plants, in order to stimulate industrial development
there (Michaelowa 2004). At state level, some states also had explicit and implicit industrial
policy to protect the German wind turbine manufacturers and suppliers and created a temporary
quasi-protected market from foreign manufacturers for the German manufacturers to increase
domestic supply. At the end of the 1980s, for example, the state of North Rhein-Westfalia
created a program that only the Tacke turbines were eligible for 50% of the investment subsidy
(Tacke 2000, cited in Johnson and Jacobsson, 2000). Enercon was also benefited from the state
policy; it helped to sell its turbines to the local utilities (Johnson and Jacobsson 2000), and the
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strong local bias helped Husumer Schiffswerft (HSW) as supplier of turbines to its local market
as well (Johnson and Jacobsson 2000).
State Support Policies for Market Development
Many state governments have provided wind energy promotion policy through investment
subsidies, tax incentives and soft loans. For the period of 1991-97, total support at state level
(EUR 218 million) actually exceeded than those at federal level (EUR 148 million) (Neij et al.
2003). In general, those policies were consistent over the years or gradually reduced, but not
increased. Six states (Bremen, Mecklenburg - Vorpommern, Neidersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz,
Scheleswig-Holstein) withdrew their support policy by 1997. With the great success with the
federal feed-in tariff mechanism, most of the states stopped their support programs for wind after
2000, while some inland states continued direct funding supports, e.g., Nordreihn-Westfalia.
Table 5-21: Summary of State Support Policy in Germany until 1999
State Promotion Scheme Contents
Baden- 1996 Investment Subsidy (25%)
Wurttemberg 1997 -1998 Soft loans with 3% lower than market rate for 15 years with ceiling
Bayern 1993 -1999 Investment subsidies (30% of cost, reduced to 10% from 1996)with a ceiling
Bremen 1993-1995 Promotion according to nacelle height, rotor diameter, location andinvestment cost with a ceiling of 33% of investment cost
Brandenburg 1993 -1999 Investment subsidies (rates varied between 20% to 30% of cost)with a changing ceiling
1993 - 1997 Investment subsidies (30% of cost, reduced gradually to 5% in
Hamburg 1997)
1994 - 1998 Production incentives of 0.10 DM/kWh for ten years
Investment subsidies (rates were gradually reduced from 50% of
Hessen 1993- 1999 cost to 20% in 1996) Maximum ceiling applied from 1997
according to plant size
Mecklenburg - 1993 - 1997 Investment subsidy (rates were gradually reduced from 20% of
Vorpommern cost to 10% in 1997)
Neidersachsen 1993 - 1994 Subsidy for turbine cost
1993-1998 Investment subsidies with various methods of determining ceiling
. 1993 -19 (percentage of investment cost in 1993, subsidy per rotor diameterNordrhein combined with noise level from 1994 to 1998)
1996 - 1999 Soft loans with 3.5% to 4% lower than market rate for ten to 11
years
Rheinland- 1993 - 1997 Investment subsidies (20% to 25% of cost) with a ceilingPfalz _________________________________
Saarland 1993- 1999 Investment subsidy (20% of cost) with a ceiling
Sachsen- 1993 -1999 Subsidy for 30% of installation and commissioning cost with max
Anhalt 3,000 DM /kW
Scheleswig- 1993 - 1996 Subsidy for turbine cost (up to 17% of cost from 1994)Holstein
Thuringen 1993 - 1999 Investment subsidies with a ceiling
Sources: Interpolated from (BWE 1993; BWE 1994; BWE 1996; BWE 1997; BWE 1998; BWE1999)
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Offshore Policy (2000 - Present)
The German offshore policy started with the EEG, which created the framework for offshore
wind development (Table 5-22). In 2001 offshore wind development was begun discussed by
the representatives of research institutes, associations that concern wind energy, and the
ministries intensively. BMU published a report in June 2001, which set the future development
targets (500MW by 2007 2,000 to 3,000MW by 2010, and 25,000MW by 2030).
ZIP initiated offshore measurement platform projects in 2001, and the first offshore measuring
platform FINO 1 was built in 2003. With these intensive efforts since 2000, the German
government formulated the Strategy of the German Government on the Use of Offshore Wind
Energy. A stricter permission procedure is required for offshore projects (IEA 2005).
Table 5-22: Offshore Development Policy in Germany
Policy Contents
Provide the tariff system for offshore plants (Table 5-15).
EEG (2000 and 2004) Define offshore plants as the ones in German territorial waters and theGerman zone outside of the 12 nautical miles zone, or the German
exclusive economic zone.
Offshore Measurement Hydrological, meteorological, oceanographic, environmental and
Platform under ZIP physical data collection for the construction of offshore wind plants in
(2001 - Present) the North Sea
Sets the target to install 2,000 MW by 2010. Default conditions are:
- Natural, environmental and economic viability
- Step-by-step approach implementation taking into consideration
technical, economic, and legal uncertainties
- Clarification of the legal situation within the 12-nautical miles zone
Strategy of the German and in the Exclusive
Government on the Use - Set up of Economic Zone (EEZ) (environment/ nature protection,
of Offshore Wind Energy investment security) and the resulting revision of the Federal
Nature Conservation Act and Offshore Installations Ordinance
- Expansion of technical and ecological research
- Identification of suitable areas, considering competing forms of use
in the EEZ areas such as fisheries, extraction of mineral resources,
navigation, military uses, and environment protection.
Sources: (IEA 2002a; IEA 2003; lEA 2005)
Oversea Development Assistance Programs (1991 - Present)
Germany has had three oversea aid programs: El Dorado Program, Technical Expertise for
Renewable Energy Application (TERNA), and Public-Private Partnership Program (Table 5-23).
El Dorado Program is an export assistant program for the German manufacturers and offered
financial supports for those which embarked on export to developing countries in other climate
zones.
Meanwhile, GTZ started the third-world development and technical assistance in wind energy
(TERNA) in the late 1980s by focusing on stand-alone installation of 50-70 kW capacity
turbines. GTZ shifted its focus to grid-connected wind development then. Unlike the DANIDA
support, TERNA does not have the purpose of stimulating the use of German turbine technology
but providing neutral and objective advice to the third world; it has been very successful.
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Another GTZ program, Public-Private Partnership Program, started in 2003, offers project
investment support for the oversea projects.
Table 5-23: Oversea Development Aid Programs by German Government
Programs Contents
Export assistance program to give wind turbine manufacturers a chance
to test and demonstrate their machines in other climate zones and
strengthening the German industry position in those countries.
El Dorado (1991 - 1999) Administered by BMFT until 1998 and then by BMWi
- Grants up to 70% of the purchase price of the technology and the
cost of its international transport
- Support amounted to about 50% of the total cost of each venture
Provide neutral and objective advice to the third world on potential wind
projects. Administered by GTZ
- TERNA helps: searching for funding (TERNA itself does not provide
enical Epere f finance); wind resource finding and measuring; building cooperative
ReplicatneableEnrelationship with the developing country agency; and assisting pre-
A c (TERNA - &resen) feasibility study
- Project initiation by developers for TERNA support by pushing the
local utility to receive government backing for its TERNA application.
No application for relevant government involved required.
Encourage private investors to undertake wind energy projects in
developing countries. Administered by GTZ Sustainable Energy
System's department.
Public-Private - GTZ providing technical and advisory support
Partnership Program - GTZ offering a limited guarantee to participate in the program; if the
(2003 - Present) results of a feasibility study for wind station do not look promising,
the developer can claim back 33% of the costs of the study, or 50%
if tit has commissioned another company to carry out the work. The
upper limit for reimbursement is EUR 100,000.
Sources: (Abramowski and Posprski 2000; Guey-Lee 1998; lEA 2001; Wind Power Monthly 1996h;
Wind Power Monthly 2003a)
5.2.3 EU-Wide Initiatives for MW-class Wind Turbine Development
In addition to the R&DD supported by national governments, multinational European R&D
collaborations started during the mid 1980s.
The EU programs continuously supported the development of large-scale wind turbines, even
after the attempts by many national governments failed and they withdrew their programs during
the 1980s. The EU programs turned their focus from developing radical new concepts to
upscaling successful turbine designs in the 1990s. The main objective was to develop large
turbines suitable for the incorporation into the utility grid.
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JOULE Program - WEGA and THERMIE
The EC has been the center of such collaborations. The EC support was provided through a
R&D program called JOULE (energy R&DD program by the EU). Within JOULE, wind
specific R&D for development of large turbines is called WEGA Program.54  WEGA was
extended into two phases: WEGA I during the 1980s and WEGA II during the 1990s.
WEGA I started in 1984 and built three MW-class experimental turbines by 1986: Tjaereborg
2MW in Denmark built by a Danish utility subsidiary; AWEC-60 1.2MW in Spain built by a
Spanish and German consortium; and Richborough 1MW in the United Kingdom by a Scottish
engineering firm and a former UK utility. A common feature of the three WEGA I turbines was
that they were based on strong academic principles although they were built by very different
groups of companies. They also had similarities in their three bladed configuration and size.
However, they all suffered from major problems in the first year of operation. The evaluation of
design and operation of the three machines did not provide the foundation for commercially
viable large-scale wind turbine technology due to their extreme weight and high manufacturing
cost (Harrison, Hau, and Snel 2000).
Meanwhile, the EC also paid attention to smaller turbines in order to take commercial viability
into the future development. Based on the result of the three WEGA I turbines and the
successful commercial experiences of the manufacturers of small and medium-capacity turbines,
WEGA II was launched in order to develop MW-class turbines with significantly lighter weight
than the WEGA I machines. The strong focus of WEGA II was the commercialization of such
turbines and the involvement of the most successful industrial companies such as Bonus,
Enercon, Nordex, Nordtank, Micon, Tacke, and Vestas. Between 1993 and 1995, a variety of
completely new prototypes of horizontal-axis MW-class turbines were developed by the
participating manufacturers through the support from WEGA II. The WEGA II machines were
erected and fully evaluated between 1994 and 1996 and the developers of those machines were
obligated to perform full measurement and evaluation during the test phase (Harrison, Hau, and
Snel 2000).
The other EU program is the THERMIE Program, which is the demonstration phase within
JOULE. The aim was to demonstrate commercial potential of machines used in unusual
locations and conditions. A number of wind turbines with rated capacity between 700kW and
3MW were supported. Some turbines were supported in conjunction of WEGA II and
THERME.
JOULE also covers a wide range of wind R&D outside of WEGA. The focus of such R&D
efforts, for example, includes generic research of crucial technical areas (verification of
aerodynamic tools, issues related to lightening, electromagnetic interference, and grid
connection), highly innovative turbines for cost reduction, turbines for alternative sites,
certification and standardization, and stand alone and desalinization system.
54 WEGA stands for Wind Energie GroB Anlagen in German.
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5.2.4 India
The main policy instruments to promote wind energy in India from 1990 have been investment
assistance through soft loans, tax benefits on wind energy investment income, state feed-in-tariff
system, R&DD and resource assessment, and offering direct third party sales, banking and
wheeling benefits to wind power producers. In particular, policies implemented after 1991 have
had significant impacts on wind energy development.
Research, Development and Demonstration (R&DD) (1984 - Present)
The government-led R&DD programs were two of the main components of wind energy support
started in the 1980s. The focus of R&DD efforts changed over the years.
Table 5-24: Government Wind Energy R&DD Programs in India
Programs Program Contents
Focus on indigenous turbine prototype development in collaboration withR&D in the 1980s BHEL (produced 20kW/5OkWw/200kW turbines)
Demonstrate new types of wind turbines or opening up new potential areas
Demonstration or locations up to 10MW of commercial project potentials
eonrato Need to be initiated and implemented by the state governments, SEBs or
(9Pr ) SNAs(1985- Present) - Demonstration sizes need to be between 2MW and 6MW
- 60% of equipment costs are available
R&D focus more on commercialization through: expansion of the market;
cost reduction; efficiency and capacity increase; and overcoming Indian-
Market focus of specific technical conditions (low wind, grid connection, and the field testing
R&D efforts of newly designed machines and components)
(1992 - Present) Demonstration focus on technological and economic viability of technologies
and applications and on opening up the new areas for commercial projects to
attract financial resources
R&D focus more on providing generic information/knowledge to innovate
components/sub-systems suitable for the Indian specific conditions
Three R&D models involving the industry, research institutions and
laboratories,55 academic institutions and end-users.
- Industry in-house R&D model: 50:50 cost share between the industry
Industry and MNES
Collaboration - Consortium model: Consortium members to share at least 50% of the
Focus of R&D project cost with MNES
(1997 to Present) - Industry and MNES joint entrustment of R&D project to an institution or
research laboratory: funding to the institution
- In all models, the industry/institution contributing 50% of cost has the
right on commercialization of the obtained technical know-how. Custom
duty exemption for goods for R&D projects undertaken by any company
with in-house R&D unit approved by GOI
Indigenous design/manufacturer of all types of turbines by 2012
Five Generic Technology support to become net foreign exchange earner by 2012
Areas of R&D Performance improvement of existing turbines (CUF from 17% to 25% by
Focus 2012)
(2003 -Present) Human resource development
Research support for wind resource assessment and micro-siting
Sources: (MNES 1997a; MNES 2002/2004/2006; MNES 2004)
ss Besides the C-WET, Electronics Research and Development Centre, National Aerospace Laboratories, and
Corporate Research and Development Division of BHEL, are the R&D institutions for wind energy.
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During the 1980s, the Indian wind R&DD was focusing on development of indigenous turbine
prototypes. The demonstration program started in 1985. The direction of the wind energy
R&DD in India changed its priority in 1992 to a more market-driven approach. Focusing only
on the indigenous turbine development became impractical, considering the rapid technology
advancement and the large capital requirements for wind turbine R&D at technology frontier
from the late 1980s as well as the R&D budget restriction posed by GOI. Since 1997, the R&D
efforts became focus more on government-industry collaboration by encouraging in-house R&D
effort by supporting the industry's R&D proposals on cost-sharing basis as well as by trying to
strengthen the connection among R&D institutions by the establishment of the R&D Unit in C-
WET.
The actual R&DD expenditure of MNES to wind energy over the years is not available.
However, a comparison of the expenditure among various energy ministries indicates the tight
budget situation of MNES; it has only received less than 4% of total energy-related-government
expenditure since the inception of DNES. This small budget has been then divided into several
divisions that support different non-conventional energy technologies (Appendix A-6).
National Wind Resource Assessment Program (1983 - Present)
The wind resource assessment program started in 1983, in order to assess the overall wind
potential in India by using the collected data and to identify suitable sites for wind energy
projects. The network of meteorological laboratories gathered information and analyzed data on
wind availability through wind monitoring, wind mapping and complex terrain projects. The
first Wind Energy Data book was published in 1983. MNES also uses several private
organizations in India and abroad to conduct comprehensive wind resource assessment by using
the state-of-art technique (MNES 1997a). Since 1999 C-WET has taken over the wind resource
assessment task. The resource assessment also continues on-going basis after the projects are
commissioned, as the project monitoring recommended since 1995 became a mandate in 1999.
Total of 540 monitoring stations were built by March 2005 (Consolidated Energy Consultants
Ltd. 2005). The data gathered by the program has significantly influenced state wind energy
policy formation.
The data collected from 1983 had some problems, as it was collected through the methods and
sites that were based on aviation and meteorological purpose (Winrock International India 2003).
During the 1996-97 year, MNES upgraded the wind power potential estimate based on new and
larger turbine sizes. As a result, the initial numbers of around 20,000 MW were upgraded into
the gross potential of 30,000 MW. MNES again upgraded the potential to 45,000 MW in 1999,
assuming 1% of land availability for wind projects in the potential areas (MNES 1999a).
Technical potential, which indicates the resources that can be practically exploited with the
current infrastructure, is currently estimated at 13,390 MW, assuming 20% grid penetration,
which can increase with the augmentation of grid capacity. In total, only 30% of gross potential
can be extracted in technically feasible ways and the gross-technical potential ratio varies
considerably among states (MNES 2005).
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Economic Reforms of 1991 and New Policy Direction for Wind Energy
By the beginning of the 1990s, India had amassed an unsustainable level of public debt and faced
an unprecedented level of economic crisis. As a result of industrial policy with heavy
regulations and restrictions controlled by bureaucrats since the Independence of 1947, the Indian
business suffered from the lack of transparency of business environment, stagnant private and
foreign investments, heavy government spending on inefficient public enterprises, and the lack
of technological progress. The country suffered from inflation, high budgetary deficit, and
foreign debt, increasing government duties and taxes, and low GDP per capita. The limited
liberalization attempts taken during the 1980s were insufficient to overcome those economic
problems. The fiscal imbalance diverted household savings to public consumption and reduced
the amount of resources available for private investment. Due to the restrictions on foreign
investment and trade, India faced a balance of payments crisis in early 1991 and its foreign
exchange reserves reached the all-time low. GOI attempted a series of short-term policies to
finance imports and meet its immediate debt service obligations, which included using its gold
stock to obtain foreign exchange, utilizing special facilities of the IMF, and gaining emergency
assistance from Germany and Japan. Eventually, however, GOI had no choice but to embark on
a program of more fundamental economic reforms and reduce the role of the government in
economic development (Bajpai 2002; Bath 1998).
The reforms have covered a wide range of sectors, including the power sector. As a part of the
reforms, on July 25, 1991, India announced new Industrial Policy, aiming at a shift from
resource-based manufacturing to technology-intensive manufacturing and services and allowing
both domestic and foreign private investments. The policy was the first substantial step taken by
GOI to liberalize the excessive restrictions on foreign investment, industrial licensing, trade
practices, foreign technology, and the private sector, thereby to create greater transparency and
competition and to establish market-oriented economic system (Bajpai 2002). This general
industrial policy direction also became the direction of wind energy sector industrial policy.
New R&D/investment/fiscal/trade policies as well as financial incentives for demand creation
have been introduced to the sector since 1993.
In line with the general economic reforms, MNES created the Strategy and Action Plan of 1993
that set the following new direction for renewable energy development: 1) focusing the
government's limited budgetary resources on demonstration projects; 2) extending the
institutional finance from IREDA and other financial institutions for commercially viable
projects with private sector participation and attracting external assistance from international and
bilateral agencies; and 3) promoting private investments through fiscal and financial incentives
as well as through facilities for wheeling, banking of power for the grid and the appropriate
pricing for wind power provided to the grid. These three elements became the core concept of
new policy for the wind energy sector, and MNES began focusing on the commercialization-
focused programs (Gupta 1995; MNES 2002b; TERI 2001).
Investment Assistance - IREDA Soft Loan (1989 - Present)
IREDA started soft loans to the wind turbine manufacturers, SNAs and SEBs in 1989. It was
only after 1991 that IREDA expanded its loans to project finance by private investors. As
mentioned already, the soft loans have been funded by various multilateral and bilateral
international assistances and operated as a revolving fund.
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Three basic schemes have been available for the wind energy sector since 1991 (Table 5-25). 56
The interest rates are slightly lower than market rates. The payment has one year moratorium.
Until June 1997, the borrowers needed to fund a minimum of 40% of the cost themselves. Since
then the amount was reduced to 20% to 30% of the cost. At the same time, the payback period
was extended from eight to ten years (Wind Power Monthly 1997d).
Table 5-25: Three Basic IREDA Wind Energy Soft Loan Schemes in India
Schemes Contents
For private developers to finance wind farms
- six to ten years of repayment periods
Wind Farm Project - one year moratorium
Financing Scheme - require minimum 25% to 30% contribution from promoter
- lending up to 70 to 80% of total project cost and/or 100%
equipment cost for farms on lease basis
Available to finance equipment (wind turbine, tower, control panel,
transformer, reactive power) and compensator necessary to build
wind farms
Equp ent F eight to ten years of repayment periodScheme
- one year moratorium
- require minimum 20% to 25% contribution from promoter
- lending up to 75 to 80% of total project cost
Available for wind turbine manufacturers to finance wind farms
developments and market assistance
- one year moratorium
Manufacturing Equipment - require minimum 25% to 30% contribution from promoter
Financing Scheme - Lending up to 75% of total project cost for development and up
to 70% of last three years average or expected expenditure on
market assistance promotional efforts (including export
promotion)
Sources:(IREDA 2002a; IREDA
2002/2004/2006) 2002D and 2006; IREDA2002c; Jagadeesn 2000; MNS
The IREDA interest rates have changed over the years in accordance with the lending
institutions' term and the market conditions. In the 1992-93 year, the rates were 12%, but they
were raised between 14% and 16% in the mid 1990s. The rates were further increased to 18 -
21% (18% for project financing and 19% for equipment financing) in 1996 and the high rates
continued until May 1997. In June 1997 the interests for project financing was cut to 15.5%.
The rates were 14-16% during the late 1990s, but fell to 11.5-14.5% in the early 2000s. From
2003 the rates were lowered to 9.5%-11.5%, with repayment periods between seven and ten
years (Gupta 1995; IREDA 2002b and 2006; Jagadeesh 2000; Sasi and Basu 2002; Wind Power
Monthly 1997b; Wind Power Monthly 1997d; Wind Power Monthly 2000b; Wind Power
Monthly 2004).
56 In addition, IREDA also offers loans for grid interconnection and T&D facility building: Grid Interconnection
Facility Scheme is offered to the eligible SEB/Utility, and Financing Guidelines for Renewable Energy Users is
offered to finance building T&D facility.
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Investment Incentives (1989 - Present)
Fiscal policy and incentives specific to wind projects was first introduced in 1989. Then the
1993 Income Tax Rules began placing very lucrative incentives.
In late 1996, as a new administration took the office, GOI reduced the levels of incentives and
changed the tax planning procedure; by lowering tax rate and imposing Minimum Alternative
Tax (MAT), GOI reduced the immediate tax benefits to the investors and encouraged the
developers to actually operate to make real profits on their investments (Rajsekhar, Van Hulle,
and Jansen 1999; Singh and Bretz 1999).57 In general, the corporate tax on domestic companies,
including those which engaging in wind energy business, was reduced to a uniform 46% for both
closely- and widely-held companies. The domestic corporate tax was further reduced in April
1997 to 35%, then to 30% in April 1998, meaning a parallel decrease in the size of tax exemption
(Aitken 1994; Bath 1998).
The tax breaks for wind turbines are more lucrative for projects built in the first half of the Indian
financial year, which runs from April to March next year. If turbines are installed before
September, the investor is entitled to the 100% tax depreciation for that year and can write off
total cost of the turbines against tax. However, if turbines are installed between October and the
end of March next year, only 50% of the depreciation is allowed for the current financial year
and another 50% must be taken in the next year.
Table 5-26: Fiscal Policy and Incentives for Wind Energy in India
Schemes Contents
1989 Tax Scheme on Tax breaks to deduct the entire cost of equipment in the first year from
Wind Power Project pre-tax profits
Five-year 100% tax holiday on income from sales of wind electricity
100% depreciation on investment in capital equipment related to wind
1993 Income Tax power plants in the first year
Rules Zero-Tax planning (possible to avoid paying corporate tax on incomes of
their registered companies and corporations) by combining various tax
rebates and exemption and 100% accelerated depreciation
Introduction of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) on wind project
- 12.9% MAT on book-value profits (return on equity) imposed on the
companies that chose the 'zero-tax' planning, while 100% first-year
1997 Tax Rules depreciation continued.Lowering tax rate for the companies with higher book-value profits than
investments on wind power projects
- Reduced marginal corporate tax rate (from 46% to 35% in April 1997,
further to 30% in 1998)
April 1999 Tax Rules 11.4% MAT Rate
April 2000 Tax Rules 8.4% MAT Rate
April 2001 Tax Rules Ten-year tax holiday on income from sales of wind electricity
2003 Tax Revision 80% of first year depreciation on and after 4/1/2003
Sources: (Consolidated
Jansen 1999)
Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and
57 IREDA also increased interest rates for loans to set up wind farms during this period.
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Foreign Direct investment (FDI) Policy (1991 - Present)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy was one of the most significant changes made by the
economic reforms of 1991. The door to foreign investments was substantially widen in 1991,
when GOI permitted financial collaborations, joint ventures and technical collaborations, capital
market via EUR issues and private placements or preferential allotments for the 35 high-priority,
capital intensive and hi-technology sectors, including the power sector and renewable energy
facilities. 58 The Ministry of Industry also began streamlined its approval process for foreign
investment projects. The automatic approval route for FDI was created in 1991 to permit foreign
equity participation up to 51% in the 35 high-priority sectors (Bajpai and Sachs 2000).
Import Duty (1993 - Present)
Another important policy change of 1991 was a new trade policy, in particular the changes in
custom duty. The Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act of 1992, which repealed the
Import and Export (Control) Act of 1947, changed the attitudes toward trade entirely from
prohibiting or controlling to regulating and facilitating imports and exports from India. Tariff
mechanisms have become the measure to regulate trade. The licensing restrictions and
discretionary control regarding trade were abolished.
Between 1991 and 1994, GOI trimmed the upper level of import duties from 400% to 65%, and
made the rupee fully convertible on trade and current accounts. Tariff rates on imported power
equipment, including wind turbine sets, were reduced to 20%, and the duty on capital equipment
fell into 25% (Bath 1998).
The import duty for wind turbines has been changed frequently since then. No import duty was
posed on up to ten components of wind turbines between 1993 and 1995. However, the duty on
raw materials of rotor blades was 80%. In 1997 GOI raised the duty for components but
eliminated the 80% duty on rotor blade materials. The import duty rate on components was
lowered in 1998. From 2002 the import duty became uniform 5%. However, the duty on four
turbine components (sensors, flexible coupling, brake hydraulics, and brake calipers) was
increased from 5% to 25% in 2003. This policy was removed in July 2004, and the import duty
has become uniform 5% on all components (Table 5-27).
In the 2000-01 year, GOI permitted MNES to issue the Duty Exemption Certification, which can
wave the necessity of declaration on critical components required for wind turbine erection and
for spare parts.
58 Industries that have been liberalized for foreign investments are 35 high-priority industries: export/trading/star
trading houses; hotels & tourism industry; 100% EOUs and units related industry; sick industries; mining;
telecommunications; power; medical clinics/hospitals/shipping/oil exploitation/deep sea fishing/with licenses;
industries reserved for small-scale industries; housing/real estate/business centers & infrastructure facilities/portfolio
investment; government securities; units in UTI; public sector mutual funds; and private sector mutual funds (Bajpai
and Sachs. 2000).
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Table 5-27: Import Duty on Wind Turbine Sets and Components in India
Import Duty Rates
Items 1993- 411997- 4/1998- 4/2002- 4/2003- 7/2004-
3/1997 3/1998*** 3/2002 3/2003 6/2004 Present
Generators up to 25% 37.86% 29%
30kW
Wind Turbine Parts/
Components* 5%Special bearing
Gearbox
Yaw components
Turbine 22% 9%
controllers 0%** 5% 5%
Sensors
Brake hydraulics 25%
Flexible coupling
Brake calipers
Rotor blades* 12% 9%
Rotor blade parts* 0% 9% 5%Raw materials for 80% 0% N/A
rotor blades
Duties are total effective duties that combine basic duty and special duty.
* For both manufacture and maintenance purpose
** Import duty exemption was up to ten components
A prerequisite to clearing imports will be a requirement for the importer to furnish a
certificate to the customs authorities from an officer of the rank of deputy secretary and
above at MNES. MNES clearance required for each and every shipment, the whole
procedure could be time consuming and arduous.
Sources: (IWTMA 2002; Khanna 1998; MNES 2002/2004/2006; Wind Power Monthly 1996c;
Wind Power Monthly 1997c; Wind Power Monthly 2003c)
Manufacturing Incentives (1993 - Present)
In addition to import duty, the 1993 tax rule set wind turbines to be exempt from excise duty and
sales tax. In 1998, the exercise duty system was changed; while the first parts of wind turbines
and rotor blades have no exercise duty, the spare parts need to pay both exercise duty and sales
tax in order to encourage high quality production and assemble of the first parts to avoid the
replacement (IWTMA 2002).
Industrial Clearance (1991 - Present)
Industrial clearances were eased to encourage private investment in the power sector after 1991.
No clearance is required from CEA for power generation projects up to INR 1,000 million as
well as for setting up of any renewable energy projects. 59 For wind projects, the forest clearance
and environment are the most important requirements in terms of environmental clearance. Land
availability from the state government and financing from CEA and financial institutions such as
IREDA are also required as non-statuary clearance (MNES 2001b).
59 Beyond this limits, statuary clearance is required for the projects to submit cost estimates as well as techno-
economic clearance such as greatest possible economic output of electric power, transmission lines and systems and
site location to CEA.
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Wind Energy Estate
In 1994 MNES and IREDA jointly introduced "Wind Energy Estates," the joint sector
companies that can be formed by a private developer, state government or its Boards or
Corporations, and MNES/IREDA. Their equity capital participation is set to 51%, 25% and
24%, respectively (Jagan 1995).
Wind Energy Estates set up wind farms in windy areas where fully developed plots that would be
provided for installation of wind turbines by individual investors. The joint sector companies
acquire and lease the land, develop infrastructure and grid facilities, obtain the necessary
clearances, and install/operate/maintain wind turbines on behalf of the investors. The objectives
of the formation of the Estates are to encourage the ownership of a small number (one or two) of
turbines and diversify the market base, reduce the project gestation period, provide infrastructure
facilities, and reduce the cost for investors.60
Export Market Development
MNES has been very active to cultivate potential foreign markets through its financial and
consultancy services to other developing countries. Need-based consultancy services and
expertise are provided by SNAs, technical institutions, autonomous organizations and freelance
experts in India. MNES has been a contact point to coordinate such international cooperation.61
IREDA also provides the export promotion through its market development assistance loan.
Technology Upgradation Fund (TUF) by Ministry of Textile
(April 1999 - February 2005)
Technology Upgradation Fund (TUF) by the Ministry of Textile offered a 5% reimbursement on
the interest actually charged by financial institutions on the sanctioned textiles projects that
include wind energy equipment for captive power generation by textile business entities. The
scheme was available from April 1, 1999 to February 22, 2005.
Quality Standards (1995 - Present)
In 1995 MNES issued the first guidelines for wind power projects, which required all turbines
have the turbine approval and certification from the recognized foreign agencies, submit the
Detailed Project Reports (DPR), and perform measurements after the project commissions, in
order to reduce any abuse of the government incentives and address geographical inconsistency
of wind policies across the states. The recommendations on the guidelines have been revised
several times and they became mandate in May 1999 (Table 5-28).
60 The first joint company was set up in the State of Madhya Pradesh in 1995. This company has performed well
and declared dividends of 20% in both years of operation, 1995-96 and 1996-97. The second company was set in
Kerala. Andra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, in particular, have been requested by MINES to promote this
concept in order to benefit small investors (MNES. 1997a).
61 As of March 2001, the MINES provided the consultancy services to 12 countries (Cuba, Morocco, Tunisia,
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Mali, Nepal, Senegal, Namibia, and Uganda) (MNES. 2001 a).
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Table 5-28: Quality Standards by MNES Guidelines
Revisions Contents
0 Mandate wind power producers to submit wind power project reports to
SNA/SEB
S Advise developers to site wind projects on locations approved by MNES
Guidelines for Wind based on National Wind Resource AssessmentP Require turbine approval from recognized foreign agencies and
Power Projes manufacturing surveillance by third party for the project approval as well
as for the eligibility for the IREDA loans
* Require performance estimates, physical verification of the project at the
time of commissioning by MNES and SNAs, monthly performance
reports, and proper maintenance
0 Mandate wind power producers to obtain clearance in the form of No
Revised Guidelines Objection Certificates (NOC)62
for Wind Power 0 For projects up to 1MW capacity, require detailed project report (DPR)/
Projects application that cover: site selection and micro-siting; selection of
(June 1996 equipment; capital cost/means of financing; annual energy output; cost
Revision) of generation; captive generation or sale; planned operation and
maintenance systems; and quality aspects
0 Require all wind turbines to be subject of third-party testing and quality
assurance evaluation and subsequent certification only by recognized
foreign agencies.
0 Certification to be based on: design evaluation; evaluation of manuals;
Turbine Approval and type testing for power performance including power curve test and
and Certification safety/function test
(February 1997 0 Prohibit any use of second-hand wind turbines imported abroad
Revision) - The quality aspects of the require project report covers: certification of
wind turbines; grid parameters at minimum monthly power factor of 0.85;
quality system adopted; minimum monthly average power factor; O&M
contract; spare-parts stock; supplier manufacturing base and installation
support infrastructure; and a detailed monthly performance monitoring63
Turbine Approval Removal of "foreign agencies only" requirement for certification and allow
and Certification the manufacturers to perform self-certification, with penalty if the turbines fail(May 1999 to perform the their own certification standardsRevision)
- Category-: C-WET to validate turbine certification issued by designated
foreign agencies and certified them with TAPS-2000 requirements
Turbine Approval - Category-Il: C-WET to verify modifications by the Provisional Type
a Ocertificat on Test/Measurements based on TAPS-2000 requirements for turbines with(Octo .0foreign certified turbines with minor modificationsRevision) 
- Category-Ill: C-WET to evaluate new types of turbines by the Provisional
Type Test/Measurements based on TAPS-2000 requirements.
Sources: (MNES 1995b; MNES 1996b; MNES 1997b; MNES 1999b; MNES 2000b)
62 No Objection Certificates are the approval and clearance given by the State Authorities to the developers in order
to proceed a proposed project. Tamil Nadu was the first state to issue NOC to wind power project from 1986
(TNEB, 2002).
63 If the projects fail to achieve the minimum monthly average power factor of 0.85 at the metering point, the
guidelines gave the authority to SEBs to impose a penalty (MINES. 1996b).
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After the establishment of testing facility at C-WET in 1999, the first Indian own turbine
certification scheme, the Turbine Approval Provisional Scheme (TAPS) 2000, was created to
issue turbine certification based on the Indian wind and grid conditions in 2000. Before 2000,
most of the turbines supplied in India had the certifications based on the European sites and grid
conditions from the internationally accredited certification bodies. TAPS-2000 categorizes wind
turbines 225kW and above into three groups. C-WET was designated to perform TAPS-2000 in
October 2000, but the self-certification by manufacturers was also permitted until March 31,
2004 (Table 5-28).
1993 MNES Guidelines for State Policy (1993 -Present)
In September 1993, MNES issued the guidelines to all states, regarding promotional and fiscal
incentives for wind project development for the first time, in order to guarantee no restriction on
generation capacity or supply of electricity to the grid from non-conventional energy sources and
set up the general rules for: operation period; producer eligibility; grid interfacing; facilities by
SEBs and other incentives; application and clearances; and guidelines for fixing purchase
process. The most important part of the guidelines was the facilities by SEBs, which stated
wheeling, banking, and purchase of power for grid-connected wind power projects, and other
incentives to stimulate the private sector investment (Gupta 1995; MNES 1995b). The original
guidelines (Table 5-29) and the subsequent revisions became mandatory in May 1999.
Table 5-29: 1993 MNES Guidelines for State Incentives
Main Contents of 1993 MNES Guidelines
- Facilities by SEBs
o Wheeling: Direct SEBs to make the state gird available to wind energy producers for captive
use or the third party within the state, at a uniform wheeling charge of 2% of the tariff-value
of electricity wheeled along the grid
o Banking: Direct SEBs to permit to bank the electricity generated for up to one year
o Feed-in Tariffs: Direct SEBs: 1) to purchase wind electricity from the producer at a minimum
rate of INR 2.25/kWh with 5% annual escalation; 2) pose no restriction on the time or
quantum of electricity; and 3) offer options of captive usage and third party sales within the
state for the producer.
o Electricity duty exemption for captive consumption
o Exemption of energy tax on consumption of electricity by wind power producer
o Exemption from power cut to the extent of 30% of the installed capacity of the producer
- Grid Interfacing
o Producers to install a current limiting devices such as thyristors and capacitors that maintain
power factor always above 0.80
- Infrastructure development policy
o Producers to bear the entire cost of interfacing and maintenance including transformers,
metering, and grid extension
o Other infrastructure facilities (approach roads, water supply, crane, power during
construction periods) to be covered by the line of industrial estates
* Other Incentives
o Sales tax benefits to power producer, tax incentives/concessions and subsidy available for
new industrial unit and unit in backward areas64
Sources: (Gupta 1995; MNES 1995b)
* See details on (Gupta, 1995; MNES, 1995b).
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State Policy - Production and Investment Incentives
State policies play the significant roles in India due to the institutional setting of the power
sector; each state government determines its own wind policy, regarding wheeling (feeding wind
electricity to the nearby grid while the power producer using the same amount of electricity at
distant location), banking (feeding wind electricity to the grid and using the same amount later),
third party sale (selling wind electricity directly to other power users via the grid), feed-in tariffs
paid to the producer by SEBs, and all other incentives.
The 1993 MNES guidelines encouraged many states to start their own wind energy policy.
However, wind support policy in each state started in different times and there has been little
consistency among the states. In some states, the support policy has changed significantly over
the years. The responsibilities to formulate feed-in tariffs and other charges have been
transferred from SEB/SNA to SERC of each state after the enactment of the 1998 Electricity
Regulatory Act. Many states started new wind policy in recent years; however, the charges on
wheeling and banking are set high, reflecting poor financial health of SEBs and their efforts to
compensate the significant T&D losses. The 2003 Electricity Act allows third-party sales in all
states. However, this is still subject to the SERC decision of each state.
The tables below illustrate the development of wind energy policy in six important states (See
Appendix A-7 for policy by other states).
Tamil Nadu
Tamil Nadu was the first state that placed support policy for wind energy, long before the MNES
1993 guidelines was issued. Tamil Nadu strongly promoted demonstration projects from the
1980s, and reflected the accumulated experiences on their early state policy (Table 5-30).
Guiarat
Gujarat was another state that started the demonstration projects in the 1980s that helped to
formulate its state support policy. Gujarat completely withdrew state policy in March 1998,
following a slight policy modification in 1997. In June 2002, the state announced a new policy
(Table 5-31).
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Table 5-30: Support Policy in Tamil Nadu
Sources: (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a;
MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004;
MNES 2005; Winrock International India 2003)
Table 5-31: Support Policy in Gujarat
Time Wheeling Banking Feed-in Tariffs Third-Party
Period Charge Sales
1994 -
1997* 2% of power INR1.75/kWh
1997 - generated No escalation
3/1 998** IR26/~6 months INR 2.60/kWh Not allowed
6/2002 - 4% of power INR 0.05 annual escalation
Present*** generated based on 2002-03 tariff
I_ I_ Ifor ten years
* Land was leased on the 15-year term, and sale tax and electricity duty were exempted.
** Sales tax exemption and deferment were available up to 50% of investment.
Reactive power charge INR 0.1 per consumed power and application/processing fee of INR
50,000/MW are applied. Electricity duty exemption and exemption from power cut are available
to the extent of 30%.
Sources: (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a;
MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004;
MNES 2005)
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Time Wheeling Banking Feed-in Tariffs Third-Party SalesPeriod Charge 
______________________________
Pre 1993 One year INR 2.00/kWh in 1994-95 Allowed with 15%
- 3/1996* 2% charge INR 2.75/kWh in 1995-96 wheeling charge
2% of power (1994-95)
4/1996- generated OneINR 2.25/kWh in 1996-97
3/2001 2% charge 5% annual escalation3/201*2%chage based on 1996-96 tariff Not allowed
4/2001- 5% of power One financial year
Present 5INR 2.7/kWh15Ps generated 5% charge No escalation for five year
in addtion, capital subsidy of 10%/ of project cost with a ceiling ot INR 15 lakhs was available until
1996-97 fiscal year. Exemption of generation tax was available until 2000-01 fiscal year.
Penalties for reactive power charge of INR 0.1/KVARH (quantum of reactive power) started from
June 1995. The charge was increased to INR 0.30/KVARH in June 1999, and again to INR
1/KVARH in April 2000.
Infrastructure charges of INR 28.75/MW and application/processing fee of INR 11,000/application
are applied. In addition, from May 2002, reactive power charge of INR 0.30/KVARH if the ratio of
reactive power drawn to kWh exported is 10% or less and INR 1/KVARH for more than 10%.
TNEB has been too financially strapped to keep 5% annual increase between 1996 and March
2001 and the tariff of INR. 2.70/kWh after April 2001. Only INR 2.25/kWh has been paid in
reality. TNEB claims the balance will be paid as and when the utility's financial health improves.
Maharashtra
Maharashtra first placed its support policy in 1995. The state began implementing a new policy
with the strong fiscal and financial incentives in December 1999, which ended in March 2002.
The newest policy began in November 2003 (Table 5-32).
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan
The states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan have offered the following policy (Table
5-33).
Table 5-32: Support Policy in Maharashtra
Time Wheeling Banking Feed-in Tariffs Third-Party
Period Charge Sales
1995- Allowed* up to INR 2.25/Kwh1199 Allowed 20% of energy 5% annual escalation based on12/1999 generated 1994-95 tariff
INR 2.25.KWh12/1999** 2% of power One Year 5% annual escalation based on
-3/2002 generated 1997-98 tariff Allowed
2% of power INR 2.25.KWh
11/2003- generated 5% annual escalation based on
Present for wheeling One Year 1994-95 tariff for Group1 and 2****
plus 5% for INR 3.50/kWh with INR 0.15/kWh
T&D loss annual increase for Group 3*****
Sources: (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MEDA 2001a; MEDA 2001b; MEDA 2002;
MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a; MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a;
MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004; MNES 2005)
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* Banking was for three month in 1996-97 fiscal year and became one year after 1997.
** Although this policy itself was created in 1998, the state did not implement it until December
1999 when the new administration took the office at the state. In addition to the above, capital
subsidy of 30% of project cost subject to maximum INR 20 lakh, and sale tax exemption up to
100% of investment were available.
Reactive power charge INR 0.25 per consumed power and application/processing fee of INR
50,000/MW. No electricity duty for five years for captive use and Green energy fund are
available for 100% of cost of approach road and for 50% of power evacuation arrangement cost
as subsidy. No interest loan is available for 50% of power evacuation arrangement cost.
5% tariff escalation is set differently for the following three groups:
Group 1 (projects commissioned before 12/27/1999): annual increase of compound basis for
the first ten years, no increase for the next three years, and then 5% increase for the next
seven years.
Group 2 (project commissioned between 12/27/1999 and 3/31/2003): annual increase of for
eight years. Then the producer needs to sell power in the open market. Increase to be simple
rate.
*****Group 3 (project commissioned between 4/1/2003 and 3/31/2007): INR 3.50/kWh for the first
year with INR 0.15/kWh annual increase for a period of 13 years
Table 5-33: Support Policy in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan
State Time Wheeling Banking Feed-in Tariffs Third-Party
Period Charge Sales
1994- One Year
3/1997* 2% charge* INR 2.25/Kwh
4/1997 - INR 2.25/Kwh
3/2000** 2% of power 5% annual escalation
Andhra generated One Year based on 1997-98 tariffs
Pradesh 4/2000 - (until 3/2000) and 1994-953/2004*** tariffs (from 4/2000)
________ ________________INR 3.48/kWh in 2003-04 Not
4/2004 - Vary between INR 3.37/kWh allowed
Present INR 46/kWh N/A N escalation
**** and 60/kWh No escalation
* 8 months banking was allowed from August to March. Capital subsidy of 20% of project cost
subject to max. INR 25 lakh and 20-year long land lease with free rent for the first five years.
** Capital subsidy of 20% of project cost subject to maximum INR 25 lakh.
Reactive power charge of INR 0.1 per consumed power.
****Reactive power charge of INR 0.1 per consumed power, infrastructure development charge of
INR 10 lakh/MW, and application/processing fee of INR 5,000/MW are applied.
1994- One year INR 1.75/kWh in 1994-95
3/1997* 2% of power (July -
4/1997 - generated June) INR 2.25/kWh
3/2000** One year 5% annual escalation base
Karnataka 4/2000 - 20% of power 2% per month on 1994-95 tariffs Allowed
12/2004*** generated for one year
1/2005 - 5% of power INR 3.40/kWh
Present**** generated 2% charge No escalation for ten years
* Banking had one month grace period. Land-lease for a period of 50 years, capital subsidy same
for other industries, and exemption of electricity duty for five years were available.
** Exemption of electricity duty for five years was available.
Capital subsidy of max INR 25 lakh, electricity duty exemption for five years, and reactive power
charge of INR. 0.4 per consumed power were applicable. Feed-in-tariffs were INR 3.25/kWh
and INR 3.10/kWh for projects commissioned before 8/31/2003 and from 9/1/2003 to
12/31/2004, respectively.
Application/processing fee of INR. 30,000/MW and electricity duty exemption for five years.
INR 2.75/kWh in 1999-01
4/1999 - 2% of power INR 2.89/kWh in 2001-04
10/2004* generated One year 5% annual escalation base
on 1999-00 tariffs
Rajasthan INR 2.91/kWh for the first Allowed
10/2004- 10% of One year, then INR 0.05/kWh
Present** power calendar annual escalation until 10 hgenerated year year, then INR. 3.36/ kWh
until 2 0 th year
* Exemption of electricity duty for five years was available.
** 50% exemption of electricity duty for seven years is available. Reactive power charge of INR
0.25 per consumed power and application/processing fee of INR. 50,000/MW are applied.
Sources: (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a;
MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004;
MNES 2005)
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Section 5.3: Wind Energy Market 1990-2005
The wind energy market grew tremendously since 1990. The market growth is closely related to
the policy schemes of each country.
5.3.1 Wind Energy Market in Denmark, Germany and India
Market Development in Denmark
Figure 5-1 shows the Danish wind energy market development by installed capacity. The
Danish wind market grew steadily during the 1990s. The cumulative installed capacity reached
over 400MW in 1991 and exceeded 500MW in 1994. Then, it was doubled every three years;
achieving 1,129MW in 1997 and 2,417MW in 2000. As of the end of 2004, the country had total
3,138.5MW of wind capacity.
The market fluctuated time to time. Although the Danish market slowed down during 1992 and
1994, it marked the record installation every year from 1995 to 2000. In 2001, the new
installation suddenly reduced. The installation recovered in the next two years, but in 2004 only
3.5MW of capacity was installed domestically in Denmark.
O r I I
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
U Cumulative Total Capacity U Net Annually Installed Capacity
Source: (Danish Wind Industry Association 2006) based on power company statistics
Figure 5-1: Installed Capacity in MW in Denmark
Denmark was the first country that engaged in offshore wind energy development. The world-
first offshore wind farm was built at Vindeby (4.95MW with 11 of Bonus 450kW turbines) in
1991, followed by the second farm at Tuno Knob (5MW with ten Vestas 500kW machines) that
became operational from 1995. Both were small demonstration programs, built as a part of the
government-utility wind installation agreements. The Middelgrunden project (40MW with 20 of
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Bonus 2MW turbines) followed in 2001 with the 50-50 wind cooperative-utility ownership. The
installed capacity of offshore projects has increased, as MW-class offshore turbines became
available. In the early 2000s, by the government orders, the utilities constructed Horns Rev
(160MW with 80 of Vestas 2MW turbines, operational in 2002) and Nysted farm (165.6MW
with 72 of Bonus 2.3MW turbines, operational in 2003). Sams0 offshore farm (23MW with ten
of Bonus 2.3MW turbines) was also inaugurated in early 2003.
Although the installed capacity in Denmark is not as large as those of Germany, Spain and the
Unites States, a more impressive achievement can be demonstrated by the share of wind energy
in electricity consumption (Table 5-34). During the 1980s, the normalized share of wind in total
power consumption was less than 1% of electricity consumption of the country. However, the
share increased steadily during the 1990s. Especially the growth in recent years is tremendous;
the 10% mark was exceeded in 1999 and the share reached to 20% in 2004. Also the installed
capacity per capita in Denmark was 579.4kW as of 2003, far more than any other countries
(BWE 2005b). In Denmark, wind power has become one of the main stream power generation
sources.
Table 5-34: Share of Wind Energy in Danish Electricity Consumption
Year Actual (%) Normalized (%)*
1990 2.1 1.9
1991 2.5 2.5
1992 3.0 3.0
1993 3.4 3.2
1994 3.6 3.4
1995 3.7 4.0
1996 3.8 4.7
1997 6.0 6.6
1998 8.2 8.2
1999 9.3 10.9
2000 12.9 13.7
2001 13 16.3
2002 14.8 15.7
2003 15.9 19.4
2004 18.8 20.8
* The normalized figures show the share of wind
power recalculated as in a normal wind year.
Sources: Power company statistics, Naturlig Energi and
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2006)
As for the contribution of wind power generation into the power grid, only 2.1% of the generated
electricity was consumed by the turbine owners themselves and the rest (98%) were fed into the
power grid at the point of 1994 (Wind Power Monthly 1994c). Although the more recent
statistics was not obtained, it is assumed the ratio of self consumption of wind power in Denmark
is still very low as any sign of changes have not been reported.
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Market Development in Germany
At the end of 1989, the German market only had 20MW of installed capacity. Figure 5-2,
however, shows the enormous market expansion during the 1990s. Since 1990 the market grows
steadily except the slight slowdown between 1996 and 1998. After the stagnation, however, the
market was quickly rebound and marked GW level record installation every year since 1999.
The annual installation has been decreased for onshore development after it reached its peak in
2002 with 3,248MW and dropped to 1,049MW in 2005.
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Figure 5-2: Installed Capacity in MW in Germany
As for the cumulative installed capacity, it exceeded 300MW in 1993. After reaching over
1,000MW in 1995, it almost doubled every two years, reaching 2,082MW in 1997, 4,445MW in
1999, and 8,754MW in 2001. The cumulative capacity at the end of 2005 was 18,428MW. The
average growth rate of cumulative capacity between 1992 and 2005 was 44%. The size of the
German market is far exceeding than that of any other countries. As for offshore development,
the first offshore wind turbine (one Nordex N90/2500) was installed in February 2006, 500m off
the quay wall of the Rostock international port.
In terms of the share of wind generated electricity in the German power requirements,
14,609MW of installed capacity at the end of 2003 is estimated to cover nearly 6% of the
country's net annual electricity consumption, and the installed capacity of wind energy per capita
in Germany was 177.2kW as of 2003 (BWE 2005b). Table 5-35 shows the rapid expansion of
electricity generated from wind in recent years.
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Table 5-35: Electricity Production by Wind Energy in Germany
Year Actual (TWh) * Potential (TWh)
1991 0.14 0.20
1992 0.23 0.33
1993 0.67 0.75
1994 0.94 1.16
1995 1.80 (0.34%) 2.06
1996 2.20 2.80
1997 3.00 3.77
1998 4.49 (0.81%) 5.20
1999 5.53 (1.00%) 8.04
2000 9.51 (1.68%) 11.03
2001 10.46 (1.80%) 15.84
2002 15.86 (2.74%) 21.72
2003 18.63 22.37
* Percentage is the calculated share in total electricity
generation of the year based on the data from I EA.
Sources: lEA; ISET cited in (BWE 2005b)
Market Development in India
At the end of the 1988-89 fiscal year, India had only 10MW of installed capacity, all by the
government demonstration projects. The market began growing from the 1989-90 year. From
the 1994-95 year to the 1995-96, the installation grew very rapidly. However, the market slowed
down dramatically from the 1996-97 year, and the recovery was slow: the annually installed
capacity only exceeded the 1994-95 level in the 2001-02 year. The 2003-04 and 2004-05 years
saw the strong installation in record numbers (Figure 5-3).
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Source: MNES cited in (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Figure 5-3: Installed Capacity in MW in India
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The cumulative installed capacity exceeded 100MW in the 1993-94 year, quickly reached
350MW next year, and then it was more than doubled to 733MW in the 1995-96 year. However,
it took the next six years to double the number, reaching over 1,500MW only in the 2001-02
year. The cumulative capacity at March 2005 was 3,595MW (Figure 5-3). The average growth
rate of cumulative capacity between the 1992-93 year and the 2004-05 year was 41%.
The electricity generation from wind has increased as the installed capacity increases (Table 5-
36). As of the end of March 2005, the ratio of installed capacity in total power generation
capacity is estimated around 3% (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005). However, the
percentage of wind in total electricity generation is below 1%, as shown in Table 5-36, and the
contribution of wind is still very low.
Table 5-36: Total Electricity Generation and Generation by Wind in India
Actual Generation Total Gross Generated Percentage of Wind inYear by Wind (GWh) Electricity (GWh) Total Generation
1992-93 88 332713 0.03%
1993-94 95 356335 0.03%
1994-95 191 385557 0.05%
1995-96 496 418043 0.12%
1996-97 878 436730 0.20%
1997-98 988 465825 0.21%
1998-99 1073 496914 0.22%
1999-2000 1446 536452 0.27%
2000-01 1577 560842 0.28%
2001-02 1971 579120 0.34%
2002-03 2448 596543 0.41%
2003-04 2811 633275 0.44%
Sources: (Central Electricity Authority 2005) and MNES and SNAs cited in (Consolidated
Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
5.3.2 Global Wind Energy Market
The total installed capacity of the world wind energy was 59,322MW as of the end of 2005.
Germany was the largest wind market in the world with total installed capacity of 18,428MW,
followed by Spain (10,027MW) and the United States (9,149MW). In 2005, India, with total of
4,430MW installed capacity, surpassed Denmark that became the fifth largest market with
3,122MW of installed capacity (Global Wind Energy Council 2006).
World Market Growth
Table 5-37 shows the development of the world wind energy market since 1990.65 The world
wind market between 1990 and 2005 grew tremendously with the average annual growth rates of
29% for annually installed capacity and 25% for cumulative installed capacity. The impressive
growth started from 1993, which corresponds to the start of strong market growth in Germany
and India. Since 1995, the world market experienced GW level of annually installed capacity,
and the number has progressively increased. The installations increased every year except 1996
and 2004; in both years the German market experienced relative slowdowns. 11,407 MW of
65 The cumulative installed capacity as of the end of 2005 in Table 5-37 by BTM Consult ApS is slightly different
from the figures provided by Global Wind Energy Council due to the differences in data sources.
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newly installed capacity in 2005 was the highest ever in a single year, and showed the highest
annual percentage growth since 2001. The average annual growth rate since 2001 was 20.5%
(BTM Consult APS 2006).
Total power generated from wind also increased steadily, as shown in Table 5-38. Between
1996 and 2004, the electricity generated from wind increased a 7.8-fold. 40,504MW (68.3%)
out of 59,322MW of the world cumulative installation at the end of 2005 has been installed
within the EU countries; in an average wind year, the EU can produce some 83TWh of wind
electricity, equal to 2.8% of the entire EU electricity consumption in 2004 (European Wind
Energy Association 2006).
Table 5-37: World Market Development 1990-2005 in MW
Annually Increase in % Cumulative Increase in %Installed
1990 250 - 1985 -
1991 317 27% 2302 16%
1992 231 -27% 2533 10%
1993 480 108% 3010 19%
1994 730 52% 3725 24%
1995 1290 77% 4778 28%
1996 1292 0% 6070 27%
1997 1568 21% 7636 26%
1998 2597 66% 10153 33%
1999 3922 51% 13932 37%
2000 4495 15% 18449 32%
2001 6824 52% 24927 35%
2002 7227 6% 32037 29%
2003 8344 15% 40301 26%
2004 8154 -2% 47912 19%
2005 11407 40% 59264 24%
Average 29% 25%
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b; BTM Consult APS 2006)
Table 5-38: World Power Generation from Wind in TWh
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
TWh 12.23 15.39 21.25 23.18 37.30 50.27 64.81 82.24 95.50
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
Market Locations
Geographically, the market locations have been concentrated in Europe, North America, India,
and China. Table 5-39 shows that the 14 markets have been in the top ten between 1995 and
2004. It is clear that the global market has definitely become more diverse; while the top ten
markets of 1995 occupied 98.7% of the total market, the ratio has been reduced steadily to 84.5%
in 2004. Although the world market has expanded, the wind market is very much policy-driven;
the geographical market locations and boundaries are largely defined by national and
institutional boundaries and the market growth pattern greatly depends on national policy.
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The market leader during the 1980s was the United States, more specifically California. This
changed in the early 1990s; Germany, Denmark, and India became the leading markets. From
the mid to late 1990s, Germany, Spain, and the United States became the growth factor.
However, the US market greatly fluctuates, as political uncertainty is extremely strong for its
support incentives based on tax credits. For example, while the United States installed only
389MW in 2004, it had the largest installation with 2,431MW and became the market leader in
2005. Germany had been the very strong and consistent market leader since the mid 1990s to
2003. Spain began placing its wind policy support schemes from 1995, and in 2004 the country
became the market leader surpassing Germany for the first time in annual installed capacity.
With Germany, Spain, Denmark, and several other countries, the EU has a robust regional
market with average growth rate of approximately 35% between 1995 and 2004. The growth of
the European market in 2005 accounted for about a half of total new capacity, while other
regions also show strong growth trends.
In terms of annually installed capacity in 2005, the United States (2,431 MW) was followed by
Germany (1,808 MW), Spain (1,764 MW), India (1,430 MW), Portugal (500 MW) and China
(498 MW) (Global Wind Energy Council 2006). However, Europe is still leading the market
with total of 40,504MW of installed capacity and showing continuing growth.
Table 5-39: Annual Installation by Country 1995-2004
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Top Five
Germany 500 420 533 793 1568 1665 2627 3247 2674 2054
Spain 58 116 262 368 932 1024 1050 1493 1377 2064
USA 53 12 29 577 477 165 1635 429 1687 389
India 375 244 120 82 43 169 236 220 423 875
Denmark 98 200 285 310 325 603 115 530 218
Other Europe
Austria 285
Greece 103 116 84 104
Italy 11 38 33 94 80 147 276 106 116 357
Netherlands 95 50 44 50 54 219 233 199
Portugal 274
Sweden 29 34 19 54 44
UK 40 73 55 63 107 195 253
North America and Asia
Canada 57 43
Australia 119
Japan 74 217 129 275 230
China 14 35 67 54 84 75 198
Total 1273 1222 1447 2439 3669 4110 6422 6595 7483 6893
% of Top ten 98.7 94.6 92.3 93.9 93.6 91.4 94.1 91.3 89.7 84.5
in the world % % % % % o o % o o
market
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
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Section 5.4: Wind Energy Industry 1990-2005
This section describes the evolution of wind energy industry since 1990, in particular focusing
on industry basic characteristics and manufacturer profiles in Denmark, Germany, and India.
The wind industry is one of the fastest growing industries, and the average growth rate of the
world wind industry was more than 40% during the second half of the 1990s.
5.4.1. Wind Industry Components
Wind energy industry can be subdivided into wind turbine manufacturing industry, wind project
development industry, wind project operation/management/service industry, and wind electricity
grid management industry, along its value chain. In addition, all these subdivided industries can
be further grouped into sub-suppliers of product components and services (Figure 5-4). The term
"wind energy industry" is frequently used to describe the wind turbine manufacturing industry
only; however, the boundary of the term is often not clear in many literatures and statistical data.
Turnkey provision means that one company performs all or most of the above value chain
functions and activities. Turnkey is prevailing today, as the total system and quality
management is one of the key elements for cost reduction in any geographic regions. Many
turbine manufacturers are also project developers themselves. Because of this, many statistical
data do not clearly draw lines between the numbers in the subdivided industries, as it is often
very difficult to do so.
Research, Development and Demonstration (RD&D)
Manufacturing of Wind Power Generator System
Wind Turbine
Manufacturing
Industry
(Turbine Suppliers
and
Sub/Component
Suppliers)
Wind Power Generation/Production Wind Project Operation!
Management/Service Industry
y Wind Electricity
Wind Power Transmission & Distribution Grid Management Industry
Electricity Consumption
Figure 5-4: Wind Energy Project Value Chain (Broad Functions)
and Wind Energy Industry Subdivision
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5.4.2 Wind Industry Profile of Denmark,
The wind energy industry structure and characteristics
the Danish and German industries have played critical
Germany, and India
have changed greatly since
roles in this development.
1990, and both
Danish Industry Basic Profile
The Danish wind industry was dominant in the world scene already in the 1980s. Although the
California bust in 1986 bankrupted many Danish turbine manufacturers, some of them
reestablished quickly within a year or so and began growing again as the European market
expended from the early 1990s.
Industry Expansion
The Danish wind industry expanded tremendously since 1990; the sales turnover increased
almost 23-fold from DKK 925 million in 1990 to DKK 21,049 million in 2004, and its average
annual growth rate was 23% in sales turnover during the same period. The sales in capacity also
show the similar growth (18-fold increase in manufactured capacity and the average annual
growth rate of 25% between 1992 and 2004, Table 5-40). The industry employment also grew
greatly. Between 1992 and 2003, the direct employment showed an 8-fold increase and the total
employment including indirect employment grew 6.7-fold (Figure 5-5) (Danish Wind Industry
Association 2006).
Table 5-40: Danish Manufacturer Sales 1990-2004
Sales in Capacity (MW) Growth Rate in
and Share (%) in Total Sales in Capacity
Domestic Oversea Total Domestic Oversea Total
1990 81.0 -- N/A -- N/A -- --
1991 72.6 44% 93.7 56% 166.3 -10% -- --
1992 44.4 27% 121.0 73% 165.4 -39% 29% -1%
1993 29.1 14% 181.2 86% 210.2 -34% 50% 27%
1994 51.9 14% 316.4 86% 368.2 78% 75% 75%
1995 98.1 17% 476.3 83% 574.4 89% 51% 56%
1996 221.2 30% 504.8 70% 726.1 125% 6% 26%
1997 286.1 30% 681.4 70% 967.5 29% 35% 33%
1998 316.8 26% 899.1 74% 1215.9 11% 32% 26%
1999 387.7 17% 1853.6 83% 2241.2 22% 106% 84%
2000 565.9 26% 1574.5 74% 2140.4 46% -15% -4%
2001 117.1 3% 3335.0 97% 3452.1 -79% 112% 61%
2002 525.9 15% 3088.3 85% 3614.2 349% -7% 5%
2003 207.6 7% 2875.4 93% 3083.0 -61% -7% -15%
2004 3.0 0% 3033.9 100% 3036.9 -99% 6% -1%
Average 19% -- 81% -- -21% 31% 25%
Source: (Danish Wind Industry Association 2006)
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1.Nordex no longer manufactures wind turbines in Denmark and is no longer included in the
statistics since 2003. This explains the decline in 2003, although the turnover of the remaining
Danish manufacturers increased by 5%.
2.Danish suppliers of wind turbine components had an additional export to foreign manufacturers
of approximately DKK 1-2 billion per year from 1995 to 2002.
3.The statistics do not include component kits with a value below 1/3 of the value of a complete
wind turbine.
4.In addition to the registered complete units, there were substantial exports in 1995-96 of wind
turbine components to be assembled in India.
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Figure 5-5: Employment in Danish Wind Industry 1992-2003
Table 5-40 also illustrates that the most important characteristic of the Danish wind industry is
its strong dependence on export. The export dependency was already clear during the 1980s but
got stronger since the 1990s. Although the share of domestic market in total sales had never
exceeded 50%, the average share of oversea market was approximately 80% in sales in capacity
between 1990 and 2004 and has increased over the years. 66 Wind turbines became the second
most important export item of the country in 1998. The main export destination has been
Germany throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and other important export destinations include the
United States, Spain, Italy, and Japan.
Danish Wind Turbine Manufacturers
By the end of the 1980s, the Danish industry consolidated greatly as described in Chapter 4.
This industry modification trend continued during the 1990s and 2000s. Among the seven
surviving manufacturers by 1990, five major manufacturers have played significant roles in the
industry development. For the past 15 years or so, there were only a very few new entries but
the structure changed by horizontal M&A. The four Danish manufacturers were horizontally
merged and acquired within the Danish border and converged into one company, Vestas A/S,
while two companies, Nordex and Bonus, were acquired by German industrial giants.
Nordtank Energy Group (NEG) A/S, Micon A/S, and NEG Micon A/S: Nordtank was
founded in 1962 as a manufacturer of tankers. The Energy Crisis of the 1970s created the oil
shortage, which made the firm to move into an alternative new product. Nordtank started
wind turbine business in 1979. One of the notable innovations by Nordtank was the closed
66 This is also true in sales turnover (Danish Wind Industry Association. 2006).
144
tubular tower which became the industry standard by the end of the 1980s. Nordtank was
floated on the Danish stock exchange in 1995; it was the first European wind turbine
manufacturer to do so. Meanwhile, some employees who left Nordtank founded a new firm
Micon A/S in 1983. On July 4, 1997, the two firms merged, forming a new company NEG
Micon A/S. NEG was the dominant partner. The new NEG Micon then acquired
WindWorld A/S (another small Danish manufacturer) in the same year.
- Vestas Wind Systems A/S: Vestas was established in 1945 as an agricultural machinery
and industrial equipment manufacturer. The firm began its wind turbine business in 1979 in
Lem, Denmark, and started the export to the United States in 1981. In October 1986, the
firm filed a bankruptcy as a result of the crash of the California market. Although a large
part of the company was sold off, within two months of period, a new firm Vestas Wind
Systems A/S was established with 60 employees and a handful of shareholders, focusing only
on wind turbines. Since the formation of NEG Micon, Vestas and NEG Micon were the
largest and the second largest wind turbine manufacturers in the world. Vestas began the
stock floatation on the Danish stock exchange in 1998. These two firms disclosed the merger
plan in December, 2003, and the deal was finalized in 2004 with the EU approval (Vestas
Wind Systems A/S 2004/2005).
- Nordex A/S: Nordex was founded in 1985. From the beginning, the firm focused on large,
but not MW-class, turbine development. The firm established its German subsidiary, Nordex
Energy GmbH, in 1992. In 1995, a German industrial giant BDAG (Balcke-Dtirr, suppliers
of components, systems and services for re-cooling and heat transfer technology) acquired
51% of the shares of Nordex Energy GmbH and increased the shares to 75% in 1997. In
1999 the firm was integrated into another German industrial group Babcock-Borsig AG. In
2000, all Nordex activities were integrated to a new German firm, Nordex AG. After the
stock flotation in Germany in 2001, all Danish facilities were closed in 2002. Nordex is now
a German firm.
- Bonus Energy A/S and Siemens Wind Power A/S: History of Bonus started in 1980
when an irrigation plant manufacturer Danregn A/S developed 5kW and 22kW wind
turbines. In 1981, Danregn Vindkraft (the owner of Bonus Energy A/S) was founded and
began manufacturing 55kW wind turbines. The export to the United States started in 1982.
Bonus survived the crash of the California market, but stopped the export to the US market in
1987. Bonus Energy A/S survived the 1990s and the early 2000s as the last privately-owned
and independent Danish wind turbine manufacturer, but it was acquired by the German
electrical engineering and electronics giant Siemens AG on December 1, 2004. The new
company Siemens Wind Power A/S is listed as a Danish company (Bonus Energy A/S
2004b).
Domestic Market Share
The share of domestic manufacturers in the Danish market has been always 100%; no foreign
manufacturers ever erected wind turbines on the Danish land and sea. Table 5-41 shows that
Vestas and NEG Micon had the majority of share in the Danish market over the years, while
Bonus had lower but constant shares. The year 2003 was the exception; Bonus had a large share
because the majority of the country's installation of the year was the company's offshore
installment in Nysted and Samso offshore wind farms as the onshore development sharply
declined. Other firms have much smaller shares.
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Table 5-41: Manufacturer Market Share (%) of Annually Installed Capacity
in Denmark
Sources: (BTM Consult ApS 1997; BTM Consult ApS 1998a;
1999; BTM Consult ApS 2002; BTM Consult ApS 2003; BTM
BTM Consult ApS 2005a)
BTM Consult ApS
Consult ApS 2004;
German Industry Basic Profile
Industry Expansion
The growth of the German wind turbine manufacturing industry has been strongly supported by
its large domestic market, as seen in Table 5-42. Between 1995 and 2003, the sales in capacity
increased 6-fold and its average annual growth rate was 26%. During the same period, the
average 87% of manufactured capacity was sold to the domestic market that grew at 23% of rate
annually. The growth of employment also has been enormous. Between 1990 and 2003, total
employment of the German wind industry grew 35-fold. In terms of the size of industry, the
Danish and German industries became comparable by sales in capacity in recent years (Figure 5-
6). The German industry has almost twice as many of employment. However, the direct
comparison may be difficult as the geographical boundary of the industry and the methods of
taking statistics are not certain.
Table 5-42: Growth Rate of German Manufacturer Sales 1995-2003
Sales in Capacity (MW) Growth Rate in
and Share (%) in Total Sales in Capacity
Domestic Oversea Total Domestic Oversea Total
1995 504 93% 36 7% 540 -- -- --
1996 428 84% 83 16% 510 -15% 130% -5%
1997 534 91% 54 9% 588 25% -35% 15%
1998 793 86% 126 14% 919 49% 134% 56%
1999 1568 90% 179 10% 1747 98% 42% 90%
2000 1665 88% 236 12% 1901 6% 32% 9%
2001 2659 84% 518 16% 3177 60% 119% 67%
2002 3240 86% 522 14% 3762 22% 1% 18%
2003 2638 78% 735 22% 3373 -19% 41% -10%
Average -- 87% -- 13% -- 23% 46% 26%
Sources: (DEWI 2002a; DEWI 2003a; DEW 2004a; DEW 2005; DEWI 2006; DEW 1993;
DEWI 1994; DEWI 1995; DEWI
DEWI 2001a)
1996; DEWI 1997a; DEWI 1998a; DEW 1999a; DEW 2000a;
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1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2003
Vestas 38.8 31.7 28.4 44.6 49.5 12.1
Micon 35.8 52.2 58.4NEG 6.9 46.2 30.8 5.7
WindWorld 5.2 2.5 3.2
Bonus 12.1 10.6 9.0 -- 13.7 80.8
Nordex 1.2 0.2 0.6 9.2 5.9 1.5
Wincon -- -- 0.4 -- -- --
Total 100 97.2 100 100 100 100
The 2004 figure is not shown as the total Danish installed
capacity was only 9MW.
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Figure 5-6: Employment in German Wind Industry 1990-2003
Compared to the Danish industry, the German industry has much weaker export performance;
only the average 13% of total manufactured capacity went to the oversea markets between 1995
and 2003.
German Wind Turbine Manufacturers
The German manufacturers are generally smaller compared to the Danish wind giants such as
Vestas and NEG Micon. After the aerospace giants such as MAN and MBB exited from the
wind business in the late 1980s, the remained German players were small and local
manufacturers. Among the survivors, two companies, Tacke Windtechnik GmbH and Enercon
GmbH, emerged as strong actor. For the past 15 years, there were more new entries in Germany
than in Denmark. Their exits have been always the acquisition by other players after bankruptcy
or financial troubles. There have been no large-scale horizontal M&A of turbine manufacturers
within the German border.
- Enercon GmbH: Enercon was established in 1984 by a young graduate engineer Aloys
W6bben. The firm has worked with energy converters and wind turbine development since.
Total installation by the firm by the end of 1989 was only 35 turbines and 2MW, and all the
installation was in Germany (BTM Consult ApS 2005b). The firm became the most
significant player in the German industry since 1990, and Enercon has been the German
market leader from the early 1990s until today. Enercon is the only company in the industry,
which successfully introduced and commercialized a radical new concept with its direct-
drive, variable speed turbines with multi-poled synchronous generator in 1992. The firm
remains privately owned and its sole owner has been the founder Aloys W6bben.
- Tacke Windtechnik GmbH: Franz Tacke, a grandson of the founder of F. Tacke KG that
specialized in gears and industrial clutches, started to develop wind turbines in 1984. Tacke
merged with a gearbox manufacturer, Renk KG Augsburg in 1987, forming Renk-Tacke.
Renk was a subsidiary of MAN that was engaging in the Growian project and the merger was
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done to increase their mutual lead in experience and know-how for wind turbine
development. Renk-Tacke only installed 16 turbines and total 1.38MW capacity during the
1980s. Six of them were installed in Germany and the rest were exported (BTM Consult
ApS 2005b). In 1990, following the MAN's departure from renewable-energy business,
Franz Tacke bought out the wind division of Renk-Tacke and assumed the responsibility for
all corporate activities associated with wind energy, establishing a new firm Tacke
Windtechnik GmbH (Germania Windpark GmbH & Co. KG). Tacke grew to the Germany's
second largest turbine manufacturer during the first half of the 1990s, supported by the strong
German market growth. However, the market recession in 1996 caused a financial difficulty
to the firm, which filed a bankruptcy in July 1997. Tacke Windtechnik was purchased by
Enron Wind Corp, a subsidiary of the American energy giant Enron Corp, in October 1997.
After Enron collapsed in 2001, its wind energy division was bought by General Electric (GE)
and became GE Wind Energy in 2002. GE Wind Energy GmbH is listed as a German
company. This research treats the firm as a German-US company.
There are several other small manufacturers in Germany:
o Fuhrlsnder GmbH: Fuhrlander started wind turbine manufacturing during the 1980s,
diversifying from metal processing company established in the 1960s;
o Jacobs Energie: the firm was founded in 1992 and jointly making larger wind turbines
with Fuhrlander;
o DeWind AG: DeWind was founded in 1995, but taken over by a British engineering group
FKI, becoming a British company in 2003;
o AN Windenergie: AN has been the licensed maker of the Danish Bonus turbines in
Germany from 1989;
o REpower Systems AG: the firm was founded in January 2001 through the merger of
Jacobs Energie, BWU, and pro + pro Energiesysteme.
o Sudwind: Sndwind Windkraftanlagen was founded in the early 1990s but bankrupted and
reformed into Sudwind Enmergiesysteme of Berlin in July 1996. In 1998, Sidwind was
taken over by BDAG, the parent company of Nordex that subsequently took over the firm
and founded S dwind Energy GmbH in 1999. All the activities were integrated in new
Nordex AG in 2000.
Domestic Market Share
The German industry concentrated on its domestic market, which has been too large even for the
German industry to serve it entirely on its own. The share of domestic manufacturers in the
German market has never been over 60%.
In 1992 the total market share of small manufacturers serving the German market was 30.2%.
However, the share declined over the years and the largest drop occurred between 1992 and
1993. Enercon has been always the market leader since the early 1990s, and the firms' market
shares have been very stable and usually have a large margin to the second; the average market
share of Enercon between 1992 and 2005 was 32.1%, and the firm had more than 40% of the
share in 2004 and 2005. Enercon has been always followed by Vestas except 1994, 1995, and
2000, when Tacke/Enron occupied the second place. The Tacke/Enron share declined for two
years after the Tacke bankruptcy and the following takeover by Enron in 1997 and 1998, but was
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recovered in the late
Jacobs, DeWind, and
(Vestas, NEG Micon,
market over the years
1990s and early 2000s. Other German manufacturers (REpower/BWU/
Fuhrlander) have not been the major players. The Danish manufacturers
Bonus, and Nordex) have enjoyed the comfortable shares in the German
(Table 5-43).
Table 5-43: Manufacturer Market Share (%) of Annually Installed Capacity
in Germany
NEG Micon AN Tacke/ RE Fuhr-Enercon Vestas Nordex Enron/ Power/ DeWind .. Others
Micon Nordtank Bonus GE Jacobs lande
1992 28.4 13.3 5.6 7.5 7.7 2.6 4.7 --- --- --- 30.2
1993 20.8 20.2 11.6 8.2 12.3 4.7 11.0 --- --- --- 11.2
1994 32.6 13.9 7.5 5.7 9.7 3.9 19.4 --- --- --- 7.3
1995 29.8 11.6 13.1 4.8 5.4 3.7 20.7 --- --- --- 10.9
1996 31.2 14.5 7.3 5.5 10.0 6.3 17.3 2.3 --- 5.6
1997 37.4 13.4 12.2 12.6 11.1 5.0 1.6 --- --- 6.1
1998 33.1 12.3 8.1 9.4 15.2 9.4 --- 2.8 9.7
1999 25.6 15.7 10.5 9.2 13.2 12.7 --- 4.5 --- 6.9
2000 27.4 13.2 11.1 11.2 8.7 14.9 2.5 5.6 1.9 3.5
2001 28.5 19.5 11.4 8.5 10.4 10.9 5.0 2.7 2.4 0.8
2002 34.0 17.8 8.3 7.0 8.7 13.1 6.8 2.4 1.4 0.2
2003 33.4 23.5 8.2 5.0 4.8 11.2 10.7 1.3 0.9 0.9
2004 41.8 30.0 4.0 4.4 7.7 9.2 0.5 1.3 1.0
2005 41.7 26.8 4.0 7.8 8.1 5.5 --- 2.6 3.4
Sources: (DEWI 2002a; DEWI 2003a; DEW1 2004a; DEWI 2005; DEWI 2006; DEWI 1993; DEWI 1994;
DEWI 1995; DEWI 1996; DEWI 1997a; DEWI 1998a; DEWI 1999a; DEWI 2000a; DEWI 2001a)
Indian Industry Basic Profile
The Indian government has had an objective to create a competitive domestic wind energy
industry by building strong technological capabilities in wind turbine manufacturing and project
engineering, aiming to export its technology in long run.
Industry Expansion and Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers
There are no statistics available for the Indian industry regarding sales in capacity, employment
or export. However, the industry greatly expanded since 1993.
The rapid market expansion from 1993 triggered the entry from the European and American
manufacturers through joint ventures and license agreements with local companies. The picture
of the wind turbine manufacturing industry in India was rapidly changing and chaotic.
According to MNES, by March 1995, there were total of 21 Indian companies that tied up for
joint venture or license agreement with foreign collaborators for turbine manufacturing. During
the 1995-96 year, additional 13 joint venture companies were formed. By the end of the 1996-97
year, however, only a dozen out of more than 30 joint venture establishments were actively
manufacturing wind turbines (MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a), and all other firms exited the
business by 1998. The lists of manufacturers active in India issued by MNES and Indian Wind
Turbine Manufacturers Associations (IWTMA) since 1998 have had only around ten
manufacturers. Through this turbulent industry evolution, the following main players have
emerged.
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- Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BH EL): BHEL is a Public Sector Undertaking, with 66% of
the government share. Out of its 13 divisions, the Ranipet division, established in 1982 in
Tamil Nadu, has the wind turbine manufacturing operation. BHEL signed technology
collaboration agreement with a Danish manufacturer Nordex in 1993, which expired in 2002
(BHEL 2002). A new agreement was formed between BHEL and Nordex in 2003.
- NEPC Micon Ltd. and NEPC India Ltd.: NEPC-Micon was created in 1987 as the first
wind turbine joint venture firm in India. About 40% of the company share was owned by the
Indian firm Non-conventional Energy Product Company (NEPC) and the rest was owned by
Micon, a Danish wind turbine manufacture. The joint venture NEPC Micon was broken up
in 1996. The Indian partner NEPC became an independent manufacturer, NEPC India Ltd.
- NEG Micon India: Following the NEPC-Micon break-up and the new company formation in
Denmark, NEG-Micon started a 100% subsidiary in India in 1997.
- Vestas RRB India Ltd: Vestas RRB was also established in 1987 as a joint venture firm
between Vestas Wind Systems A/S and an Indian engineering firm, RRB Consultants &
Engineers Private Ltd (RRB). The initial share holding agreement was that RRB owned 51%
and Vestas held 49% of the company. The company headquarter is located in New Delhi and
the main manufacturing plant is located in Chennai, Tamil Nadu. Vestas RRB is the longest
surviving joint venture firm in the Indian wind energy sector.
- Enercon India Ltd: The joint venture Enercon India Ltd. was formed in 1994 with the 56:44
venture shares between Enercon GmbH and the Mehra Group of India, and began
manufacturing and installing wind turbines in India from 1995.
- Pioneer Asia Wind Turbine Ltd: Pioneer Asia is a South-Indian family-owned company,
active in paper, textile, timber, and firework businesses for years. In 1998 Pioneer formed a
joint venture Pioneer Wincon Ltd with a small Danish Manufacturer Wincon West Wind
(26% of share), along with Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) (24% of
the share) (Pioneer Wincon Ltd. 2002). Pioneer Asia formed the second joint venture firm
with Gamesa Ec6lica of Spain in 2004.
- Suzion Energy Ltd: The parent company of Suzlon was established in textile business in
1986 in Ahmedabad and soon expanded into international trade, hotels, and finance. The
Group diversified into wind energy business by establishing Suzlon Energy Ltd, which
formed a technical agreement with a German wind turbine manufacturer, Stidwind, in 1995.
After Si dwind was bankrupted in July 1996, Suzlon restarted as an independent
manufacturer in 1997. The company became the first Indian wind turbine manufacturer
publicly listed in 2005.
- GE Wind Energy: After taking over Enron Wind, GE Wind Energy quickly established its
subsidiary and assembly plant in India in 2002.
Export
While MNES has been very active to cultivate potential foreign markets through their financial
and consultancy services to other developing countries and as a contact for international
cooperation, the export orders for the Indian manufacturers were begun negotiated with the
neighboring countries such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia during the 1996-97 year (MNES, 1997a).
The export of wind turbine components and sets except towers from India has been increased,
and the export of such products stood USD 9.2 -11.5 million annually between 2001 and 2004
according to IWTMA (Siliconindia.com 2005). This is not a large figure, however, considering
the cost of 1MW project is approximately USD 1 million. India has not been a large export hub.
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Domestic Market Share
Table 5-44 illustrates the marker share of the Indian market by installed capacity. The market
share was spread over many manufacturers during the 1990s; this is especially evident in 1996
when the number of manufacturers reached its peak. However, with the exits of many firms, the
share has gradually converged into several main players; since 2001, four major players
(Enercon, NEG Micon, Suzlon, and Vestas RRB) have occupied more than 85% of the market.
The share of each manufacturer changes greatly year to year.
was the very strong market leader, but its dominance decreased
the market. Suzlon became a new market leader in the early
In the early years, NEPC Micon
as other manufacturers entered to
2000s. Vestas RRB, despite the
solid world status by Vestas A/S, has not been a particularly strong player in India, although it
has steady market share over the years.
Table 5-44: Manufacturer Market Share (%) of Annually Installed Capacity in India
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 200 2004
3
Kenete -- --- 10.9 8.0 29.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.1
Wind orld 2.3 12.5 10.1 9.1 1.8 --- 0.9 1.5 --- -- -- 
--
BHEL- --- 3.5 8.3 5.4 1.8 --- 4.9 --- --- -- -- -
Nordex ___
Das --- 1.6 6.7 6.9 23.1 7.9 16.1 --- -- -- --
Lagerwey I__ __ __
Enercon 0.2 4.6 6.4 14.3 11.2 11.6 34.7 26.6 16.1 31.3
NEPC
Micon 81.3 62.8 40.7 21.8 21.0 12.6 1.7 - -- -
NEG Micon --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.6 2.8 13.3 13.1 30.7 26.6
NEPC - --- --- --- --- 1.3 5.0 3.0 0.0 6.0 3.1 9.6IndiaI
Pioneer --- 0.3 1.4 3.0 2.7 4.6 4.1 0.2 1.7 0.5 0.1
Wincon______
Suzion --- --- --- 1.5 6.8 13.0 26.4 50.7 39.9 42.3 39.3 19.6
Vestas 16.4 18.7 15.5 9.9 5.5 6.8 28.4 7.5 8.5 6.2 9.8 10.7
RRB _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Others 0.0 2.5 12.4 31.6 17.6 26.2 5.4 2.7 3.4 4.1 0.5 2.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Bold letters show the market leader of the year.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).
5.4.3 Global Wind Industry Profile
As BTM Consults (2005b) pointed out, between 2000 and 2004
market leader and the competition was for the second place. Also
Vestas has been the global
the market share by top ten
manufactures have been more than 90% since 1997 and increasing due to the intensified industry
concentration in recent years. The largest manufacturers (Vestas, NEG Micon, Siemens/Bonus,
Enercon, Gamesa, and Tacke/Enron/GE Wind) stay the same for the past ten years.
Table 5-45 illustrates the strength of the Danish industry in the global market, although its share
has declined for the past ten years. The Danish industry share was 59.5% in 1996, 45.3% in
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1998, 42.3% in 2002, and 38.7% in 2004 (not including Nordex). They have lost their share to
the Spanish firms; while no Spanish firms were on the top-ten list in 1996, they had 12.8% of the
world share in 1998, and 19.9% in 2004. The German industry has relatively steady shares,
24.4% in 1996, 30% in 1998, 36.3 % in 2002, and 31.3% in 2004 (including Tacke/Enron/GE).
The Indian firms still have very small share of the world market. However, the market share
does not tell the whole story; the absolute industry output for even the share-declining Danish
industry has increased more than 4-fold, from 768MW in 1996 to 3,156MW in 2004, as the
annual global output has increased more than 6-hold from 1,292MW in 1995 to 8,1541MW in
2004.
Overall, while the industry has grown tremendously, the market power has been concentrating in
handful players. At the same time, the niche for non-top ten, small players still remain due to the
increase of absolute output despite the increased concentration rate for top ten players.
Table 5-45: World Market Shares (%) 1996-2004
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Vestas NEG NEG NEG Vestas Vestas Vestas Vestas Vestas
(27.3) Micon Micon Micon (17.9) (23.9) (21.6) (21.8) (32.3)(20.0) (24.1) (18.9)
Enercon Vestas Enron Vestas Gamesa Enercon Enercon GE Gamesa
(13.6) (18.8) (16.8) (16.2) (13.9) (15.0) (17.9) W nd (17.3)
Micon Enercon Vestas Gamesa Enercon NEG NEG Enercon Enercon
(11.9) (14.5) (15.3) (12.3) (13.7) (12.7 (13.9 (14.6) (15.1)
Bonus Bonus Enercon Enercon NEG Enron Gamesa Gamesa GE
(10.4) (14.4) (13.2) (12.1) (13.4 (12.6) (11.5) (11.5) 1n8)
Tacke Gamesa Gamesa Enron Bonus Gamesa GE NEG Bonus/
(7.4) (6.09) (6.8) (8.9) (11.5) (9.4) (in Micor Si(mens
NEG MADE Bonus Bonus Nordex Bonus Bonus Bonus Suzion
(7.3) (4.9) (5.9) (8.4) (8.3) (8.6) (6.8) (6.6) (3.8)
Nordex Enron Nordex Nordex Enron Nordex Nordex REpo RE
(3.4) (4.4) (5.2) (7.6) (6.0) (6.7) (6.8) (3.5) (3.2)
NEPC Nordex MADE MADE EC MADE MADE MADE MI
(3.2) (4.4) (4.1) (5.4) (3.9) (2.8) (3.36) (2.9) (2.5)
NW DES EC EC Suzion Ml Nordex
(2.8) (3.5) (1.9) (1.5) (2.3) (2.6) RE (3.0) (2.9) EC (2.5)
WW DeWind Dewind RE EC MI Nordex
(2.6) (1.4) (2.1) (1.9) (1.6) (2.6) (2.2)
Top Ten Total
89.9 90.9 93.7 92.7 93.0 96.3 95.0 94.7 |96.1
Annually Installed Capacity in the World in MW
1292 1568 2597 3922 | 4495 6824 | 7227 8344 8154
DES = Desarrolios (Spain), EC = Ecotecnia (Spain) MI = Mitsubishi (Japan), NEG = Nordtank, NW
= NedWind (the Netherlands), RE = REPower, WW = WindWorld
Sources: Market Share by (DEWI 2001b; DEWI 2002b; DEWI 2003b; DEWI 2004b; DEWI 1997b;
DEWI 1998b; DEWI 1999b; DEWI 2000b). The World Installed capacity by (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
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Section 5.5: Wind Energy Technology Development at
Frontier 1990-2005
This section examines the main characteristics of wind energy technology development at the
technology frontier, especially in Denmark and Germany, since 1990. Technologies examined in
this section are not exhaustive of all technologies innovated; this section only focuses on the
well-commercialized technologies of three-bladed, horizontal-axis wind turbines with upwind
rotor by the major manufacturers of the two countries, although some technologies developed
and commercialized by other manufacturers may be introduced according to their importance.
5.5.1 Technology Development at Technology Frontier
Up-scaling of Wind Turbine
Hub Height
Rotor
Diameter
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Rated Power 30-55kW 80-100kW 250-450kW 500-600kW 1.5-2MW 5MW
Rotor Diameter 15 -20m 20m 30-40m 40-50m 65-80m 115-124m
Hub Height 25-30m 40m 40-50m 78m 80-100m 100-120m
Annual Energy 35,OOOkWh 95,OOOkWh 400,OOOkWh 1,250,000 3,500,000 Approx.
Yield (30kW) (80kW) (250kW) kWh 1500kW) kWh
Sources: (BWE 2005; European Wind Energy Association 2003; McGowan and Connors 2000)
Figure 5-7: Representative Size of Wind Turbines on Frontier Market
The most important feature of wind energy technology development is the steady growth of size
of turbine, rotor, and rated capacity. Technology depreciation rate of wind turbine is very high
in terms of size. Figure 5-7, Tables 5-46 and 5-47 show the rapid increase of wind turbine size
and commercialization at the technology frontier. Figure 5-7 illustrates that the size growth of
the past 25 years is 90-fold and the energy yield has increased 485-fold. Table 5-46 shows that
the average size increased more rapidly in Germany than in Denmark during the 1990s. This
relationship reversed from 2002; the large offshore development in Denmark pushed up the
average almost 1.7-fold from 2001, while the German market has begun showing the saturation
of onshore sites for larger turbine installation. The other noticeable feature is that the average
sizes of Denmark and Germany were close to that of the world average during the 1990s, while
they have been far exceeding to that of the world average in recent years. The comparison
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between Table 5-46 and Table 5-47 show that the average turbine size matches the rated capacity
of majority of installed turbine segments of Germany extremely well; most of the installed
turbines in the German market have not deviated from the average sizes.
Table 5-46: Average Size of Annually Installed Wind Turbines
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Denmark 248 365 493 531 560 687 750 931 850 1443 1988 2225
Germany 255 371 473 530 623 783 919 1101 1281 1397 1650 1715
World --- --- 394 433 528 699 784 738 918 1092 1207 1246
Sources: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b; Danish Wind Industry Association 2006; DEWI 2002a; DEWI
2003a; DEWI 2004a; DEWI 2005; DEWI 2006; DEWI 1993; DEWI 1994; DEWI 1995; DEWI 1996;
DEWI 1997a; DEWI 1998a; DEWI 1999a; DEWI 2000a; DEWI 2001a)
Table 5-47: Product Segment in German Market (% share)
OkW5 <200kW5 <310kW5 <400kWS <750kWS <1.5MW5 <3.1MW5
1993 18% 82% --- ---
1994 7% 93%
1995 3% 6% 91%
1996 -1% 2% 99%
1997 1% 1% 72% 26%
1998 --- --- 49% 51%
1999 --- --- 34% 66% --- ---
2000 --- 19% 82% ---_ -
2001 --- 10% 90% ---
2002 --- 7% 15% 78% ---
2003 --- 2% 8% 89%
2004 --- 1% 5% 93% 1%
Source: (DEWI 2002a; DEWI 2003a; DEWI 2004a; DEWI 2005; DEWI 1994; DEWI 1996;
DEWI 1997a; DEWI 1998a; DEWI 1999a; DEWI 2000a; DEWI 2001a)
Convergence to Three-Bladed, Upwind, Horizontal Axis Structure
While wind turbines have continuously upscaled, most of diverse design concepts of basic wind
turbine structure emerged during the 1970s and 1980s in terms of the number of blade, rotor
orientation, and direction of axis gradually disappeared during the 1990s, by reaching either
technical or commercial dead-end; the basic structure of wind turbines has mostly converged into
three-bladed, upwind, horizontal axis design with steel tubular tower by the mid 1990s (Gasch
and Twele 2002; Gipe 1995). There has been a strong preference of three-bladed rotors in the
market due to several reasons: historical connection to the successful early Danish turbine
designs and the associated needs for a dynamically simple rotor in stall regulation; visual
preference over one- or two-bladed turbines; and low noise production.
On the other hand, both commercialized and emerging concepts remain diverse in the following
areas of wind energy technology sub-systems.
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Rotor Power Regulation through Rotor Blade Angle - Wind Power Capture
Mechanism
Rotor power regulation systems limit and condition the rotor output power at high wind speeds
aerodynamically, in order to avoid very high powers and torques on drivetrain. Three
mechanisms are available today.
Stall Regulation
Stall regulation system fixes the blade pitch angle for all wind speeds. Without any change to
the rotor geometry, the rotor aerofoil stall as wind speed and relative flow angle increase. In
shorts, in stall-regulated turbines, power is regulated by the progressive loss of rotor efficiency as
the stall extends over the rotor and no excessive power is produced because the rotor geometry
does not change at high wind. Stall-regulated wind turbines require constant rotor speed for such
stalling to take place, and this is usually achieved by induction generator connected to the power
grid (European Commission 1999). Because of its simplicity due to no necessity of any blade
control system, this regulation system has been used for small and medium-capacity Danish
commercial turbines since the 1970s and the technology has been well-established in the 1980s.
Blade Pitch Regulation
Blade pitch regulation system increases the blade pitch angle at wind speed when it reaches
higher than the rated speed, in order to ensure the power output from the rotor to be limited to the
rated power of the generator while the angle is fitted up to the rated wind speed. Therefore,
pitch-regulated turbines can have an almost optimum pitch angle at any wind speeds and a
relatively low cut-in wind speed. An active blade pitch mechanism (usually fitted in the rotor
hub) is required to sense the blade position, measure the output power and instruct the
adjustment of blade pitch with the hydraulically-operated steel pull-bars. This regulation system
has become increasingly controlled by microprocessor for continuous and optimal adjustment of
blade angels during the 1990s, e.g., Vestas OptiTip@ (1994).
- Collective Pitching System: pitch mechanisms of all three blades are mechanically
interlinked and powered by a single actuator. It was common in the 1980s.
- Independent Pitching System: each blade has an independent pitch actuator and two
independent rotor brakes. It became used from the mid 1990s.
Active Stall Regulation
Active stall regulation system uses a number of fixed pitch settings to optimize stall behavior at
different wind speeds. The blades pitch along their axis like a propeller blade. Active stall
regulation offers a better control than stall regulation and consumes less power than pitch
regulation, because it does not regulate pitch angles as many as regular pitch regulation methods.
The most notable example of active stall is Bonus CombiStall@, which came into the market in
1995 with the firm's first 1 MW turbine (54m rotor diameter); it maintains the fixed full-span
stall regulation for normal operation but the blades are pitched back into stall for rotor braking
and over-speed protection once wind speed reaches above the rated speed.
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Rotor Speed Control and Electrical Power Generation System
Configurations
Wind turbines can be operated at fixed (constant) speeds or at variable speeds. The options are
predominated by the electrical system. There is an important connection between the choice of
rotor power regulation and the choice of rotor speed control/electrical power generation system.
Fixed-Speed Confiqurations (Danish Classical Concept)
Fixed-speed configurations can use readily available induction generators6 7 to produce the utility
compatible electricity inexpensively without any sophisticated controls. The speed of induction
generator is fixed by the frequency of the grid; there is no control of the speed. Fixed-speed
configurations work with stall regulation well, as the stall requires constant speeds that can be
done by the induction generator connected to the grid. The fixed-speed operation with stall
power regulation is called the Danish Classical Concept. The electrical system of fixed-speed
turbines contains a soft-starter for smoother grid connection and a capacitor bank for reduction of
reactive power consumption (Figure 5-8) (BTM Consult ApS 2005b).
Gar 0Grid
SCIG Soft-starter
Capacitor Bank
Figure 5-8: Fixed-Speed Configuration
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
One-Speed Configurations
One-speed systems use one generator and it operates at one constant speed.
Two-Speed Configurations with Dual Generator or Single Generator with Dual
Windinq (Pole Switching)
Efficiency drops off rapidly when the generator is operated at less than one-third of its rated
value. In order to prevent this from happening, fixed-speed turbines often use dual generators
or dual windings, which permit the turbines to operate at two speeds:
- Dual Generators: use one main generator and a smaller generator, one-fifth to one-third
the capacity of the main generator that operates at low to moderate wind. Two generators
are connected by a belt drive.
- Dual Windings: use pole switching of one generator that operates on six poles during low
winds and operates on four poles in higher winds. This operation can capture most of the
67 Induction generators are not common outside the wind energy industry, but became widely used in wind turbines
because they can increase or decrease the speed slightly if the torque varies within the generator's slip (frequency
difference between the rotational speeds at peak power and at idle, about 1%) and reduce wear and tear on the
gearbox.
156
efficiency advantages of variable speed turbines, with only a small increase in cost for extra
windings. This is more recent development than dual generators.
Two-speed configurations were already in use in the 1980s by the Danish manufacturers. The
Danish two-speed turbines in the mid to late 1980s were dual generator turbines. Two-speed
turbines in the mid 1990s more often used dual windings (Gipe 1995).
Variable Speed Confiqurations
The alternative to fixed-speed operations is variable speed configurations. In variable speed
operations, rotor speed varies with wind speed, maintaining the relationship between rotor tip
speed and wind speed and gaining the greater rotor efficiency.
Variable speed operations have several advantages over fixed-speed operations: 1) increase in
aerodynamic efficiency and energy capture; 2) reduction of noise at low wind level; and 3)
reduction of mechanical loads on drivetrain, which can reduce design requirement and the cost of
gearbox or generator. To maximize the benefits of variable speed operations, a wide range of
variable speeds is required (about the factor of 2.5 to 3 in speed variation) (European
Commission 1999). To generate the utility-compatible electricity, however, the output from
variable speed turbines must be conditioned, typically with synchronous power converter/
inverter and power electronics. There is trade-off between cost of power electronics and
performance improvement through the increased speed range and energy capture.
Variable-speed idea was first employed by the Dutch Bergey Windpower during the 1970s and
1980s. Technological alternatives of variable speed operations depend on power electronics and
its cost. The falling cost of power electronics due to the activities unrelated to the wind turbine
industry has increased technology options and variable speed systems are increasing since 1990
(Gipe 1995). The followings are well-commercialized configurations.
Limited Variable Speed Confiqurations usinq Variable Rotor Resistance (OptiSlip@)
This type of configurations achieves a limited range of variable speed operations, allowing
both the rotor and the generator to vary their speed by up to 10% during wind gusts. It uses a
wound rotor induction generator (WRIG) that is directly connected to the grid.
Variable
Resistance
WRIG Soft-starter
Capacitor Bank
Figure 5-9: Variable Speed Configuration using Variable Rotor Resistance
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
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The rotor winding of the generator is connected in series with a controlled resistance, whose
size defines the range of variable speed (0-10% above synchronous speed). The use of optical
coupling to the rotor to control resistor switching for rotor resistance change eliminates the
need of costly and unreliable slip ring and brushes. Reactive power compensation and a soft
starter are required (Figure 5-9) (BTM Consult ApS 2005b; Carlin, Laxson, and Muljadi 2003).
The technology was developed by Vestas; it was named as OptiSlip@ and introduced to the
market in 1995 with several turbine series with pitch regulation.
Limited Variable Speed Configurations with Doubly-Fed Induction Generator (DFIG)
This type of configurations achieves a narrower range of variable speed operations than full-
range variable speed operations. It uses a partial-scale power converter (only 1/4 to 1/3 of size
and cost of rated capacity of the generator), connected to the rotor of WRIG through slip rings
and brushes, because only 25-30% of the power is fed through the converter. The stator
winding of the generator is directly connected to the grid, while the rotor is fed at variable
frequency through the converter. The power converter controls the rotor current, which is used
to control active and reactive power through the stator. The size of power converter defines the
speed range, which is more limited (approximately 1.5 to 2:1) than full-range variable speed
range (2.5:1 or more). However, this is enough to have all the benefits of full-range variable
speed operations while the partial-scale converter makes this type of configuration economical
(Figure 5-10) (BTM Consult ApS 2005b; European Wind Energy Association 2003).
Partial Scale Frequency Converter
Gear Gi
WRIG
Figure 5-10: Variable Speed Configuration with DFIG
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
This type of configurations allows extracting the maximum energy from low wind speeds by
optimizing the turbine speed, while minimizing the mechanical stresses on the turbines during
wind gusts. Another advantage is the power electronic converter that generates or absorbs
reactive power, eliminating the need for installing capacitor banks. The converter also
eliminates the need for smooth grid connection. The rotor power regulation for this type of
configurations is mostly pitch. This type of configurations was first experimented in the
Growian turbine during the 1980s. The first successful commercial application was made by
Tacke in 1996. Many other Danish and German manufacturers have followed since. Tacke's
original TWI.5 model used permanently excited induction generator. Vestas calls its DFIG
technology as OptiSpeed@.
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Full-range Variable Speed Confiqurations with Full-Scale Power Converter
This type of configurations achieves wide-range variable speed operations. It uses full-scale
power converter with the same rating as the generator, which is commercially viable now,
especially for offshore. The generator stator is connected to the grid through full-scale power
converter, which gives reactive power compensation and smooth grid connection for the entire
speed range. Incorporation of the power conditioning equipment also provides the power
factor control to turbine operators/utilities (Figure 5-11) (BTM Consult ApS 2005b; European
Wind Energy Association 2003). Rotor control for this type of configurations is pitch. Types
of generators used define the subcategories.
Full-Scale Frequency Converter
Gear Grid
PMSG / WRSG / WRIG
Figure 5-11: Variable Speed Configuration with Full-Scale Power Converter
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
- Direct Drive System with Wound Rotor Synchronous Generator (WRSG): Variable
speed concepts and direct drive concepts have existed for long time, but it was Enercon that
put these two radial concepts together. 68 Enercon uses very large, multi-pole ring WRSGs,
which run at very low rpm. Since 1993, all wind turbines by Enercon use the same
configuration. A Dutch manufacturer Lagerwey also marketed two models with this
configuration LW52 and LW58 during the 1990s.
- Direct Drive System with Permanent Magnet Synchronous Generator (PMSG): All
other direct drive turbines on the market use PMSG, although the number is very limited
due to the high cost of permanent magnet.
- Geared Drive System with WRIG/WRSG: Before shifting to the direct drive
technology, Enercon was using geared-drive system with WRSG from 1985. Bonus began
using this configuration from 2003 with WRIG.
- Multibrid@ - Single Stage Geared Drive System with Medium Speed PMSG: This is
the newest type of configuration. This configuration has a single stage gear (6:1) driving a
medium-speed, permanently-magnetic, multi-pole synchronous generator, in order to avoid
the complexity of multi-stage gearbox but to have a lower system mass with more efficient
and compact nacelle arrangement than large direct drive generators (European Wind
Energy Association 2003). The concept was first presented by a German engineering
consultancy firm Aerodyn in 1998. In 2000, Pfleiderer Wind Energy (Germany) acquired
the exclusive right from Aerodyn to use the Multibrid technology in application over
3MW, while WinWinD of Finland acquired the right in application up to 3MW. After
Pfleiderer built a prototype 5MW Multibrid turbine (M5000) in 2003, the firm sold the
technology to Prokon Nord Energiesysteme GmbH (Germany).
68 In general, this innovation is considered the only radical innovation that has achieved the commercial success in
the contemporary wind turbine history, as all other innovations are incremental.
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Transmission System Configuration
Geared Drive
Geared drive uses multi-stage gearbox for high speed generators. Gearboxes increase the speed
of the main shaft up to a maximum of 6:1 per stage, in order to increase the speed of the slow
running main shaft (rotor rpm) to match the mass-produced induction generator rpm. A two-
stage transmission can increase rotor speed a total of 36:1. The number of stages influences the
cost and efficiency of turbines. Medium- and large-capacity turbines typically use three stage
gears. Two types of gear, parallel shafts and planetary gears, are used for wind turbine gearbox;
planetary gears are more compact, lighter in weight, and less noisy. Typical three stage units
today use planetary gear at the input stage and parallel shafts with helical gears at the two higher-
speed stages. Small-capacity turbines in the 1980s used two-stage transmissions. Medium- and
large-capacity turbines from the 1990s use mostly three stages (Gipe 1995).
Gearboxes have been the most problematic components in wind turbines and its failures have
been a major cause of system non-availability from the beginning. 69 Historically the problems
are equally divided with low speed (planetary) stage and high speed stages (European Wind
Energy Association 2003).
Direct (Gearless) Drive
Direct (Gearless) drive concept uses a slow-speed generator, driven directly without
transmission, as presented above. It can eliminate historically problematic gearboxes and their
cost, although the cost of generators increases. Direct drive systems are in general best suited to
variable speed operations. Their development depends on development and cost reduction of
power conditioning systems
Multibrid@ Concept (Single Stage Gearing):
This newest type of drive concept is considered as a hybrid between conventional geared drive
with high-speed generators and direct drive with low speed generators (see above). Multibrid
turbines have compact and highly integrated drivetrains.
Drivetrain Design
Drivetrain can be modular or integrated. Drivetrain design parameters are handling of wind
thrust on the rotor, rotor weight, and torque that the rotor transmits to the transmission, all of
which get bigger as turbines become larger (Gipe 1995).
Modular Drivetrain
As mentioned in Chapter 4, modular drivetrains have a metal frame or bed plate, where the
main shaft, transmission, generator and other components within separate housings are
mounted. The separate main shaft and its support bearings allowed the transmission to be
replaced readily for repair and maintenance without requiring removal of the rotor. Modular
drivetrain was the standard of the very first generation of the Danish Classical Concept during
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Actual placements of components depend on manufacturer
designs.
69 While gearboxes themselves are a med-tech component, the basic technology needs to be treated as high-tech
technology and its safety requirements should be higher (Hjuler Jensen 2005).
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Integrated Drivetrain
Integrated drivetrains use one of the drivetrain components, usually gearbox, as the primary
component, to which all the other components are flanged. Integrated drivetrains, therefore, do
not use a bed plate. Their assembly is simpler and they are more compact than modular
designs, usually used for light-weight turbines, conserve materials, and reduce nacelle weight
and space demands. However, sound insulation can be insufficient, replacement of defective
parts often requires complete removal of the nacelle from the tower, and the gearbox can be an
expensive special component. Various ways of integration have been developed by different
manufacturers. Many manufacturers also use partially integrated drivetrain, which is a
compromise between modular and integrated designs.
Rotor Blade Technology
The most important elements of rotor blade technology are materials development, aerodynamic
design, and quality control in production process. Design of individual rotor blade is determined
by aerofoil profile, external geometry, and materials. The required aerofoil quality determines
materials and manufacturing methods for rotor blade (Gasch and Twele 2002).
Rotor Blade Aerofoil Design
Various families of aerofoil have been developed and the number of options available for blade
profile is enormous.
Aircraft Aerofoil
Most small and medium-capacity wind turbine blades adapt aerofoil developed for aircraft, not
optimized for wind turbine operation. They have two shortcomings: 1) they are never intended
for stall regulation, and it shortens the lifespan of generators and transmissions if wind turbines
with aircraft aerofoil blades reach excessive peaks before the aerofoil stalls; and 2) they are
sensitive to roughness as well as dusts and dead insects in dry climate that increase the
roughness and reduce the performance (Gipe 1995).
General aviation aerofoil series by the US National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
(NACA) such as NACA 63/NACA 64/NACA 65 series have been widely used for wind
turbine blades. They can be used independently or in conjunction with special-purpose
aerofoil design.
Special-purpose Aerofoil tailored for Wind Turbines
With years of experiences, it turned out that blade aerofoil design, both external geometry and
profile, for wind turbines is extremely high-tech, because the working conditions of wind
turbines are more complex due to lifting and turbulences than the working conditions of
aircraft. In addition, the design objectives of rotor blade aerofoil for wind turbines have
changed from maximizing blade efficiency during the 1990s to optimizing the cost of energy
during the 2000s, and also turbine sizes increased tremendously. As a result, more slender
profiles became required, as the chord sizes increase at much lower rate as the blades get
longer (De Vries 2004a).
These conditions prompted many manufacturers began using tailored blade aerofoil designs
developed specifically for wind turbines since the mid 1990s. Some of the most recent models
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have the aerofoil developed just for them. The significant advancement of IT software and
hardware was the key for special-purpose blade aerofoil innovation and calculation of loads on
blades and entire turbine. The innovation process requires extremely high-speed calculation
for Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulation of wind system aerodynamics, which
became only possible in recent years with the availability of super-computer (Hjuler Jensen
2005).
Naturally, such simulation and calculation can be mainly carried out by large research
institutions or research consortiums with super-computer. Many of these research institutions
are national research laboratories and they have developed ready-to-use, special-purpose
aerofoil for wind turbines for commercial purpose, and this part of technology and knowledge
is coded. The most representative series are: S8 series by the US National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL); FFA-W series by Department of Wind Energy under the Swedish Defense
Research Agency (FOI); RISO-Al series/RISO-B series/RISO-P series by RISO; and DU-XX-
W series by Technical University of Delft in the Netherlands. Meanwhile, some
manufacturers, Vestas, Enercon and Bonus/Siemens in particular, also develop the profiles by
themselves, while Vestas buys some profiles from RISO as well (Madsen 2005).
Blade Materials
Blade materials can change rotor weight and cost significantly. Lighter and more flexible blades
materials reduce blade loads, avoid strain, and reduce rotor weight and cost. As mentioned in
Chapters 3 and 4, the composite construction became dominant during the 1980s. Table 5-48
shows the most representative blade materials since the 1980s.
Table 5-48: Major Rotor Blade Materials for Wind Turbines
Materials Features
Glass-fiber - A matrix of fiber glass mats are integrated with polyester, which is hardened after itGlassfiber has impregnated with the fiber glass.
Plastic - Fiberglass is strong and relatively inexpensive but has good fatigue strength,
(GFRP) suitable for variety of design and manufacturing processes.
- The dominant materials during the 1980s and 1990s.
Glass-fiber - Use of epoxy instead of polyester for glass fiber composite.
Reinforced - GFRE is suitable for more slender and lightweight blades for larger machines toREord reduce loads and create more favorable blade mass.
EFox - Easier quality control and lower variation in material properties than GFRP.
- The dominant materials since the mid 1990s.
Carbon- - Carbon can substantially increase the stiffness and fatigue strength of blades
fiber without increasing the weight. Ideal for lightweight design. Carbon fiber can be
Reinforced used to form the whole or partial basic blade matrix, e.g., CFRP.
Plastic - CFRP is light weight but highly strong. But because it is very expensive, using
(CFRP) CFRP only in the load carrying parts is a cost effective option.
- Evolved from aerospace applications. Smart production techniques developed by
ATV Enterprise in France in the mid 1990s made it cost effective for wind turbines.
- Wood-epoxy system was first developed by Gougeon Brothers in the United States
Wood and was already in use during the 1980s. The critical factor of using wood was the
Epoxy development of epoxy resin system that seals the wood laminates, preventing
Laminates significant moisture change during lifetime of wind turbines.
- Wood-epoxy laminates have are light-weight and relative easy to dispose.
Sources: (European Commission 1999; European Wind Energy Association 2003; Gipe 1995)
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Rotor Blade Manufacturing Technology
Rotor blade manufacturing is the extremely complex process and exclusive to each
manufacturer. Competitiveness in blade technology derives from its manufacturing technology;
copying blade is extremely difficult, and the production secret is what makes blade very
exclusive. Materials science parts of blades are deeply integrated into production, which makes
the entire blade technology very complex (Hjuler Jensen 2005). Table 5-49 shows several
representative manufacturing methods of rotor blades.
Table 5-49: Rotor Blade Manufacturing Process
Process Features
- Hand lay-up of primarily fiberglass structure in open-mould wet processes.
First, the layer-upon-layer of fiberglass cloths are hand-placed in half-shell
moulds of a blade. Each additional layer cloth is coated by a polyester orHand Lay-up epoxy resin. Once the shell is complete, the structural stiffeners andWet Process of longitudinal spar running the length of the blade are added. Then, the two
GFRE Blade halves are glues together to form a blade.
- The most conventional manufacturing method of GFRP and GFRE blades for
up to the 30m blades. Used widely by almost all manufacturers for small and
medium-capacity turbine blades in Europe.
Pre- - Fiber fabrics that are pre-impregnated with a resin that hardens when heated.pre-d - Shortcomings are: fiber fabrics used in this process is more expensive than
impregnated vacuum infusion process; the processing time is also longer; and theProcess materials require being stored in cold storage and large machines to handle.
- Fiber already presented in the mould is impregnated with resin (epoxy or
thermo-setting plastic such as polyester) that is drawn into the mould by
means of a vacuum.
Vacuum - The process allows for blades to be made in one cast, creating crystal clear
Infusion laminate without air bubbles and microscopic pores. 100% quality control is
Process for possible. More environmentally friendly by not exposing surrounding to the
Resin resin, and provides considerable flexibility of choosing between materials and
combinations than the pre-impregnated process.
- The process has been used since the late 1990s, e.g., LM Glasfiber, Aeropac,
Enercon, GE, NEG Micon.
Monolithic - Uses a dry perform, not a wet open-mould; blades are pressed in a single
(Single-shot mould, eliminating a seam and the need for bonding two separately
Infusion) manufactured blade halves.
Process - Used by Bonus (Siemens) since 2002 for their in-house GFRE blades.
Sources: (Enercon GmbH 2004b; Gipe 1995; LM Glassfiber 2005b).
Production Mould Innovation
Development of production moulds is an important part of manufacturing technology
innovation. Production moulds made from composite materials, instead of fabricated steel of
the past, have made lighter and more rigid moulds possible, providing the advantages from
production engineering and process points of views (De Vries 2004a). Production moulds
from composite materials are begun used in the 1980s, but have been patented since 1970s.
They are continuously improved by manufacturers and remain as the production secret for
them (Hjuler Jensen 2005).
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Automation/Robotics Application
Robotic systems have been used for the last 25 years for blade production and are also the
production secret for each blade manufacturer. In the past, it was used only for making the
moulds, not blade itself. However, in recent years, more and more blades and other machine
elements are made with robotic techniques in order to control quality and reduce wastes and
risks of error. For example, robotic systems place glass fiber sheets very precisely at
predetermined places in the moulds, while registering and documenting every step in the
manufacturing process and transferred to the SCADA system. Another robotic process applies
glue that bonds the two blade shells (De Vries 2004a; Hjuler Jensen 2005; LM Glasfiber A/S
2005c). Machine dependency depends on manufacturing methods and manufacturers, but it
has been increasing since the mid to late 1990s.
Control, Conditioning and Monitoring System
Control, conditioning and monitoring functions and the strategies for optimizing wind turbine
reliability and performance through various methods that the controller interacts with turbine
components are the very important business secrets for wind turbine manufacturers. Improved
control strategies have contributed to the increase of wind turbine productivity in recent years
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2003). They vary greatly from one turbine to another as
well. Both hardware and software play important roles.
Power Electronics/Power Semi-conductor - Hardware
Power electronics makes wind turbines friendly to the grid and the power utilities. Most wind
turbines on the market since the 1980s have used power electronics for soft-starter and variable
speed control systems. The development and availability of power electronics have influenced
the choice of rotor speed control and electrical power generation system configurations greatly.
Thyristors
Thyristors is a solid-state semiconductor device that acts as a switch when their gate receives a
current pulse. Modem thyristors can switch up to megawatts amounts of power. Thyristors is
the earliest device used for wind turbine operation, mainly as soft-starter. The soft-starter
application was developed in the beginning of the 1980s and thyristors was a part of this
technology. It became common place during the 1980s and 1990s (Hjuler Jensen 2005).
Transistors
Transistors, such as insulated gate bipolar transistor (IGBT), bipolar junction transistor, and
metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor, can regulate a large amount of power at one
time. These devices as well as other circuit elements can be combined in a range of ways to
control switching, current flow, resistance, and voltages. Transistors are old technology but
have made dramatic advancement in power handling capability for the past 20 years, while the
ten-time price reduction occurred during the last ten to 15 years (Carlin, Laxson, and Muljadi
2001; Hjuler Jensen 2005).
IGBT (Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistors): IGBT has become a choice for high-power
inverters/converters and soft-start controllers for wind turbines in recent years. IGBT is a
power electronics device invented during the 1980s and mainly used in switching power
supplies and motor control applications. Although the first generation IGBT were
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relatively slow in switching and prone to failure, the second generation devices from the
mid 1990 improved greatly and the current third generation withstands high-speed
operations and has tolerance of overloads. In addition, higher performance avaiability and
sharp cost reduction since the mid 1990s have increased the popularity of IGBT as
adjustable speed power electronics drives for most of variable speed operations and soft-
start controllers. Many pitch-regulated, variable speed turbines, regardless of their drive
system, use IGBT as the adjustable-speed power electronics drives (partial- or full-scale
power electronic converters as well as cost-effective torque-speed control for blades)
(Gertmar 2003).
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) - Hardware and Software
SCADA (Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition) system is a monitoring system that allows
a remote operator to log in and control wind turbines and wind farm with great precision. As
explained in Chapter 4, the Danish industry created the SCADA protocol in the mid 1980s in
order to manage the overall transmission of information between wind turbines and the grid
system. The protocol made all the SCADA information to be exchangeable from one company's
SCADA to other company's SCADA. Each manufacturer has developed its own, unique
SCADA system based on the protocol since the late 1980s, and the manufacturers and their
electronics system suppliers have continuously improved reliability and sophistication of
SCADA and user-friendliness. New SCADA products are usually applied to newly introduced
turbine models. Older models and already installed turbines can be retrofitted with new SCADA
system, usually by request.
Remote Monitorinq
The amount of data monitored by SCADA and their monitoring precision have increased.
Remote monitoring technology has continuously upgraded for the past 20 years, and the 24-
hour remote monitoring is a norm in the industry. Currently all manufacturers offer the
SCADA remote monitoring of: 1) wind turbine data (wind speed, active and reactive power,
yaw angle, etc. and command/operational/fault status); 2) electrical and mechanical data (three-
phases and current voltage, power factor, frequency, rotational speeds of generator and rotor,
and temperatures of gear oil/generator/nacelle, etc.); 3) turbine statistical data (availability,
external errors hours, and calendar hours, etc.); 4) meteorological data (wind speed and
direction, air pressure, temperature, mean wind speed, and any other project-specific data); and
5) grid data (three- phases and current voltage, active and reactive power, and any project-
specific data).
The latest development is preventive monitoring, which uses vibration censors to identify any
faults in very early stage. The products came around 2003, e.g., Vestas Condition Monitoring
Systems (VCMS) and Nordex Condition Monitoring System (Nordex AG 2002b; Vestas Wind
Systems A/S 2004).
Remote Reportinq - Internet Information Portal
Internet information portal have been used to provide remotely and instantaneously the
monitored data to anybody concerns the wind turbine performance, not only customers but also
service contractors and technical management personnel. Such services become popular since
the early the 2000s. They include Nordex Control 2 (2001, web-based), Vestas OnlineTM
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(2002, web-based), Enercon Service Information Portal (SIP, 2004),"' and Siemens WebWPS
SCADA (web-based). These most recent products convert the data into information, tailoring
them into standardized and customized reports that can be easily exported to the standardized
software product such as Excel (Enercon GmbH 2003b; Nordex AG 2002b; Vestas Wind
Systems A/S 2002c).
Grid Interface Management
As the number of wind turbines connected to the electricity grid increases, the grid interface
management has become a contentious issue for the grid stability. SCADA plays a vital role in
supporting optimal interface between the turbine controller and the grid control center at the
utility by measuring the grid conditions and controlling the turbine behaviors. Enercon Process
Data Interface (PDI, 2003) and Vestas GridSupportTM (2003), both perform such a role even
during the grid error by dealing with short-term voltage drop and preventing voltage collapse
from occurring (Enercon GmbH 2003a; Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2004).
Remote Controlling and Wind Farm Controller
SCADA has also considerably advanced its remote controlling ability together with remote
monitoring ability. The development during the early 2000s was the innovation of integrated
remote controlling system of all previously stand-alone monitoring systems. This enabled
wind farm controlling and optimization by registering all data concerning individual turbines in
a wind farm, meteorological and management systems as well as the grid substations. Both
Nordex Control 2 (2001) and Vestas OnlineTM (2002) are built for this purpose with the web-
based data exchange system. Vestas OnlineTM was launched with V80/2.OMW for Horns Rev
Offshore Wind Farm. Enercon PDI (2003) also targets wind farm integration (Enercon GmbH
2003b; Nordex AG 2002b; Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2002c).
Noise/Sound Reduction Technology
Advancement of noise reduction has been constant and significant. Sound emission levels of
many new turbines tend to cluster around similar values; this indicates technological
development in this area has well-incorporated into most of commercialized turbine designs
(Danish Wind Industry Association 2003). There are two main noise sources for wind turbine:
mechanical noise and aerodynamic noise.
Mechanical Noise Reduction
Mechanical noise arises from wind turbine internal components. In order to create an efficient
transmission that reduces mechanical noise, spheroidal graphite iron casting with better acoustic
damping characteristics than steel and elastometric gaskets became common by the mid 1990s
(European Commission 1999). Variable speed turbines have also reduced the mechanical noise
level in lower wind by lowering rotor speeds.
Aerodynamic Sound Reduction
Aerodynamic noise comes from the process that the rotor blades decelerate the wind when
transferring the energy to the rotor. It can be reduced by the favorable shape and design of rotor
blade profile. More efficient blade aerofoil can convert more wind energy into rotational energy,
70 Enercon SIP information supplys not only SCADA but also SAP, service scheduling, and the firm's field service
system (Enercon GmbH. 2003b).
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hence reduce aerodynamic noise. The development of smoother blade surface and suitable rotor
tip design geometry has also contributed to reducing aerodynamic noise vastly. Although the
aerodynamic noise from rotor blades has been vastly reduced (European Wind Energy
Association 2003), it is still the technology frontier of R&D today because calculation of
aerodynamic sound emission from blades can be done only by a few institutions with
supercomputer (Hjuler Jensen 2005).
Tower Technology
The primary consideration for tower technology is overall tower stiffness. The other factors are
the mode and cost of erection and aesthetics. Tubular designs become dominant at the frontier
during the 1990s because of their aesthetic appearance, less labor intensiveness in construction,
logistical advantages with easy transport, and reduction of the impacts on avian populations.
Stiff Tower and Soft Tower
Towers with higher fundamental natural frequency than blade passing frequency (rotor speed
times the number of blades) are called stiff tower. They are relatively insensitive to the motions
of the turbine itself but tend to be heavy and more expensive. On the other hand, towers with
lower fundamental natural frequency than blade passing frequency are called soft tower. They
are generally less expensive than stiff towers, since they are lighter, but it is important to make
sure that no resonance are excited by any motions of the rest of the turbine by careful analysis of
the entire system (McGowan and Connors 2000), which became increasingly possible by
increased capability of computer sciences. The development of soft towers has been greatly
advanced since the 1990s and they are preferred for larger turbines due to their light weight.
Offshore Wind Energy Technology Innovations and Adaptation
Since the mid 1990s the R&D focus on offshore wind energy technology has been the estimation
of offshore wind resources and the methodology improvement of wind modeling, the design
method development of dealing with the effects of combined wind and wave loading, the
development of certificate rules, and the evaluation of pilot plants in shallow waters, along with
the development of turbines specifically design for offshore environment.
Offshore-specific Turbines
There are many parameters required for turbines specific for offshore environment. Special paint
for towers to prevent corrosion as well as temperature control and dehumidifiers for nacelle to
prevent condensation are important. In addition, strong turbine control capabilities through
remote control and monitoring are required for offshore wind farms that are increasingly treated
as power plant by the utilities. Meanwhile, offshore turbines can operate at a higher rotational
speed than onshore, because turbulence at offshore is less. The most important objective in
designing cost effective offshore turbines, however, is to minimize the inspection and
maintenance requirements due to the difficulty and high expense of turbine access in harsh
offshore environments.
During the 1990s, the impacts of putting some additional marinisation features to offshore
applications were not significant because many onshore turbines are originally specified for
costal regions; dehumidifiers, small service cranes, special cooling system and special paint for
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towers were all introduced as aaitional features to onshore turbines in the Danish ottshore wind
farms developed during the 1990s.
Specifically designed offshore-specific wind turbines were begun commercialized from the early
2000s by various manufacturers, mainly modifying their onshore models by adjusting them to
higher tip speeds and higher instrumentation specification and putting a larger generator,
redundant electrical system components, and built-in handling equipment in the nacelle.
Offshore Foundation
Offshore wind projects require several different technical solutions from onshore turbines. The
most distinguishably different part is the foundation. Onshore wind turbines usually use concrete
bed plate as foundation, which was also used for Middelgrunden Offshore Wind farm. The
following several offshore foundation concepts and techniques are developed (Table 5-50).
Most of the existing offshore wind parks use gravitation foundations, and only concrete caisson
and monopole foundations have been successfully installed as of the end of 2005.
Table 5-50: Offshore Foundation Technology
Concepts Technology Advantages/Disadvantages
Can be built in dry dock near the site using
reinforced concrete and be floated into the Simple technology. Concrete platformConcrete site before being filled with sand and gravel can be used in any soil conditions, butCaisson to achieve the necessary weight. Three will become too heavy and expensiveFoundation offshore wind farms, Vindeby (1991), Tuno to install at water depths above 10m.Knob (1995), and Nysted (2003) in Denmark
used this method.
Use a cylindrical steel tube placed on a flat Considerably lighter than concrete.
steel box on the sea bed. Then, the steel Can be made onshore, may be used
Steel Gravity tube will be filled with olivine (very dense on all types of seabed, and can use in
Foundation mineral), which gives the foundation deeper water condition than concrete.
sufficient weight to withstand waves and ice However, it requires comprehensive
pressure. erosion protection.
Use a steel pile with a diameter of between Semi-standard in the mid 2000s.
3.5m and 4.5m, which is driven some 10 to While requiring no preparations of the
- 20m into the seabed, depending on the type seabed in most soil conditions, theMono-pile of underground. Mono pile foundation is installation is expensive due to theFoundation effectively extending the turbine tower under need of heavy duty piling equipment.
water and into the seabed. Horns Rev Wind Not suitable for locations with many
Farm in Denmark used this method in 2002. large boulders in the seabed.
Steel pile below the turbine tower emanatesaboveTripod or a steel frame that transfers there es 30m and in most soil conditions with
Multi-pole ah stoeel frame thte trsfes The oreero minimum site preparations, it is not
Foundation the tower into three steel piles. The three suitable at water depths lower than 6-piles are driven 10 to 20m into the seabed 7m because the steel frame makes
service vessels difficult to approach.
Suction Place mono- or tripod-suction caisson on Easy installation and removal. An
Bucket the sea bed and pump out the water, which attempt by Enercon in 2005 failed due
ouctn creates pressure from the surrounding water to mechanical deformation of theFoundation to force it into the sea bed. bucket during the installation.
Sources: (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003; De Vries 2005b; European Wind
Association 2003)
Energy
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Wind Project Execution Technology
Wind Resource Estimation/Energy Prediction and Optimization Technology
The Danish National Laboratory RISO has been making the standards on wind resource
estimation, wind energy prediction, and optimization technologies.
Wind Atlas Analysis and Application Program (WAsP)
As mentioned in Chapter 4, RISO developed a topographical wind flow model called Wind
Atlas Analysis and Application Program (WAsP) in 1987. WAsP is a wind resource
estimation model, which contains several physical models (flow model, roughness change
model, model for sheltering obstacles, model for turbine wakes in wind farms) to describe
wind flow over different topographies and roughness changes. WAsP is an implementation of
the so-called wind atlas methodology, which can do the tasks described in Table 5-51. RISO
has continuously improved WAsP to increase its accuracy and user friendliness and has
constantly introduced new tasks since the 1987 introduction. For example, the combination of
the topographical and wake models by WAsP to optimize the layout came in the mid 1990s
(European Commission 1999). As of February 2006, WAsP model has been used by more
than 1600 users in over 100 countries and territories. It is the industry standard model for wind
estimation (RISO National Laboratory Wind Energy Department 2006a).
Table 5-51: WAsP Functions
Output Products Tasks Inputs
Observed Wind Climate (OWC) Time-Series Analysis of Wind Speed and
- Wind Data Analysis Direction
Regional Wind Climate (RWC) Analysis Observed Wind Climate (OWC) + Site
- Wind Atlas Generation Description(wind atlas data sets)
Predicted Wind Climate (PWC) Regional Wind Climate (RWC) + Site
- Wind Climate Estimation Description
- Wind Resource Mapping
Annual Energy Production (AEP) Application Predicted Wind Climate (PWC) + Power
of.Wind Turbine Curve
Micro Siting of Wind Turbine Regional Wind Climate (RWC) + DigitalTerrain Map
Predicted Wind Climates (PWC) + Wind
Wind Farm Wake Losses Wind Farm Turbine Characteristics + Wind Farm
Win armcto LayoutNet Annual Energy Production of Production Annual Energy Productions + Wake
Entire Wind Farm Losses
Source: (RISO National Laboratory Wind Energy Department 2006a)
WAsP Engineering
RISO introduced another computer program called WAsP Engineering in 2001 to support the
estimation of loads on wind turbines in complex terrain by estimating extreme speeds, wind
shears, profiles, and turbulences. It designs and assumes 3D turbulence. Data from WAsP
and WAsP engineering are used as input to the aerodynamic computer code and the load and
safety analysis, which are used to design wind turbines (RISO National Laboratory Wind
Energy Department 2006b)
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Project Design and Planning Software - WindPRO
WindPRO, a software product used for project design and planning of wind turbines and wind
farms, is another Danish innovation of the 1980s, as mentioned in Chapter 4. The product has
continuously improved (Table 5-52) and extended its customer base all over the world.
It is clear from Table 5-52 that the WindPRO development has happened around every aspect of
wind power project execution. There are also two similar products (Windfarmer by Garrad
Hassan and Windfarm by Resoft) competing on the market today. 71 All the three products
include both energy and environment models, while WAsP by RISO only calculates energy
parts. However, in terms of market share, the share of WindPRO is very high. Approximately
600 to 700 users have been licensed by the end of 2005. In Denmark and Germany, the market
share has been 100%. Also all turbine manufacturers have WindPRO. In Spain, the market
share of WindPRO is smaller, approximately 50%. Only in the United Kingdom, the shares by
the other two products are larger (Nielsen 2005).
Table 5-52: Development History of WindPRO
Year Module Module Contents
1986 Basis Project Administration, Map Handling, WTG Catalogue, Wind Dataand on-screen digitalization of Height Contour Lines
Atlas Wind atlas calculation in non-complex terrain
Park Wind farm energy calculation
Decibel Noise calculation
1987 WAsP Pre- and post-processing of data calculated with WAsP
1988 Basis, Atlas, Park, Decibel and WAsP became DOS version
First visualization tool. Turbine rendering into landscape photo or
1995 Photomontage artificial landscape. Added as Windows 3.1 tool
1996/97 WindBank Economic analysis of wind projects
1997 Release of the first Windows version of WindPRO
Animation Animated presentation of photomontage
1998 Calcuaton Calculation of shadow impact. Visualization module.
ZVI Calculation of Zones of Visual Influences (ZVI) for a specific area
1999 Resource Calculation and presentation of wind resource maps
2000 Energy Automatic optimization of layout for maximum energy outputOptimization
Environmental Environmental Impact Assessment report creation for each neighbor
2001 Impact with separate report
WindPLAN Planning and/or site finding based on GIS data
3D Animator Visual reality presentation of wind turbines in an artificially rendered2002 landscape
First Internet auto update service began.
2005 eGrid Calculation of power grid connections
Sources: (EMD 2005; Nielsen 2005)
71 Both the products are originated from the United Kingdom. These two products received the EU and British
funding for their development (Nielsen, 2005).
72 WindPRO also has three array loss models and more turbulence models to choose today, which has been
demanded by users to compare the results by different models. Ibid.
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Integrated Design and Optimization of Wind Turbine
The advancement of wind project execution technology is greatly interacted with the
development of mathematical models for wind turbine components, wind turbines, wind farms,
and wind resources. This resulted in the advancement of detailed modeling of wind turbine
behaviors as analytical tools as well as the prediction of long-term wind resources at any site and
wind turbine behaviors within a wind farm as design tools. This is an important technological
contributing factor for the expansion of wind energy during the 1990s.
Computer Modeling for Integrated Design and Optimization of Wind Turbines
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Figure 5-12: Relationships among Computer Modeling Codes
Source: (Manwell, J.G., and Rogers 1999) cited in (McGowan and Connors 2000)
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Optimization of wind turbines does not solely depend on technology but on the combination of
technology and economics, as the goal is to deliver electricity at the lowest possible cost per
kWh of energy. The turbine optimization needs to be done as a system. For example, the
relative size of generator and rotor and their fit to wind characteristics, e.g., small generator with
small rotor for low speed wind, and large generator with large rotor for high speed wind, are
important for optimization (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003; Garrad 1998).
As illustrated in Figure 5-12, in the computer modeling for integrated design and optimization of
wind turbines, the results of component design codes and aerodynamic design codes are used for
turbine design codes to determine the expected turbine performance under a specific wind
climate. Then, this performance data is used with long-term wind projections and topographic
data to optimize the wind turbine performance (McGowan and Connors 2000).
Turbine Transportation and Logistics Innovations
Innovations in turbine transportation and logistics have been constant. However, their
importance has greatly increased with the introduction of MW-class turbines.
Small-capacity Turbines
A complete set of small-capacity wind turbine in the 1980s (100kW) could be packed inside a
standard shipping container (12m-long, 70m 3 of space).
Medium-capacity Turbines
Logistics and installation are not a huge issue even for medium-capacity turbine (500-600kW),
where road infrastructure is good and local site conditions are permitted.
* Around 1994, the standard container system showed its limits, when rotor blades began
exceeding 12m for the first time. A system to open the doors of containers in order for the
blades to stick out 2m was begun used (Wind Power Monthly 2002c).
* For medium-capacity turbines, the tower parts command the logistics. Towers are usually
manufactured in 20 to 30 sections, and the limiting factors are the logistics on road and rail.
Tubular tower has a logistical advantage over concrete and lattice towers, because nested
tube towers are easily transported directly to the foundation for final assembly.
MW- and Multi-MW class Turbines
The size of MW-class turbines has brought new problems with logistics and installation.
Transportation problems and costs increase as the sizes of rotor blades, hub, gearbox, and
generator increase. MW-class components are far too big for normal transport solutions. For
example, a 2MW turbine can fill 1500m 3, which is more than 20 times the space of the 100 kW
turbines in simple comparison (Wind Power Monthly 2002c). All turbines manufacturers that
produce MW-class turbines have devised unique solutions in collaborations with transportation
equipment suppliers and freight forwarders. The followings are some example:
- General practice of stacking of the tower sections on a ship for oversea transportation (each
manufacturer has a different way of stacking) (Wind Power Monthly 2002c).
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- Special container unit for oversea shipping of long blades (Vestas 2000): linking three
standard container units to transport up to three blades. Normal harbor cranes can be used
(Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2001).
- Design of special transportation vehicle and system:
o Special tailor for long rotor blade (NEG Micon, 2001): carry two blades instead of one
(NEG Micon NR 6.2002).
o Special trailer for large nacelle (Vestas, 2000): lower its base to the ground level and
load and unload without the use of crane. The nacelle is manufactured directly on the
base frame that is then attached to the trailer (Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2001).
o Modular system for large tower (Vestas): modular tower system with wheels that can
fix the tower sections to the trailer without using tools (self-loading and unloading).
Adjustable for future larger and heavier tower transportation needs (Vestas Wind
Systems A/S Date Unknown).
- Using an entire ship for exports (Vestas): nacelles in the hull area and blades on the deck.
Participation of New Sub-suppliers (Freiqht Forwarders/Transportation Equipment
Manufacturers)
The new logistical requirements and challenges have created a niche market for new sub-
suppliers. The innovations in the logistics of oversea projects are done in collaboration between
freight forwarders and wind turbine manufacturers, and the knowledge is very preparatory.
Freight forwarders tailor-make the complete transportation system; unlike a shipping company,
which is connected to one shipping line, it gets quotes from a number of steamship and trucking
lines and goes with the best price. Their roles include: keeping the components unscathed during
the shipping; locating a guarded storage area in the port; obtaining road permits for oversized
loads in different parts of the world; finding equipment large enough to carry the components;
and scheduling the just-in-time installation by coordinating the timing of turbine arrival and
crane arrival at the sites (Wind Power Monthly 2002c). Transportation equipment manufacturers
are also finding a niche market in new equipment design and manufacturing for wind turbine
transport, as mentioned above.
5.5.2 Technology Trends
Shift of Technology by Major Manufacturers
Figures 5-13 and 5-14 illustrate the technology shift by the main Danish and German
manufacturers since 1990 by showing the introduction of new products and technologies
regarding turbine rated capacity, rotor diameter, power regulation methods, rotor speed control
and electrical power generation system configurations, power electronics, and blade materials.
The figures do not indicate that all product lines of the manufacturers shift to the new technology
all at once; old technologies were usually continuously used until the product lines were taken
out of market. From these figures, it is clear that specific product lifetimes on the market vary
according to manufacturers and turbine models. Also there were many other products on the
market by other manufacturers, some of which had different innovative features and technologies
incorporated. However, the products by the manufacturers in Figures 5-13 and 5-14 have been
more commercially successful and are considered to demonstrate the main market trend.
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Permanently Excited Induction Generator, GFRP = Glass Fiber Reinforced Plastic, GFRE = Glass
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Figure 5-13: Technology Shift by Manufacturers (1)(See the notes at the end of the section)
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Figure 5-14: Technology Shift by Manufacturers (2)
(See the notes at the end of the section)
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Shift of Technology by Location of Innovations in Technology System
Table 5-53 summarizes technology trend by technology system and value functions. It is clear
that the innovations have occurred in a variety of technology subsystems and value activities.
There is a strong tendency of innovations in both components and system as a whole.
Table 5-53: Technology Shift by Technology System and Value Functions-
(See the notes at the end of the section)
1990 1995 2000 2005
Power Control Stall x x x x x
byBae Pitch Collective x x x________
Angle Individual x x x x xActive Stall x x x x
1-fixed SCIG x x
2-fixed SCIG x x x x x
Limited Variable
Rotor Speed WRIG (OptiSlip) x x
and Generator WRIG in DFIG x x x x x
Variable WRSG x x x x x x
WRIG x x
PMSG x x
Gearbox (3 stage) x x x x x x x
Transmission Direct Drive x x x x x x
Mlltibrid (1 stage) x
Power Thyristors x x x x x x
Electronics Transistors x x x x x x
GFRP x x x x x
Blade GFRE x x x x x
Materials CFRE x x x
Wood Epoxy x x x
Blade Aerofoil Aircraft x x x x x x x
Special x x x x
Hand Wet x x x x
Blade Pre-impregnated x x x x x x
Production Vacuum Infusion x x x x x
Method Monolithic x x
Automation x x x x x
Turbine Design Integration x x x x x x
Remote Monitor x x x x x x x
SCADA Internet Report x xCGrid Interface x x
Windfarm Control x x
Data Analysis x x x x x x x
Project Noise Prediction x x x x x x x
Execution Visual Impact x x x x x
(Project Micro-siting x x x x x
Development Energy Prediction x x x x x x x
& Investment) Economics x x x xOptimization x x x
Grid Connection x
Project Special Transport x x
Implementation Modular Transport
I of Tower/Nacelle I
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Technology Trends 1990-2005
From Figures 5-13 and 5-14, it is clear that all the manufacturers have introduced new turbine
models every two or three years. New component or subsystem technology is usually introduced
with new turbine models, although some technology shifts occur as the improvement for existing
models on the market.
Turbine Size - Effects of WEGAII
The market introduction of MW-class machines developed under the WEGA II Program began
in 1995 and in 1996 (Table 5-54). Their rated capacity was mostly between 1MW and 1.5MW
(the rotor diameter between 50m and 66m), but the turbine concepts varied in terms of the
number of blades, power regulation method, and rotor speed configuration. From Figures 5-13
and 5-14, it is clear that the WEGA II Program helped the participating manufacturers leap from
their medium-capacity turbines around 600kW to MW-class turbines and introduce several
innovative technologies to the market such as active stall regulation by Bonus and a limited
range variable speed operation with DFIG by Tacke. These turbines had the tremendous impacts
on the market takeoff of MW-class turbines in the late 1990s.
Table 5-54: MW-class Turbines developed under WEGA |1 Program
Manufacturer/Make Capacity Rotor # of Power Rotor Speed(kW) Diameter Blade Regulation
Nedwind NW 53/2/1000-240 1000 52.5 2 Stall Two-fixed
Nordic 1000 1000 53 2 Stall Two-fixed
Micon M2300-1000-250kW 1000 54 3 Stall Two-fixed
Nordex N54 1000 54 3 Stall Two-fixed
Bonus I MW/54 1000 54 3 Active Stall Two-fixed
HSW 1000/57 1050 57 3 Pitch Two-fixed
Autoflug 1200 1200 60 2 Pitch Two-fixed
Nordtank 1500/60 1500 60 3 Stall One-Fixed
Vestas V63-1.5MW 1500 63 3 Pitch Variable (10%)
Tacke TW 1.5 1500 65 3 Pitch Variable (1.4:1)
Enercon E-66 1500 66 3 Pitch Variable (2.5:1)
Kvaerner WTS 80 3000 80 2 Pitch Variable (1.5:1)
Source: (European Commission 1999)
Based on the technological experiences gained from the WEGA II turbine development and their
commercialization, multi-MW class turbines appeared on the market in the late 1990s. Bonus
introduced its 2MW (76m rotor diameter or RD) in 1998 and Vestas introduced its V80-2MW in
1999. In the early 2000s, the size of multi-MW class turbines grew further by the following
models: Vestas V80-2.5MW and 3MW in 2001; NEG Micon 2.75MW (NM2750/80) in 2002;
Bonus 2.3MW in 2002 and Siemens 3.6MW in 2004; Nordex N80-2.5MW in 2000, Enercon E-
70 2MW in 2003; and Enron 2000 (2MW, 80m RD) in 2001 and Enron 3.2s and 3.6 offshore
(3.2MW and 3.6MW, respectively, both 104m RD) in 2002. In 2005, Enercon introduced its
E 112 4.5MW to the market and REpower launched a 5MW model.
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Dominant Technoloqy Driver - Power Regulation and Rotor Speed Variation
The dominant technology driver for wind energy technology is how to control the variable nature
of energy input (wind) to the constant nature of output (grid-quality electricity). Two principal
methods are rotor power regulation through rotor blade angle (stall, pitch, and active stall) and
rotor speed regulation (one- or two-fixed speeds and variable speeds) with different types of
electrical power generation systems (generator and transmission). Therefore, these components
and concepts show the constant technology innovations over the past 15 years. In general, the
main trend shifted from stall-regulated, fixed-speed WRIG configurations to pitch-regulated,
limited-range variable speed DFIG configurations. The geared transmission stays dominant; the
only exception is the pitch-regulated, direct-drive, wide-range variable speed WRSG
configuration by Enercon.
1990
At the point of 1990, the turbines with the Danish Classical Concept were dominant on the
market in general. Vestas, which used pitch-regulation with one- or two-speed operations, and
Enercon, which used pitch-regulation with variable speed operation incorporating geared drive
WRSG,73 were the exception among the major Danish and German manufacturers.
The Early 1990s
Two-speed operations using one generator with dual windings became prevailing and one-
speed operations gradually lost its popularity. The most notable innovation in this period was
the introduction of direct drive mechanism by Enercon E-40 in 1993. E-40 had a very wide
variable speed range of 4.75:1, and the subsequent E-30 200kW also had a wide speed range of
3:1. Enercon has not shifted its main technology concept since 1993.
The Mid 1990s
While the WEGA II turbines represented the substantial conceptual advancement, they did not
show any sign of uniformity of design concept and each manufacturer retained its particular
preference. Two-speed operations were most popular among them, while four manufacturers
chose variable speed operations. Only Nordtank stayed to one-speed stall regulation (Table 5-
54). The consensus seemed that wide-range variable speed operations were not worth paying
for, unless they came as an integral part of direct drive generator design (European
Commission 1999). These turbines also successfully accomplished the size growth without
any significant weight and cost increase.
The domination of stall-regulated turbines on the market began to change with some of these
turbines: Tacke shifted to pitch-regulation and Bonus introduced the innovative active stall
concept with Bonus 1MW. Still, however, there was the overall market dominance of stall
during the mid 1990s with about 60% of market share (European Commission 1999).
The most popular choice of rotor speed operation remained two-speed operations on the
market. The most notable innovations of this period were the first limited-range variable speed
turbine with DFIG by TWI.5, commercialized by Tacke in 1996, and OptiSlip@ (10% rotor
7 Synchronous generators were widely used by German manufacturers such as MAN and MBB in the 1980s. See
the technical specification in (Gasch, Robert , and Jochen Twele. 2002).
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speed variation by generator slip technology) by Vestas in 1995, introduced with V63-1.5MW
and V42/44/47-600kW.
The Late 1990s
Several smaller players in the German industry, Jacobs, DeWind, and Siidwind, shifted from
stall-regulated, two-speed operations to pitch-regulated turbines with variable speed operations
from 1997. Vestas shifted to variable speed DFIG configulation (OptiSpeed@) by the launch
of V80-2MW in 1999. Two-speed operations were still popular on the market. The proportion
of pitch and stall in MW-class turbines with over 50m RD on the market was almost equal
(European Commission 1999). The range of variable speed MW-class turbines with DFIG by
the manufacturers in Figures 5-13 and 5-14 was from the factor of 1.6 to 2.3, while two new
models by Enercon achieved the factor of 2.3 and 2.4.
2000-2005
The technology shift from stall regulation with fixed-speed operations to pitch-regulation with
variable speed operations happened to the three Danish Classical concept companies: NEG
Micon shifted to pitch-regulated turbines with DFIG with its NM2705/80 turbine in 2002;
Nordex did the same with N80-2.5MW in 2000; and Bonus made a radical shift from active-
stall, two-speed operations to pitch-regulated, wide-range variable speed operations with the
geared-drive WRIG and full-scale power converter in 2003.
Pitch regulation became dominant on the market: there were more than twice as many pitch-
regulated turbines than stall-regulated ones on the market. Some kind of speed variations has
become almost mandatory for MW-class turbines; over 1MW size, only three turbines were
one-speed, 12 turbines had two-speeds and 37 turbines employed variable speed operations
(European Wind Energy Association 2003). Multibrid technology was also introdueced to the
market by WinWinD of Finland through WWD 1MW in 2001 and WWD 3MW in 2004.
The variable speed range of MW-class turbines with DFIG introduced in the early 2000s
remained mostly between 1.7:1 and 2.3:1. The speed range for Enercon turbines varied
between 1.7:1 and 3.6:1; the larger turbines achieve narrower ranges because their rotor speed
decreases with size. The speed range of Bonus turbines with WRIG and full-scale converter
was between 2.6:1 and 3:1, while WRSG turbines by GE showed a wider speed range between
3:1 and 3.6:1. Multibrid turbines by WWD also showed a wide speed range of 3.3:1.
Blade Technoloqy
Materials composition and manufacturing methods are very proprietary for each manufacturer
and where the competitions occur. A tendency of specialization of materials and aerofoil
became stronger especially after 2000.
1990
All major manufacturers used GFRP as blade material with aircraft aerofoil. The hand-lay wet
production was the dominant manufacturing method.
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The Mid 1990s
In 1995 Vestas and Enercon used GFRE as blade material for their WEGA II turbines. The
vacumme infusion method was introduced during the mid 1990s. GFRE has become popular
blade materials around this period.
The Late 1990s
In 1997 Jacobs, Stidwind, and DeWind also began using GRFE blade materials with their
pitch-regulated, variable speed turbines. Some manufacturers began using special-purpose
aerofoil in the late 1990s for their multi-MW class turbines. LM Glasfiber began using FFA
aerofoil in the late 1990s and Vestas has been using FFA and RISO aerofoil since 1999.
2000-2005
While GFRE became the industry semi-standard blade material during the early 2000s, Vestas,
NEG Micon, REpower and DeWind successfully incorporated CFRP, carbon, wood, and wood
epoxy into their blades. Special-purpose aerofil has gained more popularity. Enercon
developed a very unique aerofoil with winglet for its E-33, E-48, E-70, and E-1 12 introduced
in 2005. Although it is impossible to determine exactly whether their aerofoil is special-
purpose one or not for manufacturers such as Enercon, Vestas, and recent GE and Bonus that
design blades in-house because the data on general technical specification is rather limited, it is
considered that special-purpose aerofoil design has been applied more and more for the
products introduced during the 2000s.
The vacumme infusion production method has become dominant in the 2000s. Robotics and
automation in blade manufacturing have become popular with the vacumme infusion method.
5.5.3 Characteristics of Wind Energy Innovations
Types of Wind Energy Technology Innovation - Systemic Innovation
Teece and Chesbrought (1999) describe there are two types of technology innovations: one is
autonomous innovation that can be pursued independently from other innovations; and the other
is systemic innovation that depends on a series of interdependent innovations. The benefits of
systemic innovations are realized only in conjunction with the related and complementary
innovations (Chesbrough and Teece 1999).
The technology development and trend shifting indicates that wind energy technology
innovations is highly systemic.
- The innovations and development of the two technology drivers, rotor power regulation
through rotor blade angle and rotor speed control with different types of electrical power
generation systems, are closely related; stall-regulation is better suited for fixed-speed
operations while pitch regulation is better for variable speed operations. Their market
popularity tends to shit closely, as seen in Figures 5-13 and 5-14 as well as Table 5-53.
- The innovations and the choice of blade aerofoil, materials, and manufacturing methods are
also closely linked to each other, and their innovation needs derive as a system requirement
from the weight and cost reduction needs for enlarged rotor blades due to the continuous
turbine upscaling.
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= The advancements of SCADA and computer modeling of wind resource estimation,
integrated turbine design optimization, as well as project execution technology have fortified
the systemic nature of wind energy technology innovations.
- Noise reduction technology is related to both transmission technology advancement and rotor
blade aerodynamics technology advancement.
Pacing Technology and Pacing Industry of Wind Energy of Wind Energy
since 1990
Every technology system has the components/subsystems that pace the speed of the entire
technology advancement. In the case of wind energy technology, the main pacing technology
has been high-tech technology components developed by other industries:
- Computer Science and Technology: have dictated the systemic innovation and their
market diffusion of wind energy technology through speed and capacity of data calculation
and simulation, development of mathematical modeling codes, and the user friendliness of
software.
= Power Electronics: has dictated the introduction of rotor speed variation and its speed
range, use of different types of generators, and power conditioning capability through its
power handling capability and cost.
These two pacing technologies indicate that wind energy technology has been mainly the
adaptation of various innovations from other industries. The early success of the Danish wind
industry depended on the use of several standard components such as gearboxes and induction
generators; their simple assembly made up the commercial wind turbines in the 1970s and 1980s.
Although rotor blades and control systems were tailored for wind energy technology from the
beginning, even they were adapted from the innovations in other industries. While specialized
component suppliers evolved over the years as the wind energy market grew, the focus of wind
turbine manufacturers is still mostly the adaptation of components for wind turbines. Thus, the
nature of wind energy innovations is highly adaptive. It is also incremental.
The only pacing technology that is exclusive to the wind energy industry is blade technology.
Blade materials development, manufacturing methods and aerofoil design are dictated by the
speed of innovations by the wind energy industry.
Blade Technology: has dictated the size of rotor and turbine and energy capture capability
through its aerofoil design, materials, and manufacturing methods.
Cost Composition of Wind Energy Technology
Wind projects have three major cost components: wind turbine cost, installation costs, and O&M
costs.
Wind Turbine Cost
Capital investment costs of a wind project are dominated by wind turbine cost. The proportion of
turbine cost in the entire project cost varies, depending on the sites due to the necessity of
infrastructure installation for grid connection and road connection, land price, etc. While the US
figures indicate that turbine cost occupies approximately 75% of the project cost (Energy
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Etticiency and Renewable Energy 1997; Sterzinger and Svrcek 2004), the Danish figures show
that the turbine cost occupies above 80% of the project cost for both 600kW and 1MW wind
turbines (Dannemand Andersen 1999; IEA 2004). Based on a limited data from Germany,
Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom for turbines between 850kW and 1.5MW, the turbine
cost ranged from 74% to 82% of the project cost (European Wind Energy Association 2003). In
any cases, the turbine cost occupies the majority of wind energy project cost. The proportion of
turbine cost in total investment costs has not been changed so much over the years.
Turbine cost depends on: 1) weight (heavier turbines are more expensive); 2) complexity (simple
turbines are less expensive than complex ones, in unit to unit comparison); and 3) materials
(standard materials such as steel, copper, and glass fiber, are cheaper than more unusual
materials such as CFRP, etc, in unit to unit comparison). These three factors are interdependent
of each other. In addition, the conditions of the component markets and overhead determined by
the methods used for R&D, manufacture, assembly, administration, insurance, and marketing
change turbine cost (Harrison, Hau, and Snel 2000). Table 5-55 shows the cost breakdown of
different sizes of turbines.
Table 5-55: Cost Breakdown of Onshore Wind Turbine
1997* 2001** 2003***Components (500kW/RD 38m)* (1.5MW/RD-70.5m (2MW/RD-82m
Pitch VS DFIG) Pitch VS DFIG)
Rotor 25% 28% 27%
Blades 17% 19%
Hub 7% 2%
Pitch System/Bearing 4% 6%
Tower 19% 21% 34%
Generator 7% 7% 4%
Electrical 21% 9% 8%
Power Electronics 7% 6%
Yaw System Controls 2% 2%
Transmission 29% 28% 27%
Gearbox 13% 14%
Shaft/Bearing 4% 2%
Brakes 1% 1%
Nacelle 6% 5%
Cables 2% 1%
Miscellaneous 2% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100%
* Cost breakdown based on 50 wind farms in the United States, which include many Danish
turbines.
** Cost estimates based on the US component manufacturer survey.
Recalculated from the source (real turbine cost in Germany) by excluding transformer.
Sources: (Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 1997; Poore and Lettenmaier 2003;
Sterzinger and Svrcek 2004; Weinhold 2005)
The proportions of rotor and transmission costs in turbine cost have not changed so much,
despite the turbine upscaling trend, while the proportion of electrical system has been reduced
greatly due to the price reduction and the increase of power-handling capacity of power
electronics. Blades are an expensive part of wind turbine, which can take 15% to 20% of turbine
cost. Despite the tremendous upscaling of rotor size, however, the proportion of rotor cost in
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total turbine cost has been contained with just a slight increase; reduction of blade weights and
high energy yield have been the focus of design efforts in recent years and the science-based
innovations in materials, aerofoil and manufacturing methods in this area has definitely
prevented the blade cost from becoming too expensive. The most substantial constraints for the
upscaling of blade size are the transportation cost that rises sharply for length above 46m and
becomes prohibitive above 61m (Veers et al. 2003).
Transmission system also takes up 25% to 27% of turbine cost; gearbox is the most expensive
component in transmission. Tower is another expensive component, which may account for
approximately 20% of turbine cost. The large increase of tower cost in the 2003 figure reflects
the recent steel shortage.
The contained costs of rotor blades and power electronics despite the tremendous turbine
upscaling indicate the successful innovations in these science-based technologies and their
incorporations into wind turbine.
Installation Costs
The other part of capital investment costs is installation costs, which are the costs for site
preparation, foundations, grid connection, and turbine erection and commissioning, and other
miscellaneous costs (expenses for financing, planning and engineering, permission, and
transport). Remote and hostile locations require higher installation costs than average and more
accessible locations, although they tend to have better wind resources and yield higher revenues.
There are also obvious economies of scale of installation of turbines in these cost components.
The limit of economies of scale is mainly posed by the amount of electrical energy that the local
grid can handle.
The data on installation costs are difficult to generalize. One study reports that installation costs
range from 13% to 40% of turbine price (Milborrow 1998). While the level of installation costs
is less than 20% of turbine cost in Spain and Denmark, it is about 24% in Germany and the
United Kingdom (European Wind Energy Association 2003). The grid connection is usually the
most expensive component in installation costs, followed by the costs for foundation and electric
installation.
The share of installation costs in total investment costs decreased over the years. In Germany,
the level of installation costs decreased from approximately 31% of total investment costs in
1999 to approximately 28% in 2001. In terms of installation costs per installed kW, almost 29%
of total investment costs were the costs other than turbine in 1989. By 1997 this share declined
to approximately 20%. For a 1MW turbine, at the point of 2001, the share was further declined
to approximately 18% (European Wind Energy Association 2003).
O&M Costs
O&M costs include not only costs for regular operation, maintenance, and repairs but also costs
for insurance and management of wind farms (Table 5-56). O&M costs are usually expressed
either as a percentage of turbine purchase price or in unit cost terms (cost/kWh), which need to
be added to the unit electricity generation cost.
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O&M costs interact with turbine cost in complex ways. Turbines with complex mechanisms can
optimize the power generation more than simpler turbines, but are more susceptible to
breakdown and maintenance costs can be higher.
Annual O&M costs may increase as the turbines get older. In a German study done by Deutsche
Wind Energie Institut (DEWI), O&M costs for the first two years were 2-3% of total investment
costs, while it increased slightly to less than 5% after six years (DEWI 2002, cited in European
Wind Energy Association 2003). For major overhauls of turbines, the price of a new set of rotor
blades, a gearbox, or a generator is usually in the order of magnitude of 15 to 20 % of the
original price of the turbine (Krohn 2003a). In general, the older the turbines are, the higher the
maintenance costs are.
Newer generations of turbines show lower repair and maintenance costs than older generations.
Design for maintainability, longevity, and lower service costs conflicts with the demand for low
initial costs.
Table 5-56: Average O&M Cost Composition for German Turbines 1997-2001
Cost Items Average %
Service and Spare Parts 26%
Land Rental 18%
Insurance Charges 13%
Project Management (Administration) 21%
Power from Grid 5%
Miscellaneous 17%
Total O&M costs 100%
Source: (European Wind Energy Association 2003)
Offshore Wind Project Costs
Offshore projects require higher initial investments than onshore due to larger foundation costs
(up to 30% of initial capital investment costs) and grid connection costs (around 25% of initial
investment costs). With such figures, turbine cost can be less than 50% of total investment costs
for offshore projects (Henderson et al. 2003).
Shift to Science-based Innovations and Increased Technological
Complexity
The highly systemic nature of innovations, the high-tech nature of pacing technology, and the
contained cost increase in high-tech components since 1990, all reveal that wind energy
technology has transformed itself from the assemblage of various med-tech standard components
in the 1980s to the high-tech integration of increasingly specialized components in the 1990s and
2000s.
Although the significance of mechanical engineering technology never diminishes in wind
energy technology system, the shifting innovation focus to science-based technology is obvious.
Lighter and stiffer blade materials development required for larger turbines totally depends on
the advancement of materials sciences. Design of specially tailored blade aerofoil and precision
robotics for manufacturing are governed by the advancement of computer sciences and
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engineering. Computer sciences and engineering have also dictated the constant advancement of
SCADA, wind resource estimation and optimization as well as project execution technology.
The growth of individual pitch mechanisms, variable speed operations, and grid interface
technology has been subject to the advancement of power electronics and control software. The
required high-tech capacity and capability to innovate and manufacture the total wind energy
system has increased tremendously.
Technological complexity of wind energy technology has definitely increased as well. Many
med-tech basic standard components used since the 1970s and 1980s have become accurately
controlled by high-tech hardware and software. This increased the number of components in the
system more than 15,000 today (Hjuler Jensen 2005). The advancement of system integration by
computer science and engineering has increased the system complexity. The upscaling of
turbines has expanded the value system of wind energy technology to new sub-suppliers that
handle crucial aspects of turbine transportation and logistics.
Note:
Figures 5-13 and 5-14 and Tables 5-53 and 5-66 were constructed based on the data available on
the following sources: (BTM Consult ApS 1995; BTM Consult ApS 1997; BTM Consult ApS
1998a; BTM Consult ApS 1999; BTM Consult ApS 2002; BTM Consult ApS 2003; BTM
Consult ApS 2004; BTM Consult ApS 2005a; BWE 1990; BWE 1991; BWE 1993; BWE 1994;
BWE 1996; BWE 1997; BWE 1998; BWE 1999; BWE 2001; BWE 2002; BWE 2003; BWE
2004; BWE 2005a; Danish Energy Authority 2006; Gasch and Twele 2002)
Section 5.6: Technology Transfer Results - Technology
Development in India and Comparison with
Denmark and Germany
This section examines wind energy technology development in India since 1990, in terms of
technology transferred from the frontier to India, advancement of domestic technology, and
technology gaps between the frontier and India. The section focuses only on wind turbines
actually installed, because turbines offered in paper but not installed have very limited impacts
on the market, industry and technology development of the country.
5.6.1 Technology Evolution in India
Table 5-57 compares the average sizes of installed turbines by country and the world. It is very
clear that the Indian averages have been much smaller than the Danish, German, and the world
averages. The Indian average sizes were about a half of Denmark during the 1990s, but they
became about one third since 2002. The Indian averages have been always between half and one
third of the German averages over the years. India even lagged behind China, which has much
smaller installed capacity over the years. The average sizes of India have caught up with the
Chinese averages only in 2003 and 2004.
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Table 5-57: Average Size of Installed Wind Turbines by Country and the World
India Denmark Germany Spain China World
1995 208 493 473 297 326 394
1996 301 531 530 420 400 433
1997 279 560 623 422 472 528
1998 283 687 783 505 636 699
1999 283 750 919 589 610 784
2000 401 931 1101 648 600 738
2001 441 850 1281 727 681 918
2002 553 1443 1397 845 709 1092
2003 729 1988 1650 872 726 1207
2004 767 2225 1715 1123 771 1246
Sources: DWIA, DEWI, (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
Table 5-58: Trend of Product Segment in Indian Market (% share)
OkWS <150kW5 <300kW< <500kW5 <750kWS <1MW <1.5MWs_ <2MWS
1993 -- 100% --- --- --- -- --
1994 --- 98% 2% --- --- -- -- --
1995 1% 83% 15% -- _ --- -- ---
1996 4% 71% 21% 5% ------ ---
1997 15% 47% 38% - --- -
1998 1% 79% 17% 3% ------ ---
1999 - 63% 24% 11% 1% - _ -
2000 52% 42% 1% 1% --- ---
2001 28% 44% 20% 7% --- --- _---
2002 31% 28% 22% 8% 10% --
2003 24% 4% 26% 26% 20% -
2004 31% 2% 39% 18% 9% 1%
Turbines with the boundary rated power are included on the right side classes.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Table 5-58 illustrates the interesting pictures of technology trend in India in
Danish and German markets.
comparison with the
= The turbine class between 150kW and 300kW has been continuously the majority in India
from 1993 to 2000, by when the majority of the German turbines moved to the class between
750kW and 1.5MW. Moreover, this class has never been gone from the Indian market; in
2002, it was the majority class again, and in 2003 and 2004 it had the very close second
share.
* Unlike Germany where the average sizes of installed turbines have been very close to the
majority of the installed turbine class, the shares of installed turbines in India have spread
over several different classes and this tendency is increasing since 2000.
- In 2003 and 2004, the installation had twin peaks; while the class between 300kW and
500kW decreased greatly in both years, the majority was spread over the class between
150kW and 300kW and the class between 500kW and 750kW. This twin peaks phenomenon
was never seen in either Denmark or Germany, and the Indian market lacks a clear trend shift
in terms of installed turbine class.
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- In terms of MW-class turbines, the first MW-class turbines appeared in 1994 with NedWind
1MW machine at the frontier. The first 1MW machine was installed in India only in 2001
and the first 2MW turbine was installed in 2005. The class between 1MW and 1.5MW
increased the share, but it is still the minority.
The above examination tells that technology introduction is much slower and technology
depreciation rate is lower in India, compared to Denmark, Germany, and the world.
5.6.2 Product Technology Transfer and Technology Gaps between
Denmark/Germany and India
Wind Turbines introduced before 1993
Table 5-59: Turbines introduced to India before 1993
Introduction Turbine Capacity Manufacturers
1986 55kW Bonus (DK), Micon (DK), Vestas (DK), Windmatic (DK)110kW Micon (DK)
1987 100kW Bonus (DK)
1988 90kW Vestas (DK)
55kW BHEL (India)
1989 110kW Wincon West Wind (DK)150kW Danish Wind Power (DK)
250kW Micon (DK)
1990 100kW Vestas (DK)200kW Micon (DK), Vestas (DK)
1991 200kW HMZ Windmaster (Belgium)300kW Nordtank
1992 225kW Vestas (DK)200kW BHEL (India)
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Table 5-59 shows the wind turbines introduced to India before the sector was open to private
investments in 1993. All of these turbines were installed in the government-led demonstration
projects. Except three models (BHEL 55kW, BHEL 200kW, and HMZ Windmaster 200kW), all
turbines were introduced by the Danish manufacturers, indicating active technology
collaboration between Denmark and India during this period. The demonstration projects started
with 55kW turbines in 1986 but quickly moved to the 100kW class. The first 200kW class was
installed by Micon in 1989 (250kW), and the first 300kW class turbines were introduced by
Nordtank in 1991.
Although the turbines in India tended to be smaller, distinguishingly large technology differences
were not seen between India and Denmark during this period. All the turbines had fixed-speed
WRIG and stall-regulated, including the BHEL models that were indigenously developed and
manufactured. The only exception was the Vestas models that had pitch regulation.
187
Wind Turbines introduced between 1993 and 1997
With the privatization of the wind energy sector, more foreign manufacturers began bringing
wind turbines to the Indian market from 1993 to 1997.
Wind Turbines introduced by Danish Manufacturers
Table 5-60 shows the turbines introduced by the Indo-Danish collaborations. Although the
introduced turbine capacity ranged from 200kW to 600kW, the installation number of medium-
capacity turbines was very limited. The only exception of this class was Vestas 500kW
introduced in 1995 (still installed as of 2005). Turbines rated between 225kW and 250kW were
most common, and no manufacturers introduced large-capacity turbines above 750kW. The new
turbine introduction concentrated between 1993 and 1995 with a couple of years of delay from
the European introduction. All the introduced turbines used the Danish Classical Concept with
the exception of pitch regulated turbines by Vestas.
Table 5-60: Wind Turbines introduced by Danish Manufacturers 1993-1997
Manufacturer Capacity RD Power Rotor Generator India European
(m) Control Speed Installation Launch
AMTL - Wind 220kW* N/A N/A 1993 N/A**
World 250kW 25 Stall 2-fixed WRIG 1994-1999 1991500kW* 37 1-fixed 1996 1992
BHEL- Nordex 200kW N/A Stall N/A WRIG 1994-1996 N/A**250kW 29.7 1-fixed 1995-1999 1994
225-40kW 29.8 2-fixed 1993-1998 N/A**
NEPC Micon 250kW 29 Stall 1-fixed WRIG (1989),1993-1998 N/A**400-100kW 31 2-fixed 1994-1998 1992
600kW* 42 2-fixed 1995 1994
Pioneer-Wincon 250kW 29 Stall 1-fixed WRIG 1995-present 1995
REPL - Bonus 320kW 33 Stall 1-fixed WRIG 1995 -1997 N/A**
Textool - 300kW 31 (1991)1996 1985
Nordtank 550kW* 37 Stall 1-fixed WRIG 1996 1992
Vestas RRB 225-50kW 27 Pitch 2-fixed WRIG 1993 - present 1988
500kW 42/47 1-fixed 1995 - present 1993
* The total installation number of these turbines was less than ten.
** No European record available for the makes. The number in parenthesis indicates the year
introduced by demonstration projects before 1993 in India.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Wind Turbines introduced by German Manufacturers
The turbine introduction by the Indo-German collaborations started in 1994 and the introduced
turbine capacity ranged from 230kW to 600kW, but only six of 600kW turbines were installed.
In terms of small-capacity turbines, the Enercon and Husumer Schiffswerft (HSW) models had
substantial footprints on the Indian market, while the installation of other manufacturer models
(Tacke, Pegasus, and Slidwind) were limited as the collaborations of these manufacturers did not
last long. The most important technology introduction was variable speed turbines with direct
drive WRSG by Enercon in 1995. However, none of other important technology development at
the frontier; medium- and large-capacity turbines and variable speed technologies by other
manufacturers came to India. Mostly, the Indian turbine introduction was only slightly delayed
from their European introduction during this period (Table 5-61).
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Table 5-61: Wind Turbines introduced by German Manufacturers 1993-1997
Manufacturer Capacity RD Power Rotor Generator India European(m) Control Speed Installation Launch
Enercon 230kW 30 Pitch Variable WRSG/ 1995-present 1995India DD/OV
250-80kW* 26 Stall 2-fixed IG 1996 1990
Flovel Tacke 600kW* 43 Stall Fixed N/A 1995 1994
Grematch - 250kW* N/A N/A N/A N/A 1995 N/APegasus I_____
Suzion - 270kW* N/A Stall N/A WRIG 1996 1993
Sudwind 350-100kW 33.4 2-fixed 1996 - 1997 1996
TTG - HSW 250-80kW 28.5 Stall 2-fixed PEIG 1994-present 1990
* The total installation number of these turbines was less than ten.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Table 5-62: Wind Turbines introduced by Other Country Manufacturers 1993-1997
Manufacturers Capacity RD Power Rotor Generator Installation
________ (m)~ Control Speed
ABAN Kenetech (USA) 410kW 33 Pitch Variable CV 1995-1997
RES -AWT (USA) 250kW N/A N/A N/A N/A 1996-1999
Das Lagerwey 80kW* 18 Pitch Variable IG/CV 1995-1996
(The Netherlands) 250kW 30 1995-2000
Elecon - HMZ (Belgium) 200kW* 22.5 Pitch 1-fixed WRIG (1991),1994(Bliu) 300kW 30 ____1995-1998
Himalaya (India) 200kW N/A N/A N/A N/A 1995-1996
JMP - Ecotecnia (Spain) 225-50kW* 28 Stall 2-fixed IG 1996
Kirloskar -WEG (UK) 400kW* 39.3 Pitch 1-fixed IG 1997-1998
Rayalseema - Mitsubishi 315kW* 29 Pitch 1-fixed IG 1996
(Japan)
Sangeeth - Carter (US) 300kW 24 N/A 1-fixed IG 1995-1997
Windia Nedwind 250kW* 31 Stall 1995-1996Widi Nerdm 500kW* 40.8 Stall 1-fixed IG 1995-1998(The Netherlands) 550kW 43.8 Pitch 1995-1996
*The total installation number of these turbines was less than ten.
The number in ( ) indicates the year introduced by demonstration projects before 1993 in India.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Wind Turbines introduced by Other Country Manufacturers
Table 5-62 shows that wind turbines introduced by the manufacturers of other countries. The
new turbine introduction mostly concentrated in 1995. Although five medium-capacity models
ranging between 400kW and 500kW were introduced by these manufacturers, they had a small
number and short period of installation and all of these firms and their turbines were generally
pulled out of the India market by 1998. They did not leave significant footprints. The most
significant technology introduction was pitch-regulated, variable speed turbines by Kenetech of
the United States and Lagerwey of the Netherlands. They had a relatively large number of
installations; however neither ABAN nor Das continued to manufacture those turbines on their
own after the collaborations ended.
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Wind Turbines introduced after 1999
Wind Turbines introduced by Foreign Manufacturers
No new model by foreign manufacturers was installed to India in 1998 and in 2000, and the
number of new turbine introduction was greatly reduced after 1999, compared to the period
between 1993 and 1997. Although the introduced turbine capacity moved to the range between
600kW and 1.65MW, the number of turbine introduction was much smaller compared to that to
the frontier. The introduction time lags were also definitely increased from a couple of years
seen between 1993 and 1997 to several years after 1999. NEG Micon and Enercon tend to bring
newer models to the Indian market without long time lags.
In terms of the Danish manufacturers, both Vestas and Bonus had not introduced any new
turbines to India since 1993 and 1995, respectively. Only NEG Micon was relatively active in
new turbine introduction; however, considering the firm's active model introduction history in
Europe, the Indian introduction has been very limited. No variable speed turbines were
introduced by the Danish manufacturers. As for the German manufacturers, Enercon introduced
all of 600kW, 330kW, and 800kW models simultaneously to Europe and India during the 2000s,
after the long absence of new model introduction to India since E30 230kW in 1995. The first
DFIG variable speed configuration was introduced to India by the German DeWind in 2001, and
then by GE Wind in 2002. But the models by these two firms have had less than ten
installations. The DeWind and C-Well collaboration did not last long as the ownership of
DeWind was changed in 2003. Nordex formed a new agreement with BHEL in 2003 with stall-
regulated, two-speed models (N43 600kW and N50 800kW introduced in Europe in 1994), but
they have not been installed in India as of March 2005.74 Other German manufacturers,
Fuhrlander and Jacobs/BWU/REpower, have stayed out of the Indian market (Table 5-63).
Table 5-63: Turbines introduced by Danish and German Manufacturers after 1999
Manufacturer Capacity RD Power Rotor Generator Indian European(m) Control Speed Installation Launch
NEG Micon 750kW 48.2 Stall 2-fixed 1999-present 1998
(Subsidiary) 950-200kW 54.5 Active S 2-fixed WRIG 2002-present 20011.65MW 82 Active S 1-fixed 2004-present 2003
NEPC - Norwin 750-180kW* 47 Active S 2-fixed WRIG 2005-present 1998
Pioneer- Wincon 750kW* 48 Pitch 2-fixed WRIG 2002 1998
330kW 33.4 WRSG/ 2005-present 2005
Enercon India 600kW 44 Pitch Variable DD/CV 2001-present 2001
800kW 48 2005-present 2005
Enron/GE Wind 600kWa* 46 Active S 2-fixed IG 2002 1998(USA-Germany, 750kWi* 50 Pitch Variable DFIG/CV 2002 2001
subsidiary) 1.5MWs* 70.5 Pitch Variable DFIG/CV 2004-present 1999
C-WEL - DeWind 600kW* 46 Pitch Variable DFIG/CV 2001-2002 1997
* The total installation number of these turbines was less than ten.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
74
There has been several wind turbines offered but not installed in India. They were not counted as technology
introduction or transfer in this research because the real products and technological capability have not landed on
India. In addition, they do not show any significant innovation introductions, nor their technology does not seem the
up-to-dated ones available in Europe.
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Table 5-64: Turbines introduced by Other Country Manufacturers after 1999
. RD Power Rotor Indian EuropeanManufacturer Capacity (m) Control Speed Generator Installation Launch
Elecon - Active
Turbowind 600kW* 48 Stall 2-fixed IG 2002-present N/A
(Belgium) 
____
Pioneer Asia - 850kW* 52/58 Pitch Variable DFIG/CV 2005-present 2004
Gamesa (Spain) W 5 (Germany)
* The total installation number of these turbines was less than ten.
** No European record available for the makes.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
The turbines introduced by other country manufacturers remain a very small minority. Lagerwey
did not continue its collaboration with Das; as a result its variable speed wind turbines with
direct drive, synchronous generator have not been introduced to India. Although some important
innovations such as active stall and DFIG came to India by the Turbowind and Gamesa models,
their contribution seems fairly limited with the limited number of installation (Table 5-64).
Wind Turbines introduced by Indian Manufacturers
Meanwhile, several Indian manufacturers manage to introduce wind turbines on their own. C-
WEL began offering its 250kW turbines in 2000, although only 11 of the model have been
installed by March 2005. Vestas RRB has been also offering a 600kW model, which is the
Indian modification of V47 500kW, but no installation has been made.
The notable turbine development has been made by Suzlon. The firm introduced the first MW-
class turbine to the Indian market in 2001, 1.25MW in 2002, and 2MW in 2005. Suzlon also
offered 600kW and 950kW models in the European and US markets along with MW-class
models. The firm shifted from stall regulation to pitch regulation from its 1MW model, and its
1.25MW and 2MW models have incorporated a slip ring system with standard WRIG; however
their rotor speed remains two-speed. The slip control provides the maximum slip up to 16% by
varying the resistance of the rotor winding dynamically, and increases energy conversion
efficiency by ensuring a small amount of power loss from frequent changes in wind speed.
From these MW-class turbines, Suzlon incorporated GFRE into their blades and the vacuum
infusion production technique (Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2005a) (Table 5-65).
Table 5-65: Turbines introduced by Indian Manufacturers after 1999
RD Power Rotor Indian EuropeanManufacturer Capacity m) Control Speed Generator Installation Launch
C-WEL 250kW 29. Stall 2-fixed WRIG 2000-present No*
1 MW-250kW 64 2001-2004 2003
Suzion 1.25MW-250kW 64/66 Pitch 2-fixed WRIG 2002-present 2003
2MW-250kW 88 2005-present 2004
* No European record available for the makes.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
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Product Technology Gaps between Denmark/Germany and India
Gaps in Introduced Turbine Capacity
In terms of turbine capacity, up to 400kW to 600kW capacity turbines were introduced to India
without much of the delay from the European market launch by the mid 1990s by foreign
manufacturers. However, those medium-capacity turbines have never become the main stream
in India, and the Indian turbine capacity began lagging behind quickly from the mid 1990s. A
number of turbines between 600kW and 999kW launched at the frontier between 1995 and 2005
were not introduced to India, including: four models by Vestas; two models by Bonus; four
models by NEG Micon (including Micon and Nordtank); five models by Enercon; two models
by Tacke/Enron; two models by BWU/Jacobs; and two models by Fuhrlander.
In addition, none of the original MW-class turbines developed under the WEGA II came to
India. By 2001 when Suzlon introduced the first 1MW turbines to the Indian market, the major
Danish and German manufacturers had already launched several MW-class turbines at the
frontier market: Vestas with five models up to 2MW; Bonus with four models up to 2MW; NEG
Micon (including Nordtank and Micon) with six models up to 2MW; Nordex (including
Stdwind) with five models up to 2.5MW; Enercon and Tacke/Enron with two models up to
1.5MW each; BWU/Jacobs/Fuhrlander together with three models up to 1.5MW; and DeWind
with two model up to 1.25MW.
By the end of 2005, the turbine capacity gaps were further increased. While India only had the
introduction of four new MW-class turbines up to 2MW since 2001, the frontier reached the
market introduction of 5MW capacity model and the major manufacturers introduced new MW-
class models between 2001 and 2005 as follows: Vestas with eight models up to 3MW
(excluding V82 equivalent of NEG Micon NM82); Bonus/Siemens with four models up to
3.6MW; NEG Micon with seven models up to 4.2MW; Nordex (including Stidwind) with three
models up to 2.5MW; Enercon with four models up to 3.6MW; Tacke/Enron/GE with ten models
up to 3.6MW; REpower with three models up to 5MW; Fuhrlander with two models up to
2.5MW; and DeWind with one 2MW model.
Although all the turbines launched at the frontier are not necessarily suitable for the Indian
market, the number of non-introduced turbines cannot be simply ignored.
General Technology Trend in India and Gaps in Technology Features
The wind turbines installed from 1993 to 1997 in India were stall-regulated, fixed-speed
turbines, which were also the main stream technology at the frontier at the time. Two-speed
turbines with dual winding technology were transferred by various manufacturers to India.
However, technology gaps began increasing during the mid 1990s; as the number of new turbine
introduction has decreased and many medium- and large-capacity turbines were not brought to
India, many important innovations did not come or were introduced with significant time delays.
While the increasing number of turbines introduced and installed in India after 1999 have pitch
regulation (out of 18 turbines, 11 with pitch, three with stall and four with active stall), fixed-
speed turbines are still the majority (out of 18 turbines, 11 were fixed speed and seven were
variable speeds). While limited-range variable speed turbines with DFIG occupy a large fraction
of the market at the frontier, they have had a very limited number of installations in India. Wide-
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range variable speed operation technology brought by Enercon remains unique in India, as other
type of variable speed turbines have not been introduced nor installed so much if they came.
Table 5-66 shows the product technology innovations after the mid 1990s and their transfer
results to India by technology feature and manufacturer.7 5  Overall, it is clear that many
innovations were introduced to India on a fairly limited basis by a few manufacturers with
several years of delay.
Also technology transfer varies greatly among manufacturers. Most of the innovations after
1995 by Vestas, Bonus/Siemens, and Nordex were not introduced to India. Especially,
OptiSlip@ and OptiSpeed@ by Vestas and wide-range variable speed turbines with WRIG and
full-scale converter by Bonus/Siemens were left out of India. Active stall regulation was not
introduced by its innovator Bonus but by NEG Micon and Tacke/GE after six years of the
original introduction to Europe. Individual pitch control technology and limited-range variable
speed operations with DFIG by NEG Micon, BWU/Jacobs, and Nordex were not brought to
India at all; these technologies were only introduced by Tacke/Enron/GE and DeWind on a very
limited basis. On the other hand, the technology transfer records of Enercon are good. The
firms' core competence product technologies (WRSG, direct drive system, individual pitch
mechanism, and GERE blade materials) have been transferred without time delay, except several
SCADA products in recent years.
As for blade technology, a blade supplier LM Glasfiber has contributed to the introduction of
product and production technology of blade along with Enercon and Suzlon (see the next part).
In terms of SCADA products, because control software is usually upgraded corresponding to the
latest turbine controller status, all SCADA advanceement made since the mid 1990 by Vestas,
Nordex and Bonus/Siemens clearly have not been introduced to India. The introduction of
SCADA products by other foreign manufacturers are also considered limited.
This lag of introduction of more updated models to India, in particular larger-capacity,
individually pitch-regulated variable speed turbines, demonstrates that India has greatly missed
the important technological advancements, especially in the increase in aerodynamic efficiency
and energy capture and the reduction of mechanical loads on drivetrain that which can reduce
design requirement and cost of gearbox or generator.
7 Blade aerofoil technology was not included in Table 5-66, since the technical specification data regarding special
aerofoil usage published by manufacturers is very limited.
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Table 5-66: Product Technology Gap Matrix - Germany/Denmark and India
Market Introduction at Frontier Transfer Transfer
Manufacturer Make -Year Year Pathway
Power Control by Blade Angle
Pitch OptiTip@ Vestas V47 600kW 1995 Late 1990s JV
Vestas V63 1.5MW 1995 NO ---
Bonus/Siemens 2.3MW 82.4 2003 NO ---
Nordex N80 2.5MW 2000 NO ---
Individual Pitch Enercon E40 500kW 1993 1995 JVTacke/Enron/GE 1.5MW 70 1999 2004 S
BWU/Jacobs 1.5MW 70/77 2000 NO ---
DeWind 600kW 46 1997 2001 LA
Suzlon 1MW 64 2001 N/A N/A
Bonus 1MW54 1996 NO ---
Active Stall NEG Micon NM2000/72 2000 2004 S
Tacke/GE 600kW 46 1998 2002 S
Rotor Speed/Generator Type/Power Electronics
Fixed/Slip Ring SuzIon S66 1250 2003 2002 N/A
Limited Variable
OptiSlip@ Vestas V63 1.5MW 1995 NO --
NEG Micon NM80/2750 2002 NO
Nordex N80 2.5MW 2000 NO
DFIG/IGBT Tacke/Enron/GE 1.5MW 70 1996 2002 S
BWU/Jacobs 1.5MW 70/77 2000 NO
DeWind 600kW 46 1997 2001 LA
OptiSpeed@ Vestas V80 2MW 1999 NO ---
Variable
WRSG/IGBT Enercon E40 500kW 1993 1995 JV
WRIG/Full Converter Bonus/Siemens 2.3MW 82.4 2003 NO --
Multibrid PMSG (WWD) 1MW 56 2001 NO
Transmission
Direct Drive Enercon E40 500kW 1993 1995 JV
Mlltibrid (WWD) 1MW56 2001 NO
Blade Materials
Vestas V63 1.5MW 1995 2005 JV
Bonus/Siemens 2.3MW 82.4 2003 NO --
GFRE Nordex S70 1.5MW 2000 NO ---
Enercon E66 1.5MW 1995 1995
Tacke/Enron/GE Enron 1.5s 2001 2001 S
SuzIon 1MW 64 2001 N/A N/A
CF/CFRE NEG Micon NM900/52 2000 Unknown S
Wood Epoxy NEG Micon NM1500/64 2000 Unknown S
SCADA Products * Products include remote controlling and wind farm controlling functions.
Remote Monitoring with Vestas Condition Monitoring System 2003 NO --
vibration censors Nordex Condition Monitoring System 2003 NO
Remote Reporting Nordex Control 2* 2001 NO --
(Internet Information Vestas OnlineTM * 2002 NO --
Portal) Enercon Service information Portal 2004 NO ---
Siemens WebWPS N/A NO ---
Grid Interface Enercon Process Data Interface* 2003 NO --
Management Vestas GridSupport TM 2003 NO --
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5.6.3 Turbine Production Technology Transfer and Domestic
Technology Development
BHEL already possessed both wind turbine component manufacturing and turbine assembling
capability before the wind energy market was opened to private sector. Since 1993, NEPC
Micon (NEPC India), Vestas RRB, Enercon India, Pioneer Wincon, TTG Husumer, Elecon
Engineering with HZM and Turbowind, Suzlon, NEG Micon, GE Wind India, and C-WEL
established production facilities in India.
Turbine Production Technology Transfer and Capability Building at
Manufacturer Level
Turbine production technology in India has greatly improved since 1993 through indigenization
of transferred technology and its own technology exploitation, which have been encouraged by
MNES from the beginning. All Indian production facilities by major collaborations or
subsidiaries have been ISO-certified from very early on.
Turbine Assembly Technology Transfer and Capability Building
Turbine assembling technology was one of the first technologies transferred to India and quickly
indigenized, because originally all turbine components were imported and assembled on site.
After 1993, several manufacturers established in-house assembly lines, where turbine assembly
tasks with quality control as well as knowledge of how to streamline its production line were
transferred from their foreign collaborators because the Indian firms had a tendency of
depending on a large number of workers than Europe (Wind Power Monthly 1994b).
Indigenization of Production Technology of Turbines with Foreign Origin
About two-third of all manufacturers formed between 1993 and 1997 were not successful beyond
this period, because they never formed appropriate manufacturing capability nor had very low
interest in finer details of technology acquisition. Their business fate ended once the foreign
collaborators decided to exit from India or from the business all together; they did not contribute
to production technology indigenization in India.
However, for the remaining one-third of manufacturers that established production capacity from
early on, high-level technology indigenization of small-capacity turbines was already evident
during the mid 1990s. By the end of March 1995, MNES estimated the indigenization of
technology for up to 250kW capacity wind turbines as nearly 70% in terms of the number of
components, while blades, special bearing, etc. were imported (MNES 1995a). By 1997, the rate
grew nearly 80% industry wide (MNES 1997a).
Table 5-67 shows the Indian manufacturers that have indigenized the production of wind
turbines originally provided by their foreign collaborators. Many did so after their collaborations
ended with various reasons. The models mostly concentrated between 225kW and 350kW
turbine class. The collaborations that have lasted until this day also have high level of
indigenization of this class of turbines (Vestas 225kW and 500kW models and Enercon 230kW)
as they have been installed in India after they were no longer in production in other countries.
However, the rate of technology indigenization up to 250kW turbines did not improve greatly
since the late 1990s; the rate at industry level had not changed from approximately 80% from
1999 to 2002 (MNES 2000a; MNES 2001 a; MNES 2003).
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Table 5-67: Foreign Original Turbines Indigenized by Indian Manufacturers
Indian Original Capacity RD Power Rotor Independent
Firm Make Capac(ty m) Control Speed Generator Installation
AMTL Wind World 250kW 25 Stall 2-fixed WRIG 2004
Enercon Enercon 230kW 30 Pitch Variable WRSG/DD/CV 1995-present
225kW 29.8 1999 - present
NEPC Micon 250kW* 27.6 Stall 2-fixed WRIG 1998
India 400kW* 31 1999
600kW* 42 2004-present
Pioneer Wincon 250kW 29 Stall 1-fixed WRIG 1995 - present
REPL Bonus 320kW 33 Stall 1-fixed WRIG 2002,2004
Suzlon Sudwind 350-100kW 33.4 Stall 2-fixed WRIG 1997 - present
TTG HSW 250-80kW 28.5 Stall 2-fixed PEIG N/A - resent
RRB Vestas 225-50kW 27 Pitch 2-fixed WRIG 1993- presen
1 500kW 42/47 1-fixed 11995 - present
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Those highly indigenized small-capacity turbines are mainly stall-regulated, one-or two-speed
turbines using WRIG with dual winding. However, the indigenization level is much lower for
newer technology; the indigenization of medium- and large-capacity turbines has been much
slower because the development of supplier capacity and capability has taken time (MNES
2005), although the level of indigenization has not been reported.
The very limited number of installation of turbines with limited-range variable speed operations
with DFIG and newer blade materials such as wood epoxy, carbon fiber, and CFRE verifies very
low indigenization levels of these technologies in India as well. The exception is Enercon and
Suzlon technology: individual pitch mechanism, direct drive WRSG with IGBT converter and
GFRE blades have been well-indigenized through the Indian production of Enercon for both
domestic and export usages; and Suzlon incorporated individual pitch mechanism, slip ring
generator application and GFRE blades at its Indian production lines as well.
Component Production Technology Transfer and Capability Building
Turbine components have been manufactured in India from 1993. Although many components
such as control systems, brakes, gears, and hubs were imported, all wind turbine parts except for
blades were already made in India in 1994 (Wind Power Monthly 1994a). Blades manufacturing
also began in 1995. Component manufacturing became especially important after the import
duty for turbine components was significantly raised in 1997.
Component Production Technology Transfer
It has been different from one manufacturer to another and from one model to another which
components to be manufactured in-house in India, outsourced in India or imported. NEPC
Micon, Vestas RRB, BHEL-Nordex, Pioneer Wincon, TTG Husumer, and Enercon India began
either in-house component manufacturing or using component suppliers in India from the
beginning of their collaborations in the early and mid 1990s. In case of outsourcing components
to Indian suppliers, these technology providers transferred know-how of how to choose and
check the suppliers and their product quality. Their knowledge development also focused on
communication building with suppliers in order to transfer knowledge and acquire high quality
components.
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Technology transfer has also happened directly at component supplier level through joint
ventures between foreign firms and Indian firms. The components that tend to have more
foreign direct suppliers, subsidiaries or joint ventures are; electronics items, in particular wind
turbine controllers, power factor improvement capacitor, reactive power compensation system,
bearing, gearbox, and sensors (interpolated from Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002;
Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).
Blade Manufacturing Technology Transfer
Rotor blades are specific to wind turbine technology and its technology transfer involves more
conscious efforts than other component production technology transfer. Three Indian firms
entered blade manufacturing business in 1995 through joint ventures, 76 while two other
companies began blade production in the 2000s. In all the cases, production began with
technology transfer from the European establishments.
- LM Glasfiber India Ltd: initially established as a joint venture between LM Glasfiber A/S
of Denmark, IFU, and NEPC-Micon Ltd in 1993, but became 100% subsidiary of LM
Glasfiber A/S in 2002. The first production unit produced up to 400 sets of 13.4m rotor
blades a year (Wind Power Monthly 1996j) and was upgraded to manufacture blades up to
29m in length in 2001 using vacuum infusion technology. The firm has supplied blades to
Vestas RRB, GE Wind India, Suzlon, and NEPC India, and has been the largest blade
supplier in India, maintaining 50-55% market share (Wind Power Monthly 2003b).
- Enercon India Ltd: established its blade production from the beginning of joint venture in
1995. In 1996 the firm exported 150 sets of blades for each of 230 kW and 550 kW
turbines (Wind Power Monthly 1996i). In 2001 the firm established its second blade
factory for E-40 turbines for both domestic use in India and export.
- TTG Industries Ltd: started blade manufacturing in 1995 through its partnership with
HSW, exclusively for the HSW turbine installation in India.
- Suzion Energy Ltd: started its own blade production at Daman in 2001 using resin
vacuum infusion moulding technology and built the second blade manufacturing facility in
Pondicherry in 2003.
- Vestas RRB Ltd: has been outsourcing its blades to LM Glasfiber India, but entered blade
manufacturing in 2005 by establishing the first blade production facility in India (Business
Line Bureau. 2005a).
The production facilities of LM Glasfiber India, Enercon India, and Suzlon are ISO-certified
from the beginning. Resin vacuum infusion and automation technologies related to vacuum
infusion have been indigenized in India through the production at these three firms, which have
established good export capacity of blades as well. LM Glasfiber and Enercon played significant
roles in bringing and indigenizing blade production technology from the mid to late 1990s.
Production of 34m length blades for 1.5MW turbines and 40ms length blades for 1.65MW
turbines has been started in India in 2004 (MNES 2005), but production of large blades for many
multi-MW class turbines produced at the frontier, e.g., 40m to 70m blades, are not introduced by
LM Glasfiber India, Enercon India, or Vestas RRB.
76 In 1995, a Dutch blade manufacturer Polymarin agreed with Jyoti Ltd. to establish a joint venture company,
Polymarin India, for production of rotor blades in India. However, it did not materialize because high import duty
(80%) posed on blade raw materials did not make the business viable.
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Level of Component Production Indigenization
The levels of component production indigenization vary, depending on turbine rated capacity,
value of components as well as manufacturers. Higher-value and high-tech components are not
indigenized at high rates. In 1994 Micon covered components with 60% of the value of its
M700 225kW turbines installed by NEPC (Wind Power Monthly 1994b). Although the ratio
improved over the years, still approximately 30-35% of high value components were estimated
to be imported in the early 2000s for small- and medium-capacity turbines (C-WET 2002; Vestas
RRB 2002).
Indigenization efforts have been concentrated on gearbox and controllers since the late 1990s.
However, the progress in this area has been slow; in 2005 NEG Micon India imported gearboxes,
alternators, brake systems and controllers, which together accounted for 25% in value terms,
although local sourcing of those components would bring down turbine costs by 10-15%
(Ramakrishnan and Balaji 2006). Import content in higher-capacity turbines is high, and the
Indian wind energy industry is still a net importer, as important components of MW-class
turbines are still being imported despite the efforts to reverse the position (MNES 2004; MNES
2005). Technology indigenization in value terms has been much slower than that in the number
of component terms.
The Number of Component Suppliers
The number of Indian component suppliers has been increasing in almost every component
category, according to the supplier list provided in the 2002 and 2005 editions of Directory
Indian Windpower (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002; Consolidated Energy
Consultants Ltd. 2005). One notable change from 2002 to 2005 was wind turbine controller and
soft starter suppliers; although there were only two Danish turbine controller firms and no Indian
soft starter or turbine controller suppliers listed in the 2002 edition, two Indian suppliers
appeared in both categories each in the 2005 edition. Since the suppliers on the lists include
marketing/sales offices of foreign component suppliers or the Indian firms that only import the
components, they do not exactly illustrate the accurate picture of the Indian technological
capability. However, component supply capacity has been continuously increasing in some of
high-tech components as well as the rest of component categories.
Continuinq Quality Issues of Indian-Made Components
While sufficient capacity has been built to manufacture most of wind turbine components
indigenously, the quality of components manufactured in India has been a big issue and this has
not been solved completely. Indigenization of all components failed early on because the poor
quality of control systems and brakes made in India forced many manufacturers returned to
imports. In particular, for high-value, high-tech components, the manufacturers continued to rely
on imports. Despite approximately 15 years of experiences in wind energy, still 20% of
gearboxes failure and blade tips breaking were recorded at the point of 2003 (Wind Power
Monthly 2003f).
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Overall Production Capacity Building in India
Annual production capacity had stayed at about 500MW level for five years since the 1998-1999
year (MNES 1999a; MNES 2003). MNES reported the upgrade of annual production capacity to
750kW in the 2003-2004 year, as 615MW of wind turbines were supplied and seven 950kW
turbines were exported during the fiscal year (MNES 2004).
5.6.4 Project Execution Technology Transfer and Domestic
Technology Development
Wind Resource Estimation/Energy Prediction/Optimization Technology
Transfer and Capability Building
WAsP program and methodology developed in Denmark has been employed in India as well. So
far, however, the utilization of WAsP has been only for regional and local studies. At national
level, India has developed strong national wind resource data since 1983 on their own and wind
resource estimates have been upgraded with both technical and gross potential. This level of
estimation technology is well-indigenized. The indigenization level of wind estimation can be
raised further with the application of WAsP to development of the Wind Atlas of India, which
has been proposed to estimate the overall potential in various states as well as identify high wind
areas for setting up wind power projects (MNES 2005).
Meanwhile, know-how of wind resource estimation and energy optimization technologies such
as WAsP and Park at project level for wind resource mapping and optimization have been
introduced with project planning and development software such as Wind PRO.
Project Planning and Development Technology Transfer and Capability
Building
Skills and know-how of project planning, site assessment, site development and micro-siting
were low in the beginning and caused many project failures in the early and mid 1990s.
However, project execution capability and knowledge in understating of site conditions and
micro-siting related issues have been advanced greatly since the mid 1990s through joint
venture/license agreement collaborations. The advancement and transfer of remote monitoring
SCADA products as well as project development software tools (WAsP, WindPRO) for siting,
local wind resource mapping, optimization and micro-sting have helped the Indian
manufacturers. Also, generic project execution technology and capability such as financing,
project permissions and land acquisition, and site and infrastructure development have been
tailored for wind projects and greatly advanced for all manufacturers since the mid 1990s.
Project Execution/Auxiliary Service Technology Capacity Building
The formation of the sufficient number of service providers happened gradually. In the mid
1990s the lack of trained personnel for wind farm O&M was the major problem of the industry
(Wind Power Monthly 1996b). By the late 1990s, however, auxiliary service providers in wind
turbine erection and towing of blades and generators through the field, etc. were reportedly well-
established (Wind Power Monthly 1999b). Table 5-68 shows the increase of the service
providers from 2002 to 2005 in various service categories. In particular, the number of
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contractors related to wind turbine installation (turbine erection, crane hiring, civil works),
component repair providers, and consultants and their service areas increased greatly.
Table 5-68: Number of Indian Service Providers
Eources: interpolated from (Consolidated Energy
Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005) Consultants Ltd. 2002;
Turbine Transportation and Logistics Innovations
Because only a handful of MW-class wind turbines have been built by the frontier manufacturers
in India, their transportation and logistics expertise on these turbines have not been widely
transferred to India. However, Suzlon has indigenized transportation and logistics know-how
through its domestic installation of the 1MW model from 2001 and the 2MW model from 2005
and their exports to the United States from the 2003-2004 year.
5.6.5 Turbine Testing and Certification Technology Transfer and
Domestic Technology Development
India has successfully built the capacity to perform type testing and provide turbine certificate at
C-WET since 1999. The technology was transferred from Denmark; DANIDA provided a grant
of DKK 15.9 million from late 1996 towards the foundation of a wind turbine testing center in
Tamil Nadu, and the RISO National Laboratory provided the actual knowledge of testing and
certification procedure. This helped C-WET develop Type Approval Provisional Scheme-2000
(TAPS-2000) along the line of international certification scheme. TAPS-2000 will be replaced
by the Indian Type Approval Scheme (TAS) in the future.
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Service Providers -Number of Providers2002 2005
O&M 24 29
Wind Turbine Erection Contractor 10 25
Crane Hiring Agencies 27 34
Civil Contractors 14 27
Electrical Contractors 24 32
Component Repairs
Blades 6 9
Generator 19 24
Gearbox 7 11
Electronic Cards/Anemometer 5 9
Turbine Refurnishing -- 6
Yaw System -- 5
Insurance Companies 10 10
Surveyors/Valuers 18 18
Consultants
General Wind Project Consultants 24 35
Agricultural Consultants 2 4
Condition Monitoring -- 3
Electricity Regulatory Measures -- 1
Land Brokers -- 3
Power Quality Study -- 2
Seller/Purchaser of Old Turbines 7 9
Training Providers 
-- 6
5.6.6 Innovation (R&D) Technology Transfer and Domestic
Technology Development
R&D Institutions and Capability Building
International collaborations, in particular bilateral basis, have been evident in R&D area.
Besides the establishment of C-WET, Denmark has helped the Indian research institutions to
develop technology and guidelines that address the issues related to weak grid. From 2002, C-
WET has engaged on the joint projects in wind energy development with the Energy research
Center of the Netherlands (ECN, the Dutch National Energy Research Laboratory).
The establishment of R&D Unit in C-WET was to strengthen the connection between R&D
institutions and industry in order to provide generic information and knowledge to innovate
components and subsystems of wind turbines suited for the Indian specific conditions. In
addition, MNES has developed three R&D models involving industry, research institutions and
laboratories, academic institutions and end-users for wind energy.
In general, however, innovation capability building has been slow, and the public-private R&D
collaboration schemes developed by MNES have been seen as passive and limited by the
industry insiders. Majority of the R&D projects supported by MNES and C-WET had sub-
optimal level of funding of less than USD 25,000. While research institutions, universities and
national laboratories have emphasized theoretical and academic research, majority of resources
from MNES were spend on demonstration, evaluation, and resource assessment. Only small
amounts have been spent on basic research and product and process technology development or
upgrade (Shekhar, Kumar, and Shar 2001).
Manufacturer In-house R&D Capability
In terms of in-house R&D capability building of the manufacturers, Enercon India and Suzlon
have built such facilities in India although their main R&D activities occur in Europe.
In 2004 Enercon India set up a full-fledged R&D center and a blade design facility, and the
Indian specialists have been working on global research projects, collaborating with the R&D
headquarters in Germany. As for capability building, Enercon let the Indian engineers stay in
Germany for three months to acquire technical experience. Specific software was developed in
India to provide the daily updates on power generation by Enercon turbines to MNES (European
Wind Energy Association 2004).
Suzlon also has developed in-house R&D capability in India and the Indian engineers have
contributed to software development. However, the firm has German R&D centers for turbine
design and precision engineering and a Dutch R&D center for rotor design and development, and
control system development is carried out by the collaborations with the Danish and German
sub-suppliers. The competitive core technology of Suzlon is still developed in Europe.
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5.6.7 Evolution of Technology Gaps between Denmark/ Germany and
India
Change in Product Technology Gaps
Through the analysis above, it has been clear that the commercialized technologies at the frontier
and in India have obvious gaps.
Technology Depreciation Rate and Average Size of Turbines
Technology depreciation rates of Denmark and Germany have been much higher than that of
India over the years. Many wind turbine models that were no longer available at the frontier
have been still installed in India. The average installed turbines capacity of Denmark/Germany
and India clearly illustrates the increasing gaps for the past decade (Figure 5-15).
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Figure 5-15: Technology Gaps in Average Size of Installed Turbine
Technological Features
Many technologies commercialized in Europe, including some of the mainstream technologies,
have not been introduced at all or introduced only on a limited basis to India since the late 1990s.
The technological majority of the Danish Classical Concept was same in Europe and India by the
mid 1990s. However, whereas the frontier has shifted to pitch-regulated, limited-range variable
or wide-range variable speed operations from the late 1990s, majority of turbines installed in
India have been still fixed-speed turbines although pitch regulation has increased its installation
number in recent years. The newest Multibrid technology has not been introduced to India at all.
The gaps are increasing in blade and SCADA technology areas as well. Because the introduction
of large-capacity turbines have been very limited, blades with specialized aerofoil and some
advanced materials such as CF, CFRE, and wood epoxy, as well as SCADA products that have
advanced features in remote monitoring, remote reporting, and grid interface management are
also limited. Product technology gaps between the frontier and India have increased.
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Turbine Productivity
The gaps in both turbine capacity and technological features have created strong efficiency gaps
between the frontier and India, in terms of aerodynamic efficiency and energy capture. This can
be illustrated by Figure 5-16 that shows a simple comparison of turbine productivity, calculated
by the yearly generated wind electricity divided by the cumulative number of turbines. 77 it
shows the staggering increase of the gaps in turbine productivity between Denmark/Germany
and India over the years, even if taking weather and climate differences between the two sides
and year-to-year weather variations into account. Between 1992 and 2003, turbine efficiency in
Denmark and Germany increased 3.9-fold and 6.4-fold, respectively, while the productivity
growth in India remains only 1.6-fold. The influence of the gaps in turbine capacity and variable
speed operations on turbine productivity is evident, as the turbines installed in Germany show
the highest productivity increase over the years.
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Note: Due to the differences of statistical year between Denmark/Germany and India, the
Danish/German calendar year (January to December) is compared to the Indian fiscal year (March
of the same calendar year to March of the next calendar year). For example, data for the
Danish/German 1992 year is compared to the Indian 1992-1993 fiscal year. The comparison,
however, is considered approximate enough. Sources: (Danish Wind Industry Association 2006),
DEWI and ISET in (BWE 2005), (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Figure 5-16: Technology Gaps in Turbine Productivity
7 Turbine productivity is usually calculated by yearly generated electricity divided by total rotor swept area.
However, this calculation method was not taken because the data regarding total rotor swept areas of Germany and
India over the years was not available. Yearly differences in wind and weather conditions are also not normalized.
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Change in Technological Capability Gaps
The increasing technology gaps in product technology correspond with the increasing
technological capability gaps between the frontier and India. While the Indian wind energy
industry has successfully indigenized various technologies in production and project execution
and developed some innovation capabilities, technology gaps have greatly increased in
innovation capabilities and they have not been reduced in production capabilities of med-tech
and high-tech components.
Production Capability
The Indian wind industry has indigenized small-capacity turbine production technology at high
level. However, the indigenization level of production technology of high value and high-tech
components and their quality have stayed low. The dependency of power electronics and
controllers on imports has never reduced, and med-tech mechanical engineering components
made in India are still prone to failures. The effects of learning and experiences on reduction of
mechanical failures are not strong. In addition, many components commercialized at the frontier
since the mid 1990s, which require much higher levels of production capability, are not
introduced to India, including manufacturing of: power electronics for larger and more complex
turbine regulation; new rotor blade materials, special aerofoil blades, and their moulds; and
towers, generators, gearboxes and nacelles for the turbines above 2.5MW capacity. The
production capability of these large components usually does not come easily at the frontier in
the beginning either; initially only a few qualified component suppliers are available. However,
the number expands when both experiences and production series volume are accumulated with
market demand (De Vries 2005a).
Overall, many gaps in production capability between Denmark/German and India have not been
closed, and the gaps in production capability of high-tech and complex components for large
turbines have greatly increased.
Innovation Capability
Innovation capability has greatly advanced at the frontier for the past 15 years when many wind
turbine components and system technology have become complex, systemic, science-based, and
extremely high-tech. The frontier advanced its innovation capability in all of the following
aspects: materials science for advanced blade materials innovation; special-purpose blade
aerofoil design; smart engineering methods for blade production; control system for individual
pitch and active stall regulations; a range of variable generator configurations and rotor speed
operations; SCADA and high-capacity control systems that look after different types of rotor
speed operations, grid management and the entire wind farm; wind resource estimation and
energy optimization technology; project execution software that take care of the whole value
functions of wind project development; integrated wind turbine design and optimization
technology; transportation and logistics of multi-MW turbines up to 5MW; and offshore specific
turbines and foundations. However, none of such innovations were carried out in India. In terms
of innovation capability, the gaps have grown greatly between 1990 and 2005.
The next chapter analyzes the reasons behind these changes: why such technology gaps have
been created, why they are increasing, and how they have impacted on the Indian efforts of wind
energy development.
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Chapter 6:
Comparative Analysis of Causal Factors and
Processes for Technology Development and
Diffusion
Chapter 5 described the evolution and the basic profiles of policy, market, industry and
technology of the three research countries and the technology gaps emerged between India and
the technology frontier of Denmark and Germany since 1990.
This chapter examines the co-evolution of policy, market, industry and technology that spurred
technology development and diffusion at the frontier and in India and explores the causal factors
and processes that created the increasing technology gaps between the two sides. The chapter
consists of eight sections. The first section analyzes the market size/location, the investment
mechanisms, and the characteristics of market demands of Denmark and Germany, and examines
their effects on technology development and diffusion. The second section investigates the
effects of the changing technological characteristics on industry structure and competitiveness
management at the frontier. From the third section, the analytical focus shifts to India. In this
section, the relationship between new turbine introduction and capacity development in India is
quantitatively examined. The fourth section analyses the causal factors behind the relationship
between cross-border technology transfer and market development, focusing on the effects of
market demands and investment mechanism on technology development and diffusion in India.
The fifth section explores the effects of the changing technological characteristics and industry
structure/competitiveness management at the frontier and India on cross-border technology
transfer and the growth of technology gaps. The sixth section explores the Indian specific
conditions, appropriateness of the European technology to those conditions, and its effects on
cross-border technology transfer. The seventh section examines the effects of characteristics of
different technology partnerships on cross-border technology transfer. In each section, the role
and effects of policy and institutional setting are discussed. The last section synthesizes the
findings of the analyses, using value chain policy analysis and causal loop diagram analysis.
Section 6.1: Market Demands and Investment Economics
Pressure and Their Effects on Technology
Development and Diffusion in Denmark and
Germany
6.1.1 Market Size, Market Demands, and Investment Mechanism at the
Frontier
Germany - Growth Pulling Market
As described in Chapter 5, Germany has been the strongest market leader in the world for a
decade since the early 1990s. Especially, the growth from the late 1990s to the early 2000s was
enormous, and this had immense impacts on the general technology development and trend.
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Danish and German Market-Industry Interaction
Danish and German Market Share by Manufacturer
As also mentioned in Chapter 5, while the Danish market has been served entirely by the Danish
manufacturers, the share of the German market has been divided mostly by the Danish and
German manufacturers (including Tacke/Enron/GE Wind) (Figure 6-1).
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Note: Danish manufacturers include Vestas, Micon, Nordtank, NEG Micon, Bonus, Nordex (until
1994), and Wind World. German manufacturers include Enercon, Tacke (until 1996), Husurner
Schifftwerft, Hanseat AG, REpower System, DeWind (until 2002), Fuhr18nder, Jacobs Energie,
and SOdwind. The Danish-German manufacturer is Nordex (from 1995). Sources: (DEWI 2002a;
DEWI 2003a; DEWI 2004a; DEWI 2005; DEWI 2006; DEWI 1994; DEWI 1995; DEWI 1996;
DEWI 1997a; DEWI 1998a; DEWI 1999a; DEWI 2000a; DEWI 2001a)
Figure 6-1: Market Share of Annually Installed Capacity in Germany
by Country of Origin of Manufacturers 1993-2004
Danish and German Industry Exports
The growth of the Danish industry has been strongly supported by domestic market but more by
export, as described in Chapter 5. The export share has been increasing further in recent years as
the Danish domestic market shrunk since 2000. The average share of export in sales capacity by
the Danish manufacturers between 1990 and 2004 was about 80% and the main export
destination has been Germany throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The export turnover increased
from 1992 as the German and Indian markets grew, but the export to India has been greatly
reduced since 1997. All major Danish manufacturers had their subsidiaries and production
facilities in Germany to serve the market.
On the other hand, the German manufacturers exported only average 13% of total manufactured
capacity between 1995 and 2003. The rest was absorbed by its large domestic market, but there
are a couple of other reasons too. The German manufacturers have been pushed out of two other
important markets; Denmark and the United States. While the Danish market has been served
entirely by domestic manufacturers, technology by the most prominent German player Enercon
had been banned from the North American markets as a result of patent infringement dispute
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with Kenetech/Enron/GE since 1996 until the mid 200478; another prominent German
manufacturer Tacke Windtechnik, was acquired by Enron in 1997 and became under the
German-US ownership; and other manufacturers have not been powerful enough to demonstrate
their presence in the United States.
Danish and German Market-Industry Interaction
The German turbine manufacturers and their technology development were mainly influenced by
the German domestic market, as the amount of the German manufacturer export and the direct
influence of the Danish and other markets on the German manufacturers have been very limited.
Meanwhile, the interactions between the German market and the Danish industry have been
intense. Thus, the German market demands have had huge impacts on wind energy technology
development by both the German and the Danish manufacturers.
Wind Investor Profile and Investment Mechanism in Denmark and
Germany
Wind Project Investor Profile and Investment Mechanism in Denmark
Figure 6-2 clearly shows that it was private investors who have led the Danish market
development. The utilities only began developing wind projects in the late 1980s but its share in
total installed capacity never exceeded 30%; they increased its share in 2002 and 2003 as two
large offshore wind farms (Horns Rev and Nysted) became operational. In total, 78% of wind
energy capacity was installed by private investors and the rest (22%) was owned by utilities as of
the end of 2004 (Danish Wind Industry Association 2006).
The Danish wind investment model has been a series of small, distributed wind plants based on
local investments; as many as 150,000 families, 5% of the Danish population, have bought wind
turbines or shares of wind turbines by 2000 (Wind Power Monthly 2001b). The private turbine
ownership can be largely divided into two: individual household or business owned turbines, and
wind cooperative owned turbines. A few turbines are owned by private industrial enterprises and
by municipalities. The ownership trend between individuals and cooperatives changed over the
years (Figure 6-3). During the 1980s and the early 1990s, wind cooperatives were the most
important investors. The turbine ownership restrictions on the amount of share of wind plant
since 1985 made it very difficult for single owner to own wind turbines. Wind cooperatives
spread the ownership of turbines between 20 and 100 families in the vicinity of the turbines;
investors buy the shares of cooperative that makes investments in local wind plants. However,
the cooperative ownership decreased gradually as the general installation number declined
78 The American patent on wind turbine electronics is now held by GE, but was originally awarded to Kenetech in
1993, which sued Enercon for its infringement in 1995. As a result, in 1996, Enercon technology was banned from
the US market by the US International Trade Commission and Enercon lost a major wind plant order in Texas. The
patent was later acquired by Zond after the Kenetech bankruptcy, before passing into Enron and then GE's hands.
The US Patent Office states that the patent was granted to not the technology but its combination in a unique and
unusual way of using the technology. Enercon consistently argued that the patent granted to Kenetech was for the
technology already in the public domain, citing a wind energy textbook from 1989, and such prior art cannot be
patented. Also Enercon's turbines do not use the same power control factor and power conditioning techniques
specified in the patent. Although these Enercon's points were very clear to the industry insiders, the American
patent authorities and the courts have consistently turned down its arguments. The patent dispute was finally
resolved between Enercon and GE in 2004; both sides agreed on a settlement, forming a long-term worldwide basis,
cross-license agreement (Wind Power Monthly 2003g; Wind Power Monthly 2003h; Wind Power Monthly 2003i).
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between 1992 and 1994, and hit the lowest level in 1995. The ownership profile changed
dramatically in 1996, when individual investors, predominantly farmers, became the main
investors, as the 1996 turbine ownership regulation change opened up the possibilities for
individual investors, along with the laws for facilitating structural changes in the farming sector
to invest in wind projects. From this year on, farmers became the primary owners of newly
installed wind turbines. In terms of utility involvement of wind development, a series of the
government-utility agreements has been the reason for its growth.
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Figure 6-3: Ownership of Privately Installed Capacity in Denmark
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Another trend in the Danish investment mechanism is the growth of professional wind project
developers, who sell turnkey projects to individuals or cooperative investors, by linking them
with wind turbine manufacturers and taking care of all administration, project planning, siting
and building, and delivering of wind plant to the customers. Professional wind project
developers appeared already in the 1980s (Wind Power Monthly 2001c).
The Danish investment professionalization was spurred by the series of government ownership
restrictions from the 1980s, which complicated the process of gathering enough investors due to
the geographical and share limits on wind plant owners. On the other hand, the turbine type
approval and certificate mechanism from 1979 played an important role by making it possible for
developers to obtain easy bank financing for investment, standardize the costs for grid
connection, and shorten the project lead time. The repowering market boom since 2001 also
spawned a breed of professional repowering developers, specialized in buying up old turbines to
secure their "scrap certificate" value - a guaranteed premium rate for turbines up to three times of
their replacement capacity.
Wind Project Investor Profile and Investment Mechanism in Germany
The German domestic market has also been mostly developed by small, dispersed projects
owned by individuals and private operating pools, not by utilities. More than 90% of all wind
turbines installed are owned and operated by private investors in Germany. According to an
estimate by BWE, more than 100,000 people have invested directly in wind projects since 1991
until 2001 (Wind Power Monthly 2001a). The German utilities had been a strong opponent of
the feed-in laws, as they only became eligible to receive the premium payments for wind projects
under the EEG in 2000. Unlike Denmark, there were no government obligations for utilities to
develop wind projects in Germany. These factors contributed to the low level of utility
involvements in wind projects.
Table 6-1: Ownership of 250MW Wind Program in Germany
Ownership Number of Turbines Installed Capacit MW
Private Individuals (mostly farmers) 722(49%) 122(35%)
Commercial Operators 339(23%) 129(37%)
Operator Groups, Private Individuals 162(11%) 35(10%)
Commercial Enterprises 129)2(%(firms, factories, hotels, etc)
Regional/Municipal Utilities 118(8%) 38(11%
Source: (lEA 2001)
Table 6-2: Net Annual Installation by 250MW Wind Program in Germany
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Number -250MW Program 15 172 252 299 320 259 149 75
of Total 87 250 300 405 586 820 911 798
Turbines 250MW/Total 17% 69% 84% 74% 55% 32% 16% 9%
Installed 250MW Program 1.4 29.4 41.4 49.1 62.6 41.6 85.5 24
Capacity Total 11.8 60 51 74 151 309 493 410
(MW) 250MW/Total ,12% ,49% 81% 66% 41% ,13% 17% 6%
Source: (lEA 2001)
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Although the statistics of wind project investor profile/turbine ownership for all the installed
turbines was not obtained, the ownership of turbines installed under the 100MW/250MW Wind
Program at the end of 1999 in Table 6-1 demonstrates that private individuals and commercial
operators played significant roles in market development. The majority of wind projects
between 1990 and 1993 were developed under the 100MW/250MW Wind Program (Table 6-2)
Professionalization of investment mechanism has also happened in Germany. From 1990,
investments took a form of traditional local citizen-financed wind farms (Bnrgerwindpark).
With this mechanism, a group of local project initiators set up a project company for a specific
wind project and invited other local citizens to join the project as limited partners. The resulting
limited liability partnership developed, owned and operated a citizen-owned wind farm -
Bnirgerwindpark.
Since 1995, with the increasing demand for wind project shares from the outside of the
traditional wind regions, the Birgerwindpark mechanism evolved into the closed-end wind
funds,7 9 a more professionalized investment mechanism, taking a hybrid form of GmbH (private
limited liability company) and KG (limited partnership). The closed-end funds usually raise
30% to 40% of equity for a project to secure bank loans as debt, nearly 100% of which derives
from two wind soft loan sources: Environment and Energy Saving Program of the European
Recovery Program (ERP) and Environmental Fund by DtA and KfW. One distinctive feature of
the German closed-end fund mechanism is the increasing specialization that has happened over
the years: project development and equity acquisition take place separately from each other, and
the project shares of wind farms became the standardized financial products; the placement of
fund shares are increasingly carried out by sales subsidiaries of project developers, banks and
investment consultants; and the O&M tasks are outsourced to special O&M firms. Any financial
risks related to the projects are carried out by equity investors (shareholders), but the investors
can write some losses off against taxes, subject to some limitations. At the point of 2001, 95%
of the wind projects in Germany have been financed through the closed-end wind funds
(Enzensberger, Fichtner, and Rentz 2003; Gerdes 2005; Wind Power Monthly 2001a).
Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Factors in Market Growth at the
Frontier
Favorable policy and institutional sensitivity factors in project finance mechanism greatly
contributed to the wind energy market growth in Denmark and Germany. Revenue sources and
purchase agreements have been secured by law and several fiscal measures such as capital
subsidies, tax credits, and favorable tax depreciations have increased the revenue flow. The cost
of financing also worked well due to the declining general interest rates during the 1990s.
Guaranteed Payment by Law in Denmark and Germany
First and foremost, the heavy capital requirement in the beginning of wind project made the
guaranteed electricity tariffs play the most important role in the project finance mechanism with
low equity and high debt, because they offer a certainty for recovery of initial capital investment
in long run. The Windmill Law of Denmark as well as the Electricity Feed Law (EFL) and the
79 Open end funds bundle various projects together (e.g., biomass, solar and wind) and allow investors to put out at
specified intervals.
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Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) of Germany, which mandated the guaranteed payments to
the power generated by wind projects by law, were the most important factor behind the
successful market developments in both countries.
Denmark
In Denmark, the investment subsidy from 1976 and the direct production subsidy from 1981
supported the early private investments. The turbine testing and approval requirement for
obtaining the eligibility for investment subsidy and grid connection as well as the ownership
restrictions for preventing anyone from making enormous amount of profits from the incentives
eliminated the abuse of government incentives as intended.
Although the Wind Mill Law was created to shift the support focus to production incentives, its
formula that set the tariff at 85% of retail electricity prices caused the market slowdown from
1992 to 1994 because of the drop of payment due to the low-priced retail electricity around that
time (the average total feed-in tariffs was around DKK 0.54-0.57/kWh then); the feed-in tariffs
were too low to reduce investment risks and sustain profitability. The rise of retail electricity
price finally made the feed-in tariffs approximately DKK 0.60/kWh (the average DKK 0.33/kWh
as 85% of retail electricity prices with DKK 0.1 0/kWh of CO 2 tax refund and DKK 0.17/kWh of
direct production subsidy) and wind projects profitable, together with the decreased general
interest rates from the mid 1990s.
The conflicts over turbine siting that began happening during the early 1990s due to the
increased turbine size and the lack of suitable sites also partly contributed to the market
slowdown from 1992, until the release of municipal zoning plans after mid 1995. Political
uncertainty before the release of municipal zoning plans made some municipalities to refuse or
delay siting permission.
In 1997 the investment incentives in terms of tax deduction became less attractive than the
previous scheme. However, it did not have large impacts on reducing private investment, as the
limit of a household's financial share on cooperative turbine investment was increased from
1996.
The record installation of 2000 was created because all the turbines installed in the year were
subject to the payments under the old feed-in tariff system, as all of them were ordered in 1999.
The shift to the green certificate mechanism from 2000 made the interim tariffs much lower than
DKK 0.60/kWh, and the lack of security due to low and unpredictable purchasing prices of wind
electricity on the liberalized market and the saturation of available onshore sites with respect to
spatial planning contributed to the disappearance of market on land. However, from April 2001
until December 2004, the Danish market flourished as a result of the well-developed onshore
repowering program and offshore development.
In terms of shaping the wind project investor/turbine ownership profile, the turbine ownership
regulations had played significant roles. These ownership policies were placed in order to
encourage the local acceptance of the projects and they succeeded to eliminate the NIMBY
phenomenon. The restrictions on membership share of wind cooperatives during the 1980s
spread the ownership over many local citizens. The restrictions were gradually eased and the
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ownership rules tried to incorporate diverse owners since the mid 1990s. The removal of area
restriction in 1994 eliminated the restriction of all the members of a wind cooperative to be
required to live near the wind plant and increased investments during 1996 and 1997; this
condition was removed in 1996 but all projects approved during 1995 were allowed to proceed.
The expansion of allowed share of cooperative members in a wind plant up to 20,O00kWh/year
from 1994 and further to 30,O00kWh/year from 1996 also contributed to the market growth
during the late 1990s. In addition, the 1996 change to allow the participation of farmers in wind
investments increased individual investments tremendously and was a part of the important
reasons for the strong market growth between 1996 and 2000.
Germany
In Germany, the cumulative nature of production subsidy by the EFL and investment and
production subsidies by the 1 OOMW/250MW Wind Program initiated the market take-off in the
early 1990s. The decrease in general interest rates during the 1990s also had a significant
impact. With a pay-back time of ten years, a 3% decrease in interest rate corresponds to a 25%
price decrease. The interest rates were approximately 10% in April 1991 but decreased to
approximately 5-6% during the 1990s (IEA 2001). Availability of the two federal soft loan
programs (ERP and the loan by DtA/KfW) as well as the loan from agricultural financing
institutions for farmers contributed to the market growth as well. These loans were made for
long enough to ensure turbine operations as least for ten years and the written-off accordingly.
In addition, the taxable income deduction rules and the reduction of taxable income through
linear depreciation was another driving force behind the German market growth. The linear
depreciation of income about 10% of turnkey cost per year corresponded to approximately DM
100,000 per year. With an assumed tax rate of 30%, the tax paid by investors would be reduced
by about DM 30,000 per year (IEA 2001). Total income tax deduction available for the projects
filed before the March 1999 tax rule change made the returns from wind investment after tax
twice as high as those before tax (Wind Power Monthly 2000a). On top, no spatial or siting
regulations until 1994 also eased the early private installations.
The only exception of the continuous growth was the market slowdown between 1996 and 1998
as a result of the investment insecurity caused by political and legal attacks by big utilities
against the EFL and the reduction/withdrawal of state policy in the costal states between 1996
and 1997. However, considering the strong installation record after the mid 1990s, the federal
policy and good wind resources have much larger impacts on geographical distribution of
installation in Germany than state policy. With the great success of the feed-in tariff mechanism,
state policy was mostly eliminated from 2000. However, the EEG has created the record
installation after 2000.
The 1996 market slowdown was also partially caused by the planning permission delay from the
mid 1990s. After the 1994 court ruling that stripped the privilege of single wind turbine in open
countryside, the market for single turbine installation stagnated. The 1997 Amendment of
Building Stature book contributed to the market growth from 1998 by reintroducing the single
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turbine privilege and mandated local governments to create wind turbine zoning plans that
reduced planning uncertainty. 80
Unlike Denmark, however, the tariff reduction due to the decrease of retail electricity prices,
which was especially evident after the electricity market liberalization of 1998, did not influence
installed capacity adversely in Germany, as the EFL Amendment in April 1998 cleared political
uncertainty by specifying the financial charges of different utilities and setting a date for
reconsideration. Then, the EEG in 2000 further reduced political uncertainty, as the tariffs
become defined not by retail electricity prices but by law for 20 years. The EEG also set up the
tariffs for initial five years higher than the declining tariffs due to the market liberalization since
1998. The market decline since 2003 occurred due to the lack of opening sites for onshore
projects. The German market was ready to move onto offshore development, and the first
German offshore turbine was installed in February 2006 after the intensive preparation efforts
since 2000.
6.1.2 Effects of Market Demands on Technology Development and
Diffusion at the Frontier
Technology Driving Market Demands in Denmark and Germany
The Danish and German policy incentives and market investment mechanisms created various
market demands that influenced the wind energy technology innovations and trends greatly.
Many of the following market demands created a synergy to push technology to a certain
direction.
Technology-related Sensitivity Factors - Technoloqy Upscalinq/Upqradinq Demands
Wind investments in Denmark and Germany have had to compete with other investments to
attract private capital. In Denmark, individual investors, in particular, farmers who began
participating in wind energy development after 1996 are reportedly more conscientious about
profitability than wind cooperative owners, whose driver was more environmentally motivated
ones (Morthorst 1999). In Germany, there are many other fiscally advantaged funds, competing
directly with the close-end wind funds. These conditions have made the creation of favorable
technology-related sensitivity factors (investment cost, O&M cost, amount of electricity
generated and sold, technical system lifetime, size effects of wind project/farm) through
technology development very important, in order to increase the competitiveness of wind energy
despite the guaranteed feed-in tariff payments and various tax advantages. These incentives
were also given to the levels, which were not too generous to ignore the performance.
The most important technology-related parameters are the amount of energy generated and sold
by wind turbines and their investment costs (European Wind Energy Association 2003).
Increasing the amount of electricity generation from wind turbines creates mainly three
technology drivers: 1) utilizing the sites with good wind resources and optimizing energy capture
through better micro-siting; 2) installing turbines with higher hub-height to capture stronger wind
more constantly; and 3) increasing the efficiency of production through better equipment design
80 In the mid 1996, the licensing procedure took average four years compared to 18 months before (Wind Power
Monthly. 1996f).
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and larger rotor swept areas that increase wind energy capture. The latter two drivers make
larger-capacity turbines (taller hub height with large rotor swept areas) more preferable.
Technoloqy-related Sensitivity Factors - Cost Reduction Demands
The other technology-related sensitivity factor is the total investment cost reduction. As
described in Chapter 5, wind turbine cost usually occupies more than 75% of total investment
costs. Therefore, the foremost efforts to reduce investment costs focus on the reduction of
turbine cost through technology innovations. The reduction of turbine cost per rotor swept area
or cost per installed kW is an important market demand
In terms of installation cost reduction, it greatly depends on economies of scale, which is another
technology-related sensitivity factor. Larger projects can reduce transaction and O&M costs per
unit, as they can be spread over the number of turbines and the efficiency of management
increases. While this was not possible for the Danish onshore development, where the strict
ownership and development regulations by local and regional authorities until 2000 made typical
installation in clusters of three to seven turbines and large wind farms very rare, the German
closed-end funds prefer large wind plants in order to reduce installation and O&M costs. The
1997 Amendment of German building law to mandate local governments to create the wind
turbine zoning plans made wind turbines not to be built as single installation but to be built as
clusters in the designated zones that can be owned by different investors. This helped reduce
installation costs in Germany by creating economies of scale
Land Development Pressure in Germany - Technoloqy Upscaling/Upgradinq Demands
Another important technology driving market demand derives from strong land development
pressure in Germany, which is much higher than in Denmark. Germany has high population
density and is short of good wind sites. At good sites, diverse land users are often competing
against each other. In addition, there have been always complains about noise and shadow
effects of wind turbine installation, which is also seen in other European countries. Although the
corresponding land around turbines can be still used as farmland, there are many complaints. In
both Denmark and Germany, the noise reduction and spatial planning regulations including
zoning for wind turbines make areas for wind turbine installations limited (Gerdes 2005). In
Denmark, the conflicts over turbine siting that began happening in the early 1990s due to the
increased turbine size and the lack of suitable sites. They partly contributed to the market
slowdown from 1992 until the release of municipal zoning plans after the mid 1995. However,
the limitation has been much stronger in Germany than Denmark. In the limited land areas,
higher-efficiency wind turbines are preferred because they increase the efficiency of land use.
With this reason, larger-capacity turbines with higher hub-height and newer equipment design
are strongly demanded, especially in Germany.
Low Wind Condition of Germany - Technoloqy Upscalinq/Upqradinq Demands
Another decisive condition in Germany was its limited high wind potentials, compared to the
United Kingdom and the coastal regions of France. Geographical distribution of turbine
installation in Germany strongly reflects wind resource availability. The states facing or close to
the coasts have higher and better winds, but wind resource availability normally declines with
the increased distance from the coasts; as a result, the costal states have installed more wind
turbines than the inland states. However, the regional distribution changed over the years. The
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installation in the costal sates with higher wind resources increased continuously, reaching their
peak in 2001 and 2002. The inland states that are closer to the coastal regions show a similar
tendency, reaching their peak in 2002. The installation in these regions, however, has been
declined since, as the number of suitable and available sites declined. Good wind sites are
clearly saturated over time (see more details in Figure 6-10 in Section 6.6).
In Germany, the high tariffs set by the EEG in 2000 made low wind sites more economic, but the
2004 EEG amendments eliminated the low wind zones. At the sites with low wind resources,
investments take longer time to reach positive balance. In order to compensate this, again, the
demand for higher-efficiency wind turbines becomes strong.
Offshore Development Demands
Offshore electricity production by MW-class turbines can give stable production and high
production efficiency due to higher wind speeds and less turbulent wind environment than
onshore. The market demands for expanding offshore development began stronger after the
WEGA II Program successfully helped major European manufacturers develop and
commercialize their first MW-class turbines during the mid 1990s. As land development
pressures became stronger and the saturation of available land for onshore development in
European countries has become inevitable, large continuous areas available for major projects in
offshore has made special offshore turbines and technology development a design target in
Europe.
Power Quality Control Demands
The grid stability issues posed by distributed power plants such as wind turbine have been
pushed by the utilities in Germany, which have demanded higher power control quality to reduce
fluctuation of inputs and reactive power. This demand will increase further in the future, as wind
energy continues to grow in Germany and the offshore market gears up for massive
development, and the electricity network expansion and its stability will become a major issue.
Environmental Demands - Noise Reduction and Environmentally-Friendly Production
Taking care of noise from wind turbines and meeting the noise levels set by regulations are very
serious issues in Europe and they have been an important innovation driver. In Germany, the
areas and shapes of the wind turbine zones are influenced by the noise from turbines. More
number of turbines can be installed in larger areas if they have lower noise emission. As
described in Chapter 5, the noise requirements in Germany are different between night time
(22:00 to 6:00) and day time, and the night time noise is more important. Noise imission (sound
level heard at regulated areas) is determined by two parameters: noise emission of turbines and
distance between the turbine and regulated areas (noise imission = noise emission/distance)
(Gerdes 2005).
There was also the increasing environmental restriction on the use of polyester on blades. The
1995 German regulation on blade materials began prohibiting styrol emissions during the
production of blades using polyester to be less than 20ppm.
Demands for Solution for Mechanical Problems
Mechanical component failures have been the main cause of malfunction of wind turbines that
stop turbine operation and increase insurance changes; both are the serious problems for
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investors. Failures in gearboxes, generators, hubs, hydraulic systems, yaw systems, and
mechanical brakes have occurred frequently. In addition, the larger the machines, the more
mechanical problems happen. The market demands to cope with mechanical component failures
have increased as turbines have become larger and larger.
Efficiency Demands Posed by the EEG
The German EEG implemented in 2000 was specifically created to push the efficiency
improvement innovation. The law has the different electricity tariffs for onshore and offshore
wind projects. In addition, the amounts of hours that the tariffs are paid are differentiated
according to turbine size. For example, suppose that 1.5MW turbines receive the premium tariff
for the first 2,000 hours of operation, while 1.65MW turbines receive the same payment for the
first 1,800 hours. If a 1.5MW turbine generates X/kWh of electricity and a 1.65MW turbine with
the same rotor generates only X+ 1% kWh, the EEG makes the economics of the high-efficiency
1.5MW turbine better because the paid hours of operation are longer. Thus, the new law was
formulated to reward the real efficiency improvement rather than the improvement of turbine
size on paper; more efficient turbines and better installations can receive higher monetary
rewards, and this also makes the power grid receive higher energy yield at the same time (Gerdes
2005).
Technology Development as a Result of Market Demands at the Frontier
Turbine Upscalinq
As described above, the needs to increase project profitability, the strong land development
competition with other uses, and the increasing needs to cope with low wind conditions created
the strong demand for larger-capacity turbines, especially in the German market, which has been
the driver of turbine upscaling. The demand has been so strong that the competition for larger-
capacity turbines is extremely high in Germany, and this explains why the turbine depreciation
rates were higher in Germany than in Denmark for onshore wind development. The recent
saturation of onshore development areas in both Denmark and Germany have been a driver for
the development of multi-MW class turbines tailored for offshore environments.
Larger wind turbines with taller hub-height and larger rotor swept areas can increase electricity
production due to the increase of wind energy capture. They also use materials more efficiently,
therefore reduce turbine cost, and lessen the visual impacts and save installation and O&M costs
due to the reduction of the number of installations.
Trend toward Variable Speed
The Danish Classical Concept succeeded in the 1980s and dominated the market until the late
1990s because of its simplicity and cost efficiency by using readily available components to
produce grid-compatible electricity inexpensively without any sophisticated controls. However,
variable speed operations have gradually gained its popularity for the past ten years, because
they take care of many market demands mentioned above and because the cost efficient
technology options for variable speed configurations have become available due to various
innovations.
Suitability of variable speed operations for many market demands described above is obvious.
First and foremost, variable speed turbines can achieve higher energy capture than fixed speed
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counterparts and increase electricity production due to their greater rotor efficiency. Second, by
lowering the rotor speeds, they reduce noise in lower wind and reduce dynamic loads on
drivetrain which reduce the possibility of component failure and replacement. Third,
synchronous power converter or power electronics that conditions the output from variable speed
turbines to the grid-compatible electricity takes care of the grid stability demand by improving
power quality. Fourth, variable speed turbines also offer the great improvement in operation in
low wind speed for the turbines designed for high wind regimes. And lastly, wide-range variable
speed turbines have the ability to avoid damaging resonance, which is important for offshore
turbines where resonant frequencies have proven difficult to predict accurately. This matches the
increasing offshore market demand well. One drawback is the cost increase due to the necessary
power electronics (approximately a 10% increase in total investment costs). However, energy
capture also increases at onshore sites about 10% per year over that of the similar capacity
turbines operating at fixed speeds (Gipe 1995). Such characteristics satisfy the real efficiency
improvement demanded by the EEG as well.
Variable speed concepts were already widely used since the 1980s by the German manufacturers,
e.g., MBB, MAN and Enercon. Enercon began manufacturing pitch-regulated, variable speed
turbines with geared drive from 1985. However, it was the mid 1990s that the suitability to
various market demands described above and the increased market size did drive the successful
commercialization of variable speed turbines. First, it was Enercon that introduced wide-range
variable speed turbines with direct-drive WRSG in 1993. As for limited speed range operations,
Vestas OptiSlip@ with 10% of speed variation using variable rotor resistance was introduced in
1995 and the first DFIG configuration with a limited speed range was commercialized by Tacke
in 1996. The latter concept has been followed by many other manufacturers from the late 1990s
and has become dominant in the market today. The number of successful commercialization of
the models with wide-range variable speed operations that maximize the benefits of variable
speed operation has increased in the 2000s, e.g., Bonus/ Siemens (2.3MW-VS in 2003 and
3.6MW-VS in 2004), GE Wind (GE 2.3, 2.5, and 2.7 in 2004), and Multibrid@ technology, due
to the cost reduction of power electronics and the increased demands for offshore development
that have made the use of expensive power electronics viable.
Trend toward Pitch Control
Like variable speed operations, pitch regulation matches several market demands at the frontier.
In principle, pitch regulation provides better power quality, which is very important for the
German market, than stall regulation. Especially in the German market, large turbines favor
independent pitch mechanisms with each pitch actuator that allows the rotor to be regarded as
two independent braking systems, which is an advantage for the turbine certification purpose
(European Commission 1999; European Wind Energy Association 2003). Pitch regulation
gained its popularity due to its suitability with variable speed technique.
The early favor for stall regulation gradually faded, as variable speed configurations and pitch
regulation have become increasingly used together. Cost was not a primary driver of the choice
between pitch and stall, because overall cost becomes similar as pitch is more expensive in rotor
system than stall, while stall requires more expensive braking system (European Wind Energy
Association 2003). Instead, the driver for pitch regulation was the quality of power provided in
combination with variable speed operations; variable speed operations give easy control of pitch
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angle and pitch regulation provides better power quality and lower drivetrain loads. Fixed-
speed, pitch-regulated turbines were an early favorite, but they have been rejected due to large
transients in power output when controlling the power. In the mid 1990s some manufacturers
used stall regulation in variable speed turbines. However, concerns over the power quality of
stall-regulated turbines, especially in Germany, and concerns over stall-induced vibrations for
large-capacity turbines reduced the interests in stall regulation at large-scale machines (European
Commission 1999). In addition, rotor blades of large-capacity, pitch-regulated, variable speed
turbines had very few problems, compared to either stall-regulated turbines or pitch-regulated,
fixed-speed turbines (Wind Power Monthly 1995).
At low wind velocity, pitch-regulated blades have a large surface against wind, and this surface
decreases gradually as wind velocity increases, in order to capture the optimum energy, reduce
load on the blades, and elongate the blade lifespan. Active stall regulation also offers better
control than stall, but their application is limited to fixed-speed turbines; as a result, its
popularity has also faded as variable speed turbines have become dominant.
Innovations to Compensate Problems cominq with Large-capacity Turbines
Larger wind turbines have several significant downsides, including the increase in mechanical
problems and cost, as well as the difficulty of transportation, logistics, and construction, all due
to the increased size and weight of components.
Mechanical Problems with Large-capacity turbines
The strong demand for larger-capacity turbines has been an innovation driver for solving
mechanical problems associated with them. For older turbines (smaller, heavier, and sturdy
turbines) that had safety factor of 1.5 to 2.0, technical management requirements were actually
low because high stress could be coped with the heavily-built turbine mass itself. Weight per
rated capacity (kg/kW) was large. However, safety factor becomes lower as turbines get
larger; larger-capacity turbines have design safety factors of 1.1 to 1.2. This means that they
need to be designed close to the safety limit, which requires more precisely-designed machine
load calculation as well as lower stress on the turbines. These requirements are more
expensive to materialize for turbines with large mass, and this has been a strong driver for
lighter and lower stress turbines (Gerdes 2005). Variable speed operations are again a
preferred solution due to the reduction of dynamic load stress on drivetrain.
Another significant innovation to solve this problem was direct drive configuration. Direct
drive is only possible with wide-range variable speed operations. The cost of materials for
direct drive turbines are 25% higher than geared, induction generator turbines (Madsen 2005),
but restriction on the minimum speed can reduce the cost of power electronics. Enercon
succeeded in reducing various mechanical problems with its direct drive system and restrained
nacelle weight design (Gerdes 2005). Although direct drive generator is heavier than
conventional one, the firm's innovative nacelle design made the weight equivalent to other
pitch-regulated counterparts. In addition, direct drive also takes care of reducing noise level
and eliminates energy loss in gearbox transmission. 81 These elements were the decisive factor
of the Enercon's market success in Germany.
8 At rate power, transmission consumes 1 to 2% of the rotor's power per stage, but losses in the gearbox can
become considerable at low power (Gipe, 1995).
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More recent single-stage gearing Multibrid@ technology innovation also avoids the complexity
of multi-stage gearbox but offers lighter weight with more efficient and compact drivetrain
than large direct drive generators. Besides direct drive and Multibrid@, various integrated and
partially integrated drivetrain configurations and soft towers have been developed by all
manufacturers in order to reduce weight and stress, hence, the mechanical problems associated
with large-capacity turbines.
Rotor Blade Technology
The innovations in rotor blade technology have been another part of technology driven by the
problems associated with larger-capacity turbines. The design parameters of rotor blade vary,
according to rotor power regulation method, rotor speed, and size of rotor and turbine itself.
Small- and medium-capacity, fixed-speed turbines with stall or active stall regulation require
relatively heavy and rigid blade designs. This changed since the mid 1990s; MW and multi-
MW class turbines, many with pitch-regulated variable speed operations, require longer blades
and light and stiff blade design. In particular for the newer generations of MW-class turbine
blades, blade stiffness has been the key driver, because they have to be dimensioned for the
maximum permissible blade deflection (flexion under load) in order to guarantee the minimum
tower clearance by the blade tip (De Vries 2004a).
- Lighter and Stiffer Materials: Blade materials can change rotor weight and rotor cost
significantly. Lighter and stiffer blades materials reduce blade loads, avoid strain, and
reduce rotor weight and cost. Commercialization and popularity of GFRE material since
the mid 1990s was mainly due to its capability to create more slender and lightweight
blades, along with its easier quality control and the resulting lower variation in material
properties than GFRP. The epoxy resin system originally developed for GFRE also
prompted the use of wood as light weight materials. Wood-epoxy laminates have become
used for some large rotor blades due to its relative ease of disposal and light weight. The
beginning of carbon use in blades in the early 2000s was prompted by its capability to
substantially increase stiffness without increasing weight.
- Increase in Aerodynamic Efficiency and Decreasing Cost: The above materials
innovation and improvement coupled with novel manufacturing technology as well as
development of special-purpose blade aerofoil designs have successfully restrained the
increase of blade mass under a cubic power of radius for many blades (Veers et al. 2003),
while substantially improving aerodynamic efficiency of blades. 82 More efficient blade
aerofoil that converts more wind energy into rotational energy has contributed to reducing
aerodynamic noise level as well.
82 In 2004 the newest rotor blade by Enercon achieved aerodynamic efficiency of 56% (Cp=0.56), which is 6%
above the state of the art and only 3.3% below the theoretical Betz limit (Renewable Energy World 2004). The
aerodynamic efficiency of the process that a turbine rot or extracts the power of wind and converts into mechanical-
rotational power in the rotor shaft is known as the power coefficient C,, defined as the ratio of extracted shaft power
to the undisturbed wind power across an area equal to the rotor disc area. The theoretical limit of the power
coefficient is known as the Betz limit, first formulated in 1919 by the German physicist Albert Betz. According to
Betz, the maximum theoretical achievable power that can be extracted from the wind by horizontal axis turbines is
PBetz = 1/2pAV 3-cd, where cd = (167/27 x 8) ~ 0.593. Thus, even if a power extraction without any losses would be
possible, a wind turbine can utilize only about 59.3% of wind power.
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i ransportation and Logistical Innovations
Transportation and logistical innovations described in Chapter 5 were also the direct result of
the demands for larger-capacity turbine development.
Meeting Environmental Demands
In addition to variable speed turbines that lower noise level in low wind, general noise reduction
technology, including direct drive technology and more efficient blade aerofoil, has advanced
greatly due to the strong and consistent noise reduction demands.
The environmental demand concerning polyester as blade materials was another reason that
prompted GFRE to rapidly gain the ground from the mid 1990s and its predominance in the
2000s. For larger blades, all established manufacturers switched from polyester to epoxy resin
infusion some years ago, and all new manufacturers now use epoxy-resin-based systems. The
development of vacuum infusion process for resin has made the resin more environmentally
friendly by not exposing the surrounding to the materials, and provides considerable flexibility of
choosing between materials and combinations than the pre-impregnated process. The method
became widely used since the late 1990s.
Advancement of Wind Project Execution Technology
The market demand for increasing the amount of electricity generation has created a technology
driver for improving the understanding of site-specific wind regime and the skills in micro-siting.
This driver was responsible for the advancement of various wind resource estimation/energy
prediction and optimization modeling as well as project design and planning software.
Advancement of SCADA
The advancement of SCADA has been driven by the market demands for power quality control
and offshore development. Better remote monitoring capability to prevent accidents in the
offshore environments as well as strong controllability demanded by utilities for large onshore
and offshore wind farms have prompted the SCADA innovations in preventive remote
monitoring, remote reporting using the Internet interface, grid interface management, and wind
farm controlling.
Increase in Energy Yield
The advancements in aerodynamics and structural dynamics as well as micro-meteorology have
contributed to a 5% annual increase in energy yield per squire meter wind turbine rotor area,
which was recorded in Denmark between 1980-2001 (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003).
Cost Reduction of Wind Energy as a Result of Technology Advancement
and Experiences
The above technology advancements created the significant cost reduction in both wind
electricity production and price of turbines at the frontier. Between 1980 and 2000, the annual
energy yield increased 10-fold, and it multiplied almost another 5-fold from 2000 to 2005 (BWE
2005). The price of wind energy was USD 0.1/kWh in the early 1980s, but it became USD 0.04
to 0.06/kWh by 2004 (BTM Consult ApS 2005b).
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Experience Curve Studies
In order to find the sources of such cost reduction of wind energy, many experience curve studies
have been carried out mainly in Europe since the late 1990s. The most prominent study was
Experience Curves: a tool for energy policy programmes assessment (EXTOOL), funded
partially by the EC. The purpose of EXTOOL was to analyze the experience curves as tool for
energy policy program assessment, using wind power as case study. The analysis was done for
Denmark, Germany, Spain, and Sweden, and the curves were constructed for different dependent
variables (Table 6-3).
The EXTOOL results show higher learning ratios for Denmark than Germany in every category.
More importantly, the cost reduction of wind generated electricity in both specific production
and levelized production are large, while reduction in wind turbine price/kW, which describes
cost of production, price of wind turbines, and total installation price, are quite modest.
Dannemand Andersen (2004) notes that experience curves based on the cost of generated
electricity are more true and fair than those based on the cost of equipment, because the curves
based on the cost of generated electricity include not only experiences and learning of the
manufacturing industry (experiences in equipment manufacturing) but also those of the whole
business cluster (experiences in installations, improvement of efficiency, and disembodied
utilization) (Dannermand Andersen 2004).
Table 6-3: Progress Ratios (PR) and Learning Ratios (LR) of EXTOOL
Experience Curves for Denmark and Germany
Dependent Variables Denmark (1981-2000) Germany (1987-2000)
PR LR r, PR LR r2
Produced Wind Turbine Price /kW 92% 8% 0.84 94% 6% 0.74
Specific production cost of electricity* 86% 14% 0.97 88% 12% 0.87
Levelized production cost of electricity** 83% 17% 0.97 ----
Installed Wind Turbine Price/kW 91% 9% 0.94 94% | 6% 0.88
Total Installation Price/kW 90% 10% 0.92 ---
* calculated by dividing the average wind turbine list price by number of full load hours
** cost reduction of turbines (cost/kWh) calculated with 20 year life time, 6% interest rate with
specific O&M cost for individual models
Source: (Neij et al. 2003)
Sources of Cost Reduction
Determining the sources of cost reduction in wind energy has been attempted by many, including
the EXTOOL study. However, pinpointing the specific factors and their effects has been
impossible as the experience curve studies look at the composite learning system as a whole, not
necessarily the processes within the black box. The effects of size factors on turbine cost and on
unit cost of electricity have been studied most among all sensitivity factors. The effects of scale
factors include: standardization of product (mass production) and redesigning and upsizing of
individual product (e.g., upscaling of a gas turbine leads to lower costs of specific component per
turbine). The effects of technological learning factors include: innovations and learning-by-
searching through R&DD; learning-by-doing in manufacturing process; learning-by-interacting
through the network interactions between research institutions, industry, end-users, policy
makers, etc.; and learning-by-using in O&M process (Abell and Hammond 1979; Grubler 1998;
Junginger, Faaij, and Turkenburg 2005).
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Effects of Scale Factor on Cost Reduction
Higher cost reduction of wind generated electricity in both specific production and levelized
production in the EXTOOL study and other studies done by Neij (1999a; 1999b) for wind
turbines under 600kW show the effect of scale, specifically upscaling of wind turbine size and
capacity, as a key driver behind the cost and price reductions as larger-capacity turbines improve
wind capture (efficiency and availability) and decreased load on the turbines (Neij 1999b; Neij et
al. 2003; Neij 1999a).83
Historically the upscaling of wind turbines has lead to the lower specific costs per kilowatt for
turbines under 600kW. However, this trend seems diminishing for the turbine class above
600kW. The study done by Junginger, Faaij, and Turkenburg (2005) shows that the annual
energy generation strongly varies within the turbine class above 600kW under the same wind
regime condition, as rotor diameter and hub height vary significantly among turbines in the class.
They show the potential of cost reduction of electricity by upscaling wind turbines seems to
become less significant in comparison to the earlier achievements, as installation costs increase
for larger-capacity turbines. This indicates the turbines in the 600kW-900kW range are not
likely to extinct in near future as the turbines below 600kW did, since the 600kW-900kW class
turbines have advantages in logistics and weak grid condition of developing countries
(Junginger, Faaij, and Turkenburg 2005).
Another scale effect, size of wind project (wind farm) has a simpler relationship with unit cost of
electricity: larger project has lower unit cost, as all transaction costs are spread over more
kilowatt hours, and O&M costs become lower due to the efficiency of managing a larger wind
farm (American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) 2002). The discount from manufacturers
can be also a factor that lowers the unit cost.
The other scale effect, mass production, will be a significant factor for future cost reduction.
Currently the order size of 500 turbines and above is still exceptional. A single order of 1,600
turbines can make a single production plant to operate for several years, and create many
advantages such as bargaining power in raw material purchase agreements. Labor costs have
been substantially reduced from seven to two employees per MW over the period between 1991
and 2001 of a major turbine manufacturer (Junginger, Faaij, and Turkenburg 2005). The further
reduction depends on improvement of production process and location of production facilities.
Other Sources of Cost Reduction
Although the scale factors, in particular turbine upscaling, have greatly impacted the cost
reduction of wind energy technology, a number of other factors are considered to cause the cost
reduction in wind turbine and electricity generation. Despite the large impact of scale factors,
the effects of technological learning (learning-by-searching, learning-by-doing, learning-by-
interacting, and learning-by-using), in particular the Danish grassroots networks and R&DD
programs that were connected well to the commercial market since the late 1970s, should not be
83 Neij studied the penetration of wind turbines with increasing size in the Danish market and each dominant turbine
type was replaced by several newer and larger-capacity turbine classes, which had lower turbine costs per kW than
the previous ones and a higher yield per unit of swept area, only 2 or 3 years later. (Junginger, Faaij, and
Turkenburg 2005) showed this was also true for the German market.
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dismissed as the sources of cost reduction in the country. This has given the first mover
advantage to the Danish industry and may have induced the higher learning ratios of Denmark
than Germany over the past 20 years. Much higher learning ratios in cost of generated electricity
than cost of equipment also support the importance of learning factors in the whole business
cluster.
6.1.3 Section Summary
Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Factors on Demand-pull
Technology Development and Diffusion at the Frontier
From the above examination, it is very clear that technology at the frontier has been advanced by
faithfully following and satisfying various market demands. While policy/institutional
sensitivity factors of wind energy project investment mechanism (revenue sources, fiscal
measures, cost of financing, purchase agreements) worked favorably to expand market size in
Denmark and Germany, technology-related sensitivity factors (investment costs, amount of
electricity generated and sold, technical system lifetime, size effects of wind project/farm)
directly worked on technology development in order to create the favorable conditions for power
generation that can be independent from political uncertainty as much as possible.
Although the investment economics pressure played the most significant role in creating
technology efficiency demands, various policies along with the enthusiasm toward wind energy
also played important roles in creating the market demands that pulled technology development
in Denmark and Germany. In both countries, the strength of the market derives from the
participation and support from a broad range of private citizens. Various concerns over wind
energy development occurred time to time, but both countries have cleared the way step by step
by establishing necessary spatial planning/noise/ownership regulations, fighting the NIMBY
phenomenon, and strengthening the local and national supports.
While providing the investment incentives that eased high initial capital investment costs, their
gradual retreat and the concentration toward production incentives, in particular, the
establishment of guaranteed payments for wind electricity by law increased the motivation for
performance efficiency. Although the market experienced some fluctuations when the
investment incentives became less attractive, the market prospect was continuous and strong
with the laws. The turbine testing and certification requirement from the beginning for eligibility
for bank loans, investment subsides, and export as well as the ownership regulations eliminated
the abuse of government incentives, especially in Denmark. The success of the Danish quality
assurance mechanism created a de facto European and then international standards.
Strong competition with other types of investments also required the seriousness in investment,
contributing to restraining the abuse of government incentives and increasing the demands for
performance efficiency. In Denmark, the 1996 opening of wind investment to farmers made
wind investment more sensitive to profitability. In Germany, the wind turbine zoning and noise
regulations put more pressure on land development competition and have pushed the turbine
efficiency demands further, together with the new EEG feed-in-tariff setting mechanism.
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The emerged market demands under these policy factors and investment economic pressures
have created a significant synergy that strongly pulled the direction of technology innovations
toward efficiency improvement, leading tremendous wind turbine upscaling in size and capacity,
inducing the popularity of pitch-regulated, variable-speed turbines, advancing technology in
rotor blade materials/profile/manufacturing methods as well as project execution and SCADA
technologies.
Above all, the market continuity and certainty guaranteed by the feed-in laws have played the
most significant roles in concerting the whole technology development process by assuring
investment recovery for both market and technology investors.
Thus, virtuous cycle of market growth and technology development has been created at the
frontier, and the cycle also brought the tremendous cost reduction through scale effect of wind
turbine upscaling.
Role and Effects of Technology-push Policy on Demand-pull Technology
Development and Diffusion
While market development and investment policy have played the important roles in shaping the
technology improvement demands, pragmatic technology development and investment policy
has contributed to the materialization of many technologies. The demand-pull synergy has been
well supported by technology-push R&DD efforts at both national and the EU levels. It is
important to note that in the process the role of Europe and the role of the national governments
in R&DD were distinguished well but created an important synergy together; while the European
efforts concentrated on the grand scheme of turbine upscaling technology development, the
national governments supported basic science, commercialization as well as technology analysis
of various components/subsystems and technology system.
JOULE Program- WEGA 11 and THERMIE
The key contribution of the Europe-wide JOULE program to the development and
commercialization of wind energy technology during the 1990s, especially the successful turbine
upscaling to MW-class turbines in the mid 1990s, is the most obvious one. Without the program
supports, the commercialization of MW-class turbines and many technology development
triggered by their commercialization did not happened as it did. The success of the WEGA II
Program was partly due to the failed experiments of WEGA I. While many individual developed
countries abandoned wind energy R&D for large-capacity wind turbines by the end of the 1980s,
Europe as a whole did not give up and concentrated the resources for further advancement. The
clear focus on the accumulated experiences by commercially successful technologies and
manufacturers was the important factor for the success of the second program.
National Government R&DD Programs
Both the Danish and German R&DD programs were targeted to basic science, commercialization
as well as technology analysis of components and system. The German R&DD program also
contributed to statistical data accumulation through WEMP. In both countries, many funding has
been granted to the collaborative efforts among research institutions and manufacturers and to a
wide-range of value chain R&D activities.
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Section 6.2: Transformed Technological Characteristics and
Industrial Competitiveness Management and
Their Effects on Technology Development and
Diffusion in Denmark and Germany
The previous section examines the effects of market size and demands on technology
innovations at the frontier. This section analyzes the relationships of industry structure and
competitive strategies with technology innovations and transformed technological characteristics
at the frontier.
6.2.1 Technology Development, Strategic Demands, and Evolution of
Industrial Competitiveness Management at the Frontier
Technology Development and Strategic Demands
The strong market demands for constant technology upscaling and efficiency improvement have
changed wind energy into high-tech technology since 1990 and created the high technology
depreciation rates, forcing the manufacturers to introduce newer models to the market every two
or three years at the frontier. This condition has generated the constant high level of competition
among manufacturers and placed two significant strategic management demands on them:
technological advantage management and cost advantage management.
Strategic Demands for Simultaneous Technoloqy and Cost Management
As described in Chapter 5, wind energy technology innovations have been highly systemic. At
the same time, the competitiveness of manufacturers is increasingly relying on the high-tech
nature of pacing technologies and components as well as manufacturing methods, which are very
much science-based, e.g., computer and materials sciences and technology. With the increased
importance of science-based technology within the technology system, technological complexity
and system integration needs have also increased across the value chain activities.
To materialize the constant technological advancements across the value chain activities
portrayed in Chapter 5, the industry has spent a large amount of development cost. In particular,
the role of manufacturers have increased since 1990, as the R&D at the frontier has focused more
on incremental innovations and turbine upscaling based on market experiences. Tables 6-4 and
6-5 show the development cost figures for Vestas and Nordex since the late 1990s, respectively.
Although the industry-wide figures for technology development cost could not be obtained, the
figures for both the firms can illustrate the condition, in which they were placed. Because the
Danish business accounting method changed in 2001 for Vestas and because the figures for
Nordex before the 2000/01 fiscal year only show the development cost of the German subsidiary
(Nordex Energy GmbH) of the Danish Nordex A/S at the time, it is not possible to compare the
figures over the years straightforwardly for both. However, it is very clear that both the firms
needed to meet the demands to raise technology development fund that increased exponentially
every year. Both the firms also show the strong growth of development cost after 2000, which
corresponds to the introduction of new generation of multi-MW class turbines.
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Table 6-4: Development Cost of Vestas Wind Systems A/S (Million EUR)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cost 4.4* 7.7* N/A 16.0 (old)** 26.8 37.0 50.0 72.721.0 (new)*
Growth Rate -- 175% --- --- 127% 138% 135% 145%
% in Turnover 1.17% 1.21% N/A 1.64% 1.92% 2.24% 1.95% 2.03%
* 1998 and 1999 figures are calculated by exchange rate 1 EUR = 7.4243 DKK (12/31/2002 rate).Development costs of 1998 and 1999 were DKK 33 million and DKK 57 million, respectively.
** From 2001 accounting, the accounting policies applied have been changed as a consequence
of the new Danish Financial Statements Act. Development costs are recognized in intangible
assets and are measured at cost less accumulated amortization, which is calculated on a
straight-line basis over 3-5 years, following the completion of the development work. Previously,
development costs were recognized in the income statement on a current basis.
Sources: (Vestas Wind Systems A/S 1999; Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2000; Vestas Wind
Systems A/S 2001; Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2002a; Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2003; Vestas
Wind Systems A/S 2004; Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2005)
Table 6-5: Development Cost of Nordex AG (Million EUR)
19971 1998/ 1999/ 2000/ 2001/ 2002/ 2003/
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cost* 1.06 2.50 4.04 6.78 14.80 19.71 20.91 11.27
Growth Rate --- 236% 162% 168% 218% 133% 106% --
% in Turnover 1.28% 1.11% 1.48% 1.96% 3.32% 9.16% 9.56% 3.53%
* Figures are before amortization. Development cost is written down over a period of five years.
They are for the German fiscal year (October 1 - September 30) except 2005. The 2005 figure is
for the calendar year.
Sources: (Nordex AG 2001a; Nordex AG 2001b; Nordex AG 2002a; Nordex AG 2003b; Nordex
AG 2004)
This evolution of development cost illustrates the increasing demand and pressure of R&D
finance and capability management on manufacturers, i.e., finding market demands and
technology focus across the entire value chain activities in advance, procuring the necessary fund
for R&D, creating a strategic R&D plan, bringing all required capability and capacity into the
plan, and executing the plan successfully on time. Even after the R&D is successfully carried
out, production and project execution capacity and capability need to be adjusted to bring the
results of the R&D into the market fruitfully.
While technology has to be constantly innovated, the price of technology cannot be increased
exponentially in order to keep the competitiveness. The cost reduction market demand has been
very strong at the frontier, and the manufacturers have been exposed to it in every aspect of the
value chain activities. While the turbine upscaling itself has significantly contributed to the cost
reduction of electricity production as already mentioned in the previous section, other cost
reductions derive from technology innovations and advancements in both production and project
execution technology management. Thus, the increasing technology development demand has
fortified the cost management demand simultaneously.
Cost management is indeed technology management of procuring necessary capacity and
capability for innovation, production and project execution in the least expensive ways.
Therefore, the question of asking from where and whom the procurement should be carried out is
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very important in finding and establishing competitive advantages. The demands for this
simultaneous cost and technology management have increased, as the wind energy market has
expanded geographically, the market size has increased, and technological complexity and
reliance on high-tech components have intensified.
Competitiveness Strategy Evolution for Simultaneous Technology and Cost
Management
Various strategies have been employed to manage the simultaneous technological and cost
competitive advantages in the wind energy industry and this part explores the evolution of such
strategies.
Business Entry Strateqy and Technology and Cost Management
Several methods of business entry have been used in the wind industry at the frontier.
During the 1970s to the early 1990s, the most popular entry method was organic business
diversification within a corporation from its mechanical or aerospace business branch into wind
business. While most of the Danish manufacturers (Vestas, Bonus, Nordtank, Danish Wind
Technology) started by diversifying from agricultural or mechanical machinery business, the
early large entrants in the United States and Germany (Boeing, GE, Westinghouse, MAN, and
MBB) diversified from their aerospace business via the government R&D contracts for large-
scale wind turbine development. In Germany, some small manufacturers also took this mode of
entry: Tacke grew out of a long-established gearbox manufacturer; HSW diversified from a ship
building; and Fuhrlander started from metal processing.
Meanwhile, there were other manufacturers that started from scratch or spilled over from other
firms by the engineers with wind energy academic and/or practical backgrounds. The most
notable example was the entry by Enercon in 1984, which was founded a graduate engineer
Aloys W~bben, while the establishment of Micon in Denmark in 1983 was a spillover from
Nordtank. Other German examples of this entry mode include Siidwind in the early 1990s,
DeWind in 1995, BWU in 1996, and Jacobs in 1992. The last two later transformed into
REpower in 2001.
However, the popular entry mode has changed in the late 1990s into business diversification of
major industrial player with extensive capital and vast regional and global network into the
growing wind energy business. These firms usually take over the established but often
financially struggling wind turbine manufacturers, absorbing their technological know-how but
providing necessary future capital needs on return. This was the cases of the following: BDAG
and the subsequent Babcock-Borsig AG takeover of Nordex; Enron takeover of bankrupted
Tacke and Zond; GE acquisition of the renewable energy division of collapsed Enron; and most
recently, Siemens AG purchase of technologically acclaimed Bonus. It is important to note that
the business entry or re-entry of these large conglomerates in the 1990s and 2000s is different
from the business diversification of large firms during the 1980s. The conglomerates are no
longer the primary providers of technology to the wind turbine manufacturing industry, but they
are now the takers of the accumulated knowledge of experienced smaller firms.
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The changing mode of business entry strategy is the reflection of wind energy technology
evolution. In the beginning, the cost of wind energy technology development was low,
especially for smaller commercial turbines and for the firms with mechanical, electrical, and
aerospace engineering backgrounds, because technology was drawn from the experiences of
other industries. Over the years, however, the accumulation of knowledge through experiences
began posing formidable entry barriers for even large conglomerates, which contemplate the
business entry to the now well-established and lower-risk wind energy industry. Wind energy
technology has become unique, original, and costly to develop. The recent large conglomerate
takeovers of privately owned manufacturers substantiate the increasing complexity of financial
management of the constant technology development demands.
Organizational Growth Strategy and Technology and Cost Management
The most wind turbine manufacturers combine two or three different organizational growth
strategies for simultaneous technology and cost management.
First, the public listing of company stocks started during the mid 1990s, becoming a method of
acquiring the necessary capital for continuous technology development. It started in the United
States with the public listing of Kenetech in 1994. Soon, the major manufacturers in Denmark,
which were founded and owned privately by family business or a small number of business
owners, began stock floating (Nordtank in 1995; NEG Micon in 1998; and Vestas in 1998). In
Germany, Nordex (Germany) initiated the public listing in 2001, followed by REpower in 2002.
The Spanish giant Gamesa also began listed on the stock exchange in 2000. The most recent
example was Suzlon of India in 2005. Siemens Wind and GE Wind are a part of publicly owned
conglomerates. Today, Enercon remains the only major manufacturer wholly owned privately
by a single owner.
While the public listing has been used to raise the necessary capital for technology management,
the manufacturers have combined technology development on their own (organic growth) and
technology acquisition through horizontal and vertical M&A.
Pure organic growth strategies have been taken by several major manufacturers. Enercon is the
most notable and successful firm that has taken this strategy. The firm has never engaged in
horizontal M&A; it organically grew by establishing in-house manufacturing and R&D facilities
for rotor blade (1993), ring generators (1993), electrical engineering (1993), and tower (2000)
and by expanding those facilities gradually, both in size and location. Bonus was another
example of taking organic growth strategy. Unlike Enercon, however, it never expanded into in-
house component production extensively (except rotor blade production from 2001), and
geographically the firm mainly focused on the Danish, German and other European markets.
The firm never engaged in horizontal or vertical M&A, until it was bought by Siemens at the end
of 2004. Many other manufacturers have taken partial organic expansion strategies (expanding
not all but some in-house business or production units without M&A) as their business grew.
The global industry structure and competition have changed dramatically for the past 15 years
through business entries, exits, and horizontal M&A. Figure 6-4 shows the structural change due
to horizontal M&A happened between 1990 and 2005 at the frontier.
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Figure 6-4: Horizontal M&A of Major Manufacturers 1990-2005 at the Frontier
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Horizontal M&A occurred both domestically and cross-border. Most major manufacturers
except Enercon were involved in some kind of M&A activities, and the industry consolidation
occurred in all countries. Horizontal M&A has become an important growth and survival
strategy for some manufacturers, in particular, from the mid 1990s. All exited firms have been
acquired by other manufacturers; firm acquisition has been an important mode of entry as well as
a mode of established technology acquisition. The acquired technology and know-how is always
transferred to new owners. 84
There have been several patterns in horizontal M&A. The first one is to combine and
consolidate technology and know-how of the companies at similar level and reorganize them as a
new company. This was the pattern for: Nordtank (Denmark) and Micon (Denmark) combined
into NEG Micon (Denmark) in 1997; Jacobs, BWU, and pro + pro engineering (all Germany)
transforming into REpower (Germany) in 2001; and Vestas (Denmark) and NEG Micon
(Denmark) merger in 2004. The second and most prevalent pattern is to take over the
technological know-how of financially weakened fellow manufacturers. This was the case for:
Kenetech (USA) acquiring US Windpower (USA) in 1994; Turbowinds (Belgium) taking over
Windmaster-HMZ (Belgium) in 1995; Zond (USA) acquiring Kenetech (USA) in 1996; NEG
Micon (Denmark) taking over WindWorld (Denmark) in 1997; NEG Micon (Denmark)
acquiring NedWind (the Netherlands) in 1998; Nordex (Denmark-Germany) taking over
Stidwind (Germany) in 1999; and Gamesa (Spain) acquiring MADE (Spain) in 2003. The third
pattern is to protect against a hostile take-over from foreign capital or conglomerate, and this was
another reason behind the Vestas and NEG Micon merger in 2004. The last pattern is the
strategy of the firms with larger capital or engineering conglomerates to acquire the specialized
technological know-how of wind energy for business entry: BDAG and Babcock-Borsig AG
(Germany, Nordex), Enron (USA, Tacke and Zond), GE (USA, Enron in 2002), and Siemens
(Germany, Bonus in 2004) took this method as already mentioned.
The Danish manufacturers have engaged also in vertical M&A in order to incorporate
technological know-how of sub-suppliers and to ensure component supply and quality control.
The most prominent examples of engaging in vertical M&A have been Vestas and NEG Micon
(Table 6-6). Many sub-suppliers acquired by both the manufacturers had supplied components
to them for long time and had already established good relationships. With their 2004 merger,
Vestas directly and indirectly acquired component technologies from all these sub-suppliers, in
addition to the accumulated knowledge of turbine development and manufacturing from DWT,
Nordtank, Micon, NEG Micon, WindWorld, and Nedwind. The other notable example was the
acquisition of the assets of Aeropec bV, a Dutch blade manufacturing firm that was established
in 1989 and bankrupted in 2001, by Enron. Some employees of this firm started the production
of moulds in a subsidiary of Suzlon in 2001.
84 There are two exceptions. Technologies of US Windpower and DeWind completely disappeared from the market
after their acquisitions by other firms (Madsen, 2005).
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Table 6-6: Vertical M&A of Vestas and NEG Micon
Acquired Vertical M&A and the Year
Technology Vestas NEG Micon
Taywood Aerolaminates (UK,
Rotor Blade 1998 wood epoxy)
Pitch Rotor 1989 Danish Wind Technology
Regulation (DWT) A/S*
2005 Weier Electric GmbH
Generator (half of the share)
Casting 2003 Windcast Group A/S
Tower 1994 Volund Stalteknik A/S 1999 Alust l A/S
Electronics/Control Cotas Computer
Systems Hardware 1999 Technology er 1998 Dan Control Engineering A/S
& Software
Wind Energy Group (UK) underSales & Marketing 1998Woodrow Construction
Other 2003 Danvest Energy A/S
Other_2003 (wind/diesel development)
* The merger was also horizontal as DWT was a turbine manufacturer itself that possessed larger-
capacity turbine experience and more advanced pitch-regulated rotor technology (BTM Consult
ApS 2005b).
Sources: Vestas and NEG Micon websites (www.vestas.dk) and (Madsen 2005)
In Germany, there has no significant vertical acquisition of suppliers by manufacturers, as
Enercon has not engaged in such M&A. However, indirect vertical M&A happened when a
conglomerate parent company engages in vertical M&A of wind component manufacturers: in
2005 Siemens AG, the parent company of Siemens Wind Power A/S, purchased Flender
Holdiung GmbH, the long-term gearbox supplier for the wind industry, strengthening its holding
in wind technology hardware market. Nordex established the electronics control unit in 1999 as
a result of the Nordex takeover by Babcock-Borsig AG, which owned an electronics control
system production company Babcock Prozessautomation that became a part of Nordex that year.
The latest large takeover of sub-suppliers by wind turbine manufacture comes from India; in
March 2006, Suzlon acquired Hansen Transmissions International NV of Belgium, one of the
largest wind turbine and industrial gearbox suppliers.
In general, however, vertical M&A of sub-suppliers has never been a general trend (Madsen
2005). Also horizontal M&A involves the issue of timing; the opportunities need to be presented
simultaneously by financially-weaken manufacturer and enough capital to acquire it. Both
horizontal and vertical M&A, however, have been an effective means of technology acquisition
and management, because the acquired manufacturers and sub-suppliers immediately contribute
to technology and know-how development and often to the expansion of production facilities.
They save the cost of technology accumulation by bringing already existing knowledge bases
and by increasing information flow under one roof.
Overall, the increasing public listing and the active horizontal and vertical M&A by larger
manufacturers demonstrate that there have been intensifying technology competition and capital
requirement from the 1990s behind them.
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Value Chain Analysis of Strategies I (Innovation) - Establishment of Industry Level
Innovation Collaborations and Networks for Technology and Cost Management
The constant needs for more science-based technology development, however, cannot be
sustained by horizontal and vertical M&A and the isolated internal R&D of each manufacturer
alone, even with the government R&D funding support. Many of core components of wind
energy technology, e.g., blade technology and wind resource estimation/energy optimization
technology, require basic scientific research before any commercialization attempts, and they are
costly and difficult to achieve by individual manufacturers alone. In order to manage the serious
and continuous requirements for those costly new R&D, the industry at the technology frontier
have developed successful collaboration networks for knowledge creation and accumulation as
well as for sharing of codified information in basic scientific areas.
International Innovation Network of Research Institutions and Manufacturers
In the area of blade technology development, of which distinctiveness creates competitive
edges for each manufacturer, international innovation networks have been established since
1990 in order to advance and share basic research that is extremely capital intensive.
Blade aerofoil innovation networks, which develop specialized aerofoil for wind turbines, have
been created in several developed countries. The initial detailed CFD modeling of
aerodynamics of flow around wind turbine blades/rotors was carried out in Canada in the early
1990s (McGowan and Connors 2000). Then the further development of models have been
carried out by the government research organizations and well-funded universities in Denmark,
Sweden, the Netherlands and the United States, which have capacity and capability of using
supercomputer for the CFD simulation. In the case of RISO, the network has evolved as an
informal one by researchers and industry professionals after an initial government attempt of
bringing them together. The works have been continuous for the past 15 years, and the first
specialized-blade aerofoil was developed during the mid and late 1990s (Hjuler Jensen 2005).
Blade materials innovation networks are far more extensive internationally. Raw materials of
epoxy and fiber plastic can be developed by only three or four companies globally, because
dealing with these raw materials require extremely high level of laboratory control, therefore
only large manufacturers and materials suppliers can handle the requirement. Then, these
materials are brought to the international network of wind turbine materials science R&D.
This is the network composed of European research institutions and universities (from
Denmark, the Netherlands, and others) and American companies and universities (NREL and
the Sandia National Lab that contract with US universities). In the network, blade materials
are tailored for wind turbine usage through close collaborations with the R&D branch of
various blade manufacturers. Both CFRP and GFRE were developed through this mechanism
(Hjuler Jensen 2005).
In terms of blade materials behaviors, the European Fatigue of Composite for Wind Turbines
(FACT) database and the US DOE/MSU (Montana State University) database have led to the
major advancements in the understanding of fatigue behaviors and testing program
development for fiberglass composites since 1990. In the early 2000s, the deficiencies of these
databases have led to the establishment of a new EC-funded program Optimatblades, which is
composed of ten R&D institutions, two certification authorities and six industrial partners
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within Europe. The examination of carbon fiber composites is now underway by this program
network (McGowan and Connors 2000; Veers et al. 2003).
In addition to these innovation networks, the IEA Implementing Agreement for Co-operation
in the Research, Development, and Deployment of Wind Energy Systems (IEA Wind) founded
in 1974 sponsors cooperative research tasks and provides a forum for international discussion
of R&D issues. 20 OECD member countries and the EC participated in the agreement (IEA
2006).
It is important to note that these networks are international but not global, as their core
existence is highly concentrated in certain developed countries. In addition, in these kinds of
mechanisms, national competitiveness and competencies are no longer the issues (Hjuler
Jensen 2005). The primary concern is the advancement of the industry itself through cost and
knowledge sharing in the area of capital intensive, basic science R&D. In this way, a level
playing field is created for all manufacturers and the basic scientific knowledge is shared by
every member of the industry. Then, it is up to each manufacturer to tailor the knowledge into
its own unique product lines and create competitive advantages.
Manufacturer-Sub-supplier Collaborations
The relationships between manufacturers and component suppliers have greatly changed in the
1990s and 2000s. The standard component suppliers of the 1980s have evolved into the trusted
partners for many turbine manufacturers in innovating technology and devising cost effective
solutions across the value chain activities. Technology development and production
collaborations between manufacturers and sub-suppliers increased significantly since 1990, as
wind energy technology has been transformed into highly integrated system technology of
many specifically designed, high-tech components.
In blade technology, collaborations between manufacturers and sub-suppliers are frequently
behind the creation of successful commercialization of unique products out of the shared basic
scientific knowledge created by the international networks described above. The world market
leader of the blade industry, LM Glasfiber A/S of Denmark, has engaged in more intensive
collaboration with NEG Micon, Nordex and REpower for development of new blades for their
specific models since 2000. Abeking & Rasmussen Rotec of Germany has also developed the
specialized blades for DeWind and REpower and manufactured the prototype of the Enercon
winglet blades before the series production moved to the in-house production unit of Enercon.
Other blade suppliers such as NOI Rotortechnik and EUROS (both Germany) have developed
and manufactured specialized blades for models of their customer as well. Through these joint
developments, sub-suppliers offer manufacturers not only customized blades suited to specific
products but also know-how of optimization for series production (De Vries 2004a), and such
collaborations have increased since the 1990s and become very common in the 2000s. Strong
connections among choices of turbine size, blade aerofoil, blade materials, and manufacturing
methods make the development of rotor blade extremely systemic, and this is the important
reason behind the intense collaborations between manufacturers and sub-suppliers at the stage
of commercialization.
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Logistics innovation is another area of strong manufacturer-sub-supplier collaboration, as
mentioned in Chapter 5. All specialized transportation and logistics solutions in terms of
special equipment design and transportation of MW- and multi-MW class turbines have been
devised by such collaborations.
Besides the above two areas, the development of many other outsourced components have
been the results of technology collaborations between manufacturers and sub-suppliers. Joint
development collaborations with sub-suppliers offer the manufacturers less expensive options
of technology management, more of technological options, and short-term production
flexibility, although the risks of losing technology control and technology leaking remain.
Strong trust between the two sides is crucial and that is why such collaborations are typically
built on the established long-term relationships between two sides.
Industry Network for Information and Knowledge Sharinq
Besides the formal innovation network arrangements described above, there have been more
informal industry networks that have contributed to technology development from the
beginning.
This tradition has been particularly strong in Denmark, as described in Chapter 4. The
grassroots and industry networks (Table 6-7) have connected research institutions and
manufacturers while bringing user perspectives at the same time. In Denmark, R&D
collaborations among universities, research institutions such as RISO, and the industry have
been also very active, partly because the national R&D funding selection includes
contribution/collaboration criteria. The inclusion of collaboration ideas in the application has
been a plus for selection.
Table 6-7: Danish Innovation Networks
Organizations Roles as Innovation Network
Organization for Supplementing the formal government R&D programs with grassroots
Renewable Energy activities, enabling amateurs and professionals to meet each other and(1975-) discuss ideas and experiences in construction of wind turbines
Wind Co-operatives Technology improvement by providing a list of all turbines and regular
(the late 1970s-) & reports of performance and technical problems in the membership
Danish Wind Turbine magazine, Naturlig Energi, and by making the manufacturers possible
Owners Association to learn from mistakes quickly and to keep turbines operated and
(DWTOA, 1978-) maintained well
RIS0 Turbine Constant upgrading of turbine approval scheme has allowed the close
Certification/Approval relationship between the research community and type approval
Scheme (1978-) experts allows the state of the art technology to be incorporated in the
products.
Annual and bi-annual meetings of activists, researchers, engineers,EMDn raonao other experts, users, manufacturers for knowledge exchange for EMD
software product development
Research Consortium RIS formed a consortium with the Technical University of Denmark
for Offshore (aero-elastic design), Aalborg University (electrical design), and Danish
Development (2002-) Hydraulic Institutes in order to improve network and coordinationbetween education, research and industry (cEA 2004)
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In Germany too, the WMEP Statistics under the 100MW/250MW Wind Program (1989-2006)
created market transparency by publishing the statistics through Institut fnr Solare
Energieversorgungstechnik (ISET) for all turbines installed under the Program and provided
the database for machine reliability, failures, and verification of wind climate assessment
(Krohn 1998) for further technology development. In addition, the federal government has
successfully managed coordinating the R&DD programs spread out over various government
agencies and diverse R&D network participants, including research institutions such as ISET
and DEWI, academia, turbine manufacturers, component suppliers, and testing institutions
such as Germanischer Lloyd.
Thus, the wise utilization of industry networks for innovations has added the significant strength
to the frontier players while tremendously saving the costs by sharing.
Value Chain Analysis of Strategies II (Marketing and Sales) - Market Expansion
Strategy and Technology and Cost Management
Market expansion is another important technology and cost management strategy, because the
expansion of market share enhances the capital base for future R&D by increasing turnover as
well as quickly recovers the R&D investments already made.
Table 6-8: Export Share (%) of Major Manufacturers
1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004
Vestas (Denmark) 74.0 66.0 77.1 96.9 83.4 98.6
NEG Micon (Denmark) --
Micon (Denmark) 44.8 47.4 65.5 93.9 83.9 98.6 99.9
Nordtank (Denmark) 82.9
WindWorld (Denmark) 62.1 73.6 83.8
Bonus (Denmark) 80.3 85.1 81.1 100 85.5 69.2 98.8
Nordex (Denmark, 94.7 87.1 98.6 39.9 43.7 47.3 52.2Germany from 2001)
Enercon (Germany) 11.8 10.5 21.3 26.9 17.3 31.2 34.9
DeWind (Germany, UK 3.2 7.8 100 100
from 2003) 32 78 10 0
REpower (Germany) 0.5 0.7 2.6 32.2
GE (USA) --- - -- -
Enron (USA) --- -- 90.4 41.9 75.8
Tacke (Germany) 10.8 8.4 4.5 51.4
Kenetech/Zond (USA) 100 58.9
Gamesa (Spain) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 1.8 11.4 12.5
MADE (Spain) 0.0 0.0 6.9 0.0 5.0 4.0
Suzion (India) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 0.0
Average* 55.5 45.9 44.4 59.9 51.9 55.8 60.5
*The figures were calculated by BTM Consult ApS as the average of all top 13 or 14
manufacturers of the years. They are not the average of manufacturers on the above lists.
Sources: (BTM Consult ApS 1997; BTM Consult ApS 1998a; BTM Consult ApS 1999; BTM
Consult ApS 2002; BTM Consult ApS 2003; BTM Consult ApS 2004; BTM Consult ApS 2005a)
First, horizontal M&A has been used as market expansion strategy. In fact, the most significant
reason behind horizontal M&A is getting the market share of the acquired manufacturers
although technology acquisition is another important reason (Madsen 2005). Second, oversea
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expansion is another crucial market expansion strategy, especially for the Danish manufacturers,
whose dependence on export has increased since 2001 due to the domestic market reduction.
However, the export figures are increasing for the German and Spanish firms as well in recent
years (Table 6-8). There has been a clear indication of increasing cross-border activities since
2000. The market locations spread over European countries as well as Asia, North and South
America.
Industry oversea expansion follows the markets. The Danish manufacturers have most
extensively diversified their market in order to reduce political risks of concentrating in a small
number of markets, not to repeat the bitter experience of the California boom and bust of the
1980s. Two strategies have been taken for oversea market expansion by the frontier
manufacturers: establishing a 100% subsidiary through FDI and engaging in joint
ventures/license agreements with local companies.
Establishing subsidiary is the most prevailing method of oversea market expansion (Table 6-9).
The expansion to the European and North American markets has been mainly achieved through
this strategy. Most manufacturers have taken joint ventures with local firms or granting license
agreement to local firms as exceptional cases. Joint ventures/license agreements are found
mostly in Asian countries, namely India, China, and Japan. All the three countries have
somewhat different backgrounds that triggered such arrangements. In India, local production
was critical for cost reduction in the beginning of the market expansion during the early 1990s.
GOI also encouraged joint ventures for technology indigenization by restricting building
manufacturing facilities by foreign firms without the collaboration of local firms and created the
favorable foreign investment environment by reducing taxes on FI and granting easier approval
for foreign venture. In China, the government requires high degree of local contents in total
value of wind energy projects and this has triggered joint ventures/license agreements. Lastly in
Japan, the manufacturers grant license agreement to well-established dealers because the
Japanese market has been too small for setting up and keeping subsidiaries.
In some cases, the manufacturers expand their activities through joint ventures/license agreement
initially, but terminate the agreements to withdraw from the market or to replace the local
presence with subsidiaries. This is the case for Vestas that bought all shares of its Italian joint
venture with Italian Wind Technology in 2000 and made the firm a 100% subsidiary. Vestas
also terminated the technology transfer agreement based on joint venture with Gamesa E6lica of
Spain in 2003, two years earlier than the original agreement, 85 and replaced it with a sales office.
Immediately after the termination, however, Gamesa has become a formidable competitor for
Vestas by using the significant knowledge accumulated during the agreement. Vestas could not
gain the access to the Spanish market until 2004, when it began using the established NEG
Micon channel that became available by the merger between the two. In India, all entries by
foreign manufacturers during the early and mid 1990s were through joint ventures/license
agreements, many of which were terminated in the late 1990s.
85 The termination was due to the conflict over the two company strategies. One conflict was over Vestas being a
supplier only, while Gamesa served as developer. In addition, Gamesa's internationalization strategy from 2001
created geographical conflicts; the agreement with Vestas limited Gamesa markets only in Iberian Peninsula and
some Latin American countries (Vestas Wind Systems A/S. 2004/2005).
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Table 6-9: Geographical Distribution of Joint Ventures/License Agreement/
Subsidiaries/Foreign Branch Offices
Manufacturers Subsidiaries/Foreign Branch Offices Joint Ventures/
(HQs Location) License Agreement
USA (1983-1986, 1992-), Germany (1989-), India (Vestas RRB 1987-),
Vestas Sweden (1992-), Spain (2003-), The Spain (Gamesa E6lica,1994-
(Denmark) Netherlands (1995-), China (1999-), France 2003), Italy (IWT 1998-2000),
(2002-), Poland (2003-), Italy (2000-) Japan (2000-),
Germany (2003-), Argentine, Australia (2003-),Gamesa Brazil, France (2001-), Greece (2000-), Italy India (Pioneer Asia 2005-)
.Spin) (2000-), Mexico, Poland, Portugal (1998-),(Spain) Dominican Republic, UK (2003-), USA
Greece (1995-), Portugal (1995-), Italy (1999-), India (Enercon India, 1994-),Enercon Brazil (1996-), Spain, Sweden, UK, Turkey, Japan (Hitachi 1997-),(Germany) Denmark, Austria, Egypt, Canada Australia (WindCo)
Bonus* Spain, Italy, Ireland, UK, USA, Norway, The Germany (AN 1989-), India
(Denmark) Netherlands, Japan, Greece (REPL, 1995-1997)
Suzion USA, China, Australia (2005-)(India/Denmark)
REPower France (2001-), Australia (2002-), Canada Japan (Meiden 2002-), China
(Germany) (2002-), Greece (2003-), UK (2003-), Spain, (Goldwind/Zheijang Windey)Portugal, Italy
India (BHEL 1993-1999/2003-),
Nordex France, UK, USA, Spain, Austria, Greece, China (Xi'an Nordex), Croatia
(Germany) Brazil, Turkey, Italy, Sweden, China (AAM), Egypt (Ament-Emad
Taymour), Japan (IHI)
Sources: Company websites
Establishing foreign subsidiaries is preferred, because it enables simpler technology control and
management. As the Vestas and Gamesa case illustrates, joint ventures can expose technology
providers to more risks of loss of proprietary knowledge control.
Value Chain Analysis of Strateqies Ill (Innovation and Production) - Geographical
Management of Capacity and Capability Procurement and Technology and Cost
Management
Expanding geographical boundary of technological capacity and capability procurement through
internationalization is one important method of technology and cost management. Several
authoritative data sources such as DEWI and BTM Consult ApS have reported the increasing
difficulty of keeping the track of cross-border activities or assigning the origin of wind turbine
manufacturers to a single country. The export figures do not necessarily illustrate the actual
cross-border sales as many turbine manufacturers favor local production outside their base
country. Because of these reasons, locations of innovation/production/sub-suppliers are a good
indicator of the degree of internationalization of firm activities.
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The list is basically the locations of sales/marketing/service activities and wind project developers
that have direct connection with manufacturers. As for GE, while it does not list particular wind
energy offices, it is considered the network is extensive considering its global reach of the
conglomerate.
* as of November 30, 2004
Locations for Innovation
Table 6-10 shows geographical locations of innovation activities for major manufacturers. It is
clear that they are concentrated in Europe, especially in Denmark and Germany, where the best
industry experiences and knowledge are available and are the home countries of most of the
major manufacturers. Even Suzlon, an independent Indian manufacturer, places its core R&D
facilities in Germany and the Netherlands, not in India. Thus, the degree of
internationalization of innovation activities is quite low.
Table 6-10: Geographical Distribution of R&D Facilities
Manufacturers R&D Locations (Established Year)
Vestas Denmark (1979-),
NEG Micon Denmark (Nordtank 1979-), UK/England (1998-)
Enercon Germany (1984-), India (2004-)
GE Wind Germany (Tacke 1990-), USA
Bonus/Siemens Denmark (1981-)
Gamesa E6lica Spain, Denmark
REPower Germany (BWU 1996-)
Nordex Germany
Suzion India (1996-), Germany (Nacelle 1999-), The Netherlands (Blade 2001-)
Sources: Company websites
Locations for Production
In terms of production facility location, the degree of internationalization varies greatly among
manufacturers (Table 6-11).
Table 6-11: Geographical Distribution of Manufacturing Facilities
Manufacturers Production Locations (Established Year)
Denmark (1979-), India (Vestas RRB, 1987-), Germany (1987-), Spain
Vestas (Gamesa E6lica,1994-2003, NEG Micon, 2004-), Italy (1998-), UK/Scotland(2002-), Australia (2003-), Norway and Sweden (Acquisition of Windcast
2003-), China (planned, 2006-), Acquired NEG Micon Facilities (2004-)
Denmark (Nordtank 1979-), India (NEPC Micon 1987-1996, NEG Micon
NEG Micon* 1996-), Spain (1993-), The Netherlands (Acquisition of Nedwind 1998-),
UK/England (1998-)
Enercon Germany (1984-), India (Enercon India 1994-), Brazil (1996-), Sweden(2000-), Turkey (2002-), Spain (2003-), Portugal (2005-)
GE Wind*** Germany (Tacke, 1990-), USA, India (2002-), Spain, The Netherlands
Bonus/Siemens Denmark (1981-) Germany (AN Windenergie, 1989-)
Gamesa E6lica** Spain (1995-), India (Pioneer Asia 2004-), USA (planned, 2006-)
REPower Germany (Jacobs 1992, BWU, 1996-)
Nordex Denmark (1985-2003), Germany (1992-), China
Suzion India (1996-)
Sources: Company websites
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As of November 2003
** According to the Gamesa's web site, there are 21 manufacturing facilities as of 2004, but the
exact locations could not be obtained.
*** Enron had production facilities in both Spain and the Netherlands. However, as of the end of
2005, these facilities seemed to be consolidated by GE.
As far as looking at Vestas, NEG Micon, and Enercon, the internationalization of
manufacturing is increasing throughout the late 1990s and the 2000s. Most manufacturers
have built their production facilities in Europe and a few other locations such as India. The
facilities are still largely concentrated in Europe, where both strong market and skilled labors
are available. Only Enercon has manufacturing facilities in Brazil and Turkey that do not have
much of its own market; the firm chose those locations primarily due to low manufacturing
cost. Despite the repeated talks, most manufacturers have not put production facilities in the
United States because of the strong market instability of the country. However, advanced
technologies are exported to the United States.
Sub-Supplier Locations
As locations of manufacturing facilities and markets have expanded geographically, backward
and forward linkages have extended accordingly. In terms of project execution, the locals are
hired for turbine installation and service/maintenance activities as such skills are more generic
and easily transferred than innovation and production skills, and the linkages are extended to
both developed and developing countries.
In terms of production, backward linkages have also expanded to many locations, as shown in
the Indian production capacity increase in Chapter 5. However, locations of major sub-
suppliers are still highly concentrated in Europe, specifically in Denmark and Germany,
according to the profile of major sub-suppliers in the World Market Update published every
year by BTM Consult ApS (Table 6-12).
Table 6-12: Major Component Suppliers and their Country of Origin
Component Major Suppliers and their Country of Origin
LM Glassfiber A/S (Denmark), Abeking & Rasmussen Rotec (Germany),
Rotor Blade Polymarin-Bolwell Composites (the Netherlands), NOI Rotortechnik
(Germany), Tecsis (Brasil), EUROS (Germany), Umoe (Norway)
Jahnel Kestermann Getriebewerke Bochum GmbH (Germany), Hansen
Gearbox Transmission (Belgium), Winergy AG (Germany), Metso Drives
Technology (Finland),
ABB (Germany), Elin (Austria), Siemens (Germany), Weier
Generator Elektrotrenwerk GmbH (Germany), Winergy AG (Germany)
KGW Schwerier Maschinenbau GmbH (Germany), Chemieanlagenbau
Stassfurt AG (Germany), Omnical Borsig Energy GmbH (Germany),
Tower Pfleiderer AG (Germany), Bladt Industry A/S (Denmark), Valmont Wind
Energy (USA), Erik Roug A/S (Denmark)
Bearing FAG OEM and Handel AG (Germany), SKF (Germany)
Contorller/Control KK-electronic A/S (Denmark), MITA Teknik A/S (Denmark), Bachman
System electronic GmbH (Austria), DEIF (Denmark)
Grid Connection Peter & Thiding (Germany)Systsem
Brakes Svendborg Brakes A/S (Denmark)
Steel Componenets Skoda Steel (Czech Republic), Welcon A/S (Denmark)
Sources: (BTM Consult ApS 2002; Danish Wind Industry Association 2005a; De Vries 2004a)
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In particular, there are significant concentrations of sub-suppliers in Germany; the real strength
of the German wind industry indeed comes from its extensive component industry. German
component suppliers such as Siemens (generators) and FAG (bearing) have very large markets
shares, close to 50% in the wind turbine manufacturing industry worldwide (Krohn 1998).
Besides Germany, solid backward linkages in all major components across Europe are found,
utilizing geographical proximity, regional political and economic integration movement, and
technical abundances inside the region. For example, Denmark has strong domestic supply-
chain networks in every component of wind turbine as well as planning, consulting, O&M and
services, including Danish subsidiaries of large German component suppliers such as Siemens,
ABB, SKF, and FAG (Danish Wind Industry Association 2005a). In Germany, although
Enercon has the production sites in India, Brazil, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, and Portugal, the
firm has an extensive supplier network in the home country alone; it had more than 150
component suppliers in Bavaria alone at the point of 2001 and more than 250 component
suppliers in North Rhine-Westphalia at the point of 2005 (Enercon GmbH 2002c; Enercon
GmbH 2005c).
Overall, the innovation and production facilities of manufacturers and their backward linkages
are not evenly globalized but highly regionalized within Europe, although the degree of
internationalization in terms of location of subsidiaries/joint ventures/sales and/or service offices
has increased continuously. Despite the merits of lower production and transportation costs and
the necessity of diversification of currency exchange rate risk through the internationalization of
manufacturing, globalization of innovation and production capacity and capability management
is limited. Most manufacturers have chosen their manufacturing locations based on the
combination of market and availability of high level of human skills and experiences. The strong
European regionalization is a result of the existence of strongest markets in the region and the
high level of quality control that the markets demand. Without strong and stable market
environments, the manufacturers are hesitant to build the facilities oversea as seen in the case of
their reluctance over the US facility expansion.
In addition, the highly systemic nature of wind energy technology development strongly
contributed to this phenomenon as well. When innovation is systemic, the decentralized
approach to innovations poses serious strategic hazards because the innovation requires
information sharing and coordinated adjustment throughout an entire product system
(Chesbrough and Teece 1996). Highly systemic technological nature of wind energy makes
modularization of technological knowledge across innovation-production value chain difficult.
The increased importance of technology development collaborations between manufacturers and
subs-suppliers, the close proximity to the international innovation networks, and the large and
stable markets have thus contributed to the European regionalization of innovation and
production capacity and capability management.
Value Chain Analysis of Strategies IV (Innovation and Production) - Strategy for
Sourcing
Sourcing strategies are closely linked to geographical expansion of the markets, geographical
capacity and capability management, and horizontal and vertical M&A. There are three main
sourcing strategies: 1) in-house sourcing; 2) outsourcing, which often engages in the close
collaboration in R&D and manufacturing with sub-suppliers; and 3) mixed sourcing (the
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combination of in-house sourcing and outsourcing). The choice of sourcing strategy depends on
manufacturers and components.
Table 6-13 illustrates the increasing trend for in-house sourcing and vertical integration since
1990. The strong vertical integration orientation of Vestas and Enercon is most obvious. While
Vestas achieved it through the combination of organic growth and horizontal and vertical M&A,
Enercon has done it through pure organic growth. Gamesa is also clearly orientated toward the
vertical integration according to the firm's statement (Gamesa Eblica 2006), although the
detailed data regarding the sourcing of the firm was not obtained. Expansion of in-house
sourcing capacity and capability has become an important strategy throughout the 1990s and
2000s, especially for larger manufacturers. The global market share of vertically integrated
manufacturers has been increasing since 2000, as the above three companies and NEG Micon
have been the top five in the global market share in recent years. The increasing vertical
integration demonstrates that these manufacturers have shifted to more tightly-controlled
technology development and management through keeping tacit and proprietary knowledge in-
house.
Table 6-13: Component Sourcing Strategies of Manufacturers
Components In-house Sourcing Outsourcing
Bonus/Siemens (1998-), DeWind Bonus/Siemens, DeWind,
(R&D), Enercon (1993-), Gamesa, GE Wind, NEG Micon,
Rotor Blade GE Wind (2001-), NEG Micon Nordex, REpower, Suzlon,(1998-2004), Nordex (2000-), Ecotecnia, Fuhrlander,
REpower (R&D), Suzlon (2001-), Lagerwey the Windmaster
Vestas (1983-)
All manufacturers except
Enercon (gearless)
Generator Enercon (1993-) All other manufacturers
Electrical Components Enercon (1993-) All other manufacturers
Electronics Hardware Vestas (1999-), NEG Micon All other manufacturers(1998-2004)
Control Systems Software Nordex (2001-), Vestas (1999-) All other manufacturersNEG Micon (1998-2004)___________
Steel & Die-Cast Components Vestas (partially, 2003-) All manufacturers
Tower Enercon (2000-), Vestas (1994-)' All other manufacturersNEG Micon (1999-2004)
Data on in-house sourced components of Gamesa and GE were not obtained.
Sources: Company websites, (De Vries 2004a)
The trend of increasing vertical integration is more obvious in core components. Manufacturers
vertically integrate the components crucial for their competitiveness creation and tightly control
their development and proprietary characteristics. The most notable example is rotor blade, a
technology that truly creates the competitive edges for each manufacturer. The main driver of
in-house sourcing of blade is not purely economic but to have full knowledge and control
(Madsen 2005). At the point of 1997, only a few manufacturers produced their own blade in-
house (European Commission 1999). However, total level of in-house sourcing of rotor blade
has increased from approximately 35% in 1998 to 60% in 2002, because of the growing market
shares of three firms Vestas, Enercon, and Gamesa, which source 100% of their rotor blade in-
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house (De Vries 2004a). Table 6-13 shows that many other manufacturers also developed in-
house R&D and/or manufacturing capability in rotor blade.
As for other components, generator and electrical components are integrated by Enercon, of
which competitiveness derives from its unique multi-pole synchronous ring generator and direct
drive mechanism. Control software is another critical component for competitiveness creation
and the manufacturers have strong willingness to vertically integrate it.
Vertical integration reduces the dependence on component sub-suppliers, while increasing
flexibility of product development and maintaining high level of manufacturing know-how.
However, no manufacturers have comprehensive in-house sourcing capability in all components;
they still use outsourcing or mixed sourcing strategies for many components, including highly
vertically integrated Vestas and Enercon. Even for rotor blade, those with in-house supply
capability still have purchased many blades from independent suppliers (European Wind Energy
Association 2003). Creating in-house blade innovation and production capability and capacity is
more expensive in the beginning than later on. Vestas and Enercon are large enough to afford
their own in-house sourcing.
For outsourced components, most manufacturers maintain two or more large suppliers with good
international reputations for each component, in order to reduce the dependence on one supplier
and to operate with comparatively low level of resources. This practice started by the Danish
manufacturers from the late 1980s for their expansion to other European markets, in order not to
repeat their bitter experiences of mechanical failures of many core components such as blades,
generators, and gearboxes in the California market during the 1980s by depending only on one
supplier.
In general, while larger manufacturers with larger capital base choose mixed sourcing with
increasing in-house sourcing for core components, smaller manufacturers choose outsourcing
strategy for all components. In either case, using off-the-shelf products by component suppliers
has been greatly reduced and customization of products for different markets and different makes
of turbines through in-house sourcing or close collaboration between sub-suppliers and turbine
manufacturers has increased. In any cases, technology control by manufacturers has been
tightened in sourcing strategy, while know-how sharing through sub-suppliers has contributed to
cost reduction.
6.2.2 Relationship of Competitive Management Strategy with
Technology Development Demands and Direct Role and Effects
of Policy
Industry Stability - Change Adjustment Level and Degree of Change
The above examination reveals that competitive strategies for technology and cost management
at the frontier have changed significantly since 1990 and the degree of change is high in every
category of those strategies. Consequently, the industry structure and the nature of competition
have greatly changed; the number of wind turbine manufacturers has been decreased but the
competition among the survivors has been intensified for market expansion and technology
development. While the dominance of larger manufacturers has increased, smaller
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manufacturers also survive by offering high-quality technology options and finding some niche
in domestic and regional market. 86  The wind turbine manufacturers have adjusted to the
constantly changing environment, but there were many casualties that exited from the business
and were taken over by fellow manufacturers.
Adjustments and transformations happened not only at manufacturer level but also at sub-
supplier level. Although vertical M&A has not been the general trend for most of component
suppliers, the structure of rotor blade industry has changed greatly since 1990 as this component
is specific to wind energy technology and receives the direct influences from the wind market
movement and the strategic modifications of turbine manufacturers. While larger wind turbine
manufacturers embarked on in-house blade R&D and manufacturing, numerous independent
blade manufacturers exited from the business through bankruptcy or acquisition by other
suppliers. Blade manufacturer exits in both the United States and the Netherlands have been
especially noticeable, as the wind turbine industry of both countries declined over the years. The
structural adjustment of rotor blade industry is clearly and closely connected to the
transformation of wind turbine manufacturing industry. In Denmark and Germany, only three
blade manufacturers established before 1990 (LM Glasfiber, Vestas, and Abeking & Rasmussen
Rotec) have survived today. 87
Transformed Business Entry and Growth Barriers and Industry
Consolidation Logic
The industry structural change and the transformation of business entry and organizational
growth strategy are due to the raised barriers for business entry and growth. In both Denmark
and Germany, the governmental and institutional barriers for business entry and exit have been
very low or non-existed. The barriers have been purely technological.
Technical entry and business growth barriers were low in the beginning for the wind turbine
manufacturing industry, as technology and know-how could be easily brought from other
industries. However, the height of technical cost of building and keeping business has become
higher and higher, as the constant and intense technology upscaling and upgrading demands have
shifted wind energy technological characteristics into more science-based and more systemic
innovations. This also raised the height of capital requirement for business entry and growth. In
addition, technical barriers of wind energy technology are cumulative. While the knowledge
based on scientific R&D can be generated through the international and national research
86 For example, smaller manufacturers in Germany, e.g., REpower and Fuhrlander, are more willing to finish
projects during the busy December season than larger manufacturers. The German market has seen strong demand
since the implementation of the EEG, which reduces tariff payment for newly installed turbines every year. This has
created robust demand to install turbines before December 31 every year in order to receive higher tariff payment.
However, this is also the time that usually business slows down due to holidays. These newer and smaller firms
serve this niche demand and have gotten chances to get on the market (Gerdes, 2005).
87 The business exits include: Aeropec of the Netherlands in 2000; Rotorline B.V. of the Netherlands in 1999;
Polymarin of the Netherlands in 2000; Aeroconstruct GmbH of Germany in 1994; Gougeon Brothers of the Unites
States; Stork of the Netherlands; and, Peterson Products of the United States. The blade units of the wind turbine
manufacturers also exited as their parent companies exited business. They are: Kenetech, Carter, Flowind, Fayette,
Stormaster, Windtech, and Blue Max of USA; WEG and Howden of UK; Polenko and Bouma of the Netherlands;
and, WindMaster of Belgium (Glenn, 2004).
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networks, the required specialist knowledge and technical know-how to tailor such basic
knowledge into successful commercial products are acquired only by long-term experiences and
learning. Although the wind energy industry has successfully created equal access to the
codified information of basic science, building the resources to utilize such information in-house
presents significant barriers for business entry. The cumulative experiences, thus, are extremely
important for wind energy technology innovation. Also, in the highly competitive environment
of wind energy, the market and brand reputation for quality and performance also poses as
cumulative entry barrier, which is only built through long-term, continuous high-level
performance of the firms.
All these increased technical barriers with cumulative nature caused the shift of competitive
strategy and consolidated the industry by eliminating the firms that could not keep up with the
pace of technology development demands and raised growth barriers. Only the manufacturers,
which could afford to keep up with the turbine upscaling/upgrading demands and create
successful commercial products, cleared these raised business barriers and survived.
Direct and Indirect Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Settings on
Industry Structure and Competitiveness Management
Direct Role and Effects
In both Denmark and Germany, government policy and regulations on concentration of firms in
industry and business entry and exit have been minimal, except that any M&A attempts need to
be examined and approved by the EU. As a result, policy and regulations on industry
concentration have had very little direct influence on the transformation of wind energy industry
structure and competitive strategy for simultaneous technology and cost management.
As for direct influences of industrial policy, they have been seen not in Denmark but in
Germany. First, the federal and some state governments offered the protections for local firms,
and both Tacke and Enercon benefited from their local government supports for selling their
turbines in preferable terms. Enercon was also saved from a potential bankruptcy by receiving
financial help from the state of Neidersachsen in 1993, when it needed to replace 300 blades on
the market as the state covered the loss (Twele 2005). Without the state rescue, the German
industry might have not had any major manufacturers today. Second, the German federal
government subsidies for building production plants in the former East Germany after the
reunification of 1990 were wisely used by Enercon. This type of support was actually offered by
the EU to the Danish manufacturers as well. As a result, all major turbine manufacturers used
these subsidies to build production plants in Eastern Germany, e.g., Vestas established blade ring
manufacturing facilities at north of Dresden and Enercon has expanded production plants all
over Germany (Madsen 2005; Michaelowa 2004).
Indirect Role and Effects
On the other hand, there have been indirect but significant influences by policy and institutional
settings on the industry structure and competitive strategy evolution at the frontier.
First, as examined in the previous section and this section, market development and investment
policy in both Denmark and Germany have indirectly forced the manufacturers to adjust their
competitive strategy for technology and cost management by creating the market that have
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strongly demanded the constant turbine upscaling and various technology upgrading. The
change in market policy did also influence the industry structure more directly. The market
slowdown of 1996 in Germany due to the sudden withdrawal of some regional and federal
government subsidies contributed to the industry consolidation in the country, as smaller
manufacturers and Tacke bankrupted and exited in the following years.
Second, technology development and investment policy supported the manufacturers and the
industry as a whole, in the process of meeting the technology development demands created by
the markets. In Denmark, the early R&D programs such as New Energies Technologies Program
of the 1980s helped the manufacturers focus on commercial manufacturing of new energy
technology and the industry development. The creation of the international and domestic
innovation networks for basic science R&D was initiated and strongly supported by the
individual government R&D programs. The EU-wide WEGA and THERMIE as well as the
R&D for offshore turbine development by the individual national governments have helped sort
competitive firms out of many manufacturers while supporting technology development. In
addition, the turbine certification and approval schemes that have been constantly upgraded over
the years have deterred the entry of low quality firms by working as institutional-technical
barrier for business entry. They also have influenced geographical management of the industry
capacity and capability building by containing the facility locations in the regions with higher
capacity and capability. In addition, the certification and approval schemes gave tremendous
advantages for the Danish manufacturers' oversea expansion by providing them technological
guarantees.
Lastly, some cross-border technology transaction and investment policy have also helped
manufacturer oversea expansion strategy, in particular in Denmark. The Danish manufacturers
actively used the DANIDA tied-aid which requires 50% of the contract value to be Danish
technology, for their oversea market expansion. However, the DANIDA supports have been
reduced as the industry grew stronger and the assistance shifted its target to other areas in recent
years. Meanwhile, the German manufacturers did not expand to oversea by using the
government supports as much as their Danish counterparts did. The German TERNA program is
neutral for the use of German technology and it has been characteristically similar to the RISO
WindConsult. As a result, the German manufacturers have not been vigorously involved in the
TERNA projects. Besides those differences in the program characteristics, it also illustrates that
the weaker oversea orientation of the German industry than the Danish industry.
As for export support, the German government had offered the El Dorado assistance to the
manufacturers during the 1990s, targeting developing countries in other climate zones. El
Dorado helped several small companies, which did not have the resources to pursue foreign
markets on their own, survive in Germany. However, larger companies were breaking into these
markets without the government finding (Wind Power Monthly 1997a), and there was a political
doubt about the usefulness of the program, which was terminated after 1999. On the other hand,
the Danish government has never had official export policy. However, the tax benefits for the
Danish investors on wind project investment in the United States during the late 1980s and the
Wind Turbine Guarantee Company, which warrants the long-term finance of large projects with
Danish wind turbines outside Denmark, helped the Danish manufacturers expand to the market
oversea.
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6.2.3 Section Summary
Transformed Competitiveness Management due to Transformed
Technological Characteristics
The constant technology upscaling/upgrading market demands and the resulted technological
characteristics transformation since 1990 created the significant shifts in competitive strategy by
the wind turbine manufacturing industry at the frontier.
The capital intensiveness of meeting the increasing demands for more science-based technology
development has created the international innovation networks for basic science R&D, where all
industry players can share the cost and codified information for industry-wide competitiveness
development.
Meanwhile, each manufacturer has enthusiastically pursued its own unique competitiveness
building and employed every means of competitive strategies from business entry, organizational
growth, innovation network building, to geographical management of capacity and capability
procurement and sourcing, in order to survive the fierce technology development competition.
Public stock listing has become a means of raising the necessary R&D fund for many privately
owned firms, and horizontal and vertical M&A are often used as business entry and
organizational growth strategy to acquire technology and capacity and increase market share
instantly. Oversea and domestic market expansion has been zealously pursued to increase the
capital base for future R&D and recover the R&D investments already made. Whereas larger
manufacturers have increased their vertical integration tendency for core components to control
and accumulate tacit knowledge, mixed sourcing and outsourcing of component development
through intense collaborations with sub-suppliers have also increased in general in order to
accomplish cost reduction by know-how sharing through subs-suppliers while enhancing
technological options and flexibility of manufacturers. Although project execution has extended
over a large part of the world as the market expands, production of high value components and
innovation are not truly globalized but carefully managed in the contained region of Europe,
where the access to the international innovation networks, high level of capacity and human
resource capability, and the collaborations with subs-suppliers are easily available. Increasingly
more systemic nature of wind energy technology and tighter control of proprietary knowledge
have prevented innovation and production capability and capacity management from being
globalized over extended geographical areas.
In the process of this technology-industry co-evolution at the frontier, technical barriers for
business entry and growth have become increasingly cumulative and the firms that could not
keep up with the pace of technology development demands and the rising growth barriers were
eliminated, consolidating the industry, while technology and cost management has been
tightened by the surviving manufacturers.
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Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Settings on Supply-Push
Technology Development and Diffusion at the Frontier
While the direct role and effects of policy and institutional settings on industry structure have
been rather limited in both Denmark and Germany, market development and investment policy,
technology development and investment policy as well as policy on cross-border technology
transaction and investment have had indirect but significant effects on technology development
and diffusion at the frontier through modifying the industry structure and competitive strategies.
The most important effects were the constant technology upscaling and upgrading market
demands supported by market development and investment policy in both Denmark and
Germany. This was the driving force behind the rapid and intense competitiveness management
strategy modification to push technology-supply at the frontier.
Technology development and investment policy, in particular the R&DD programs offered by
both the EU and the individual governments, has been very important technology supply-push by
creating a synergy with the market demand characteristics, as mentioned in the previous section.
Besides these direct technology development supports, however, technology development and
investment policy also have played important roles in assisting technology supply by nurturing
the industry indirectly, through the initiation of various network creations, the R&D programs
that assisted the selection of competitive firms, and the turbine certification and approval
schemes that have worked as institutional-technical barrier for business entry of lower quality
firms as well as the technological guarantees for oversea expansion.
As for industrial policy and cross-border technology transaction and investment policy, the
effects on technology development and diffusion have been different between Denmark and
Germany. While no direct and formal industrial and export policy has been provided in
Denmark over the years, the DANIDA tied-aid, the tax benefits for the Danish investors on the
US wind project investments during the late 1980s, and the Wind Turbine Guarantee Company
helped the oversea expansion by the Danish manufacturers greatly in the earlier years, advancing
their technology supply capacity and capability. On the other hand, the German policy supports
for oversea expansion did not have significant effects on the industry, while the industrial policy
was more explicitly used at local level for manufacturer survival during the 1980s and 1990s. In
general, however, industrial and cross-border technology transaction and investment policy has
lost the significance as supply-push measures over the years, as the industry in both countries has
grown strong enough not to require any protective measures.
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Section 6.3: Quantitative Analysis of Market Development
and New Wind Turbine Introduction in India
From this section, the research focus shifts to India, examining technology development and
diffusion in India through cross-border technology transfer from Indian perspectives. First, this
section quantitatively examines and establishes the relationship between new turbine
introduction to India and market development of the country.
6.3.1 Observations of Indicators
Indicators
Market Indicator
As an indicator of market development, this research has been using installed capacity of wind
turbine. One reason is that capacity development is proportional to the amount of market
investments. Using installed capacity as market indicator is also the general practice in other
wind energy related research. Therefore, installed capacity is going to be used as market
indicator continuously.
Technology Transfer/Diffusion Indicator
As examined in Chapter 5 and the previous sections in this chapter, newer technology in wind
energy system has been developed through turbine upscaling and mostly introduced to the
market through new turbine models. Therefore, the number of new turbine introduction to the
market is going to be used as technology transfer/diffusion indicator.
Observations
Table 6-14: New Turbine Introduction and Annually Installed Capacity in India
Year Number of New CapacityTurbine Introduction (MW)
1992-93 2 15.575
1993-94 5 57.44
1994-95 11 256.515
1995-96 16 385.04
1996-97 2 155.905
1997-98 1 70.536
1998-99 0 42.33
1999-2000 1 132.915
2000-01 4 180.89
2001-02 4 285.135
2002-03 2 239.785
2003-04 1 594.05
2004-05 6 1103.86
Total 55 3519.976
in (Consolidated
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Source: Interpolated from installation data
Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
Table 6-14 shows the number of new turbine introduction to the Indian market and annually
installed capacity. Correlation between the two indicators in the entire period is only
0.274720807; the two indicators do not have a strong relationship.
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Annually Installed Capacity (MW)
Figure 6-5: Plot of New Turbine Introduction and Annually Installed
Capacity in India and Three Possible Structural Groups
Figure 6-5 is a plot of the indicators. At a glance, the two indicators do not show any strong
relationships, as the correlation between the two indicated. However, a close observation of the
plot reveals that there may be three different structural relationships according to the timeline: 1)
between the 1992-93 year and the 1995-96 year; 2) between the 1996-97 year and the 2002-03
year; and 3) from the 2003-04 year. Correlation between the two indicators of the first period is
0.994699009 and that of the second period is 0.810936694. Because there are only two
observation points in the third period, their correlation is 1. These correlations indicate the
possibility of the existence of different structural relationships.
6.3.2 Econometric Analysis
The above statistical observations reveal that relationships do exist between the two indicators
but it is not appropriate to assume one relationship is continuous through the entire timeframe of
the observations. This part tries to establish the relationships by employing switching regression
model method, using dummy variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998).
Regression Models with Two Structural Breaks
Figure 6-5 shows two possible structural break points: the 1996-97 year and the 2003-04 year.
In order to establish three different structural relationships between the two indicators in the
research timeframe, three regression models are constructed and tested. The three models are: 1)
regression model from the 1992-93 year to the 2004-05 year with an assumption of no structural
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break; 2) regression model from the 1992-93 year to the 2002-03 year with structural break at the
1996-97 year; and 3) regression model from the 1996-97 year to the 2004-05 year with structural
break at the 2003-04 year. In the latter two models, the variance of the error term is assumed to
be the same throughout the time period being studied, but both the intercept and the slop may
change at the point of structural break (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998)
Regression Model with No Structural Break
The following regression is estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS).
TNUMBER = c + B1* CAPACITY + C (Equation 1)
B1 >0
TNUMBER:
CAPACITY:
Number of New Turbine Introduction
Annually Installed Capacity
The OLS regression result produced the following equation with t-statistics values in the
parenthesis.
TNUMBER = 3.082 + 0.004* CAPACITY
(1.75) (0.95)
R2 = 0.08
The calculated regression coefficient (R2) was only 0.08. The t-statistics value indicates that the
variable CAPACITY to be statistically insignificant at the 5% level. In this model, the impact of
installed capacity on the number of new turbine introduction seems to be fairly low.
Regression Model from the 1992-93 Year to the 2002-03 Year with Structural Break at
the 1996-97 Year
The following regression using dummy variables was estimated by using OLS for the period
between the 1992-93 year and the 2002-03 year. Both the intercept and the slop are assumed to
be changed at the point of structural break.
TNUMBER = c + B1* CAPACITY + 32* Di*CAPACITY +133* DI + c (Equation 2)
Where:
B1 > 0, B2 < 0, 33 < 0
TNUMBER: Number of New Turbine Introduction
CAPACITY: Annually Installed Capacity
Di= 0 before structural break (from the 1992-93 year to the 1995-96 year)
1 otherwise (from the 1996-97 year to the 2002-03 year)
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Where:
The OLS regression produced the following equation with t-statistics values in the parenthesis.
TNUMBER = 2.091 + 0.0359*CAPACITY - 0.0216*D 1*CAPACITY - 2.353* Di
(2.896) (11.592) (-4.027) (-2.221)
R 2=0.98
F= 89.969
The calculated regression coefficient (R2) of 0.98 shows the high explanatory power of the
model. The t-statistics values indicate that each of the estimated coefficients is significant at the
5% level in absolute value, except the t-statistics for D1, which is slightly lower than the critical
value of 2.262. Since the significance of the effects of dummy variable Di could not be verified
statistically, the initial regression model was adjusted as follows by excluding Di. The adjusted
model assumes only the slop was changed at the point of structural break.
TNUMBER = c + 81* CAPACITY + B2* Di*CAPACITY + E (Equation 3)
Where:
BI > 0,12<0
TNUMBER: Number of New Turbine Introduction
CAPACITY: Annually Installed Capacity
Di= 0 before structural break (from the 1992-93 year to the 1995-96 year)
1 otherwise (from the 1996-97 year to the 2002-03 year)
The regression produced the following equation with t-statistics values in the parenthesis.
TNUMBER = -0.999 + 0.0395*CAPACITY - 0.0315*D 1*CAPACITY
(1.548) (12.238) (-8.736)
R- = 0.96
F= 88.830
The calculated regression coefficients (R2) of 0.96 shows that the capacity variable helps explain
96% of the variation in the number of new turbine introduction. Each of the estimated
coefficients is significant at the 5% level in absolute value.
In order to test the hypothesis of structural change, the F-test (Chow test) is performed. The
large F-statistics value (88.830) allows rejecting the null hypothesis that the regression models
before and after the 1996-97 year are identical. It is safe to conclude that there was a structural
change in the 1996-97 year.
Regression Model from the 1996-97 Year to the 2004-05 Year with Structural Break at
the 2003-04 Year
The following third regression model using dummy variables was estimated by using OLS for
the period between the 1996-97 year and the 2004-05 year. Both the intercept and the slop are
assumed to be changed at the point of structural break.
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TN UMBER = c + l13 * CAPACITY + 32* D2*CAPACITY + B3* D2 + 6 (Equation 4)
Where:
131 > 0, B2 < 0, B3 < 0
TNUMBER: Number of New Turbine Introduction
CAPACITY: Annually Installed Capacity
D2= 0 before structural break (from the 1996-97 year to the 2004-05 year)
1 otherwise (from the 2003-04 year to the 2004-05 year)
The OLS regression produced the following equation with t-statistics values in the parenthesis.
TNUMBER = -0.262 + 0.0143*CAPACITY - 0.0045*D 2*CAPACITY - 4.564* D2
(-0.320) (3.099) (-0.839) (-1.795)
R2= 0.84
F= 89.969
Although the calculated regression coefficient (R2) of 0.84 shows the high explanatory power of
the variables, only the t-statistics of the estimated coefficient for the variable CAPACITY shows
statistical significance at the 5% level in absolute value. The F-statistics value (8.764) is smaller
than the critical value at the 5% significance (F3,3 = 9.28). The null hypothesis that the
regression models before and after the 2003-04 year are identical cannot be rejected. A
regression model without D2 intercept dummy variable did not produce statistically significant
results either. The second structural break could not be verified statistically.
Regression Models with Two Structural Breaks
The above examination could not verify the second structural break. A small number of the
observations (two) after the possible second breaking point are considered as the reason. In
order to prove the hypothesis of the second structural breaking point in the 2003-04 year, more
observations have to be made and a new regression model needs to be constructed and tested by
including those future observations. However, the first structural break was clearly established
statistically if the research period is limited to the one until the 2002-03 year.
Regression Models with One Structural Break
Considering the above results, this part tries to establish two, not three, structural relationships
between the two indicators in the research timeframe; a new regression model is constructed and
tested. The new model is the regression model from the 1992-93 year to the 2004-05 year with
only one structural break at the 1996-97 year. The following regression using dummy variables
was estimated by using OLS for the period between the 1992-93 year and the 2004-05 year.
Both the intercept and the slope are assumed to be changed at the point of structural break.
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TNUMBER = c + B1* CAPACITY + 2* D3*CAPACITY + B3* D3 + E
Where:
B1 > 0, B2 < 0, B3 < 0
TNUMBER: Number of New Turbine Introduction
CAPACITY: Annually Installed Capacity
D3= 0 before structural break (from the 1992-93 year to the 1995-96 year)
1 otherwise (from the 1996-97 year to the 2004-05 year)
The OLS regression produced the following equation with t-statistics values in the parenthesis.
TNUMBER = 2.091 + 0.0359*CAPACITY - 0.0320*D 3*CAPACITY - 0.9575* D3
(1.920) (7.683) (-6.545) (-0.754)
R2 =0.93
F= 39.886
The calculated regression coefficients (R2) of 0.93 means that the variable CAPACITY helps
explain 93% of the variation in the number of new turbine introduction. The t-statistics for D3 is
lower than the critical value of 2.262 at 5% significance level in absolute value. Since the
significance of the effects of dummy variable D3 could not be verified statistically, the initial
regression model was adjusted as follows by excluding D3. The adjusted model assumes only
the slop was changed at the point of structural break.
TNUMBER = c + Bi* CAPACITY +12* D3*CAPACITY + C (Equation 6)
Where:
1I > 0, B2 < 0
TNUMBER: Number of New Turbine Introduction
CAPACITY: Annually Installed Capacity
D4= 0 before structural break (from the 1992-93 year to the 1995-96 year)
1 otherwise (from the 1996-97 year to the 2004-05 year)
The regression produced the following equation with t-statistics values in the parenthesis.
TNUMBER = 1.386 + 0.0382*CAPACITY - 0.0347*D 3*CAPACITY
(2.532) (11.091) (-10.691)
R2 =0.93
F= 69.227
The calculated regression coefficient (R2) of 0.93 shows the high explanatory power of the
model. The t-statistics values indicate that each of the estimated coefficients is significant at the
5% level in absolute value. The large F-statistics value (69.227) allows rejecting the null
hypothesis that the regression models before and after the 1996-97 year are identical. It is safe to
conclude that there was a structural break in the 1996-97 year.
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(Equation 5)
Structural Break and its Effects
The above examination verifies that there was a structural break in the 1996-97 year for the
relationship between the number of new turbine introduction and installed capacity. This is true
for both the cases with and without the 2003-04 year and the 2004-05 year. Before and after the
structural break, the relationship was changed as follows:
For the entire period of the research timeframe (between the 1992-93 year and the 2004-05 year)
Before the structural break: TNUMBER = 1.386 + 0.0382*CAPACITY
After the structural break: TNUMBER = 1.386 + 0.0035*CAPACITY
For the period between the 1992-93 year and the 2002-03 year
Before the structural break: TNUMBER = -0.999 + 0.0395*CAPACITY
After the structural break: TNUMBER = -0.999 + 0.0080* CAPACITY
The above results show the existence of the structural break in the 1996-97 year. In both the
cases, the intercepts were not changed before and after the break, but the slopes became much
gentler, suggesting that more capacity installation has become required in order to introduce new
wind turbine models to the Indian market.
6.3.3 Section Summary
The examination of this section succeeded in establishing the quantitative relationships between
installed capacity (capacity development) and new turbine introduction. Capacity development
has a very strong relationship with new turbine/technology introduction in India, and the
structural relationship between the two changed after the 1996-97 year.
There may be many reasons behind this structural change. This type of structural transformation
itself is not either necessarily harmful or something should be avoided, because capacity
development is not only indicating the investments made, hence used as market indicator, but
also closely related to the size of models used in projects. To a certain degree, as the wind
turbine upscaling progresses, the shift to the structure that the same number of turbine
installations brings more capacity naturally happens, as medium- and large-capacity wind
turbines became dominant since the mid 1990s at the frontier when the Indian structural change
happened. If this is the only reason, the line that shows the new structure in Figure 6-5 with a
gentler slope should have appeared without accompanying the dramatic capacity decrease of
observed data. In reality, however, the structural change accompanied the reduction of both
capacity and new turbine introduction and the great increase of technology gaps. Also as
examined in Chapter 5, the Indian market did not move onto newer medium- and large-capacity
turbines in the late 1990s. This indicates that there should have been other factors that brought
the structural change to the Indian wind energy sector in the 1996-97 year.
The following sections try to find various reasons behind the structural change and its effects on
cross-border technology transfer and the growth of technology gaps.
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Section 6.4: Market Demands and Investment Economics
Pressure and Their Effects on Capacity and
Technology Development and Diffusion in India
This section analyzes the effects of market demands and investment economics in India on the
relationship between cross-border technology transfer and capacity development and its
structural change as well as on technology development and diffusion.
6.4.1 Market Size, Market Demands, and Investment Mechanism in
India
Indian Market Characteristics
Increased Gaps in Installed Capacity with Europe
Although the Indian market has been among the top five world markets since the mid 1990s, the
size of the market has been much smaller, compared to that of Germany and Spain.
Table 6-15: Comparison of Annually Installed Capacity in MW
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Germany 500 420 533 793 1568 1665 2627 3247 2674 2054
Spain 58 116 262 368 932 1024 1050 1493 1377 2064
India 375 244 120 82 43 169 236 220 423 875
Denmark 98 200 285 310 325 603 115 530 218 --
Source: (BTM Consult ApS 2005b)
In particular, the market size disparity began after 1996 and grew larger from 1998; the German
market installed almost ten times as much as the capacity of the Indian market in 1998, and the
difference grew into almost 15 times in 2002. When India finally surpassed the level of the
1995-96 installation in 2003, the German installation was still six times larger than that of India
(Table 6-15).
Weak Regional Market
Although the Danish installation capacity was not particularly strong, compared to India during
the same period, unlike Europe, India has no other robust wind energy markets nearby. The
Indian market has been rather isolated in the region. In addition, the Indian export has been
weak while the country has been a net importer of wind turbines and components. The Indian
local production facilities are mostly targeted for the domestic market demand. Therefore, the
effects of other market demands on the Indian technology development have been fairly limited.
Stronq Market Fluctuation and Segmentation
As illustrated in Chapter 5, the Indian market fluctuates greatly; it does not show a stable and
steady growth pattern seen in Germany and Spain. The market slowdown after the 1996-97 year,
in particular, the recession between the 1997-98 year and the 1999-2000 year was severe. After
the recession was over, the market slowly gained the strength. The growth in the 2003-04 and
2004-05 years was explosive. This fluctuation is seen not only at national level but also at state
level, and there is a strong disparity of wind development among states.
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Figure 6-6: Installed Capacity in MW by State in India
Figure 6-6 shows geographical distribution of the market within India. It is clear that only
handful states out of 25 states and seven union territories contributed to wind energy
development. The first wave of development concentrated in mainly Tamil Nadu and Gujarat
between the 1992-93 year and the 1995-96 year. Maharashtra was the main market between the
1998-99 year and the 2001-02 year when other state markets stagnated. The picture changed
again from the 2002-03 year; Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, and Karnataka have become the main
installation locations. Gujarat also shows the growth in the 2003-04 and 2004-05 years, while
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh had smaller market development. In total by the end of March
2005, 57% of installed capacity has been in Tamil Nadu, followed by 13% in Maharashtra, 11%
in Karnataka, 8% in Rajasthan, 7% in Gujarat, 3% in Andhra Pradesh, and 1% in all other states.
The difference and fluctuation of growth patterns by state illustrate strong segmentation of the
market within India. Overall, the Indian market demand, in terms of size, location, and stability,
has been highly uncertain.
Wind Investor Profile and Investment Mechanism in India
Wind Project Investor Profile in India
By March 1989, there were no private wind power projects in India; only total 22MW of the
government-led demonstration projects existed. This situation changed dramatically, when
private investment started in the 1992-93 year. On the other hand, the number of government-
led demonstration projects has been fairly constant but small. More than 98% of total installed
capacity of 3,595MW by March 2005 has been developed by private sector since 1992 (Figure 6-
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7). Similar to Denmark and Germany, the Indian wind energy development has been led by
private investment.
However, the Indian investor profile shows a very different picture from Denmark and Germany.
When the private market began developing in the early 1990s, there were many small investors
who invested in from one- or two-turbine projects to ten- or more turbine projects, creating
diverse size of projects (TERI 2002). However, this pattern was eroded very quickly as the large
and energy intensive industrial companies began investing in wind projects. Since then, the
investors have been overwhelmingly the industrial sector, and they fall broadly into three
categories: 1) energy intensive production companies using wind power for captive use; 2) wind
turbine manufacturers selling the power to the grid; and 3) financial companies setting up wind
farms as a profitable investment due to fiscal incentives (Winrock International India 2003).
According to MNES, 80% of wind power fed into the grid has been used as captive
consumption, consumed by the investors in distance. 88  Table 6-16 illustrates that production
companies have the highest share in installed capacity, although the number of financial
company investors in both Tamil Nadu and Gujarat is larger than the number of production
company investors. This means the average installed capacity by production company for
captive power usage is larger than the average installed capacity by financial company. Also the
categories of buyers of wind turbines (Figure 6-8) indicate that 78% of buyers are energy
intensive production companies.
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Figure 6-7: Installed Capacity in MW by Ownership in India
88 In India as a whole, captive power production almost doubled during the 1990s and reached 15,000MW by 2002,
although the estimates vary among different sources. This number is said on conservative side, which may not take
into account the units under 1MW that many represent another 7,000MW (IEA. 2002b).
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Table 6-16: Wind Power Investor Profile in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat by 1997
Numberof % in Installed % inState Investors nvestors Number of Capacity Installed
Investors (MW) Capacity
. Production Companies 86 22% 306 56%
Tami Financial Companies 288 75% 169 31%
Turbine Manufacturers 13 3% 63 12%
Production Companies 37 39% 74 76%
Gujarat Financial Companies 56 60% 17.4 18%
_ Turbine Manufacturers 1 1% 5.8 6%
Source: (Economics of wind power: Impact
cited in Winrock International India 2003)
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Figure 6-8: Categories of Buyers of Wind Turbines from NEPC
This wind investor profile in India has been shaped mainly by cross-subsidized general
electricity tariff policy of SEBs and the fiscal incentives for wind energy investments. For very
long time, SEBs had charged high tariffs on the industrial sector to compensate the loss created
by the policy that provided free or extremely low-priced power to agricultural and residential
consumers. Due to the dominant position of SEBs as utility in the power sector until recently,
the industries had to bear this pricing for long time. This cross-subsidized tariff structures by
SEBs have encouraged captive power wind ownership by industry investors. The typical
generation cost of captive power plants (INR 2.5/kWh) is much lower than SEB tariffs for the
industry (the average 1999-2000 SEB tariff for industry of INR 3.5/kWh) (IEA 2002b).
The popularity of captive usage can be also illustrated by the comparison of wind energy feed-in
tariffs in various states with the national average industry electricity tariffs charged by SEBs over
the years (Table 6-17). The national average industry electricity charges are much higher than
wind feed-in tariffs paid in each state. In some states and for some industries, electricity tariffs
are much higher than the national averages. It is much more profitable to save the payments to
SEBs by constricting captive power plants than to earn the payments from SEBs by selling wind
generated power to them.
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Table 6-17: Wind Energy Feed-in Tariffs and Electricity Tariff for Industry (INR)
aml Gujarat Maharashtra Pndra Karnataka Rajasthan Nnust TAverige
_____Nadu PradeshInutyTrf
1992-93 2.00 1.72
1993-94 2.00 1.98
1994-95 2.00 1.75 2.25 1.75 2.21
1995-96 2.75 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.20
1996-97 2.25 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.76
1997-98 2.25 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.13
1998-99 2.25 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.29
1999-00 2.25 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.75 3.51
2000-01 2.25 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.75 3.59
2001-02 2.70 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.89 3.67
2002-03 2.70 2.60 --- 2.25 2.25 2.89 3.46
2003-04 2.70 2.65 3.50 3.48 2.25 2.89 N/A
2004-05 2.70 2.70 3.50 3.37 (fro3 1/05) (fro 1/04) N/A
Sources: (Central Electricity Authority 2003; Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005; Lok Sabha
2001; MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a; MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES
2001a; MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004; MNES 2005; Planning Commission 2001 and 2002)
Indian Wind Investment Mechanism
Although there has been disparity of wind energy policies among states, the investment
mechanism is basically same across India. Wind projects in India have been financed with low
equity and high debt, as they have been in Denmark and Germany. The IREDA wind farm
project financing scheme plays the central role in the investment scheme; the IREDA loan
requires the minimum 25-30% of equity from the project promoter, mostly the industrial firm,
and the rest is financed as debt from IREDA. This equity-debt ratio is similar to that of closed
end wind fund in Germany. The equity-debt ratio was lower until the 1996-97 year (40:60).
The biggest difference between India and Germany/Denmark, however, was that the Indian
investors (industrial firms) primarily saw wind project as tax planning and management tool.
Although there are some tax advantages for wind investment in Denmark and Germany, they
have never been the primary investment objectives.
6.4.2 Quantitative Analysis of Wind Energy Investment in India
Econometric Analysis of Direct Relationship between Policy Incentives and
Market Development
Various attempts were made to form regression models to establish quantitative relationship
between policy incentives and annually installed capacity development in India. Independent
variables include: IREDA interest rates; corporate tax rates; MAT rates; tax holiday; first-year
tax depreciation schedules; import duties; national average industry electricity tariffs; and the
requirement of wind turbine certificate. However, none of the attempts was successful and none
of the above variables directly showed strong relationships with annually installed capacity
development.
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Profitability and Tax Saving of Wind Energy Investment in India
The failed econometric attempts to establish direct quantitative relationship between various
policy incentives and annually installed capacity development led to the next analytical attempt,
which analyzes the relationship of profitability or tax saving of wind energy investment with
capacity development.
Profitability Indicators
The indicator of profitability used in the analysis is Internal Rate of Return (IRR). IRR
embodies the effects of various market development and investment policy incentives, as the
cash flow analysis to reach an IRR includes the effects of those incentives.
The indicator of tax saving used in this analysis is the first-year tax saving materialized by the
accelerated depreciation (100% in the first year until the 2002-03 year, then 80% in the first
year). In reality, this tax incentive works as capital subsidy during the first year of operation.
From the 1997-98 year, taxes due to MAT and Income Tax are deducted from the saving
materialized by the accelerated depreciation.
Modeling Tool for Cash Flow Analysis
To establish the relationship of profitability or tax saving with capacity development, a time
series data for those three variables is required. Although diverse policy and market conditions
have made the market conditions in each state very different from one another, the research tires
to analyze the national average conditions since the core financial and fiscal policy incentives are
same nationally, and more importantly, a time series data of industry electricity tariffs for
different states was not obtained.
A modeling tool was developed to perform the calculations. The tool includes the main data for
wind project investment and various assumptions (economic lifetime; capital cost of project per
MW; project size; conditions for tax treatment; IREDA financing terms, such as equity-debt
ratio, interest rates, and loan payoff period; Capacity Utilization Factor (CUF)8 9; O&M cost;
electricity tariffs for the industrial sector; and de-rating of wind turbine, etc) (see detailed
assumptions and data in Appendix C-1). Since the policy variables in the model of each fiscal
year are fixed and capital cost of project per MW use the estimated average cost for the year, The
IRR results produced by each model are not sensitive to project sizes. In order to make the
results fairly comparable, the following common assumptions are used in the calculations:
- All calculations are carried out in current prices.
- The input data reflects the expectation in the stated year.
- The main results include measures of net present value (NPV) and IRR after payment of
tax. The tax conditions prevailing in the year of turbine investment are expected to be
fixed for the time period under consideration.
- All data are stated as average.
89 CUF is a ratio of the annual energy output to the theoretical maximum output, if the machine were running at its
rated (maximum) power during all of the 8760 hours of the year. Wind energy CUF states the ratio of annual energy
output for a wind turbine in a particular location to its rated power, CUF = Energy generated per year (kWh)/
Turbine rated power (kW) x 8760 (hours).
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- The economic lifetime of all wind turbines under considerations is assumed to be 20
years.
- The calculations are performed only for captive use plants and all generated electricity is
assumed to be used by the producers via wheeling. Selling the wind generated power to
SEBs and third-party sales are not considered in this model in order to simplify the
assumptions and because captive use has been the majority of investment form.
Therefore, the revenue stream of the model comes from the saving created by not paying
the industry electricity tariffs to SEBs.
- The expected annual raise of industry electricity tariffs is assumed based on the growth
rate of tariffs of the previous several years. However, the maximum ratio was set to 10%,
as the annual raise of more than 10% for 20 years of project life time is unlikely,
considering the actual industry electricity tariffs for the past 15 years.
National Averaqe IRR and First-year Tax Savinq
The cash flow models between the 1992-93 year and the 2004-05 year produced the following
results (See Appendix C-2 for Base Cash Flow Calculations for each year).
Table 6-18: Annually Installed Capacity, Expected IRR, and First-year Tax Saving
Annually Installed Expected First-year TaxYear Capacity (MW) Average IRR Saving (INR)
1992-93 15.575 1.44% 8671000
1993-94 57.44 0.50% 14490000
1994-95 256.515 5.23% 20240000
1995-96 385.04 -0.79% 22770000
1996-97 155.905 2.69% 28704000
1997-98 70.536 10.11% 17242000
1998-99 42.33 6.92% 13621608
1999-00 132.915 5.43% 19055880
2000-01 180.89 4.76% 19578240
2001-02 285.135 0.55% 16686000
2002-03 239.785 1.77% 17353400
2003-04 594.05 3.08% 14908320
2004-05 1103.86 4.37% 13843440
In general, it is very clear that the IRR results fluctuate over the years but more importantly they
are very low. However, this is not a surprise. One of the reasons for the low IRR results is high
interest rates. In addition, the low revenues stream due to low CUF (technology efficiency) and
high capital cost make IRR low. In India, the revenue income from wind project is said to be too
low to gain the benefits on its own and this makes the investors must have very high taxable
income from other businesses, and the wind project solely depends on the balance sheet of the
investor company with very high tax liability (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005). For
the constructed cash flow models too, IRR could not be calculated without the first-year tax
saving (capital subsidy). This can explain why the Indian wind investment is primarily seen as
tax planning and management tool rather than real investment in the technology.
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Capacity Development and Expected National Average IRR and First-year
Tax Saving
Observation of Indicators
Statistical analysis was performed for two different structural time periods identified in the
previous section. Between the 1992-93 year and the 1995-96 year, correlation between installed
capacity and IRR was 0.038, while correlation between installed capacity and first-year tax
saving was 0.951. Installed capacity and first-year tax saving shows a very strong correlation.
During the second structural period between the 1996-97 year and the 2004-05 year, correlation
between installed capacity and IRR was -0.272, while correlation between installed capacity and
first-year tax saving was -0.387.
Econometric Analysis
For the period between the 1992-93 year and the
estimated by using OLS.
1995-96 year, the following regression was
CAPACITY = c + fl1* TAXSAVING + , (Equation 7)
Where:
B1 > 0
CAPACITY: Annually Installed Capacity
TAXSAVING: First-year tax saving
The OLS regression produced the following equation with t-statistics values in the parenthesis.
CAPACITY = -254.44 + 0.00002618*TAXSAVING
(-2.421) (4.338)
R2= 0.90, F= 18.82
Figure 6-9: Relationship between First-year Tax Saving and Capacity
between the 1992-93 year and the 1995-96 year
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The calculated regression coefficient (R2) of 0.90 tells that the tax saving variable helps explain
90% of the variation in the capacity variable. The t-statistics for the estimated variable is higher
than the critical value of 3.182 at 5% significance level. A regression analysis between installed
capacity and IRR did not produce a statistically significant result. The annually installed
capacity, hence the market development, during the first structural period can be largely
explained by the first-year tax saving (Figure 6-9).
On the other hand, similar regression analysis for the period between the 1996-97 year and the
2004-05 year did not produce any statistically significant results. The market development in the
second period cannot not be explained quantitatively by either the expected national average IRR
or the first-year tax saving.
Summary Results
The above examination reveals the difficulty of explaining capacity development in relation to
the national average IRR in India. However, profitability did not necessarily explain all
investment decisions made at the frontier either. The research done by Morthorst (1999) also
concluded the poor relationship between profitability and capacity development in the projects
invested by wind cooperative owners in Denmark, although there was a strong relationship
between the two variables in the projects invested by individual owners. The investments in co-
operatively owned turbines in Denmark were influenced by expected profitability to only a
minor extent, compared to other determining factors such as environmental concerns and
planning procedures (Morthorst 1999).90
For India, building the cash flow models based on the national average data in the above
examination was a rather forceful effort, due to the lack of data availability of state industry
electricity tariffs in India. However, the poor relationship between the national average IRR and
capacity development was also expected to some degree, as the strong dependency of the Indian
investment mechanism on tax saving measures was pointed out.
Still, IRR is sensitive to technology-related sensitivity factors such as capital cost per MW, CUF,
and O&M costs as well as the industry electricity tariffs and their expected annual raise. CUF
and the industry electricity tariffs vary significantly among states. Also, wind conditions,
various utility charges and project-related fees differ greatly from one state to another, and they
are frequently changed, altering project economics and IRR across the nation and creating
market fluctuation. Thus, the state conditions and technology-related sensitivity factors are
important for market development in India. Taking this point into account, the next part
examines the different causal factors behind the Indian market development and the structural
break of the relationship between new turbine introduction and capacity development.
90 In his research, profitability was defined by the difference between the nominal IRR after tax and the nominal
discount rate after tax. The nominal discount rate was taken to be equivalent to the IRR that could not be obtained
by an alternative investment. See (Morthorst, 1999).
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6.4.3 Causal Factors of Market Development in India
First-boom Years - from the 1992-93 Year to the 1995-96 Year
The first structural period confirmed by the quantitative analysis in Section 6.3 was the first
boom years in the Indian market development. Various factors influenced the rapid market
growth of the period. The most important factors were the policy incentives offered not only to
the wind energy sector but also to the power sector in general.
Tax Incentives
The rapid market growth since the 1992-93 year until the 1995-96 year was due to the
combination of the 1993 tax rule (the first-year 100% depreciation of capital equipment and
zero-tax planning), 91 as confirmed by the analysis in the previous part. It was estimated that up
to 80% of wind turbines between the 1992-93 year and the 1995-96 year in India have been
installed to take advantage of the available tax depreciation (Wind Power Monthly 1996e).
The strong connection between wind energy projects and corporate tax management in India is
also illustrated by the concentration of project commission in September and March, as the tax
mechanism of the country requires wind projects to be finished from planning to commission
within the six-month periods that end in either September and March, in order to take the tax
benefits, creating a roller coaster order process. September is the preferred commission timing,
in order to receive the full tax saving benefits within one year. This short lead time given for
each project prompts turnkey provision by one developer, unlike Germany where different legal
entities take care of each value activity from equity acquisition, project planning, project
commission, to O&M.
On top of this, the benefits of tax saving through the highly accelerated depreciation can be
realized only if taxable income is substantially high to absorb the high rate. In general, IPPs do
not have tax income liability high enough in order to receive the benefits from this kind of tax
saving measures, and this is why the Indian wind investors are confined within large industrial
business entities. Also it is only the industrial firms which have financial capacity to bear large
initial investment costs. The Indian wind investment mechanism, thus, was constructed to help
other business of the investors, not to make wind project itself viable. This explains the low IRR
and weak relationship between IRR and capacity development.
Gold-plating
The tax saving practice that supported the tremendous market growth of the first boom years also
created dubious practice of "gold-plating" by many bogus investors, who cared only for the
reduction of tax liability; they wanted higher capital price tag in order to gain larger tax benefits
from it. This 'gold-plating' of wind turbine prices (price increase of wind turbines despite the
international price reduction trend and the sharp increase in the sales volumes in the same time
period) were seen until the 1996-97 year in India. Many damaged and low-quality second-hand
turbines were imported mainly from California, tagged with extremely high prices, and sold.
The percentage increase of installation cost per MW from the 1992-93 year to the 1996-97 year
91 The effects of the other tax saving, the five-year 100% tax holiday on the income from sales of wind electricity,
was considered small, as most of projects were created for captive power consumption.
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was 27.5% in India, while the Danish wind turbine prices fell approximately 30% during the
same period (Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and Jansen 1999; TERI 2002).
Table 6-19: Gold-plating of Capital Cost
Capital Cost per MW Estimated Nominal Capital Cost GeneralYear (INR, 1992-93 price) ost per MW based Inflation Inflation in India
__onCPI (CPI based)
1992-93 29 Million -------
1993-94 32.5 Million 35 Million 20.1% 7.5%
1994-95 33.6 Million 40 Million 14.3% 10.1%
1995-96 34.7 Million 45 Million 12.5% 10.2%
1996-97 37 Million 53 Million 17.8% 9.3%
Source: Capital cost per MW from (Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and Jansen 1999). Nominal cost and
inflation were calculated by the author based on CPI from Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
GOl.
Other Factors
The IREDA soft loan was another important measure that enabled the largc private investment
boom.92 However, no project quality standards placed by the government during this period
created many bogus investors with the sole purpose of taking the IREDA loan along with the
generous tax credits. Many projects performed very poorly and some were abandoned without
being ever operated. Usually, once these corporate investors took the IREDA loan and zero out
their tax liability in the first year, they abandoned the projects. As a result, a large portion of the
IREDA revolving fund after the first boom years was not recovered. The total pay-back ratio
from borrowers was still 83% even at the point of 2002 (IREDA 2002d); it reached to 90% only
in 2005.
The FDI stimulation from 1991 and the import duty reduction from 1993 were other factors
behind the strong market development by bringing necessary technologies from abroad. The
policy change that made the grid-connected wind energy investment possible was another major
contributing factor.
Recession Years - between the 1996-97 Year and the 1998-99 Year
The first boom years ended by the sudden policy changes at both central and state levels.
Policy Change
The largest policy reason for the structural break was the introduction of quality assurance
measures in July 1995 and the 1997 tax rule change (the elimination of zero-tax planning by
imposing MAT and the reduction of marginal corporate tax in 1997 and again in 1998). The
1995 quality assurance measures suddenly made it difficult to erect low quality wind turbines
and/or leave them without proper operation, as MNES began requiring the turbine certification
and the detailed project report before and after the commission. The new tax policy plunged
corporate investments in wind from the 1997-98 year, because the size of tax benefits was
greatly reduced as the corporate tax rate was reduced. Many corporate investors quickly lost
92 Only manufacturers and developers that never used IREDA financial schemes for any of their wind power
projects was BHEL, which is a state-own enterprises and no need for external loans (BHEL, 2002).
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their interests in wind, as they could no longer zero out their tax liability and the projects process
became cumbersome.
In addition to the above policy change, the interest rates of the IREDA loans were also
significantly raised in 1996, approximately 4-5% across the board and reaching 18-20%. The
IREDA interest rates, which have been between 10% and 20%, are significantly higher
compared to those in Denmark and Germany, where the rates move around 5-7%. This
worsened project economics significantly. The increased import duty from April 1997 also
contributed to deter new investments from the year.
The market slowdown lasted until the 1998-99 year. The 1996-97 year seems to be the
transitional year structurally, as the gold-plating of capital cost still continued and the first-year
tax saving amount was also still large but the installed capacity was greatly reduced due to the
introduction of quality assurance measures and the raised IREDA interest rates.
IRR in Table 6-18, however, show that the investment climate and profitability seemed improved
in these recession years despite these new tax policy and higher interest rates. This is largely
because the gold-plating effects on capital cost were no longer in presence in the model; the
elimination of gold-plating effects lowered tax savings significantly but improved IRR. It was
also because the average industry electricity tariffs and their annual raises estimated during these
years in the model were much higher. Yet, behind these high industry electricity tariffs of the
period, there was great uncertainty involving the power sector.
Financial and Technical Problems of SEBs
While the new policy measures successfully eliminated bogus investors, many obstacles
remained for serious investors. And a large part of the problems came from their relationships
with SEBs, which were in great trouble in the mid 1990s.
SEBs had accumulated huge financial debts by the mid 1990s due to the buildup of high T&D
loss, poor revenue collection, and their cross-subsidy tariff policies. These conditions deterred
power investments by private sector in general in many states. 93 The high T&D loss and grid
abnormalities directly affected the wind investment climate as well (Madras Cement 2002). For
example, grid abnormalities reportedly induced the average 20% loss of potential revenue in
wind investment in 1996 (Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and Jansen 1999). There was also great
uncertainty for the future of SEBs and their pricing policy. Power plant investment became
much riskier business during the mid 1990s.
Another detrimental factor caused by SEBs was their considerable resistance to grant third-party
sales to wind investors. Wind plants can increase the revenue flow by selling generated power
directly to third parties by bypassing SEBs, if SEBs permit it. However, third-party sales can
93 The poor financial situation of SEBs also deterred IPP investments in India. In general after the liberalization of
the power sector, the initial IPP responses to the governments were enormous. Most of international heavyweights,
Indian corporate houses and small companies with no previous experience in power sector proposed over
100,000MW of capacity in total. However, along with the constantly changing government policy and the
inconsistency among policies among various agencies, the poor financial situations of SEBs have made 20-30 year
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) very risky for IPPs and have deterred the IPP involvements in the power
generation (Indiapoweronline. 1999).
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cause SEBs a significant revenue loss because they lose the most profitable industrial customers
to wind investors. Tamil Nadu changed its third-party sales policy from granting to not granting
after the first boom years, and this contributed to the market slowdown of the state.
In addition, during this period, SEBs began generally showing more hostile attitudes toward
wind energy plants, e.g., imposing additional charges on reactive power consumption by wind
power plants during peak hours, while not offering any extra feed-in tariffs to wind power
generation during peak hour. The extra charges during off-peak hours were often imposed as
well. This kind of attitude changes happened because SEBs saw wind energy plants as nuisance
due to their low reliability. However, many investors did not find such pricing strategies by
SEBs as fair or attractive to induce further investments to the sector (Madras Cement 2002).
Also there was a disparity between actual T&D loss and wheeling charges by SEBs; according to
the MNES guidelines, SEBs could only charge 2% of the power that they wheel, while their
T&D loss were close to 20% in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat (Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and Jansen
1999). This made the investors consider that they were losing their high quality wind power
through high T&D loss via wheeling due to the poor grid system of SEBs (Madras Cement
2002). The relationship between SEBs and wind investors was deteriorated quickly during the
recession years.
Inadequate Technical Performance and Lost Investor Trust
The problems with SEBs were mainly triggered by the extremely low level performance of wind
energy plants during the first boom years. This also deterred serious investors.
During the first boom years, many wind turbine manufacturers and project developers were not
adequately prepared for O&M and repairs of wind turbines and the system. Inadequacy of repair
facilities, disregard for earthing regulations, and the lack of lightening protections led to long
breakdown periods and often resulted in expensive repairs. The lack of safety design and
technical quality in rotor blades caused many failures as well (Jagadeesh 2000). Low level of
project execution skills was another issue. During the first boom years, many projects suffered
from inadequate wind resource assessments and improper siting practices. Little efforts were
made to adopt the European and American technology to the weak Indian grid conditions. These
conditions left many projects at sub-optimal levels of CUF, which were well below 20%
(Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and Jansen 1999). The Indian average CUF in 2001 was still 15%
(Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002).94 Low CUF causes low viability of wind projects.
The sub-optimal level of operation and the low CUF also exacerbated reactive power
consumption from the grid. These were the reasons behind the significant turbine productivity
decline in India during the first boom years shown in Figure 5-16 in Chapter 5.
Thus, the high initial capital cost and the low CUF under 20% have made the competition against
conventional thermal power generation very difficult (Indiapoweronline, 2001). The low
technical performance, the reduction of tax benefits, the higher interest rates, and the great
uncertainty involving wind energy policy and financial conditions of SEBs, all contributed to the
market decline, despite the potential huge savings in terms of fuel inputs and O&M costs as well
as the savings due to the raised industry electricity tariffs during the late 1990s.
94 Wind energy CUF in Europe is mostly around 25-30% (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd, 2005).
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Recovery and the Second Boom from the 2003-04 Year
Political Certainty
The market began gradually growing again from the 1999-2000 year, as the direction toward
sustainable market and industry development with various quality assurance measures after 1995
began taking positive effects; the market confidence slowly came back.
The continuous SEB reform efforts were another important factor. However, the explosive
market growth since 2003 can be explained mainly by the enactment of the 2003 Electricity Act.
Many wind investors waited for the new Act from the beginning of the new millennium and
began participating in crafting the 2001 draft of the Act. Although there are still rooms for
improvement, the new law was enough to clear many political uncertainties.
The process of participation and communication in making of the 2003 Act and the SEB reforms
gradually contributed to regain the investor confidence and increased the understanding between
utilities and investors. The formation of political power by the Indian Wind Turbine
Manufacturers Association (1997) and the Indian Wind Energy Association (2002) and the open
communication process of the SEB reforms led by CERC and SERCs were another important
factor of change.
State Policy Conditions
Many states began implementing more detailed and clear wind energy policy that is suitable for
their own SEB conditions during the early 2000s, as not SEBs but SERCs have increasingly
became responsible for deciding general electricity tariffs and wind feed-in tariffs as the result of
the 1998 Reform Act. The 2003 Electricity Act finally clarified SERCs to be responsible in all
tariff decisions, provided open access to transmission grid, permitted free captive generation by
removing all licensing and permission requirements, and clarified to take suitable measures for
grid connection and power sales to any person to promote electricity generation from renewable
energy sources. In particular, the 2003 Act ensured third-party sales to be made in all states and
finally eliminated the resistance from SEBs, although the final decision is still subject to each
SERC decision. This will open up more diverse possibilities of wind energy business.
During the early 2000s, several states began offering high feed-in tariffs for wind power. This
has increased wind energy plants built for sales to SEBs in those states. In particular, more than
95% of installed capacity in Rajasthan has been for sales for SEBs, not captive use. Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra also have relatively high percentage of plants built for
power sales for SEBs, due to their high feed-in tariffs (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd.
2005).
Technology Upqradation Funds (TUF)
Although the total installed capacity utilizing TUF offered by Ministry of Textile since April
1999 has not been reported, the scheme also helped the market recovery, especially in the state of
Tamil Nadu, where a large number of energy intensive textile business exist. TUF greatly
improved project viability by lowering the interest rates for debt from any financial institutions
by 5% for wind energy projects facilitated by textile business entities. The effects of TUF,
however, were not immediate; the projects utilizing the scheme increased after the enactment of
the 2003 Electricity Act. For example, approximately 57% of total installed capacity by Suzlon
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in Tamil Nadu since 1999 was materialized under TUF, but 87% of them concentrated in the
2003-04 and 2004-05 years 95 (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).
Sensitivity Factors of Investment Economics
Sensitivity factors in project economics have changed greatly during the 2000s. First, the
industry electricity tariffs have not increased since 2000 as fast as they did during the 1990s.
Although the higher electricity tariffs improve wind energy investment economics by making the
revenue flow created by captive power consumption larger, they worsen general business
conditions. The industry electricity tariffs skyrocketed during the 1990s due to the poor financial
conditions of SEBs. The SEB reform efforts have contributed to strengthening the general trust
in the power sector. Uncertainty regarding the tariff and pricing structure has been reduced
greatly, and this also contributed to increasing the certainty for wind energy investment.
Second, the tax saving has been further reduced as the first-year accelerated depreciation of wind
energy investment was reduced from 100% to 80% from the 2003-04 year. However, this did
not influence capacity development at all. On the contrary, installed capacity greatly increased
from the year. This may be an indicator of the shift of the Indian wind energy investment toward
more performance-oriented investment, although project economics still cannot be viable
without the tax saving. There are also some states that began offering higher feed-in tariffs that
can make wind project economically viable by selling the power to SEBs, as mentioned. This
movement toward higher feed-in tariffs and the lower effects of tax saving suggest that there is a
good prospect of verifying the second structural shift in the 2003-04 year, once more
observations are made.
Other factors have worked for wind investment favorably too. For example, the IREDA interest
rates have been gradually reduced throughout the 2000s, reaching the lowest level in history in
2005. The gradual increase of turbine capacity and improvement of project execution
technology such as micro-siting have slowly improved CUF, although it is still far from the
European level.
Effects of State Conditions on Market Growth
The state conditions, in particular state policy, have influenced the Indian wind energy market
greatly.
Tamil Nadu
The market domination of Tamil Nadu in the early 1990s was due to the following clear state
policy: 1) the demonstration projects led by TNEB from the 1980s showed viability of many
sites to private investors; 2) the wheeling and banking incentives offered by TNEB made energy
intensive textile and cement industries in the state to invest in captive wind power projects; 3) the
third-party sales was permitted to power producers with much higher rate than selling to SEBs,
although the wheeling charge was also high (15%) for third-party sales; 4) the approval process
of private projects was accelerated by issuance of NOC and Chief Electrical Inspectorate to the
government clearance; and 5) TNEB created an effective registration system of wind turbines,
making the turbine owners to easily adjust either their energy bills or payment to those who sold
95 229.25MW out of total installation of 403.1MW by Suzlon in Tamil Nadu between the 1999-2000 year and the
2004-05 year was under the scheme (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).
269
the power to TNEB. In addition, TNEB succeeded in effective implementation of the above
policies by its officials with knowledge accumulated through demonstration projects (Jagadeesh
2000; TNEB 2002).
The market slowdown in Tamil Nadu from the 1997-98 year was also greatly influenced by state
policy. The following policy changes reduced the market in the state: 1) from 1996, TNEB no
longer allowed the third-party sales in order to avoid losing their industry customers to wind
power producers; 2) the withdrawal of capital subsidy from the 1997-98 year and the placement
of new penalties for excessive reactive power consumption from June 1995 made project
economics less favorable; and 3) the inadequacy of substations provided by TNEB and the weak
grid systems created unsatisfying performance (Jagadeesh 2000; Madras Cement 2002).
The resurge of the Tamil Nadu market from the 2002-03 year greatly depended on the incentives
under TUF, combined with the enactment of the 2003 Electricity Act.
In addition to state wind energy policy, many other factors contributed to the strong performance
of Tamil Nadu. First, Tamil Nadu has the best wind resources available in the country (see
Table 6-25 in Section 6.5 for more details). Second, a fair degree of political stability, good
industrial culture with enterprising spirit, and very liberal and pragmatic state industrial policy,
focusing on strengthening its industrial and social infrastructure since 1991,96 made Tamil Nadu
one of the most successful industrial states in the country (Bajpai and Sachs 1999). Especially,
energy-intensive textile and cement industries boomed during the early and mid 1990s and
invested in captive wind power projects, although the recession in those industries in the late
1990s contributed to the market slowdown. Third, the wind power demand and supply matched
well for industry investors in Tamil Nadu, because the windy summer season meets their high
power needs (Madras Cement 2002; Vestas RRB 2002). Fourth, the infrastructure was better
compared to other states; the port facilities of Chennai made it easy to import heavy machinery
and components of wind turbines (IWTMA 2002; Jagadeesh 2000; TNEB 2002), and the
technical wind resource availability was also high from the beginning due to its well-connected
infrastructure (roads and the power grid) and good labor supply from nearby towns to windy
sites. Lastly, unlike many other states, lands with good wind resources were privately owned
and easily purchased. However, the decline of available prime wind resources locations and the
rising land cost contributed to the market slowdown in the late 1990s.
Maharashtra
Maharashtra contributed to the national market recovery greatly between the 1999-00 year and
the 2001-02 year. The Maharashtra market had been also strongly influenced by state policy: 1)
new state policy implemented from December 1999 had strong fiscal and financial incentives
components (the third-party sales, the capital subsidy of 30% of project cost, and the sale tax
exemption up to 100% of investment); 2) Maharashtra had high commercial electricity tariff
96 Measures include increasing general power generation, transmission and distribution arrangements, improving
road and rail network, bringing in technological advanced telecom facilities, opening new minor ports and
developing existing minor ports and strengthening the technical training facilities. All these measures also
successfully attracted many foreign direct investment into the state since August 1991 (Bajpai, and Sachs, 1999).
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(INR 5/kWh) for the industrial sector 97 and this encouraged captive power projects (MEDA
2002); 3) the state removed the 100% sales tax exemption policy as of March 31, 2002, and this
wiped out the investment; and 4) the market only came back slowly with a new policy with
higher tariffs for newer projects, but only after the 2003 Electricity Act enacted.
In addition, like Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra has been a strong industrial state with Mumbai as the
nation's business capital and has had the financially strong SEB. The state implemented robust
industry/trade/commerce policy from 1995, encouraging the participation of private sector for
large scale developments at all levels. As a result, Maharashtra has attracted a large share of FDI
as well as domestic industrial investments and continues to remain a favored destination for both
types of investors (Bajpai and Sachs 1999). The industrial giant such as Tata Group and Bajaj
Group, who have shown strong interests in wind investments, are based in the state. The state
has offered investment incentives in infrastructure, fiscal, and thrust industries areas that created
good infrastructure, including the state power grid system that has contributed to high-technical
wind resource potential of the state.
Other States
State policy incentives have been the largest market driven factor in other states as well.
- The early market development in Gujarat was due to its early placement of state policy, but
the market was not as large as Tamil Nadu because Gujarat did not allow the third-party sales
in early years. The complete state policy withdrawal from 1998 stopped the market from the
year. The market resumed again with a new policy from June 2002.
- The market in Karnataka has grown greatly after 2001 due to a new policy with capital
subsidy and high feed-in tariffs. As a result, the state has high percentage of wind power
sold to SEBs, instead of captive use (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).98
- The market in Rajasthan started with the first state policy implementation from 1999, but has
grown dramatically with a new policy, which cleared the tariff structure for the period of 20
years. Unlike other states, more than 95% of installed capacity has been for sales to SEBs
due to its high feed-in tariffs (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).
- Utter Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala, and Madhya Pradesh have not experienced much
success in wind market development, mainly due to their unattractive policy measures and
general policy uncertainty, along with their lagging attitudes toward political and institutional
reforms.
97 Those industries could save INR 2.5 million per year by investing captive power consumption and third-party
sales in wind energy development in Maharashtra (MEDA, 2002).
98 Although the data from the states were no available, 100% of installed capacity by Suzlon (up to March 2005) and
70% of that by Enercon (up to June 2005) were for sales for SEBs in Karnataka (Consolidated Energy Consultants
Ltd. 2005).
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Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Factors on Indian Market
Growth
Effects of Institutional Settings
The strong market fluctuation and segmentation in India is largely due to its institutional setting
of the power sector. Diverse state policy incentives, specific to each state, have created diverse
economics environment. As many detailed policy decisions are up to each state, there was
persistent inconsistency between national policy and state policy. In addition, power
transmission across states is not generally permitted; the absence of cross-state wheeling for
captive power consumption confines the benefits of wind installation within one state. These
factors created a number of small and segmented markets. Diverse financial and technical
conditions of SEBs exacerbated the market segmentation as well. In such environments,
political uncertainty is quite large. The exponential market growth since the 2003-04 year has
been mainly due to the implementation of the Electricity Act of 2003, which cleared many
uncertainties regarding electricity pricing structures and set a clear future direction of renewable
energy generation nationwide.
The Indian market fluctuation has been also greatly influenced by the limited and distorted form
of power sector privatization and commercialization. In general, under commercialization,
governments maintain ownership of power utilities but remove subsidies and preferable policies,
while requiring full recovery of capital, operations and maintenance costs. Privatization follows
commercialization, and can include sale of existing facilities to private firms, the purchase of
electricity from private power producers, and independent regulation (The President Committee
of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 1999). In the economic reforms since 1991,
however, India took quite a mishmash process; a part of privatization took place in private sector
power generation, while commercialization was incomplete, leaving cross-subsidies and
preferable policies in electricity pricing and not targeting the recovery of capital, operation, and
maintenance cost in general. Thus, the hasty power sector liberalization process posed larger
costs later by creating the self-contradictory mechanisms, affecting the wind energy market
growth negatively in the process.
Effects of Policy Incentives on Investment Mechanism
The most outstanding character of the Indian wind energy investment mechanism is its high
dependency on tax saving measures. Although creating the IREDA revolving fund and soft
loans, bringing technologies from foreign manufacturers by encouraging FDI, and lowering the
import duty on wind turbine components greatly helped the creation of market, the subsidy-
driven mechanism by tax saving measures has made profitability and viability of project almost
irrelevant for investors. This is well-illustrated by the strong relationship between the first-year
tax saving and installed capacity during the first boom years.
However, this initial structure could not last long. The low-performance oriented mechanism
paid high price. The structural break was caused by the sudden policy change by lowering tax
benefits and placing the quality assurance measures in order to correct technical and economic
problems of the initial mechanism. However, these counteracting measures pulled the market to
the opposite direction too fast and too strongly. The abrupt policy change only added political
uncertainty to the already problematic mechanism; the market adjustment was slow and the lost
confidence could not come back quickly.
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The continuous improvement of quality assurance measures and the SEB reform efforts have
been paid off by the gradual return of investor confidence. However, the main investment
mechanism has not been changed. It is very difficult to pin point the causes of market recovery
quantitatively. Although the influence of the first-year tax saving on capacity development has
become much smaller, it still plays an important role in the investment economics because many
projects cannot even produce positive IRR without the subsidy. The recent changes in state
policy incentives as a result of the SEB reforms and the 2003 Electricity Act have shown the
potential of transformation of this subsidy-driven investment mechanism into a more
performance-based investment mechanism. In states such as Karnataka and Rajasthan, the
higher feed-in tariffs and the ensured third-party sales options are providing opportunities for
wind energy projects to be viable as non-captive power generation plants. Offering higher feed-
in tariffs or other performance-oriented incentives will be very important to change the current
subsidy-oriented investment mechanism in the future.
Structural Break and Market Size
The market recession from the 1996-97 year is considered an important reason behind the change
in the structural relationship between capacity development and new technology introduction
examined in Section 6.3. It is true that the beginning of the Indian market recession from the
mid 1990s seems to correspond to the natural transformation point of structural relationship
between installed capacity and new turbine introduction, as the frontier was moving toward
larger-capacity turbine introduction at the time. However, as mentioned in the summary of
Section 6.3, if turbine upscaling at the frontier were the only reason behind the structural break
and if those newer and larger capacity turbines were introduced to India in the late 1990s, the
new relationship could have shown the increased capacity installation even if the number of
turbine installation were somewhat reduced. Yet, in reality, most of medium and large-capacity
turbines that became dominant at the frontier in the mid 1990s were not introduced to the Indian
market during the recession years, as examined in Chapter 5.
The new structure after the 1996-97 year showed the reduction of both installed capacity and the
number of new turbine introduction. This means that as the investments to wind energy in
general were stagnated, the Indian market simply lost the power to attract the introduction of
newer and larger models, which required stronger and larger investments.
6.4.4 Effects of Market Demand Characteristics on Technology
Development and Diffusion in India
This part examines the market demands derived from the Indian specific investment mechanism
and conditions and their effects on technology development and diffusion.
Technology Driving Market Demands in India
Cost Reduction Demands
Similar to Denmark and Germany, the cost reduction demands to reduce initial capital
investment, repairs, and O&M costs, have always existed in India, especially from serious
investors. In addition, the ownership of one wind turbine in wind farm in India is usually one
company, while one turbine can be owned by many individuals in Denmark and Germany where
the cost of turbine can be spread over many investors. This makes the demands for capital cost
reduction strong in India to make the economics better for serious industry investors.
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Weak Technology Demands in the First Boom Years
Although the cost reduction demands existed, the investment mechanism in the first boom years
simultaneously created a totally opposite demand, as already mentioned. Many investors did not
care for operation of wind plants and their demands for technological efficiency was extremely
weak; they had no interests in taking full advantage of available wind resources. Also, there was
no government policy to check the quality of technologies used in project and project economics
viability. There were no efficiency improvement demands from these bogus investors.
Demands for Higher Level Project Execution Technology - After the First Boom Years
While the bad practice of importing second-rated turbines and leaving them without operation
caused the decline of investor confidence in wind power project and technology, many technical
problems also contributed to low performance during the first boom years. One of the reasons
was inadequate understanding of wind resources and micro-siting that turned out to be state-of-
the-art technique, which needed to be learned from experiences. During the first boom years, the
understanding of location-specific aspects of wind resources was limited due to inadequate
information. The National Wind Assessment Program was not created to provide the data
necessary for micro-siting. Technical understanding of developers about micro-siting was also
fairly limited at the time. After the first boom years, serious investors began demanding
improvement of wind resources estimation, energy prediction and optimization technology.
A series of project and technology quality assurance measures by MNES from 1995 spurred this
demand too. Site selection and micro-siting, selection of equipment, means of financing, annual
energy output, cost of generation, and planned operation and maintenance systems became
required to be included in the detailed project report (DPR) submission. On top of these
increased tasks, the short lead time required by the Indian tax mechanism have also contributed
to creating the market demands for higher technological capability and improvement of wind
project execution technology after the first boom years.
Demands for Efficiency Improvement - After the First Boom years
Besides wind resources estimation, energy prediction and optimization as well as project design
and planning technologies, there were many other technical issues needed to be improved. It
was the only way of regaining the lost investor confidence after the first boom years. In order to
improve technical performance of wind turbines, MNES mandated the turbine approval and
certification by the recognized foreign testing and certification centers for all projects from 1995,
and has placed the CUF improvement as one of core R&D subjects (MNES 2004). Serious
investors also began demanding higher quality components and turbines in order to reduce
failures and repairs, lower the insurance costs, raise CUF, and improve the economics.
Demands for Low Wind Technology
Wind resources in India are low wind, similar to the inland states of Germany, but even lower.
The low wind condition of India makes higher capacity turbines more profitable, as mentioned in
Section 6.1. India has had the potentially strong demand for larger and higher efficiency turbines
that make low wind operations more profitable.
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Demands for Weak Grid Technology
A large part of wind energy development in India has been concentrated in rural areas where the
existing T&D grids are weak. While the power quality at wind turbine connection points is poor,
the connected wind turbines can also worsen the power quality further because grid
reinforcement for turbine integration is insufficient; there is the mutual influence between weak
grid and wind turbines. This creates the market demands for both grid improvement and wind
turbines designed to compensate the weak grid conditions.
This demand is in a sense similar to higher-power quality demand posed by the German utilities.
While the German utilities did not pose extra charges, however, many SEBs in India began
imposing additional charges on power consumption by wind plants during both peak and off-
peak hours. In addition, the general inadequacy of power facilities such as the lack of
substations and the weak grid system also often caused the shutdown of power generation and
contributed to the loss of revenue. Considering such financial pressures, the potential demands
for weak grid technology has been quite large in India.
Technology Transfer and Development in India as a Result of Market
Demands
Several market demands found in India are similar to those in Denmark and Germany, including
the cost reduction demands, the efficiency improvement demands, the demands for low wind
technology, and the power quality improvement demands. Meanwhile, the land development
pressure for technology upscaling, the offshore development demands, and the environmental
demands in noise reduction and environmentally friendly production seen in Europe have not
been present in India. In contrast, there was the gold-plating demand in India, which was not
seen in Europe.
Gold-Plating Demands and Hindered Technoloqy Development
The gold-plating demands greatly hindered the Indian industry in building local production
capacity and capability. First of all, many joint venture companies established between 1993 and
1995 did not build any local production capability, as they were just importing wind turbine sets
and components and assemble them on sites. Secondly, project execution technology capability
was not advanced by these developers either, during the first boom years. In addition, the gold-
plating demands diminished many opportunities for introducing better-quality turbines; instead
the early Indian market was flourished with a large number of low-quality and second-hand
turbines. During the first boom years, the entire industry lost technological capacity building
opportunities that could have been materialized otherwise.
Improvement in Project Execution Technoloqy
At first, the transfer of project execution technology was rather difficult due to the differences in
investor profile and investment mechanism between the frontier and India. The experiences
accumulated in the professionalized mechanisms of Denmark and Germany, especially in terms
of financial aspect of project planning as well as permission processes, were not useful in India
at all. The difference in wind regimes also made the transfer of knowledge for technical aspect
of project execution difficult (Twele 2005).
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Project execution technology in India after the first boom years, however, has greatly improved.
Both the policy and market demands for improvements in project planning/O&M/repair
capability and for turnkey provision capability increased since the mid 1990s, and they have
helped the industry advance and introduce higher project execution technology from the frontier.
The foreign collaborators that decided to stay in India after the first boom years helped their
Indian partners more actively cultivate these skills and know-how further by providing additional
supervised trainings (see Section 6.7). Project monitoring recommended since 1995 and
mandated in 2000 also spurred the industry to improve project execution capability and
knowledge in understating the site conditions and micro-siting related issues. The advancement
of software products that support project execution are introduced and helped raising the level of
project execution in India as well.
Slow and Limited Introduction of Large-capacity Turbines and Variable Speed Turbines
with Pitch Regulation
As mentioned in both Chapters 5 and this Chapter already, the low wind condition of India
makes higher capacity turbines more profitable. In addition, variable speed turbines with pitch
regulation and synchronous converter or power electronics have the great advantages for
achieving higher energy capture and higher efficiency in low wind conditions, reducing dynamic
loads on drivetrain lessening the mechanical problems, and clear many weak grid problems.
However, despite this suitability, the introduction of turbines with these features lagged behind
since the mid 1990s.
Limited Effects of Efficiency Improvement Demands
In case of wind energy, to a certain extent, there is a choice between a relatively stable power
output (close to the design limit of generator) with high CUF and a fluctuating high energy
output with low CUF. For example, at a very windy location, substantially larger annual
production can be realized by using larger generator with the same rotor diameter, although it
lowers CUF by using less of the generator capacity. Whether it is worthwhile to use a relatively
large generator with lower CUF depends both on wind conditions and on the prices of different
turbine models (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003). However, the case of India does not
match either pattern; smaller capacity generators are run at low wind sites, creating low annual
power production.
Despite the demands for CUF improvement, the factor still floats well below the European
average of 25%-30%.99 This is largely due to the limited introduction of larger and more
efficient turbines. Turbine upscaling, the largest source of cost reduction at the frontier, has not
happened in India and did not bring the benefits of more economical project operation.
Technologically and economically more efficient pitch-regulated, variable speed turbines are not
dominant in India. As a result, the Indian CUF and turbine productivity have not improved so
much. Low CUF by older and smaller-capacity turbines is still prevailing.
99 Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd (2005) estimates CUF of older and less efficient turbines installed at the low
wind sites, which is more common in India, to be 18%, while CUF of newer and more efficient turbines installed at
high wind sites to be 26%.
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Effects of Cost Reduction Demands
The cost reduction demands for small-capacity turbines introduced during the first boom years
was largely satisfied by rapid and high-level indigenization of turbine assembling as well as
component production. However, the effects of cost reduction through local production have
been limited for medium- and large-capacity turbines as well as higher-value components, as
described in Chapter 5.
Capital cost per MW has not changed since the early 2000s in India; the slow indigenization of
high value components contributed to this stagnation. The limited effects of technology
indigenization efforts for cost reduction have made wind investment in India still very expensive,
compared to Denmark and Germany. The market recession and market uncertainty also slowed
down the expansion of production capacity, which did not increase from the annual 500MW
level since the 1998-99 year until the 2003-04 year (750MW level); thus, the cost reduction
through the increase of production scale was also limited since the late 1990s. Installation cost
in Denmark and Germany was estimated approximately USD 0.36/kWh, while that of the Indian
figure was USD 0.5 1/kWh in 2002 (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002). 100
Limited Effects of Market Demand Characteristics
The above examination shows that in general, the effects of market demands for efficiency
improvement, cost reduction, and low wind technology on the Indian technology have been
fairly weak. Despite the similarity of demand characteristics with the frontier, they did not
induce technological change through replicable technology transfer.
6.4.5 Section Summary
Missing Elements - Market Size and Certainty
In Denmark and Germany, the technology has been developed to satisfy specific market
demands; the market demands are the technology driver. On the other hand, despite the
similarity of characteristics of various market demands, the introduction of larger and more
advanced turbines to India have been limited.
The largest reason behind the difference between the frontier and India was not market demand
characteristics but market size. It was the regional European market, especially the shear market
size of Germany, which strongly pulled the technology development for the Danish and German
manufacturers. Besides Germany, there were other stable markets in Europe, e.g., Denmark and
Spain. The size of regional market has been growing continuously and this created a fairly stable
market environment in Europe. The market size was the factor that pulled technology
development to the direction that the characteristics of market demands induced.
In addition, the beginning of the Indian market recession since the mid 1990s reduced the market
pulling force in India. As a result, larger investments required to introduce the same number of
newer models to the market did not happen.
100 The original figures were INR 17.80/kWh for Installation cost in Denmark and Germany and INR 25.14/kWH for
India (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002). The USD figures were calculated by exchange rate 1 USD
48.86 INR (6/30/2002 rate).
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Yet, it is also true that market size alone could not pull technology development continuously
and create the replicable technology transfer demands if there were no prospect and certainty for
the future. Technology development of wind turbines takes time; at least a couple of years of
R&D are necessary for introduction of new models. The continuity and certainty of the market
is necessary to support constant turbine upscaling and upgrading.
And the large market size and the market certainty and continuity were the missing elements in
India; even though many market demand characteristics are similar to those of the frontier,
without sizable market and its puling power, technology upgrading through replicable
technology transfer did not happen. Although production indigenization is important to reduce
turbine cost, technology providers did not invest in building new production facilities tailored for
newer models because the market prospect was too small and too weak.
In addition, even though larger-capacity turbines can produce more power more efficiently, they
cost more in installation. This makes operating them in a collective manner in large wind farm
very important to save O&M costs through economies of scale; it is difficult to bring large-
capacity turbines to the market with limited prospect of economies of scale. Thus, it is natural
that the firm with the largest market share (Suzlon Energy Ltd.) offers the largest-capacity
turbine in the Indian market. However, in general, the market prospect for new production
facility investments and economies of scale was too small in India.
Thus, the Indian market has been too small, too weak, and too uncertain to pull the investments
in technology upscaling and upgrading and replicable transfer from the technology frontier,
especially during the late 1990s and the early 2000s when much important technological
advancement was made in Europe. The lack of prospect and the strong uncertainty toward future
market development as well as the absence of economies of scale have made many technology
providers hesitant to bring larger-capacity turbines and newer technologies to India. The small
market made all technology driving demands insignificant.
Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Settings on Demand-Pull
Technology Development and Transfer in India
The wind market is policy driven; the market of wind energy is basically triggered by policy
incentives. While policy clarity and continuity that support the continuous market prospect has
been the most important factor behind the successful technology development and diffusion at
the frontier, the Indian investment mechanism was created to attract industry investors whose
primary drive has been tax management and escape from unreasonably high electricity prices
posed on them. Although this created the strong market growth in the early 1990s, without any
proper mechanism to prevent the abuse of government incentives, the market created extremely
weak technology driven demands. The strong dependency on investment incentives in the
beginning was difficult to recourse.
After the first boom years, the problems in policy, market and technology were mounted. Many
investors did not find wind investments attractive anymore due to the sudden withdrawal of tax
incentives, the low economic performance, and the rising O&M/repairs/insurance costs because
of numerous project failures during the first boom years. Instead of investing in further
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technology improvement, many of them just left wind, as their primary investment driver, the
lucrative tax savings, was gone.
The situation was more difficult for the remaining serious wind supporters. Although the
government continuously provided various incentives, the reduced tax incentives, the raising
interest rates, and many miscellaneous charges sank the market for the next three years, along
with the problematic finance and pricing strategies by SEBs caused by the limited and distorted
power sector commercialization and privatization that have reduced the attractiveness of wind
investment by adding policy inconsistency and uncertainty at state level. The inconsistency with
the central government policy was not improved either, as the entire power sector of India
needed to embark on the very serious reforms. In India, market continuity and certainty for wind
were far from reach under such conditions.
The setback between 1996 and 1999 was devastating for the Indian technology upgrading
through replicable technology transfer, because there were simply no attractive markets to pull
numerous technological advancements made at the frontier during this period. The regional
market demands were also weak, not helping utilize the established Indian production facilities
and augment production capability by bringing new export orders. Although the market
gradually improved from 2000, India was not the primary investment spot for technology
upgrading by technology providers at the frontier, as the market size has been far smaller,
compared to the combined regional European markets. The market uncertainty persisted until
the enactment of the Electricity Act in June 2003 that finally rationalized the institutional
responsibility and clarified the direction of the power sector. In particular, the restructuring of
problematic SEBs and relieving them from tariff making and implementing responsibility have
had large and positive effects. However, the policy and institutional inconsistency and
uncertainty after 1996 have created the ineffective demand-pulling force in the market for
technology transfer from the frontier.
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Section 6.5: Transformed Technological Characteristics and
Industrial Competitiveness Management and
Their Effects on Technology Development and
Diffusion in India
This section focuses on the effects of the changing technological characteristics and industry
structure/competitiveness management in both Europe and India on cross-border technology
transfer and the growth of technology gaps.
6.5.1 Effects of Indian Policy and Competitive Strategy and Industry
Modification at the Frontier on Indian Industry
Indian Industry Formation and Structural Modification
Although there were three private firms in the wind turbine manufacturing industry already in the
1980s in India, it was the economic reforms after 1991 that triggered the industry expansion.
Industry Formation since 1993
The Indian wind turbine manufacturing industry has been largely formed by business
diversification of local companies through technical collaboration agreements (joint venture or
license agreement) with manufacturers from the technology frontier. Table 6-20 shows that
turbine manufacturer entry and exit in India, and it is clear that most of the Indian firms have had
foreign technology collaborators. BHEL, the wind energy division of which was formed in
1985, was the exception in the beginning, but the firm began engaging in license agreement with
Nordex from 1994 after successfully developing turbines up to 200kW on its own. Both Vestas
RRB and NEPC Micon were joint ventures from the beginning.
Table 6-20 illustrates the concentration of new entry between 1993 and 1996, all with foreign
collaborators except one firm (Himalaya). However, the majority of those firms exited from the
Indian market between 1996 and 1999, which corresponds the three-year market slowdown. The
reasons of exit varied; while some Indian companies lost their technology providers due to their
business exit at the frontier, other collaborations seemed to come to an end simply because of the
market slowdown and high risks of further investment in India although exact reasons are
unknown. For several foreign manufacturers, it seems that the Indian market slowdown and their
own status change at the frontier happened coincidentally within a relatively short timeframe.
Several frontier firms such as Micon and Tacke reportedly had financial, technical and ethical
problems with their Indian partners.101 Some Indian firms (C-WEL, Elecon, and Pioneer) show
the switching of foreign collaborators over the years as the position of their original technology
providers at the frontier had weakened.
101 For example, Flovel and Tacke engaged in the bitter court dispute over the compliance of their joint venture
agreement each other after Tacke dissolved their partnership. Tacke was restrained by a High Court injunction from
doing business in India in late 1995 (Wind Power Monthly. 1996a). Micon dissolved its joint venture with NEPC in
1997, as the Danish firm was reportedly strongly dissatisfied with the Indian partner's business practice. After that,NEG Micon and NEPC got into a court dispute regarding manufacturing rights of the turbines introduced by Micon
during their joint venture years. In 1999, the Chennai High Court ruling permitted NEPC the exclusive right of
manufacturing NEG Micon turbines up to 400kW in India (Wind Power Monthly. 1999c).
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Table 6-20: Turbine Manufacturer Entry and Exit in India
Entry Indian Firm Foreign Collaborator Exit
Year ______________Year
1985 BHEL ----
1986 Vestas RRB Vestas (Denmark)
1987 NEPC Micon Micon (Denmark) 1999*
1993 AMTL Wind World (Denmark) *
BHEL Nordex (Denmark) 1999**
1994 Elecon HMZ (Belgium) 1998
TTG Industries Husumer Schiffswerft (Germany) *
ABAN Loyd Kenetech (USA) 1997
Das Lagerwey Lagerwey (The Netherlands) 2000
Enercon India Enercon (Germany)
Flovel Tacke (Germany) 1997*
1995 Grematch CNC Pegasus (Germany) 1995Himalaya ---- 1996
Windia Nedwind (The Netherlands) 1998
Pioneer Wincon Wincon West Wind (Denmark) *
REPL Bonus (Denmark) 1997
Sangeeth Carter (USA) 1997
JMP Ecotecnia (Spain) 1996
Rayalseema Mitsubishi (Japan) 1996
1996 RES AWT (USA) *
Suzion SCdwind (Germany) 1996
Textool Nordtank (Denmark) 1996
1997 Kirloskar WEG (UK) 1998SuzIon
1998 NEPC India ---
1999 NEG Micon (subsidiary) NEG Micon (Denmark)
2000 C-WEL -----
2001 C-WEL DeWind (Germany) 2002
2002 Elecon Turbowind (Belgium)GE Wind Energy (subsidiary) GE Wind Energy (USA)
2005 Pioneer Asia Gamesa (Spain)
Bold letters show the firms active as of March 2005.
Entry year is defined as the year that the firm installed its first turbine, and exit year
is defined as the firm installed its last turbine in this table. Although the original
source shows some other manufacturers on the list, this table only included the
ones that installed turbines and those locations and dates were verified by the data
in the source.
* These collaborations already ended in the late 1990s or before the specified exit
years. However, the turbines originally provided by the providers were
continuously manufactured and offered in India independently by the Indian firms
after their partnerships ended. Flovel stopped the installation of turbines all
together in 2001.
** Nordex and BHEL ended its first license agreement in 2002 but a new agreement
was in place from 2003. However, no installation was made after 1999 until
March 2005.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).
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Only four technology collaborations established before 1996 (excluding TTG Industries)
survived in 2005. The new entry from 1997 includes two subsidiaries, which are 100% owned
by foreign manufacturers (NEG Micon and GE Wind), and three independent firms, two of
which (Suzlon and NEPC India) became independent after the dissolution of their original
partnerships with foreign technology providers. NEG Micon India (subsidiary of NEG Micon)
and Vestas RRB are both still in business separately in India, as their new parent company
Vestas has not announced any organizational plan in its Indian operation publicly as of the end of
2005.
Effects of Industry Modification at the Frontier on Indian Industry and its
Technology Options and Sources
The Indian business entry and withdrawal have been strongly influenced by the business
decisions as well as the status of technology providers at the frontier. Table 6-20 shows that total
16 technology collaborations formed since 1993 practically ended their relationships by 1999
(including TTG Industry-HSW). Out of the 16 collaborations, only six foreign collaborators
survived at the frontier as of 2005 (Bonus/Siemens, Wincon West Wind, Ecotecnia, Mitsubishi,
DeWind, and Lagerwey) and all other firms exited from the business during the 1990s. Their
exit from India corresponded to not only the Indian market slowdown but also their weaker
presence at the frontier. Even out of these six survivors, however, five fell into somewhat
obscure existence in the industry by 2005, and only one of them, Bonus/Siemens, remains as
technologically and financially strong industry player. Bonus made a conscious decision of
staying out of the Indian market and has kept doing so since 1997. Thus, most technology
providers that left India by 1999 also did not survive the intense technology competition at the
frontier during the 1990s; their business exit at the frontier certainly consolidated the available
technology options in general and reduced the potential technology introduction to India.
As for technology introduction by those collaborations ended by 1999, none of the following
WEGA II participants, Bonus, Lagerwey, Nedwind, Micon, Nordtank, and Tacke, introduced
large-capacity turbines before their exit from India, although they brought many models under
400kW. Their MW-class turbines were just coming out for the frontier market, but the timing
coincided with the Indian market slowdown. In terms of medium-capacity turbines, Micon,
Nordtank, and Nedwind brought turbines between 500kW and 600kW, and non-WEGA
participants, Wind World, Kenetech, and WEG brought turbines between 400kW and 500kW
too. However, only the 410kW models by Kenetech and the 550kW models by Nedwind had
more than ten installations in India. All other turbines did not leave significant footprints on the
Indian market and the industry, and all the Indian partners did not continue manufacturing or
installation of these medium-capacity turbines after the collaborations ended.
The significant technological innovations that India missed by the exit of the WEGA II
participants, which had relatively strong technological and financial position in the mid 1990s,
were: 1) limited-range variable speed turbines with DFIG introduced at the frontier in 1996 by
Tacke; 2) medium-capacity, full-range variable speed turbines with synchronous generators and
full-scale converter by Lagerwey; and 3) all innovations made by Bonus since 1995, especially
active stall regulation introduced at the frontier in 1996 and full-range variable speed turbines
with WRIG and full-scale converter introduced in 2003.
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Roles and Effects of Policy on Industry Formation and Structural
Modification in India
Unlike the Danish and German governments, GOI more actively employed industrial policy
measures for wind energy industry development from the beginning. In particular, new FDI and
trade policy implemented as a part of the 1991 economic reforms played important roles.
First, the new FDI policy that reduced barriers for foreign investment and foreign corporation
taxes made the formation of joint ventures easier, but there were still the rules prohibiting foreign
manufacturers to set up a shop independently in India. Therefore, foreign wind turbine
manufacturers actively sought for Indian partners for their market entry. While GOI thus
strongly encouraged the formation of joint ventures with foreign companies, cost reduction by
technology indigenization, which benefited both technology providers and their Indian partners,
was another driver behind many serious joint venture/license agreement formations. The new
trade policy since 1993 also played a role; although the policy generally reduced import duty for
critical components such as rotor blades and electronics of controllers to zero, the duty free status
was applied only on up to ten components and this still made the import of the whole technology
expensive. Local manufacturing and technology transfer through technical agreements was the
solution for foreign firms that seriously contemplated the market expansion in India.
The policy strategy, which lowered the custom duty on imported components, is opposite to the
ordinary infant industry protection strategy of import substitution, which uses high custom duty
in order to create domestic demand for goods and protect infant domestic firms. However, the
low custom duty strategy was taken because many components could not be manufactured
domestically in India at the time and the domestic wind market was too small to make the high
custom duty protection viable. Thus, the lowered custom duty structure was another strong push
for many joint venture formations.
The use of revolving fund by IREDA also contributed to the formation of diverse technology
collaborations, as it effectively eliminated the danger of bilateral concessionary financing, which
often distorts the market and promotes technologies from the donor's domestic industry. The
revolving fund, which pooled financial resources from various multilateral and bilateral sources
together, has given tremendous freedom for the Indian investors and manufacturers to choose
their technology from diverse countries of origin and avoided potential technology-lock-in
situation.
The Indian industry consolidation during the late 1990s happened mostly due to the dissolution
of technology collaborations. In terms of the effects of policy and institutional setting on the
industry consolidation, the institutional setting for taxation and various quality standards placed
from 1995 were responsible in eliminating many low-capability firms and collaborations. The
short six-month lead time of project development makes the initiation of wind power project a
highly stressful and often expensive business due to necessity of rapid transactions. In addition
to this, the increasingly tightened MNES requirements for project and technology clearance and
approval since 1995 have further increased transaction costs and time pressures on wind power
project developers and investors. Under these circumstances, capability to perform turnkey
projects became a key determinant of survival of manufacturers. Offering the guarantees to
products and services also became necessary requirement for manufacturers to attract investors.
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Many foreign providers were not keen about investing such technological capability building for
the Indian partners under the strong market uncertainty. This was an important part of the
reasons that prompted business exits and consolidation of the Indian wind turbine manufacturing
industry.
In addition to the reduction of the number of manufacturers, this industry consolidation process
created an entry barrier for small-and-medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which do not have high
financial and technological capability to perform turnkey projects. MNES and IREDA together
with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce have been promoting SMEs in wind and other
renewable energy sectors by offering various fiscal and financial incentives while eliminating
restrictions on firm location, products, and services (MNES, 2001b). However, the restriction
over equity share holding, which limits capital from any industrial undertaking of both foreign
and domestic to 24% for SMEs, as well as the market slowdown since late 1996 made it very
difficult for them to enter wind turbine manufacturing/wind energy development business.
Relationship of Industry Transformation with Structural Break in
Capacity- Turbine Introduction Relationship
The Indian industry transformation mentioned above corresponds the second structural period of
the relationship between capacity development and new turbine introduction. The reduction of
the number of manufacturers and the industry structural change were triggered by the structural
break of the 1996-97 year, which was primarily caused by the market slowdown set off by the
sudden policy change. There were chain reactions in the event. The European industry
consolidation coincidentally contributed to the transformation.
The capacity-turbine introduction relationship was also shifted, partly because the number of
manufacturers, hence the number of technology options, was reduced by the industry structural
transformation. In this regard, the structural shift to the second period examined in Section 6.3
was due to the combined reasons of market and industry transformation.
6.5.2 Technology Transfer and Development in India by Surviving
Manufacturers and New Comers
As the number of manufacturers decreased since the mid 1990s, technology development and
diffusion in India depended on the surviving manufacturers and new comers.
Technology Control - Type of Technology Agreements/Technology
Ownership and Technology Transfer Results
Although the formation of joint ventures or license agreements was the policy and market
requirements for foreign manufacturers to enter the Indian wind market in the early and mid
1990s, this condition eroded from the late 1990s. In 1997 GOI permitted the market entry by
NEG Micon through the establishment of 100% subsidiary, after Micon and NEPC ended theirjoint venture NEPC Micon and Nordtank and Micon merged into NEG Micon in Denmark. GE
Wind founded its subsidiary in India in 2001. Several independent Indian manufacturers were
begun formed as well (Suzlon, NEPC India, and C-WEL).
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Table 6-21: Firm/Technology Ownership and Introduced Turbine Capacity
by Surviving and New Manufacturers in India
Divided Firm/Technology Ownership 100% Firm/Technology Ownership
(Joint venture/License a reement) 100% subsidiarlindeendent Indian firm
Turbine Make and Capacity IIntroduon Turbine Make and Capacity Inrduron
Small-Capacity (less than 500k
Vestas RRB 225-50kW (JV) 1993 1988 C-WEL 250kW (1) 2000
Pioneer Wincon 250kW (JV) 1995 1995
Enercon India 230kW (JV) 1995 1996
Enercon India 300kW (JV) 2005 2005
BHEL-Nordex 200kW (LA) 1994 N/A
BHEL-Nordex 250kW (LA) 1995 1994
Medium-Capacity (between 500kW and 1MW)
Vestas RRB 500kW (JV) 1995 1993 NEG Micon 750kW (S) 1999 1998
Pioneer Wincon 755kW (JV) 2002 1998 GE Wind 600kWa (S) 2002 1998
Enercon India 600kW (JV) 2001 2001 GE Wind 750kW (S) 2002 2001
Enercon India 800kW (JV) 2005 2005
Pioneer Asia 850kW (JV) 2005 2004
NEPC-Norwin 750-180kW (LA) 2005 1998
C-WEL-DeWind 600kW (N/A) 2001 1997
Elecon-Turbowind 600kW (N/A) 2002 N/A
Large-Capacity (larger than 1Turby nt d
NEG Micon 950-200kW (S) 2002 2001
NEG Micon 1.65MW (S) 2004 2003
GE Wind 1.MW (S) 2004 1999
N Suzion 5MW-250kW () 2001 2003
Suzion 1.25MW-250kW (1) 2002 2003
Suzion 2MW-25OkW (1) 2005 2004
JV = Joint Venture, LA = License Agreement, S = Subsidiary, I = Independent
Table 6-21 shows the relationship between firm/technology ownership structure and turbine
capacity introduced to India. Medium- and large-capacity turbines are mostly introduced from
2001 after the worst of the market recession was over. However, more importantly, it is obvious
that technology control through ownership is strongly related to the introduced turbine capacity;
the firms with 100% ownership of technology have introduced larger-capacity turbines than the
firms with divided ownership structure. In particular, turbines over 1MW are only introduced by
the firms with 100% technology ownership.
Tight technology control through the resistance of most foreign manufacturers to pass turbine
licenses of 500kW and larger to their Indian joint venture/license agreement partners is obvious.
It was sited as one of the most important reasons of delay of technology introduction to India in
the 1998 EC report, "Market Analysis and Opportunities for Wind Energy in India" (Wind
Power Monthly 1998b). When the introduction of medium-capacity turbines and their
component production increased during the 2000s after several years of the EC report release,
the frontier had already moved onto multi-MW class turbines. The tight technology control and
delayed turbine introduction still continue until this day.
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The low level of indigenization of high value components in India is also intended by technology
providers to keep such portions of production on their sides. In addition, technology control by
providers is imposed on not only new technology but also on already-transferred technology.
Technological capability building in R&D or innovation is mostly limited by technology
agreements; in many joint venture/license agreements, the technology licenses prohibit any in-
house R&D in India and/or R&D collaborations with other companies and institutions in India
(BHEL 2002).
Significant reasons behind such resistance for replicable technology transfer and technology
upgrading in divided technology ownership are the tightened technology and proprietary
knowledge control and competitiveness management at the frontier since the mid 1990s. First,joint venture relationships can be quite risky for technology provider; the risk was well-
demonstrated by the growth of Gamesa E6lica, which absorbed critical technology through its
joint venture with Vestas A/S. That is why the oversea market expansion by wind turbine
manufacturers has been done mainly through the establishment of 100% subsidiary, wherever the
local governments permit. Second, there is a difficulty of keeping good long-term joint venture
relationships under the condition of constantly changing technology and industry competition.
Joint ventures require strong mutual benefits between the partners, and they are usually
materialized in production advantages (cost reduction) and/or innovation advantages (higher
value input). In the beginning, the Indian partners could only offer production advantages
derived from low labor cost and they were strong by the mid 1990s. Once the Indian market
slowed down from late 1996, however, the production advantages diminished for the local
market as the market size was reduced. In addition, this timing was coincided with the
increasingly tightened control and management by wind turbine manufacturers at the frontier as
a result of the intensified technology competitions. Thus, both the diminished production
advantages and the intensified innovation advantage control by technology providers interrupted
replicable technology transfer and technology upgrading to medium- and large-capacity turbines
in joint ventures/license agreement firms.
On the other hand, 100% technology ownership firms have much smaller concerns over
technology control. Although there are always risks for technology spillovers from employee
turnovers, knowledge accumulation in individual can seldom exceed that in organization, in
particular, in the business environment with the raised technical and financial barriers for entry
and growth such as wind energy. Technology ownership and control are the strong reason
behind why undivided technology ownership has shown the lead over divided technology
ownership in technology introduction to India.
Strategic Role of Indian Partners/Manufacturers in Global Value Chain and
Geographical Capacity and Capability Management and Sourcing
Although the Indian market slowdown diminished the production advantages by local labor,
there is another production advantages that the Indian partners could have offered to keep and
enhance joint venture/license agreement relationship benefits for their frontier partners;
manufacturing high-quality products for export to meet the ever growing market demands
outside India.
286
Although the exact export figures by the Indian manufacturers were not available, in general, the
export from India has been weak. Again, the joint venture/license agreement manufacturers have
not been active in export from India (Table 6-22). In particular, the export activity of Vestas
RRB has been extremely weak, despite the large world market share of Vestas A/S. Pioneer and
BHEL also have not shown any significant export activities. The only notable exception is
Enercon India, which has been used by Enercon GmbH as an export base of generic turbine
components from the beginning of their joint venture. Now, the production facilities of Enercon
India have manufactured the blades for E-66 1.8MW, which is not offered in India, to export to
Europe.
Table 6-22: Export Activity from India by Manufacturer
Manufacturer Export Activities
First Indian manufacturer that exported blades and synchronous generators
Enercon India back to Europe during the 1996-97 year, and its 230kW Indian-made wind
(JV) turbine was exported on March, 1998 to Australia, for the first time (MNES
1997a; MNES 1998). Continuously export to the European markets.
Vestas RRB (JV Very weak. Is expected to increased with the commission of new facility forBV) blade and controller in 2005
BHoneer (JV) No noteworthy export activity
Commissioned a new manufacturing facility for export of 950MW turbines
. I to Europe and other locations in 2003 (Wind Power Monthly 2003d).NEG Micon India However, due to the merger between Vestas and NEG Micon, the export
did not happen as it was planned originally and the export decision was still
pending as of the end of 2005 (Ramakrishnan and Balaji 2006).
GE Wind India (S) Reportedly, assembling and exporting components to China and otherEuropean markets (Siliconindia.com 2005).
NEPC India (I) Export orders from Turkey, Tanzania, Abu Dhabi, Kenya and Kazakhstan(Wind Power Monthly 2003e) for its 225 kW turbines
First Indian manufacturer that exported a complete wind project to
Suzlon Energy (1) overseas; the 12.5MW project using the firm's turbines shipped from
I Mumbai was exported to Huston, Texas in 2002.
JV = Joint Venture, LA = License Agreement, S = Subsidiary, I = Independent
As for subsidiaries, GE Wind has been reportedly increasing activities using the Indian
production facilities as manufacturing hub for export. NEG Micon India has been planning to
export since 2003 but it has not happened yet as of the end of 2005 due to the merger between
NEG Micon and Vestas. The independent manufacturer NEPC India has also been receiving a
string of export orders from other developing countries for its 225kW turbines, but the model
does not have high-tech features of much larger-capacity turbines offered by manufacturers at
the frontier.
Suzlon is another independent company that actively targeting export growth and offers its
turbines on various international markets. Despite the efforts for export and international
marketing, however, the firm's sale largely depended on the domestic Indian market; in 2005,
only about 8% of its sales by capacity came from outside India. However, this dramatically
changed in the first half of 2006 as three-quarters of its order comes from the markets oversea.
Suzlon Chairman Tulsi N. Tanti explanes that a part of the reasons of this dramatic shift is the
Suzlon's acquisition of Hansen Transmissions, a Belgian maker of wind-turbine gearboxes in
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March 2006 (The Economist 2006). This was the second-largest foreign purchase ever made by
an Indian firm and a part of strategy of backward integration to overcome the component supply
bottleneck that has been the main barrier in the firm's growth, according to Suzlon (Suzlon
Energy Ltd. 2006). The acqusition instantenously gave Suzlon an ability to manufacture the
first-class gearboxes and to perform R&D required for new generation of wind turbines, as the
products of Hansen range from outputs of 1.5MW to 3MW.
The weak export performance is an indicator that the Indian manufacturers have not played
significant strategic roles in global value chain and sourcing/geographical capacity and capability
management of their technology providers. Although the availability of finance to explore
oversea market could be a reason for the general weak export performance, it is not a robust one.
All the Indian firms have enough capital to support their export business development on their
own if their technology providers seriously want them to do so. The independent Suzlon also
had strong capital base from its parent group and the firm was listed publicly in summer 2005.
The market development assistance offered through the IREDA Manufacturing Equipment
Financing Scheme that can be applied to the promotion of export activities has been
underutilized because the firms that target the export have enough capital to do so on their own
(IREDA 2002d).
The more robust reason for the weak export performance has been the lack of sufficient
technological capacity and capability of producing high-tech turbine components in India and
strong concerns over the quality of the Indian-made components, as the Suzlon' case clearly
illustrates. As described in Chapter 5, development of the Indian capability of production of
medium- and large-capacity turbines are still weak; the import contents in higher-capacity
machines are still very high and the Indian wind energy industry is still a net importer. Key
components of MW-class wind turbines are imported (MNES 2004; MNES 2005). However, the
technologies demanded in the frontier markets are far more advanced than those indigenized in
India, and the Indian-made technologies have persistent high component failure ratios. With
such deficiency in technical capacity and capability, the Indian facilities have not been as a part
of global network to solve the strong supply-chain bottlenecks reported since the 2001 in the
industry as a whole (Wind Power Monthly 2002b). The bottleneck still continues as the orders
placed in 2005 is expected to be delivered only in 2008 (Danish Wind Industry Association
2005b) for the companies such as Vestas and NEG Micon, but their Indian facilities are not
included in their global production networks and sourcing strategies. And due to the lack of
reputation for high level capacity and capability, Suzlon have had a hard time to expand its
market outside India until the acquisition of Hansen Transmission.
According to DWIA, specifically-tailored wind turbine components are not outsourced to
developing countries for manufacturing, because their specification is very detailed and their
production requires very high level technological capability. Local networks within Denmark
make adaptation and improvement much easier. The Danish and German sub-suppliers are
directly supplying their components to India and China today, also because the manufacturers
cannot offer any guarantees to the locally produced components; internal quality control is
impossible with the local production of gearbox/controller/generators within India or China. On
the other hand, the manufacturers with already established global component sub-supplier
networks such as Siemens (Bonus) have become using their local sourcing, which creates the
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cost advantages while keeping high level of technological quality (Danish Wind Industry
Association 2005b).
Such conditions have contributed to the lack of forward linkages and demonstration effects for
the Indian manufacturers. Without making more conscious efforts of meeting the higher quality
demands, India has had only limited opportunities to improve the quality of production, and this
further deters the chances to be a part of global value chain and sourcing network of technology
providers, hence the chances of replicable technology transfer.
6.5.3 Effects of Transformed Technological Characteristics on
Easiness and Cost Change Potentials of Technology Transfer
This part examines the effects of technological characteristics other than turbine upscaling itself
on technology transfer from technological capability and cost perspectives.
Easiness of Cross-Border Transfer of Technology System and
Components
The effects of easiness of cross-border technology transfer on the transfer results will be
examined from technological management perspective, based on technological capability
required to perform specific value chain activities and the level of system integration needs for
specific technology. As examined in Chapter 5, many innovations were introduced to India on
fairly limited basis by a few manufacturers with several years of delay. The transformed
characteristics of wind energy technology innovations at the frontier are an important reason
behind the delayed and limited technology transfer.
Easiness of Product Technology Transfer
In terms of product technology transfer, the increased systemic nature and system integration
needs of wind energy technology and progressively more specialized design and function of
components for specific models have made it extremely unlikely for components to be
transferred without the introduction of the entire turbine models. Especially, the close
relationship between the choice of rotor power regulation and the choice of rotor speed control,
the necessity of integration of blade technology in materials/aerofoil designs and production
methods, the correspondence of SCADA software to specific turbine controller, and the
computerized design optimization of entire technology system make it impossible for these
technologies to be transferred on individual component basis.
Easiness of Production Technology Transfer
As for production technology transfer, the Indian wind industry quickly indigenized small-
capacity turbine production technology due to the combination of the following reasons besides
the necessity of cost reduction: 1) relative simplicity of small-capacity wind turbine technology;
2) basic similarity of small-capacity turbine component manufacturing with other mechanical
engineering parts such as gas turbines and electricity generators that made the component
suppliers easily adopt foreign know-how; and 3) availability of capable and versatile engineers in
India due to high level science and engineering education.
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However, the increased high-tech nature of components in medium- and large-capacity turbines
and their technological complexity require very high level of technological capability for
production and adjustment. In India, they cannot be manufactured to the level that satisfies the
guarantees that each manufacturer is required to provide to buyers. As a result, transfer and
indigenization of production technology of more updated technology have been fairly limited, as
already mentioned.
Easiness of Project Execution Technoloqy Transfer
In terms of project execution technology, technology transfer has gotten easier with advancement
of computer technology and software products. The limitation, however, can be posed by the
system integration needs of project execution technology product, e.g., SCADA products. Still,
many generic knowledge of project execution can be relatively easily transferred and
accumulated, once initial differences are cleared.
Increased Difficulty of Component Technology Transfer
In general, cross-border transfer of individual technology components innovated at the frontier
has increasingly difficult as their system integration needs and technological capability
requirements have become higher and higher.
Cost Change Potentials by Cross-Border Technology Transfer
The cost reduction/increase potentials are another very important factor that determines the
transfer results from cost management perspective. Costs can be reduced by reduction of
labor/materials/transportation costs through relocating innovation/production/project execution
activities, while they can be increased by initial and continuous investment needs on the
relocation of various activities.
Cost Reduction by Project Execution Technology Transfer
Due to data deficiency, it is very difficult to examine the exact cost change potentials for various
technologies by cross-border technology transfer. However, it is clear that the easiest and most
cost-effective activity relocation is project execution technology transfer and that is why this
value activity has been indigenized internationally. It only requires minimum facility
investments, and project execution cost is reduced greatly by low cost labor in India. The
continuous education cost is not extensive either, as the experiences accumulate locally and
much of knowledge is inherently generic.
Cost Reduction by Innovation Technoloqy Transfer
On the other hand, innovation activity relocation requires high initial investment costs in facility
development. However, the labor cost reduction potential is large, as long as human resources
with required high-level innovation capability are available and technology holders are willing to
reduce technology control and take risks of releasing tacit knowledge from their original home
grounds.
In general, this is not a case. Looking at the case of Suzlon, its core R&D facilities are still in
Germany (nacelle) and the Netherlands (blade technology), while the Indian R&D facility
engages in control software development with some European sub-suppliers such as MITA
Teknik A/S of Denmark. In the case of Enercon, its core R&D facilities are also located in
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Germany, although a support R&D facility does exist in India. These cases clearly illustrate that
required innovation resources and human capability are still scarce in India. All other Indian
manufacturers do not have innovation facilities. The needs for high-level human resources and
technology control outweigh the cost reduction possibility through innovation activity relocation
to a low labor cost country such as India.
Cost Reduction by Production Technology Transfer
The cost change potentials of various components by production technology transfer are most
difficult to examine because of unavailability of such cost data due to its proprietary nature. It
has been reported that local production of blade and controller (approximately 30-35% in value
terms) planned to start in late 2005 at Vestas RRB is expected to reduce the cost of its wind
turbines (225kW and 500kW) by 25% (Business Line Bureau 2005a) and local sourcing of
gearboxes, alternators, brake systems and controllers, which currently imported by NEG Micon
India and together accounted for 25% in value terms, would bring down turbine costs by 10-
15% (Ramakrishnan and Balaji 2006). These numbers suggest that the cost reduction potentials
vary according to components and their combination of indigenization.
Necessary Economies of Scale
Although the cost reduction potentials by indigenization are quite large mainly due to low
labor cost (in particular for high value components such as blade and controller) and high cost
of transportation, they also depend on how large the manufacturer can create the effects of
economies of scale, which are determined by the manufacturers' market share and export
status. For example, in order to make indigenization of blade production cost effective in India
by creating economies of scale large enough, 300 per year production of blades for small- and
medium-capacity turbines are required (Vestas RRB 2002). This explains why only three
companies (LM Glasfiber, Suzlon, and Enercon India) could have blade manufacturing
capacity and capability in India until recently; all the three firms have enough economies of
scale through the Indian domestic market shares and/or export. The 2003 expansion of blade
production facilities by Suzlon and the 2005 Vestas RRB decision of entering in-house blade
manufacturing were prompted by the Indian market growth and its good future prospect since
2003.
Relocation Costs
In terms of cost increase potentials, the initial investment costs for relocation of production
activities are large due to the necessity of setting up new facilities and education/training of
employees.
6.5.4 Effects of Manufacturing Incentives on Cost Reduction and
Technological Capability Building
Import Duty
Import duty can be used for different purposes; low import duty can be used as market
stimulation policy by reducing the cost, while high duty can encourage indigenization of
production. Table 6-23 shows the ratio of cost increase per total turbine cost for four imported
components, calculated from the Indian import duty since 1993 (Table 5-23) and the
approximate ratio of component costs in total turbine cost (Table 5-54). Table 6-23 illustrates
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that the duty increase during the 1997-1998 year from zero to 22% raised the cost of the four
components by almost 10% in medium-capacity turbines.
The purpose of the raise was the stimulation of technology indigenization of high value
components; GOI suddenly turned to the original use of import substitution. However, the
change did not attain the goal; the duty change came too suddenly for the manufacturers and sub-
suppliers to adjust their production capacity and capability, as they were not ready to
manufacture many of high value components. Also the market at that time was too weak for
them for additional investment. Although the raised import duties could have encouraged
production technology transfer if the market was stronger, they only lowered the demand-pulling
force for technology transfer by contributing to the further market slowdown.
Realizing their negative effects by the strong industry protests at that time, GOI lowered the
duties in 1998 (IWTMA 2002). As a result, the cost increase was almost halved at least for these
four components. However, technology indigenization has not advanced well, in particular for
gearboxes and controllers, despite the lowered duties since 1998. In 2003, the duties for sensors,
brake hydraulics and calipers, and flexible coupling were raised from 5% to 25% to encourage
indigenization. They were lowered again to 5% in the following year as the attempt did not
produce the hopeful result.
Table 6-23: Cost Increase by Import Duty on Four Components
Components 1993 4/1997 4/1998 4/2002 4/2003 7/2004(Approx. RatioIIII IIin Total Turbine 1997 3/1998 3/2002 3/2003 6/2004 PresentCost) ____
Blade Duty 0%* 12% 9% 5%
500kW 15% Cost 1.8% 1.4% --
1.5-2MW 17-20% Increase ---- ---- 1.5-1.8% 0.9-1%
Controller Duty 0%* 22% 9% 5%
500kW 21% Cost 4.6% 1.9% --
1.5-2MW 8-9% Increase ---- --- 0.7-0.8% 0.4-0.5%
Gearbox Dut 0%* 22% 9% 5%
500kW 15% Cost 3.3% 1.4% --
1.5-2MW 13-14% Increase ---- --- 1.2-1.3% 0.7%
Brake System Duty 0%* 22% 9% 5% 25% 5%
500kW 1% Cost 0.2% 0.1% 0.05% 0.25% 0.05%
1.5-2MW 1% Increase ---- ----
Total 500kW Cost 0%* 9.9% 4.8%
of Four 1.5-2MW Increase ---- ---- 3.5-4% 2.1-2.2% 2.3-2.5% 2.1-2.2%
* 0% duty applied to these components as long as the number of total imported component did
not exceed ten.
The cost increase figures for 1.5-2MW in the 1990s and those for 500kW in the 2000s were not
calculated because the cost ratios for these turbines were based on the numbers for turbines
produced in different time frames.
Another conflicting use of import duty was 80% duty posed on blade raw materials between
1993 and 1997. In 1993 the Indian wind industry just began its formation, and it was blades that
the industry most strongly pushed for indigenization for cost reduction. With the consistent
efforts by the industry players to bring the frontier blade production to India, several joint
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ventures (LM Glasfiber India, Enercon India, TTG Industries, and Polymarin-Jyoti) were formed
by 1996. However, GOI did not reduce the import duty on blade raw materials (glassfiber and
resin). Blade raw materials require high technological capacity and capability for handling and
temperature control for production, and it was not possible for any Indian firms at that time to
handle without the inputs from foreign technology providers. This import duty raised the
production cost 80%, wiping out the possible 20% cost reduction by low labor cost; the imported
blades were cheaper than the ones made in India (Wind Power Monthly 1996c). The high duty
made one joint venture Polymarin-Jyoti terminate the agreement without producing any blades at
all and forced to slow down the business for LM Glasfiber India as well (Wind Power Monthly
1996c; Wind Power Monthly 1996d). After the removal of the 80% duty in 1997, the blade
manufacturing advanced in India, especially by production at LM Glasfiber India and Enercon
India.
Exercise Duty
As the record of import duty as manufacturing incentives has been mixed, the Indian exercise
duty policy also shows inconsistency. The 1993 tax rule that set wind turbines exempt from
excise duty and sales tax was in place to reduce manufacturing cost. This was a good incentive.
The 1998 change of exercise duty system set no exercise duty on first parts of wind turbines and
rotor blades, while placing both exercise duty and sales tax on spare parts, in order to encourage
high-quality production and assembly of the first parts to avoid repairs and replacement. This
policy successfully encouraged high quality production and assembly of the first parts (IWTMA
2002), and these measures were effective as cost reduction and manufacturing incentives.
However, exercise duty has been also used as a sort of manufacturing disincentives at the same
time. Exercise duty has been zero on domestically manufactured components, final output,
assembling and shipping, but imposed if further values are added by domestic manufacturers to
the inputs. The duty ratio is average 16% on the cost of the inputs. This was one important
reason that has prevented indigenization of higher value components (BHEL 2002).
Lack of Political Capacity and Capability
Both import duty and exercise duty in India have shown the conflicting usage as manufacturing
incentives and had both positive and negative effects on market development and technological
capability building.
The timing and the level of change of import duty have been abrupt and inadequate, indicating
that GOI has not adequately grasped the realistic conditions of the industry players. In the early
years, it was because the Ministry of Finance decided the duty, while MNES possessed weak
power in the government. Over the years, MNES increased its influence and the coordination
skills with other ministries, and the industry has successfully built political capacity and capacity
though the formation and lobbing activities of IWTMA (formed in 1997) and the Indian Wind
Energy Association (IWEA, formed in 2002). However, the frequent change of import duty still
shows the insufficiency of policy formation ability, which is also seen in the use of exercise duty
as well.
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6.5.5 Section Summary
Effects of Competitiveness Management Transformation at the Frontier on
Technology Development and Diffusion in India
The transformation of technological characteristics and its effects on industry structural
modification and transformation of competitive strategy at the frontier have had the significant
impacts on cross-border technology transfer to India.
Technology transfer was active in the early to mid 1990s through technology collaborations with
technology providers from various countries. By 1998, however, many providers pulled out of
the Indian market. The reasons varied from the market slowdown since late 1996, financial/
technical/ethical problems with the Indian partners, to their own business exits as a consequence
of industry consolidation at the frontier.
Technology gaps between the frontier and India began appeared during the mid 1990s. The
reduction of technology providers decreased the introduction of technology. In addition, the
surviving technology collaborations also slowed down the introduction of updated technology.
The tendency of continuously using less-updated technology is stronger in divided technology
ownership firms (joint ventures and license agreements) than undivided ownership firms (100%
foreign subsidiaries and an independent Indian ownership firm with European innovation base).
The increasingly tighter technology and cost management and control at the frontier and the
market slowdown since the mid 1990s have reduced strategic advantages of joint ventures and
license agreements with the Indian partners, which require continuous and strong mutual benefits
from the partners on both sides. The resistance to pass production licenses to the Indian partners
became obvious from turbines above 500kW since the mid 1990s. While the growing high-tech
nature of wind energy requires advancement in production capacity and capability, the persisting
low quality production despite the long-time indigenization efforts in India offset any production
(cost) advantages derived from low cost labor. At the same time, the market was slowing down;
production advantages themselves were diminishing as the revenues from the Indian market were
reduced. There were very little advantages for technology providers in joint ventures to keep
updating technology, as the Indian partners could not offer them much return. The lack of proper
technological capability to meet higher quality demands at the frontier and the absence of
forward linkages and demonstration effects have limited the opportunities to improve the quality
of production in India and further deterred the chances to be a part of global value chain and
sourcing network of technology providers, creating a negative feedback loop regardless
ownership structure.
The transformation of technological characteristics also has had direct impacts on cross-border
transfer. Technology components innovated at the frontier has increasingly become difficult to
be transferred as individual basis as their system integration needs have become higher and
higher. Acquiring high level technology by transfer also requires high level capability as well as
cumulative experiences, but technological capacity and capability supply to attract more updated
technology have been weak in India. Thus, supply-push technology transfer has been weak, as
the Indian side has not built up sufficient capacity and capability to support the transformed
global technology and cost management needs of technology providers.
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Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Settings on Supply-Push
Technology Transfer
In contrast to the frontier, the Indian government employed various industrial policy measures
for industry development from the beginning. Wind energy policy became a part of the massive
economic reform efforts since 1991, which eased the requirements for FDI, reduced corporate
taxes, and began utilizing import duty mechanism to manage cost and technological capability
building. Along with the market boom created by lucrative tax incentives, these industrial policy
measures brought more than 30 foreign wind turbine manufacturers to India through numerous
joint ventures and a couple of license agreements from 1993. The revolving fund used by
IREDA for wind project financing effectively eliminated the danger of bilateral concessionary
financing, allowing diverse sources of technology introduction.
However, the lack of supervision of firm operations and technology/project quality control
measures contributed to the limited production capacity formation, as only handful
collaborations actually built manufacturing facilities and it allowed many low quality projects to
be prevailed. Placing the technology and project quality control measures was urgent
requirements for healthy and sustainable industry development in the mid 1990s. Gradual
strengthening of the technology and project quality controls since 1995 contributed to
eliminating low-quality technology collaborations and projects and raised the industry
technology standards by influencing the Indian manufacturer-developer strategy and
technological capability building.
Several other measures placed to support the industry capability building had very limited
effects. The Manufacturing Equipment Financing Scheme by IREDA, which offers the market
development assistance loan for domestic and export market development, has not been used by
developer-manufacturers which have enough capacity to finance such market developments on
their own. The export cultivation efforts by MNES have also been limited to its financial and
consultancy services to other developing countries. There has been the lack of more direct and
specific technology-push policy to support the manufacturers to build higher capacity and
capability to become the export bases, due to the limitation of government intervention to
individual joint ventures/license agreements. Most of technological decisions are left to the
mercy of foreign technology providers, but they have strictly controlled which technologies to be
introduced and how they are to be handled in India.
As for technological capacity and capability building, the contradictory use of import duty for
cost reduction and indigenous technology development discouraged not only technology transfer
but also market investment. The conflicting use of manufacturing incentives has been seen in the
use of exercise duty as well; imposing high exercise duty on high value activities has had
negative impacts on improvement of technological capability building, while the differentiation
between the first and second components did contributed to the improvement of production and
assembly activities. The lack of consistency in these manufacturing incentives have confused the
industry and contributed to hindering technology transfer and production capability building of
higher value components.
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Section 6.6: Suitability of European Technology to India
This section examines cross-border technology transfer from the frontier to India from the
perspective of suitability and adjustment needs of the European technology to several Indian
specific conditions. The market demands for technology for low wind and weak grids mentioned
in Section 6.4 are examined in more details in this section.
6.6.1 Indian Specific Conditions
There are three Indian specific conditions, which have been particularly important for wind
energy technology development and diffusion: low wind, weak grids, and infrastructure
deficiency in both power T&D system and transportation.
Low
Wind
Wind
(m/s).
Wind
resource of a specific site can be expressed by annual average power per unit area called
Power Density (WPD, expressed in watt per square meter or W/m 2) and mean wind speed
Wind Conditions and Turbine Installation in Denmark and Germany
A comparison of geographical distribution of wind turbines with wind resource maps at the
frontier shows the concentration of turbine installations on sites with good high wind resources.
Table 6-24: Wind Resources in Denmark and Germany
at 50m above Ground Level
Shelterd Open Plain Sea Coast Open Sea Hils and
m/s W/m2 m/s W/m2 m/s W/m2 m/s W/m m/s W/m'
Denmark & 5.0 150 6.5 300 7.0 400 8.0 600 10.0 1200German Costal I I I I I I I I I I
States 6.0 250 7.5 500 8.5 700 9.0 800 11.5 1800
German Inland 4.5 100 5.5 200 6.7 250 7.0 400 8.5 700
StatesI I I I I I I I6.0 150 6.5 300 7.0 400 8.0 600 10.0 1200
German Inland 3.5 50 4.5 100 5.0 150 5.5 200 7.0 400
StatesI I I I I I I I4.5 100 5.5 200 6.0 250 7.0 400 8.5 700
German Inland
States C <3.5 <50 <4.5 <100 <5.0 <150 <5.5 <200 <7.0 <400
German Costal States = Niedersachsen, Scheleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Bremen,
and Hamburg
German Inland I = Nordrhein-Westfalen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Berlin, Sachsen, ThOringen,
Hessen, Saarland, Rheinland-Pfatz, and Northenr part of Baden-W0rttenberg
German Inland 11 = Bayern
German Inland Ill = Southern part of Baden-W0rttenberg
Sources: Interpolated from European Wind Atlas by RISO National Laboratory in (Danish Wind IndustryAssociation 2003) and a German state map
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The Wind Atlas of Denmark by the RISO National Laboratory (Danish Wind Industry
Association 2003) tells that the inland sites in Denmark have mostly wind resources indicated as
Sheltered Terrain in Table 6-24, but other locations belong to either Open Plan and Sea Coast,
which have good resources with high wind (mean wind speed above 6.5m/s and WPD above
300W/m 2). The examination of a wind turbine siting map of Denmark (Dannemand Andersen
1999) shows that turbines are spread across the entire country fairly evenly. However, the
increased awareness of wind resources and the focus on economics led to heavier siting on rural
areas in North and Western Jutland and Southern part of Zealand (BTM Consult ApS 1998b).
The active offshore development efforts also increased the concentration of turbines, especially
on open sea off the coasts of North and Western Jutland and Southern part of Zealand, which
have very high wind resources (mean wind speed above 8.0m/s and WPD above 600W/m 2)
during the early 2000s.
The geographical distribution of turbine installation in Germany more strongly reflects wind
resource availability than Denmark. In Germany, the states facing or close to the coasts have
better wind resources available, as wind resources normally decline with increased distance from
the coasts (Table 6-24). As a result, the costal states have more wind turbine installed, but the
regional distribution changed over the years.
1600.0
1400.0
1200.0
1000.0
800.0
600.0
400.0
200.0
0.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
-+- Coast States (Niedersachsen, Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, Bremen, and Hamburg)
-I-- Inland 1 (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandenburg, and Berlin)
--.- Inland 2 (Saarland, Rheinland-Pfalz, Hessen, ThUringen, and Sachsen)
-x-- Inland 3 (Baden-WOrttenberg and Bayern)
Sources: (DEWI 2002a; DEWI 2003a; DEWI 2004a; DEWI 2005; DEWI 2006; DEWI 1994; DEWI
1995; DEWI 1996; DEWI 1997a; DEWI 1998a; DEWI 1999a; DEWI 2000a; DEWI 2001a)
Figure 6-10: Geographical Distribution of Installed Capacity in Germany
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DEW1 categorizes all German states into four groups by distance from the coasts (Figure 6-
10). 102 The new installations in the first row (costal states) increased continuously, reaching
their peak in 2001 and 2002. The second row of Inland 1 shows a similar tendency, reaching
their peak in 2002. The installations in both the regions have declined since. The third row of
Inland 2 and the fourth row of Inland 3 have had much lower numbers of installations. This
demonstrates that the majority of turbines in Germany have been installed on sites with similar
wind resource with Denmark (Sheltered Terrain, Open Plain, or Sea Coast for the row for
Denmark and German Costal States in Table 6-24) and with a little bit lower wind resources
(Sheltered Terrain or Open Plain for the row for German Inland States A in Table 6-24).
Considering that turbine hub heights of medium- and large-capacity turbines installed since the
mid 1990s are much higher than 50m and the amount of power produced by wind turbine is
proportional to the cubic of wind speed (m/s) which increases as the height increases, most of the
turbines installed since the mid 1990s at the frontier have been at sites with much better wind
resources than those described in Table 6-24.
Wind Conditions and Turbine Installation in India
Table 6-25 shows wind resources of six states that have more than 99% of total installed capacity
in India (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu) as of
the end of March 2005, based on the results from testing stations established by the National
Wind Resource Assessment Program since 1983.
It is very clear that Tamil Nadu has the best wind resources in the country, which obviously
contributed to its largest installed capacity along with its conducive state policy. Karnataka also
have several locations with above 350W/n WPD (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005).
However, other states have mostly WPD below 300W/m 2, which corresponds to Sheltered
Terrain (lowest wind) of Denmark and German Costal States and Sheltered Terrain and Open
Plain (low wind) of German Inland States A in Table 6-24.
Table 6-25: Wind Resources in Six Wind States in India
Installed NumNumber (%) of Stations with WPD
State Capacity uteto <200 W/m2 200-300 W/m2 300< W/m2
(% in Total) at 50m at 50m at 50m
Andhra Pradesh 120.6MW (3%) 61 26 (42%) 25 (41%) 10 (16%)
Gujarat 253.5MW (7%) 55 17 (31%) 26 (47%) 12(22%)
Karnataka 410.7MW (11%) 40 14 (35%) 15(38%) 11(28%)
Maharashtra 456.3MW (13%) 68 39 (57%) 25 (37%) 4 (6%)
Rajasthan 284.8MW (8%) 32 26(81%) 5 (16%) 1 (3%)
Tamil Nadu 2036.9MW (57%) 57 14 (25%) 13 (23%) 30 (53%)**
* The number only includes the stations that WPD at 50m above ground level are available.
** 14 stations among them have above 400W/m2 WPD.
Source: Interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005)
102 The DEWI categorization of inlands 1, 2, and 3 is slightly different from the categorization of inland states A. B.
and C in Table 6-24 but roughly corresponds.
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The above examination illustrates that Denmark, German and India all installed turbines on the
sites with low wind resources. This verifies that the technology driving market demand for low
wind conditions have existed both at the frontier and in India. However, there is a significant
difference between the two sides. While India has very limited locations with relatively high
wind resources, Open Plain, Sea Coast, as well as Open Sea of Denmark and the German costal
states, which have been the most densely installed locations at the frontier, offer excellent high
wind resources. Turbines at the frontier first occupied those high wind sites, and then gradually
moved to lower wind sites in recent years, especially in Germany.
Weak Grids
The term "power quality" refers to voltage stability, frequency stability, and the absence of
various forms of electrical noise (e.g., flicker or harmonic distortion) on electricity grid. AC
with a nice sinusoidal shape without instability in voltage/frequency and electrical noises is
preferred by power companies and their customers (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003).
Weak grids are more often found in remote areas, where better wind resources are available and
therefore wind energy development is usually concentrated. But in those areas the T&D grids
are usually very weak because they are the remote corner of the grid.
Weak electrical grids have low-power carrying ability that can frequently cause the following
problems by wind turbines: 1) voltage instability caused by power surge due to the electricity fed
by wind turbines into the grid and reactive power; 2) flickers, which are short-lived voltage
variations caused by turbines feeding to the grid; and 3) harmonic and inter-harmonic distortion
caused by the application of power electronics for power supply and motor drives as well as by
variable speed wind turbines with power converters. In addition, on weak grid networks,
because the majority of customer loads are single-phase, voltage unbalance can be high if loads
are not correctly shared out between the phases (Danish Wind Industry Association 2003;
European Commission 1999).
While wind turbines influence the power quality of grid, the power quality of grid also influences
the power performance and safety of wind turbines as well as the lifespan of their mechanical
and electrical components. First, wind turbine performance is compromised by: 1) shutting
down of turbines during frequent power outages that are common in India; 2) frequency
variation; and 3) large voltage unbalance that increases the loss in WRIG and can cause the
shutdown by overheating WRIG. Second, the safety of wind turbines is also influenced by weak
grids as follows: 1) a high number of power outages increases turbine failures; 2) voltage and
frequency variations or voltage unbalance can trip relays or result in generator overheating that
can cause failures (this can also reduce the lifespan of WRIG by exposing it to overstress); and
3) low voltage can reduce the maximum torque of WRIG, which is essential to the safety of wind
turbines with directly connected WRIG. Third, frequent power outages increase wear and tear of
mechanical brakes, which will be used for full-braking instead of electrical braking in normal
condition (Sorensen, Unnikrishnan, and Mathew 2001).
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indian Weak Grids
The Indian power system has been described very weak in general. While the power quality of
connection points of wind turbines is basically poor, wind turbine connections themselves also
worsen the power quality because the grid reinforcement has been insufficient to integrate wind
turbines into the grid system. In the areas with many wind turbines installations, insufficient
capacities of the grid cause large variations in steady-state voltage as well as in frequency and
trigger power outages on the grid. Variations in steady-stage voltage and frequency exceed the
tolerance set by the Indian standards are said significant compared to the European systems
(Sorensen, Unnikrishnan, and Mathew 2001). In general, the Indian grid frequency fluctuates
between 48 to 51 Hz, while the European grids offer constant 50 or 60 Hz. The Indian grid
frequency is extremely unreliable and does not adequately translate the generated power into
T&D facilities, which creates the profit loss to investors.
In terms of power quality problems caused by wind turbines, all of the above problems of weak
grids are common in India. However, their seriousness varies. For example, while harmonic
emission is generally associated with variable speed wind turbines with power electronics, in
India it had also been measured from turbines with WRIG with irregular windings. Yet, the
measurements indicate that the limits in the European voltage quality standard EN 50160 are not
exceeded in terms of harmonic emission. The measurements of substations in Tamil Nadu and
Gujarat also showed that voltage unbalance did not exceed the limits set by EN 50160 (Sorensen,
Unnikrishnan, and Mathew 2001). Instead, the most serious weak grid related issue in India has
been the problem of voltage instability, in particular reactive power consumption.
Reactive Power Consumption
Reactive power is the consumption of power from the grid to create a magnetic field inside
WRIG in order to start it. The problem is specific for wind electricity generation using WRIG
at low loading stage. Reactive power shifts the phase of AC in the grid near the turbines and
reduces the efficiently of transmission. Reactive power is generally consumed by the
following components: wind turbines themselves; step-up transformers from turbines to wind
farm feeders; wind farm feeders; and substation transformers. Reactive power needs to be
adjusted by switchable electrical capacitor banks.
The reactive power issue becomes more intense after the mid 1990s in India. Although the
problem can be eased by placing capacitor banks, a large difference in attitude toward the
reactive power between SEBs and wind power investors has created political problems. Most
of the SEB directives mention that reactive power should not be more than 30% of the wind
generated power. However, in reality, the prevailing low-wind conditions can create repeated
start-stop operations and reactive power could consume up to 70% of wind generated power
(Indiapoweronline 2001). TNEB began charging the reactive power fees from June 1995,
which has increased over the years, hoping investors to place capacitor banks into their
projects. Unfortunately the uncertainty surrounding the levels of reactive power taken from the
grid and the costs related to it caused many developers to hesitate making the further
investment, and made the issue very contentious, in particular in Tamil Nadu. Wind investors
consider that SEBs have passed their own responsibility of upgrading the T&D facilities and
eliminating the weak grid related problems to them by placing extra charges (WINPRO
interview 2002). In general, unclear responsibilities regarding who need to take care of these
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problems on the grid interface have created different perceptions toward viability of wind
power projects among investors, consumers, and policy makers, and this has caused the
conflicts among them.
Infrastructure Deficiency
Besides the weak grid problems, the best wind resources on remote areas also make resource
costs extremely high due to the necessary of building additional road infrastructure and power
grid. Historically, India had shown low investments on infrastructure; infrastructure deficiency
has been considered as one of the important causes of deterring economic development in
general.
T&D System Deficiency and Losses
In India, the weak grids described above are a part of the large electricity grid system problem.
Especially, the rapid decay and deficiency of grid penetration and T&D facilities, including the
lack of substations, have been exacerbated by the financial problems of SEBs during the 1990s.
The T&D losses due to system inadequacy are very significant in India, varying between 20%
and 45% (IEA 2002b). Table 6-26 shows no improvement of the losses over the years; in fact,
the average T&D losses have been constantly increasing during the 1900s and 2000s. Also in
some urban areas, the reported losses are a couple of times higher than the numbers in Table 6-
26 due to more frequent theft. These high T&D losses have been considerable investment
disincentives, because only 80% to 90% of the generated power (or less) has been used to create
the profit (C-WET 2002).
Table 6-26: T&D Losses in India
Year T&D Loss (%)
1992-93 21.8
1993-94 21.41
1994-95 21.13
1995-96 22.27
1996-97 24.53
1997-98 24.79
1998-99 26.45
1999-00 30.93
2000-01 32.86
2001-02 33.98
2002-03 32.54
2003-04 32.53
Source: (Central Electricity Authority 2004)
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Transportation and Loqistical Infrastructure Deficiency
Other infrastructure deficiencies have been also a problem, especially in transportation and
logistics.
Surface Transportation
Although the privatization took places in various infrastructure sectors since 1991 in India, the
road and highway facilities in many sections of the country are still at inadequate levels. As of
March 2006, India has 3.34 million kilometers of road network, which is the second largest in
the world. Annually the traffic on roads is growing at a rate of 7 to 10% and the vehicle
population growth is 12%. It is estimated that roads carry almost 67% of freight. The total
length of National Highways in the country as of March 2006 is 65,569km, which comprises
only 2% of total road network, but carries over 40% of total traffic (Department of Road
Transport and Highways 2006).
The World Bank (2005) reports that constantly overcrowded roads, government-imposed
multiple check point systems, mixed use of roads by motorized and non-motorized traffic,
almost complete lack of highway safety enforcement, and poor quality of equipment have
contributed to the slow transit times and the poor reliability of timely delivery by modern
standards in India. In terms of vehicle fleet, the Indian surface transportation industry today
uses mainly two- and three-axle rigid trucks with an open top freight box of 1,100 to 1,400
cubic feet. The low cubic capacity reflects the freight market of predominantly heavy, often
unpackaged commodities, which are hardly suitable for just-in-time logistic needs of computer
industry and other high-tech undertakings. Additional introduction of high cube vans, fast line-
haul transit, and large multi-axel tractor-trailer trucks, which occupy only 2% of total vehicle
fleet and 10% of market share today, are necessary to serve high-tech commodity
transportation needs and reduce costs. In general, the road transportation service is not
adequate for higher value manufactures or time-sensitive export trades that comprise a growing
share of the Indian economy (World Bank Energy & Infrastructure Operations Division 2005).
Port Infrastructure
Similar weakness can be found in the Indian port system. India has 12 major ports under the
Union List of the Constitution, which are managed by the Port Trust of India under GOI, and
184 minor ports. The ports handle 90% of all foreign trade in India. The major ports accounts
for almost 76% of total sea trade while the remaining 24% is handled by the minor ports. The
liquid and dry bulk cargo constitutes about 83% of total volume of traffic handled, while the
container and general cargo comprise the remaining 17% (Ministry of External Affairs
Investment and Trade Promotion Division 2006).
The productivity of ports in terms of the Average Ship Turn Around (ASTA) and the Average
Ship Berth Output (ASBO) has improved in recent years. The ASTA has decreased from 8.1
days in the 1990-91 year to 7.8 days in the 1996-97 year to 4.84 days in the 1999-2000 year
and further to 3.47 days in the 2002-03 year. The ASBO also increased from 3,372 tones in the
1990-91 year to 4,249 tones in the 1996- 97 year to 6,321 tones in the 1999-2000 year, to 8750
tones in the 2002-03 year (Indian Ports Association 2003).
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Due to the lack of modernization, however, the performance of the Indian ports does not
compare favorably with that of efficient international ports at all. The Indian ports suffer from
inefficiency, low capacity, and low productivity, which are resulting in high costs and long
vessel turnaround times. In international terms, the labor and equipment productivity levels are
still quite low due to outdated equipment, poor training, low equipment handling levels by
labor, uneconomic labor practices, long idling time at berth, and time loss at shift change
(Indiacore.com 2006). Inefficiency of Indian ports and services has resulted in higher through-
port and sea transport costs.
Installation Equipment
The lack of adequate cranes was another problem for installation of medium-capacity turbines
during the mid to late 1990s. For example, when Tacke first brought the 600kW turbines that
exceeded the size of standard container to India in 1996, the firm took nine months to deliver
them to the planned site, because of not only infrastructure limitation of the Indian road system
but also the lack of cranes necessary for erecting turbines in that class. At that time, only two
cranes were capable to build turbines of the size in India, and NEPC Micon occupied all
drivers (Twele 2005). Since then, improvements were made gradually by the efforts of each
manufacturer. Today, there are cranes available to install 2MW-class turbines.
Infrastructure Deficiency and Gaps between Gross Resource Potential and Technical
Potential
According to the National Wind Resource Assessment Program updated as of March 2005,
approximately only 30% of wind resources are available technically in India, compared to gross
potential (Table 6-27). The infrastructure problems are an important reason of high cost of wind
resource availability and installation in India.
Table 6-27: Wind Power Potential as of March 2005 in India
Gross Technical Technical/State Potential (MW) Potential (MW) Gross Ratio(Ratio in Total)
Andhra Pradesh 8275 1920 (14.3%) 23.2%
Gujarat 9675 1780 (13.3%) 18.4%
Karnataka 6620 1180 (8.8%) 17.8%
Kerala 875 605 (4.5%) 69.1%
Madhya Pradesh 5500 845 (6.3%) 15.4%
Maharashtra 3650 3040 (22.7%) 83.3%
Orissa 1700 780 (5.8%) 45.9%
Rajasthan 5400 910 (6.8%) 16.9%
Tamil Nadu 3050 1880 (14.0%) 61.6%
West Bengal 450 450 (3.4%) 100%
Total 45195 13390 (100.0%) 29.6%
Source: (MNES 2005)
Table 6-27 shows that the industrial states such as Andra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and
Tamil Nadu demonstrate higher technical potential than other states because they tend to have
better grid penetration rate and infrastructure in general and their SEBs are financially better
shape than other agricultural states. Among them, both Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu have
particularly high level of gross-technical potential ratios (83.3% and 61.6%, respectively).
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The general road and port infrastructure problems have forced the wind turbine manufacturers
and their production facilities to concentrate on several locations with better transportation
infrastructure such as Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and the Union Territories of Daman and
Pondicherry. The proximity between market and manufacturers is important due to high
transportation cost in India, as these locations are also close to the strong markets (Gujarat,
Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra). However, the transportation infrastructure problems are a part of
significant reasons of weak development of export business in wind too.
6.6.2 Appropriateness of European Technology to Indian Specific
Conditions and Technology Transfer Results
This part examines appropriateness of the European technology to the Indian specific conditions
described above as well as the effectiveness of the efforts made to solve any inadequacy.
Ready-available Frontier Technology
Pitch Regulations and Variable Speed Turbines with Power Converter
Most of the problems associated with the Indian weak grids are related to the direct grid
connection without power converter, seen in stall-regulated, fixed-speed turbines or turbines with
variable rotor resistance (Vestas OptiSlip@). The most typical problem is reactive power
consumed by WRIG. Although capacitor banks compensate this problem technically, the best
solution is to use variable speed turbines with partial- or full-scale power electronics converter
that generates or absorbs reactive power, thus eliminating the source of the problem itself.
Besides the reactive power problem, variable speed turbines with power converter solve many
other weak grid related problems. First, they eliminate the need for smooth grid connection, i.e.,
soft starter. Second, frequency variations in the grid do not affect the performance of wind
turbines with power converter, which controls the frequency on the generator side independently
of the grid frequency. Third, they generally produce significantly lower flicker than fixed-speed
turbines. Incorporation of power conditioning equipment also provides the control of power
factor to turbine operators/utilities (BTM Consult ApS 2005b; European Wind Energy
Association 2003).
In terms of frequency variations of the grid, pitch regulation can address the issue quite well;
although the fluctuating Indian frequency between 48 to 51 Hz affects the performance of wind
turbines, the effect is only limited to stall-regulated wind turbines. The performance of stall-
regulated wind turbines is lowered because the changes in grid frequency cause the changes in
rotor speed, which changes the angle of attack of relative wind speed as seen from rotating
blades. The calculation of variations in values of power curve' 0 3 of stall-regulated wind turbines
demonstrates that the maximum value of power curve varies by approximately 20% due to
frequency variation from 48 to 51 Hz. Stall-regulated wind turbines designed for the European
50 Hz grid connection can have the blades pitched to avoid power production above 51Hz, or
they may trip owing to the generator heating when the power gets too high. In either case, the
performance of wind turbines will be affected. Meanwhile, the similar calculation for pitch-
regulated turbines shows that blade angle control by pitch regulation ensures a maximum steady
103 Power curve of wind turbine is a graph that indicates the net electrical power output from the turbine with a
specific rotor diameter as a function of wind speed at hub height.
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state power for frequency variation between 48 and 51 Hz, although the 48 Hz power curve is
not quite as good as the 50 Hz curve. The results demonstrate that although the performance of
pitch-regulated turbines will be slightly reduced due to the frequency variations in India, the
influence is much smaller than that of stall-regulated wind turbines (Sorensen, Unnikrishnan, and
Mathew 2001). Thus, pitch-regulated wind turbines can reduce the effects of frequency
variations in the Indian grid quite nicely.
Thus, although pitch-regulation and variable speed opreations do not solve all the problems
associated with weak grids such as the performance loss due to frequent outages, these ready-
available European technologies are quite suitable for dealing with low wind and many weak
grid conditions in India.
Utilization of Readily-available Solutions for Reactive Power
Even without the introduction of pitch-regulated, variable speed turbines, the installation of
capacitor banks could have solved the reactive power problem nicely. However, the problem can
worsen if capacitor banks do not perform well, and it was the case in India in the beginning.
During the early 1990s, approximately a half of capacitors in wind turbines in Gujarat were
defective and the condition in Tamil Nadu was similar. However, the performance in Tamil
Nadu improved since the mid 1990s; most of wind turbine capacitor banks became performing
well and the reactive power consumption of wind farm substations became lower in Tamil Nadu
than in Gujarat (Sorensen, Unnikrishnan, and Mathew 2001).
The high ratio of defective capacitors in Gujarat was mainly because wind plant owners had no
incentive to replace defective capacitors, while TNEB forced wind plant owners to pay reactive
consumption charges (Sorensen, Unnikrishnan, and Mathew 2001). Although the charges have
been disliked by many investors, they have worked well to improve technical performance of
capacitor banks. From the 2000s, all other states began placing reactive power consumption
charges.
Site-Specific Turbines for Low Wind Sites
Developing site-specific wind turbines, especially for low wind conditions, has been attempted in
Europe. An EU supported project was carried out during the late 1990s and early 2000s to
explore various possibilities of developing site-specific design optimization of wind turbines.
The project found that optimized site-specific designs showed the reductions in cost of energy by
up to 15% due to increase in annual energy yield and reduction in manufacturing costs. In
particular, the greatest benefits were found at sites with low mean wind speed and low
turbulence, although site-specific design could not offset intrinsic economic advantages of site
with high-wind speed (Fuglsang et al. 2002).
Several wind turbines designed specifically for low wind sites begun introduced to the market
from the early 2000s, as many high wind sites began being saturated in Germany. For example,
Vestas V90 1.8MW and 2MW (2003) as well as V100 3MW (2004) are all designed to optimize
low wind resources. However, these turbines are large-capacity turbines, because larger rotor
shifts power curve slightly to the left, which means that the turbines generate more power at low
wind speeds. Also while turbines with larger rotor shaft will endure greater loads at higher
winds than smaller rotor, the greater energy efficiency can be achieved and they suffer less wear
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and tear if winds at higher speeds occur less frequently (Gipe 1995). These multi-MW machines
are designed to be ideal for the areas where space for siting is scare, e.g., sites in the German
inland states, in order for them to exploit local wind resources better. Thus, in Europe, wind
turbines specifically designed for low wind have been developed, but they are large-capacity
turbines and their number is still quite small on the market.
R&D Efforts for Technology Adjustment and Indian-specific Solutions
To overcome the Indian specific conditions, some manufacturers have tried to tailor special
solutions. For example, Vestas RRB developed a frequency adjustment controller, which looks
at grid frequency and adjusts the generated power to the available grid frequency in order to
overcome the frequency fluctuation problem. Such controllers have been developed in Europe
with the inputs from the Indian engineers and have contributed to technology development
(Vestas RRB 2002).
R&D institutions in India have also contributed to solve this issue through international
collaboration projects. Electronics Research and Development Centre has taken up a project on
"Power Quality and Integration of Wind Farms in the Grid," by jointly undertaking R&D with
the RISO National Laboratory to prepare the guidelines for the integration of wind turbines with
weak grid (MNES 1998).
Domestically, MNES has focused on providing generic information and knowledge to innovate
components/subsystems of wind turbines suited for the Indian specific conditions through
industry collaboration since 1997. Three R&D models (Industry in-house R&D model,
Consortium model, and Industry and MNES joint entrustment of R&D project to an institution or
research laboratory) were developed. However, the effects of these new public-private R&D
collaboration efforts have been limited, as mentioned in Chapter 5. The majority of R&D
projects supported by MNES and C-WET had sub-optimal level of funding. Another important
reason for little progress in public and private sector R&D collaboration is the license issues of
technology, as discussed in the previous section. These reasons have limited R&D contribution
in the Indian wind energy sector.
Effects of Infrastructure Deficiency on Upgraded Wind Turbine Introduction
Deficiency in Surface Transportation and Port Infrastructure and Turbine Size
In general, larger-capacity turbines can deliver electricity at lower cost than smaller machines,
because they can save the costs for materials, foundation, electrical connection, and O&M due to
economics of scale. This makes them more suitable for single installation in the areas where the
siting of many turbines is difficult and for offshore development. On the other hand, the most
significant downside of larger-capacity turbines is the difficulty of construction and logistical
coordination due to their size and weight. In particular, this poses significant obstacles in
developing countries where surface infrastructure is vastly underdeveloped for transportation of
MW- and multi-MW class turbines. Cranes necessary for installation of MW-class turbines cost
more than double for the ones for 500kW turbines. For the area without sufficient infrastructure
for construction, therefore, smaller machines are generally more suitable.
The insufficient capacity of surface transportation of India has definitely a significant
contributing factor for the delayed and limited introduction of MW- and multi-MW class
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turbines. The 1998 EC report, "Market Analysis and Opportunities for Wind Energy in India"
mentioned that the bad surface transportation system and high costs of large cranes have been an
important reason that have deterred the introduction of medium- and large-capacity turbines, in
addition to the tight technology control by technology providers (Wind Power Monthly 1998b).
Logistical coordination and special equipments designed for transportation of large-capacity
turbines in developed countries cannot simply work in India, because the Indian roads are too
narrow and segmented, their vehicles are too small, and many parts of the roads are unpaved. In
addition, although the highly segmented state markets increase the needs for good transportation
networks between production facilities and installation sites across various locations, in reality,
such networks are scarce and the road conditions worsen in remote areas where better wind
resources are found.
The poor Indian port facilities and networks have also hindered both export and import of larger-
capacity turbines. As described in Chapter 5, MW- and multi-MW class turbines require the
highest level of logistical knowledge and capability even with the most updated port facilities.
Also, the six-month project lead-time in India makes the use of inefficient and time-consuming
port and road networks highly risky. High costs and high risks involved in exporting from the
Indian ports has been another significant factor hampering India to increase its export.
Deficiency in T&D System and Turbine Size/Technology Level
In general, smaller turbines are also more suitable for the areas with deficient T&D system. If a
large size turbine suddenly stops delivering electricity to weak T&D grid, it can cause a
catastrophe in the system. However, if there are several turbines making up for the same
capacity with one large-capacity turbine and even if one of them suddenly stops, it does not
cause a substantial problem to the system.
In addition, wind turbines at the frontier have become more and more high-tech, which is
originally developed for high grid standards of Europe. Significant risks are involved for
connecting the intricate electronics control of MW- and multi-MW class turbines to the crude
grid system of India, because the system can easily hamper the entire technology system.
Without upgrading of the grid system or development of proper interface technology between
weak grids and extremely high-tech wind turbines, it is very hazardous to connect them together.
6.6.3 Section Summary
Appropriateness of Frontier Technology to India and Technology Transfer
Results
In general, the technologies and technical solutions developed at the frontier show sufficient
adequacy to control the negative effects of the Indian low wind and weak grids, in particular
pitch-controlled, variable speed turbines. However, the technology transfer results show that
these technologies are minority in India. The Indian specific problems of low wind and weak
grids are not considered as primary reason hindering the introduction of technologies appropriate
to solve the problems. The more significant problem is rather the infrastructure deficiency,
which has greatly limited the size of turbines to be transported and installed in general.
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However, it is also true that there have been discrepancy in installed turbine size among
manufacturers. In addition to technology control by ownership structure examined in the
previous section, creative marketing and development approach by manufacturers has made a
difference. With little governmental supports and slow improvements in various aspects of
infrastructure, each manufacturer has needed to address the infrastructure deficiency on their
own as much as they can. For example, one of the reasons that Suzlon could install the first
MW-class turbines in India in 2001 and has been leading the packs in terms of turbine size is that
the firm began the so-called Wind Park approach, which solves many infrastructure-related
problems (see details in the next section).
Role and Effects of Policy and Institutional Settings for Technology
Adjustment
In addition to weak demand-pull and supply-push transfer of technology, the infrastructure
deficiency in surface transportation, port facilities, and power T&D system was another
significant factor behind the increasing technology gaps. As the insufficient infrastructure has
hindered the introduction of large-capacity high-tech turbines, other technologies that can
address the problems related to the weak grids and the low wind conditions have not been
brought and/or diffused in India because they are as a part of large-capacity turbine technologies.
The lack of supports from MNES for improvement of infrastructure deficiency is not a surprise,
considering the issues cannot be solved by MNES and the wind energy industry alone. As for
the T&D deficiency, despite the principle that SEBs should be responsible for upgrading
facilities and fortifying weak grids, this has not been done because of their severe financial
difficulty. The issues also involve many other energy related ministries and industries.
As for the transportation and logistical infrastructure deficiency, regardless of the privatization of
these sectors since 1991, the improvements have been slow. MNES have not offered any
significant supports for improvement of logistical issues (Twele 2005). The Equipment
Financing Scheme that finances equipment for turbine installation including cranes offered by
IREDA is the only direct measure to engage in the problems. Under such conditions, the
manufacturer-developers have taken the responsibility to develop road infrastructure to reach the
sites and fortify power evacuation facilities wherever necessary. However the efforts by
individual manufacturers have limitation. Policy supports necessary to solve the infrastructure
deficiency systematically require a better coordination among various ministries and larger and
continuous investments, which cannot be provided by the wind energy industry alone.
As for better utilization and diffusion of readily-available European technologies, reactive power
charges have worked well as an incentive for technology diffusion. As for adjustment of readily-
available European technologies, however, the industry level R&D collaboration schemes by
MNES for meeting the Indian specific needs have been unrealistic, as the technologies brought
by joint ventures and license agreements are tightly controlled by providers and usually any
adjustments and R&D on them in India are prohibited.
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Section 6.7: Effects of Technology Provider/Partnership
Characteristics on Cross-Border Technology
Transfer
The previous sections explored the effects of general conditions on cross-border technology
transfer to India. Meanwhile, each Indian manufacturer has taken unique development path and
has demonstrated different technology transfer results. This section explores those differences
by examining the evolution of different Indian manufacturers and their relationship with foreign
collaborators.
6.7.1 History and Profile of Six Indian Manufacturers
This part takes six Indian manufacturers, which have had significant influences on the Indian
industry development.
Vestas RRB Ltd. - Joint Venture between Vestas Wind A/S of Denmark
and RRB Consultants & Engineering of India
Vestas RRB India Ltd. was established in 1987 as joint venture between Vestas A/S of Denmark
and RRB Consultants & Engineers Private Limited (RRB) of India. RRB owns 51% of the
venture share and Vestas held the rest (49%). The company has the headquarters in New Delhi
and manufacturing plants in Chennai, Tamil Nadu. Vestas RRB is the longest surviving joint
venture in the Indian wind energy sector today.
Technology Transfer in the Early 1990s
Between 1987 and 1993, the company imported the turbines from 50, 65, 90, 100, to 200kW
from Denmark for the government-led demonstration projects. All components were imported,
then assembled and erected directly on sites by Vestas RRB. In 1994, due to the growing
domestic private market, Vestas and RRB modified their business structure and technology
agreements; Vestas RRB began manufacturing wind turbine components using local suppliers in
India, and immediate technology infusion between Vestas and RRB through constant and instant
information sharing and Indian personnel training in Europe began. Indigenization of
technology became a strong focus of the joint venture for cost reduction.
The new technology agreements with Vestas allowed RRB to purchase engineering documents
such as drawings, specifications and technical requirements from Vestas and to import
components that were not capable to be manufactured in India. RRB carefully chose local
suppliers for component manufacturing. Then, a prototype wind turbine set was assembled at the
RRB plant with the components manufactured by local suppliers as well as the imported
components. The indigenization was gradual in this process. Two or three new components
became locally manufactured for each new order. Local manufacturing experiences in heavy
industries were crucial for this arrangement, because RRB did not have to engage in too much of
additional investments to build capability of local suppliers as well as in-house engineers. Thus,
the availability of initial capacity in Chennai area to absorb foreign know-how was critical for
the indigenization process. Then, knowledge accumulation through both learning-by-doing and
backward linkages and through the feedback mechanisms between RRB and suppliers
contributed to local production capacity building further. Quality control was another important
capability, demonstrated by Vestas to the Indian partner; after both Vestas and RRB oversaw the
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quality of components from local suppliers, Vestas inspected and gave quality approval and
assurance to the prototype turbines assembled at the RRB plant.
Local project execution capability was also quickly built up through personal training offered by
Vestas in Denmark. The Danish technical experts carefully instructed the RRB employees for
site selection and planning, on-site assembling and turbine erection. In particular, site
development has been carefully executed. After general locations with good wind resources
were identified by the National Wind Resource Assessment Programme, the employees of both
Vestas and RRB conducted the minimum of one additional year of site assessment as normal
procedure. Personal exchange was continuous; every one or two months, the Indian personnel
visited Denmark for training and the Danish personnel came to India whenever their assistance is
needed.
However, local capacity building for RRB was limited to manufacturing of certain components
and project execution. All critical engineering and innovation capability was retained by Vestas,
although all R&D set-up formed in Denmark was immediately informed to RRB to avoid costly
mistakes because manufacturing of large components and modifications in wind turbine design
are costly. Technical and managerial inputs from RRB had also played important roles for R&D
to deal with several Indian specific technical problems such as low wind conditions and weak
grids, for example, the development of frequency adjustment controller, mentioned in the
previous section.
The amicable relationship of Vestas RRB, supported by the common goal of cost/responsibility
sharing as well as strong conviction in quality control, contributed to the successful building of
local technological capability during the early 1990s.
Staqnated Technology Transfer - after the Market Slowdown
The strong commitment for quality control through close involvement of Vestas from the
beginning worked well to adjust to the new quality control measures began imposed by MNES in
1995. RRB has developed the capacity to perform turnkey project with high level of quality
control in both production and site development. However, technology transfer of this venture
since 1995 is most puzzling among all the technology partnerships in India. Despite the strong
market share by Vestas in the world, RRB seems to be struggling to keep updating its
technologies for many years. No new turbine models by Vestas have been introduced to India
for more than ten years after the introduction of V39 500kW in 1995.
A turning event happened with the Indian market downturn in the mid 1990s. In 1995 after a
large order was sent from Denmark to India with limited guarantee of payment, the spiraling
interest rates in India jeopardized the total payment. Although the loss was finally averted, the
1995 stocks were still in India at the point of 1997 due to the market downturn. Facing the
public listing in the Danish Stock Exchange at the time, Vestas wrote off some DKK 150 million
(net receivable) in order to remove any future risks related to the large balance in the Group's
favor for Vestas RRB. The decision left the Group with a net loss of DKK 18 million in 1997
(Vestas Wind Systems A/S 1998; Vestas Wind Systems A/S 2002b).
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After the write-off in 1997 and the successful public listing of Vestas on the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange in 1998 as well as with the falling interest rates and inflations in India, in November
1998 Vestas RRB was awarded a mixed credit loan by DANIDA which partially financed a
15MW wind farm in Tamil Nadu. The loan covered 60% of the project costs, with the remainder
being met equally by other financial institutions and the project developer (Vestas Wind Systems
A/S 1999; Wind Power Monthly 1998c).
Despite the successful commission of the project, however, the introduction of new wind
turbines did not follow. Vestas has expanded its product line to MW- and multi-MW classes
since 1995, introducing more than 15 models ranging from 600kW to 3MW104 for both onshore
and offshore markets by the end of 2005. Yet, none of them has been introduced to India.
Vestas RRB still provides only two Vestas models (225kW introduced in Europe in 1988 and in
India in 1993 and 500kW introduced in Europe in 1993 and in India in 1995). Many other
manufacturers currently provide larger models in India. Technology had not been upgraded for
many years, and all the innovations by Vestas since the mid 1990s are not brought to India at all.
As a result, RRB has never been the dominant firm in the Indian market, in terms of market share
and technology. The firm only has been between 6% and 10% of the market share throughout
the 2000s.
This technology transfer stagnation limited spillovers and slowed capability building. Although
the technology indigenization level continuously grew throughout the mid and late 1990s at
Vestas RRB, high value components had been still imported. As of 2002, the firm indigenized
approximately 90% of components for the 225kW model. The rest 10% was electronics of
controller and rotor blade. For the 500kW model, the indigenization was completed up to 85%.
However, in terms of value term, the indigenization level was at 80% for the 225kW model and
at only 55% to 65% for the 500kW model. Electronics of pitch regulation system is imported
due to the absence of production capability in India. All parts other than the main controller
portion, however, have been slowly indigenized throughout the early 2000s.
As for blade manufacturing, Vestas RRB had hesitated to enter in-house production of blades for
long, because it requires low temperature in material handling condition and the firm's domestic
share had not been large enough to create economies of scale to make the production
economically viable. Finally in 2005, however, Vestas RRB commissioned a new in-house
manufacturing facility for electronics controllers and blades, which makes the indigenization
level of the 500kW model up to 75% in value term. Years of indigenization efforts of controllers
have paid off and the Indian market has been showing the strong prospect for growth since 2003.
Vestas RRB also has successfully built testing capability: each individual machine is tested in-
house at RRB for fine tuning after receiving the type certificate from C-WET (Business Line
Bureau. 2005a).
Yet, the relationship between Vestas and RRB remains obscure. As Vestas engaged in massive
corporate reorganization after the merger with NEG Micon in 2004, Vestas RRB is no longer
directly included as a part of the corporate structure. In addition, Vestas has not informed
publicly about the commission of new Vestas RRB production facility through its news release;
104 V120 4.5MW has been already developed for offshore, but has not been installed yet (Vestas Wind Systems A/S.
2006).
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the construction of the facility seems out of touch of Vestas. The relationship with NEG Micon
India Ltd. (100% subsidiary of NEG Micon in India) is also unclear. (The information in the
above Vestas RRB case is based on (Vestas RRB 2002) unless other sources are noted.)
NEPC-Micon - Joint Venture between Micon A/S of Denmark and Non-
conventional Energy Product Company (NEPC) of India
NEPC-Micon was the first joint venture firm formed in India with collaboration with foreign
wind turbine manufacture. About 40% of the company was held by the Indian firm Non-
conventional Energy Product Company (NEPC) and the rest was owned by Micon A/S, a Danish
wind turbine manufacture.
Fate of NEPC-Micon Ltd.
In 1987, TNEB, which was interested in demonstration project, entered an agreement with
DANIDA with help from DNES. TNEB and DANIDA identified Micon as the best wind turbine
manufacturer at that point. TNEB entered a contract with Micon to erect 21 of the 250kW
turbines and looked for a local contractor to erect the machines. NEPC was chosen, and NEPC
and Micon eventually formed a joint venture.
Similar to Vestas RRB, 100% of wind turbine components were imported from Denmark and
NEPC assembled on site in the beginning. However, as the market expanded from 1993, the
firm built a production facility in Chennai, Tamil Nadu. The joint venture enjoyed the strongest
market share in India between 1993 (81.3%) and 1996 (21.8%).
However, the partnership suddenly ended in 1996. Despite the technology agreement with the
first-rated Danish manufacturer Micon, NEPC had created many low quality projects during the
first boom years. NEPC was a pioneer firm, instrumental in technology indigenization, and it
produced many spinoff entrepreneurs and human resources base for other companies in India
(IWTMA 2002). In this regard, the firm's contribution to the industry should not be undermined.
However, business practice with low quality control and its financial problems worried Micon,
which subsequently decided to break up the joint venture agreement with NEPC in 1996. The
time also coincided to the formation of NEG-Micon, created by the merger between Micon and
Nordtank.
NEG Micon India Ltd.
Following the break-up of NEPC-Micon and the new company formation, NEG-Micon
immediately started the first 100% subsidiary firm in India in 1997. However, for the first two
years, the firm concentrated only on replacing the Micon models installed by NEPC and by other
firms that imported the second-hand Micon turbines from California during the first boom years
to clearn up the bad reputation created by them. NEG-Micon began taking its first new order in
India only in 1998 (IWTMA 2002; NEG-Micon India 2002).
As 100% subsidiary, NEG Micon India has introduced larger-capacity turbines than joint
venture/license agreement firms. In 1999, the firm brought the first 750kW model to India,
followed by the 950-250kW model in 2002 and the 1.65MW model in 2004. All were
introduced to India within one year of their European launch. NEG Micon India also put great
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efforts in project execution technological capability and know-how building as developer, in
order not to repeat the mistakes of creating low quality projects under the name of the company.
In addition, the firm was also planning to make the Indian facility an export hub since 2003.
However, the merger with Vestas seems halted the decision. As mentioned, the relationship
between Vestas and Vestas RRB has been unclear and the new company Vestas after the merger
has not shown a clear direction in its Indian operation publicly. As of 2005, NEG Micon India
and Vestas RRB have taken different paths, and NEG Micon India is planning to export from the
2007-2008 year (Ramakrishnan and Balaji 2006).
With the years of effort to take back good reputation and to introduce newer turbines, NEG
Micon India has increased its market share since 1999 and enjoyed more than 25% of the share
in both 2003 and 2004.
NEPC India Ltd.
After the break-up with Micon, NEPC became an independent wind turbine manufacturer. Since
1997 NEG Micon and NEPC involved in a court dispute regarding the manufacturing rights of
turbines introduced by Micon during their joint venture years. In 1999, the Chennai High Court
ruling permitted NEPC the exclusive right of manufacturing the Micon models up to 400kW in
India (Wind Power Monthly 1999c). As a result, NEPC has continuously manufactured and
installed the Micon 225kW, 250kW and 400kW models. Among them, the most popular make
has been its 225kW, which the firm indigenized best. In 2005 NEPC began installing 750kW
turbine developed by Norwin, a small Danish manufacturer.
It seems that technological capability of the firm has not advanced greatly since the joint venture
break up, as no indigenously developed turbines were introduced. The market share of NEPC
India has never exceeded 10%.
BHEL-Nordex - License Agreement between Nordex of Denmark/Germany
and Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) of India
BHEL is a Public Sector Undertaking company, currently under the Department of Heavy
Industries (Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises) in India. It was first established
in 1956 in Bhopal in order to develop strong domestic technological capacity of power
generation. Over the years it expanded to 13 divisions and the headquarters is located in New
Delhi. It was 100% state-owned until 1991, but the state share was reduced to 66% due to the
privatization efforts after 1991. BHEL manufactures and offers a wide range of equipment,
systems and services in the field of power, transmission, industry, transportation, oil & gas, non-
conventional energy sources, and telecommunications. It has been the largest engineering
enterprises of its kinds in India and has had the major R&D divisions across the areas of power
engineering, electronics and mechanical engineering (Sagar, 2002). The Ranipet division,
established in 1982 in Tamil Nadu, has engaged in wind turbine manufacturing operation.
Wind Turbines Development as Independent Manufacturer in the 1980s
In the 1980s, while engaging in various demonstration projects, DNES began exploring the
possibility to develop fully indigenous wind turbines in India. To do so, it created a R&D
project funding and asked BHEL to develop wind turbine prototypes suitable for the Indian
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conditions. As the largest engineering enterprise of its kind in India, BHEL had high capacity to
experiment technology development and its central R&D center at Hyderabad started working on
the prototype development. This attempt successfully produced small-capacity turbines in 20kW
and 50kW capacity and they had reasonably good market in the demonstration projects. By 1992
the BHEL R&D division developed a 200kW model, which was supplied to total of 10MW of
demonstration projects in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat that year.
License Agreement with Nordex
BHEL signed technology collaboration agreement in 1993 with Nordex, another prominent
Danish wind turbine manufacture at the time. BHEL was the only company that chose license
agreement over joint venture in the early 1990s, and several reasons contributed to this decision.
As state-own-enterprise (SOE), there is a restriction to incorporate foreign assets into its capital
structure. Also as SOE, it had certainly no need of financial supports from foreign collaborators
or external financial institutions such as IREDA.10 5 In addition, BHEL already had very high in-
house technological capability to support new technology as well as produce necessary
components for wind turbines due to its manufacturing experience in electrical equipment
(turbines, transformers, boilers, etc). Joint venture was not the best option for this flagship-
engineering firm of India.
Just before forming the license agreement, BHEL had an experience to erect Nordex turbines on
site for a demonstration wind farm in Maharashtra in 1992. All components were imported from
Nordex. This experience encouraged BHEL to consider technical collaboration with the Danish
manufacturer, rather than continuing in-house technology development. One reason that BHEL
sought for Nordex technology was certification issues. Wind turbines developed by BHEL by
1992 were not certified by any of the prominent institutions in Europe such as the RISO National
Laboratory or Germanischer Lloyd, which could give the quality assurance to investors. Another
reason was that the Indian market was looking for larger-capacity turbines, e.g., 250kW or more,
around the time. Along with these reasons, the private market prospect created by the new
government policy measures prompted BHEL to form the license agreement with Nordex, in
order to take advantage of its state-of-art European technology. The Ranipet division was
chosen due to its location in Tamil Nadu for wind division, although any of other 12 divisions in
BHEL could accommodate the function easily.
The technology agreement included procurement of engineering documents, specifications, and
drawings. There was no procurement of components in the agreement because BHEL had
enough experience and capacity to manufacture them in-house. Technology transfer of
necessary know-how was carried out by both purchase of documents and personnel training for
the 150kW and 250kW turbines. Training was done in both India and Denmark through the
personnel exchange. The license agreement included the payment arrangement of price of
technology (documents and know-how) and the small percentage of sales of each turbine (3-5%),
following the GOI guidelines.
In terms of building local manufacturing capability, the self-contained SOE system did not create
any backward linkage formation with local suppliers. Learning-by-doing was the only factor to
accumulate manufacturing capability. However, the learning-by doing experience was not
105 In fact, BHEL has never used the IREDA financial schemes for any of their wind power projects (BHEL, 2002).
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translated into innovation capability. Indigenous technology development target of 400kW and
500kW capacity turbines set by 1994 was abandoned, and BHEL shifted to the 100%
collaboration with Nordex. Although there was the good prospect of market development during
the first boom years, it was not still enough to force BHEL to invest further resources into R&D
to develop original wind turbines, considering the availability of state-of-art technology from the
first-class European manufacturer.
Project execution capability was also advanced through personal training offered to the Indian
personnel in Denmark, although BHEL already had original high capability due to the existence
of various well-established departments such as Planning and Development, Marketing,
Engineering and Contract management. Quality control was carefully carried out; both the
demonstration effects from Nordex and the traditional responsibility of SOE to provide high
quality engineering and services prompted it.
In terms of knowledge spillovers, the effects of Nordex-BHEL license agreement were rather
small due to the BHEL's self-contained system, low-employee turnover, and high initial capacity
as SOE. BHEL simply increased its internal technological capacity by incorporating the state-of-
art technology from Europe.
Termination and Reinstatement of License Agreement
The fate of the BHEL-Nordex partnership changed after MNES issued the guidelines for project
and technology quality control in 1995. As mentioned previously, the quality control measures
have tightened the six month project leadtime further and contributed to the Indian industry
consolidation. All other surviving private firms could manage the situation and improvised the
solutions by improving project execution capacity and capability in a short amount of time.
However, the status as SOE made BHEL very difficult to provide turnkey projects within the six
month period, especially after the placement of quality control measures despite its high
technological capacity and capability.
Besides external transaction costs for initiation of wind power project, BHEL has extremely high
internal transaction costs due to the rules and restrictions posed on SOE by GOI in general. All
expenses and investment decisions need to be undergone lengthy internal approval. Marketing
wind power projects to private investors are very difficult for the company, because making a
contract and gaining the approval from GOI by clearing all required paper works consume a
large amount of time. Contract negotiation is also restricted because the set prices cannot be
changed easily and private land acquisition is prohibited for SOE as well. It also cannot issue
long-term guarantee easily because the firm owes high responsibility as a part of GOI. Although
all these aspects work as advantages to create high credibility, they become huge disadvantages
to initiate wind project within the short gestation period required for wind power project. The
number of projects by BHEL-Nordex peaked in 1995 (total 32.3MW), but sharply decreased in
1996 (13.5MW) and in 1997 (2MW). The export market cultivation is also limited by both the
SOE structure and the technology agreement with Nordex.
The license agreement with Nordex was periodically reviewed and BHEL kept manufacturing
and installing wind turbines until 1999. The agreement finally expired in 2002 and it was not
renewed immediately. However, BHEL had strong willingness and feels the responsibility to
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keep its wind turbine division in order to support sustainable development as the flagship-
engineering firm of India. (The information in the above BHEL case is cited from (BHEL 2002)
unless other sources are cited).
In 2003, with the great expectation of market expansion again, BHEL and Nordex reinstated
their agreement. This time, Nordex offers two stall-regulated, fixed-speed models (N43 600kW
and N50 800kW introduced in Europe in 1994). However, none of the models have been
installed as of March 2005. In addition, their technology is a decade old. Although Nordex
offered pitch-regulated, limited-range variable speed turbines with DFIG configuration to the
frontier market since 1999, they have not been introduced, despite there is a Nordex 800kW
model with this configuration since 2001 and they are considered more suitable for the Indian
low wind and weak grids.
Pioneer Asia Group and its Joint Ventures with Wincon West Wind of
Denmark and Gamesa E6Iica of Spain
Pioneer is a South-Indian family-own company that has been active in paper, textile, timber,
chemicals, and firework businesses for years. Energy intensity of these businesses prompted
Pioneer to begin investing in wind energy and it became the owner of 15MW of wind capacity
by 1993. This experience encouraged Pioneer to embark on wind energy business on its own;
since then, Pioneer Asia has formed two joint venture companies, Pioneer Wincon Pvt. Ltd. for
manufacturing and marketing of the 250 kW turbines and Pioneer Asia Wind Turbines for higher
capacity wind turbines. Pioneer has the manufacturing facilities in Chennai and Pondicherry,
one of the tax free union territories of GOI.
Pioneer Wincon Private Ltd.
In 1994, Pioneer decided to buy wind turbines from Wincon West Wind, a Danish manufacturer,
and sell them in India. Although the market was on down-slope in 1996, Pioneer wanted to stay
in wind energy business and asked Wincon to form a joint venture agreement. Wincon, which
had a conservative attitude toward the joint venture formation, asked IFU of Denmark to become
a financial partner of the joint venture. In 1998, after two years of negotiation, IFU, Wincon, and
Pioneer reached a joint venture agreement and formed Pioneer Wincon Ltd., which both the
Danish and Indian sides share equal 50% of holdings (24% by IFU 26% by Wincon West Wind,
and 50% by Pioneer Asia Group), and then Pioneer and Wincon formed technology
agreement. 106
The technology agreement divided the responsibilities for Wincon to design technology and for
Pioneer Wincon to manufacture components for the Indian market. Cost sharing was the
primary motive of the agreement. The agreement let Pioneer Wincon to receive full information
from Wincon through drawings, specifications and vender lists. Pioneer Wincon outsourced
components to local suppliers. For capital items, suppliers are more carefully chosen among
those approved by Wincon. All components are then assembled at the company's assembly
plant in Chennai, brought to the project site, and installed with blades at the site. Although
Pioneer Wincon uses three to four reliable civil, electrical and mechanical engineering
106 The 50-50 share holdings ensure no domination from either side. IFU would like to sell the share eventually after
technology transfer but the agreement restricts selling its share only to Wincon to keep the 50-50 share holding
between Denmark and India (Pioneer Wincon Ltd., 2002).
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subcontractors for site installation, its in-house team deals with 100% of O&M for turnkey
projects during the two-year warranty period. After the warranty expires, the in-house team
usually extends the contract on annual basis with their clients and continues offering high quality
O&M.
Within a couple of years since the joint venture started, Pioneer Wincon upgraded the
manufacturing capacity from the 250kW model to the 755kW model. The initial indigenization
level was 27% in 1998 on component basis. The rate of indigenization improved to 90% at the
point of 2002. The other 10% includes electronics of controllers. Pioneer Wincon uses blades
made by LM Glasfiber India. In the beginning, Wincon came to inspect and guide the
commission of projects. However, this know-how was indigenized within one to two years of
the joint venture formation, and Pioneer Wincon has become to take care of commission
independently of Wincon. (The information in the above is cited from (Pioneer Wincon Ltd.
2002).
Although the joint venture was amicable, the technology transfer from Wincon was limited to the
above two models. The important reason was the weak status of Wincon West Wind at the
frontier. Wincon has not introduced new turbines since 1998 after the launch of the 755kW
model at the frontier. It has been a small manufacturer and has had difficulty to keep up with the
intense technology competition at the frontier.
The market share of Pioneer Wincon has never exceeded 5%; the highest share was 4.6% in
1999, and the share fell into less than 2% during the early 2000s.
Pioneer Asia Wind Turbines Ltd.
The growing market prospect since 2003 and the endeavor to gain access for newer technology
prompted Pioneer Asia to form another joint venture with Gamesa E6lica of Spain.
In January 2004, both the firms entered an initial operational agreement, which allows Pioneer
Asia to purchase and assemble the Gamesa turbines. Gamesa introduced the pitch-regulated
850kW model with limited-range variable speed with DFIG. The model was introduced to
Germany in 2004. The first seven turbines purchased by Pioneer in 2004 and installed in Tamil
Nadu in early 2005. After this initial arrangement, both the firms entered the formal negotiation
to form a joint venture company. The exact equity holding structure between Gamesa E6lica and
Pioneer group was still being worked out in 2005.
The two companies were contemplating a technology transfer agreement, which allows Pioneer
to manufacture the Gamesa 850kW models in India. The disclosed agreement indicates that the
turbines would be imported and assembled at the Indian plant initially, but as volumes picked up,
the company hoped to substantially indigenize component manufacturing. The joint venture
already announced the investment about INR 100 crore in production facility, which handles
component manufacturing, import-handling, turbine assembly, and maintenance services
(domain-B.com 2005; Gamesa E6lica 2005).
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Enercon India, Ltd. - Joint Venture between Enercon GmbH of Germany
and Mehra Group of India
Enercon India Ltd. was established in 1994 as joint venture between Enercon GmbH of Germany
and Mehra Group of India. Enercon GmbH owns 56% of the venture share and the Mehra Group
has the rest (44%). The commercial operations started in 1995. The Indian market share by
Enercon India was not particularly strong during the 1990s; it never exceeded 15%. However,
the share grew to 35% in 2001. Since then, Enercon India has achieved approximately 25 to
30% of the market share, competing against Suzlon Energy and NEG Micon India.
Locations
Unlike other early joint ventures that chose the locations in Tamil Nadu because of the strong
market of the state, Enercon India placed its headquarters is in Mumbai, Maharashtra, and set up
the first manufacturing plant in 1995 and the second facility in 2000 in Daman, one of seven
union territories in India, which imposes no commerce, capital and profit taxes on business.
Although Daman is a subject to GOI, the location is very popular among western entrepreneurs
due to the problems of the Mumbai port as well as its tax free status. The firm chose the western
locations not only in order to reduce business taxes and costs associated with production but also
to export back turbine components to Europe (Enercon GmbH 2002a).
Subsidiaries under Enercon India Ltd.
Enercon India has a distinctively different way of managing and expanding its business from
other wind energy technology collaborations established in India. One of the most distinguished
methods is to establish various subsidiaries for different business purposes. Using these
subsidiaries as conduit, Enercon GmbH has brought various business know-how and
technological capacity and capability necessary for each activity. 100% subsidiaries established
under Enercon India are: 1) Enercon Export Ltd, established in 1995 as a 100% export oriented
unit; 2) Enercon Wind Farms Ltd, established to demonstrate and exhibit the variability of
Enercon wind energy project on stand alone basis in various locations; 3) Enercon Financial
Consultancy Private Ltd, founded to assist the projects (either customer's or its own) with
various funding options by structuring innovate funding options and products as well as by
developing financial markets to make wind project more profitable (Enercon India Ltd. 2005b);
and 4) Enercon (India) Power Development Private Ltd. (Enercon Power), established in 2004 to
develop, establish, own and operate 1,000MW of clean energy by 2010 in India as well as to set
up and manage IPP business for the Enercon Group in selected world market. Enercon Power
has become not only the largest renewable energy based IPP in India, but also has become
managing several Enercon Wind Farms Ltd. which were established in different locations
(Enercon India Ltd. 2005a).
Product Technology Transfer
As for product technology introduction, like other technology collaborations, not all the turbines
developed by Enercon GmbH were introduced to India. E-30 230kW model was introduced to
the frontier and India simultaneously in 1995. The radical innovation by Enercon GmbH, the
direct drive, full-range variable speed turbines with full-scale power converter, was brought to
India by this model for the first time. While Enercon India installed only this model for the next
five years, Enercon GmbH launched E-66 1.5MW (1995), E-58 850kW and 1MW (1998 and
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1999, respectively), E-44 600kW (1999), and E-66 1.8MW (2001). None of these models were
introduced to India for installation.
In 2001, with a recovering sign of the Indian market, E-40 600kW model was introduced to the
frontier to India simultaneously, and the second large production facility was built in India for its
production. In early 2005, the newest Enercon models E-33 330kW and E-48 800kW were
introduced worldwide to replace their best-seller predecessors E-30 and E-40 models. There was
no time delay between India and the frontier for their introduction. Between 2001 and 2005,
Enercon GmbH launched E30-300kW (2002), E-66 2MW (2003), and E- 12 4.5MW (2005) to
the frontier market, but they have not been introduced to India.
None of MW- and multi-MW class turbines developed by Enercon GmbH have been brought to
India yet. Nonetheless, the technological essence and most of the innovative features of the
Enercon products have been introduced to India, because the uniqueness of Enercon technology
has made the German firm possible to stick to the same technological path since 1993; all the
turbines launched and not launched to India have had pitch-regulated, direct drive, full-range
variable speed operations with synchronous ring generators and full-scale power converters.
However, some of the SCADA products and several features developed along with the latest and
largest turbine E-1 12, e.g., special rotor blade with winglet, are among the technologies not
brought to India.
Positive influences of the Enercon technology on India should not be underestimated. The firm's
pitch-regulated, direct drive, variable speed turbines have frequency operational band of 50 ± 5
Hz, ensure steady state power for frequency variation between 48 and 51 Hz, reduce reactive
power consumption, eliminate the needs for soft stator and capacitor banks, and minimize the
mechanical stress on drivetrain, solving many problems mentioned in the previous sections. In
low wind conditions, they improve the performance, extracting the maximum energy by
optimizing turbine speed. Considering the limited introduction of variable speed turbines by
other manufacturers, the contribution of Enercon India to the Indian wind energy development is
quite significant.
Production Technology Transfer and Export
Enercon India has the production lines for complete turbines, including blades, synchronous ring
generators, and electrical components. They are not only for domestic use, but blades and
electronics components have been exported back to Europe. Unlike any other joint venture
companies, Enercon GmbH has used its Indian facilities as the export base of those generic
turbine components from the beginning of their joint venture. The introduction of production
technology of high value components are not held back by Enercon GmbH. The tax free status
of Daman on high value components also helped. Strong forward linkages and demonstration
effects have improved product quality of components made in India.
Enercon India has expanded its production capacity constantly to meet the domestic and export
needs. The expansion has been constant and aggressive, compared to any other technology
collaborations. In 1994 the construction of the first production factory began in Daman for E-
30/230kW (Unit 1), from where the first three E-30 turbines have left for export back to
Germany in the following year. In 2000 the construction of the second production factory was
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commenced in Daman for E-40 (Unit 2). In the following spring (2001), the production of E-40
600kW started there. In addition to 150 turbines produced for the Indian market for the year,
600 of the E-40 blades were exported back to Germany. In 2003 the blade factory was expanded
to manufacture E-66 1.8MW blades for solely export purpose, as the model has not been
installed in India yet (Enercon GmbH 2002a).
In 2004, Enercon India built an 8,000m2 mobile factory to produce prefabricated concrete tower.
It was the first of the kind even for Enercon GmbH, and can be moved anywhere in the world. It
will remain in Jamnagar, Gujarat until 2007 to produce 30 of the E-40 towers. The factory
produces 18 segments of the 74m tower with 5.5m-diameter base and 1.8m-diameter top.
Enercon GmbH has been using both steel and prefabricated concrete towers, but the prefab
concrete towers are used for E-40, E-48 and E-70 models because the price of steel has become
increasingly expensive and the transportation cost for prefab concrete tower sections are much
less expensive (Enercon GmbH 2004a).
Project Execution Technology Transfer
Enercon GmbH has actively transferred project execution technology to India, using different
methods.
Project Planninq and Development Technology
Enercon India established two 100% subsidiaries, Enercon Financial Consultancy Private Ltd
and Enercon Power during the early 2000s and fortified the transfer of project execution and
development know-how from Germany to India. These two firms have helped raise Enercon
India's project execution skills further to the level of independent professional service firms.
In particular, Enercon Power was created to be a base toward business expansion to other
selected world markets in the future, as Enercon GmbH itself does not have such an
independent project development unit in Germany. The range of services provided by Enercon
Financial Consultancy includes: financial modeling; initial project analysis of project; investor/
customer assistance in approaching/liaisoning/negotiating with funding entities; achieving
optimum financial closure; and documentation support. Enercon Power initiates wind farm
IPP business development, plans and implements the IPP projects in collaboration with
Enercon Financial Consultancy, and conducts the assessment of the projects (Enercon India
Ltd. 2005a; Enercon India Ltd. 2005b).
As for improvement of wind energy estimation/optimization technology, Enercon India Ltd.
has set up a dedicated Wind Resource Department in 2001 to conduct siting, wind monitoring,
wind resource mapping, and optimization and micro-siting (Enercon India Ltd. 2005d).
Enercon Traininq Academy
As for O&M technological capability building, Enercon GmbH provided personnel training
on-going basis. However, in order to meet the growing needs for high-level service personnel
for increasingly high-tech turbines and wind farm O&M as well as to re-educate the Indian
technicians with diverse cultural, linguistic and educational backgrounds to the level that
equally satisfies the Enercon service standards, a training academy was established in Daman
in 2004. The fully residential academy not only provides practical technical training but also
requires trainees to go through a well designed physical training curriculum, to meet the
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service needs often in harsh environments and on 24-hours, 365 days basis (Enercon GmbH
2005b).
Business Process Technology
Enercon GmbH has been also very active on transfer of business process technology. The
most notable example was the introduction of SAP, German software which is one of the most
used ones for management of finances, production, purchasing, and other company processes
in the world. SAP was first introduced by Enercon GmbH for logistics and accounting purpose
in 1996. Enercon GmbH expanded the application of SAP to production planning and
management, project management, service, and sales by 2001 (Enercon GmbH 2005a).
In 2002 Enercon India introduced the first SAP system to streamline the business process and
enhance technical skills to meet the high-standard work culture by harmonizing working
methods and organizational structure with Enercon GmbH. The firm also uses Lotus Notes
communication system, which enables the immediate database sharing between Germany and
India (Enercon GmbH 2002b). Strong demonstration effects and forward linkages were
established. The SAP introduction to India enabled the firm to develop a system of online
Daily Generation Report of every turbine operation through coordination through the SAP on-
line & real-time information. In 2005 a decision support system with SAP BW was
implemented as technology platform to offer enhanced analysis of data, ad hoc reporting
capabilities, various drill-downs in the reports, exception reporting, trend analysis, and internal
benchmarking etc.
Innovation Technology Transfer
Another distinguished characteristic of Enercon India is that the joint venture has a full-fledged
R&D facility in order for the Indian engineers to work on global research projects in
collaboration with the R&D headquarters in Germany. For example, the Daman blade facility
engages in not only blade manufacturing but also blade design (Enercon India Ltd. 2005c). In
addition, specific software was developed in India to provide the daily updates on the Enercon
turbines production to MNES. Before deciding the further financing for wind farms, the minister
can thus evaluate personally the performance of technology. Due to this complete transparency,
MNES asked all other manufacturers to do the same, which resulted in a competition to increase
the quality and performance (European Wind Energy Association 2004). However, the exact
extent of R&D project contents in India has not been disclosed and the level of innovation
capacity and capability is unknown.
Continuous Technology Path and Transfer
The uniqueness of Enercon technology definitely helped the Indian side to accumulate
technological capacity and capability over the years. Most of other major frontier manufacturers,
especially the Danish manufacturers, shifted their technology path from the Danish Classical
Concept to pitch-regulated, variable speed operations during the past decade. On the other hand,
the technology path of Enercon stays the same because of the great and early commercial success
of its unique innovation - direct drive, full-scale variable speed turbines with synchronous ring
generators. During the five-year technology introduction blank after 1995 to India, the basic
characteristics of Enercon technology did not change and the new model introduction in 2001
had no difficulties of technological path adjustment.
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Reciprocal Technology Transfer
The above story illustrates that Enercon India has established much deeper technology
collaboration relationship than any other joint venture/license agreement collaborations.
Similar to other technology collaborations, Enercon India and Enercon GmbH engages in
personnel training in Germany. The period is usually for three months for the Indian engineers
(European Wind Energy Association 2004). However, their technical exchange goes beyond this
level. Enercon India has developed high level production capacity and capability of almost
every component of the high-tech Enercon turbines, including high vale added blades,
synchronous generators, and electronics components, and they meet the high-quality standards at
the frontier through export. The Indian engineers have been participating in the R&D activities
in collaboration with engineers at the frontier. In addition, the level of project execution
technology has been upgraded constantly and reached to high level through the constant
personnel exchange for training, the establishment of special training academy, and the
introduction of universal business software and the cross-border sharing of database. The
establishment of subsidiaries under the joint venture has worked well as conduit for technology
transfer as well. From the very beginning of the collaboration, the Indian partner was included in
the global strategy of the German technology provider; unlike other early collaborations that set
up their facilities in Tamil Nadu where the market exists, the Enercon India's choice of
production locations in Daman was targeting for export and low cost production.
However, the most notable characteristics of Enercon technology transfer probably come from
the sole ownership of Enercon GmbH by Aloys Wbbben. The venture share of Enercon India
by Wbbben is 56%, which gives him strong control over his technology. Moreover, he has
strong enthusiasm for technology transfer to developing countries. Wbbben attributes
technology transfer for developing countries as one of the key success factors of Enercon GmbH.
In addition to India, he has established the production lines for complete turbines and/or blades
in Brazil and Turkey. W6bben says,
"Our main production and R&D center is in Germany but we are also focusing on
developing countries like India and Brazil. I think it is important to support these
countries via technology transfer. .... India is doing what so-called developed countries do
not. In terms of technology and knowledge transfer, it does not only go from the
industrialized world to the developing world. So we could also take some lessons from
the developing countries back to here........ India is a market where normally you make
no fast profit, but at Enercon we want a long-term investment strategy and we think that
India is growing very fast. .... Until now we have a very good experience (European
Wind Energy Association 2004)."
From the very beginning, W6bben has frequently met the family owners of the Mehra Group and
has built strong mutual trust and respect at personal level, which resulted in not only the
continued expansion of production lines in India but also the establishment of various
subsidiaries, the R&D center, and Enercon Training Academy.
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Suzion Energy Group - First 100% Indian-own Wind Energy Multinational
Suzlon Energy Group has taken an entirely different path from other Indian manufacturers; it
became the first fully Indian-owned wind energy firm that built the R&D facilities in Europe and
expand its business worldwide. Suzlon Energy Ltd. has become the first Asian company that
ranked among the world top ten in the wind energy development field. In 2005 the firm became
publicly listed on the Mumbai Stock Exchange and climbed up to the fifth position globally with
6.1% share of installations worldwide (BTM Consult APS 2006). With the public listing in
2005, Tulsi N. Tanti, the owner of Suzlon Energy, became the seventh richest Indian with nearly
USD six billion-worth of assets (The Economist 2006). The Indian market share of Suzlon has
steadily grown from 7% in 1997 to 51% in 2000. The firm has had approximately 40% of the
domestic market share throughout the 2000s.
Beginning- License Agreement with Sidwind of Germany
The parent company of Suzlon Group was established in 1986 in Ahmedabad in textile business,
which expanded to international trade, hotels and financing business. The Group started as an
investor in wind energy development first; facing the serious power shortage problems for their
business, the Group started to build captive wind power projects in Gujarat during the first boom
years. The success of its own wind farms led the Group to diversify its business into wind
energy. Suzlon Energy Ltd. was founded in 1995, in Pune, Maharashtra. The location was
chosen due to the state's political stability, favorable industrial policy and good infrastructure,
and strong educational base (Suzlon Developers Pvt. Ltd. 2002; Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2002).
At the beginning, Suzlon formed one-year technical agreement with a German wind turbine
manufacturer, Stidwind Energie Systeme. However, after Suzlon Energy Ltd. imported ten of
the 350kW turbines from Stidwind and completed the first project within three months in 1996,
Stidwind bankrupted. Suzlon immediately bought a part of Siidwind in 1997 and created a R&D
center in Germany, where subsequent models of Suzlon have been developed (Twele 2005).
Although Siidwind was eventually reformed as a new company, which was incorporated under
Nordex AG in 1999, the license agreement formed with Suzlon under the previous business
entity left its technology for Suzlon to use freely without any further loyalty payment to the new
Si dwind. Suzlon quickly established itself as independent Indian manufacturer and the business
took off rapidly.
Domestic and International Expansion
By 2001 Suzlon Energy Ltd. focused on the domestic market with four subsidiaries. While
Suzlon Energy Ltd. offered R&D, engineering, and manufacturing, the four subsidiaries
managed other wind business as follows: Suzlon Developers Pvt. Ltd. developed and
implemented projects; Suzlon Windfarm Service Ltd., provided O&M services; Suzlon Green
Power Ltd., invested in wind power projects as IPP; and Suzlon Realties Ltd, managed land
acquisition and development.
Suzlon started its international expansion in 2001 with a project export to the United States. By
March 2006, the group expanded into 22 domestic and international subsidiaries. The corporate
structure has been greatly restructured and expanded during the early 2000s. While Suzlon
Windfarm Service Ltd remained as it was, Suzlon Towers and Structures Ltd. was established to
expand the IPP activities by the former Suzlon Green Power Ltd and to include business
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activities pertaining to towers. Suzlon Structures Pvt. Ltd. was added as a new subsidiary. The
firm was most active in restructuring during the 2005-06 year due to the initial public offering in
September; Suzlon Developers Pvt. Ltd., Suzlon Realties Ltd., and several operations at Suzlon
Energy Ltd. were restructured into the following new subsidiaries: Suzlon Generators Pvt. Ltd.
(manufacturing of generators), Suzlon Power Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., and Suzlon Gujarat Wind
Park Ltd. In addition, Sarjan Engitech Pvt. Ltd. was acquired and became Suzlon Engitech Pvt.
Ltd. for production of various engineering products (Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2006).
As for international expansion, several subsidiaries for R&D units (AE-Rotor Holding B.V., AE-
Rotor Techniek B.V. and Suzlon Energy B.V. in the Netherlands in 2001, and Suzlon Energy
GmbH in Germany in 1999) were established before the 2001 international business expansion.
During the early 2000s, Suzlon established the US headquarters in Chicago (Suzlon Wind
Energy Corporation USA), the Chinese headquarters in Beijing, and the Australian office
(Suzlon Energy Australia Pty. Ltd. Australia) in Melbourne for global expansion. However, the
lack of credibility of Indian brand created tough competition against the established European
multinationals. To overcome this problem, the Group founded Suzlon Energy A/S in Denmark
as its new world headquarters in January 2005, began managing all international sales and
marketing activities outside India by tapping into the Danish human resources and brand image.
Suzlon became a member of DWIA. During the 2005-06 year, the establishment of the
international subsidiaries was most active: both Suzlon Rotor Corporation USA and Suzlon
Energy (Tianjin) Ltd. China were founded to start manufacturing in the United States and China,
respectively. In Europe, Suzlon Windpark Management GmbH was formed in Germany. The
firm and the existing Suzlon Energy GmbH acquired three German companies Windpark Olsdorf
WATT GmbH & Co KG, Constellation GmbH, and SE Drive Techniek GmbH in order to
expand R&D activities. Constellation GmbH became Suzlon Windkraft GmbH. In addition, on
March 2006 Suzlon acuqired the Belgian firm Hansen Technologies, specializing in gearboxes
for wind turbines, as mentioned. Suzlon Energy Ltd. also founded a new subsidiary in Mauritius
for investment and provision of turnkey solutions for setting up of wind farm projects (Suzlon
Energy Ltd. 2006).
Innovation Technoloqy
Technological development at Suzlon strongly depends on the European expertise. Most of
important R&D and innovations have been carried out in Europe. Three companies in the
Netherlands, AE-Rotor Holding B.V., AE-Rotor Techniek B.V., and Suzlon Energy B.V, are for
rotor blade R&D. They were established by the Suzlon acquisition of a part of Aeropec, a Dutch
blade manufacturer bankrupted in January 2001, and they form the blade R&D center in the
Netherlands. Many former employees of Aeropec continuously worked for AE-Rotor Holding
B.V. and they brought the Resin Infusion Moulding (RIM, equivalent to vacuum infusion)
techniques to Suzlon. In Germany, Suzlon Energy GmbH was established in Rostock by
acquiring a part of the bankrupted Stidwind. This subsidiary has been carrying out R&D of
components in nacelle, especially controllers since 1999. Two new German subsidiaries
incorporated in the 2005-06 year, SE Drive Techneik GmbH and Suzlon Windkraft GmbH
(Formerly Constellation GmbH), have been carrying out R&D in the area of gearboxes and wind
turbine components, respectively. In addition, the 2006 acquisition of Hansen Transmissions
International NV brought the R&D capacity of high quality gearbox to Suzlon. The R&D
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headquarters of Suzlon, however, is located in Pune, India, taking advantages of the growing
expertise of the Indian IT business.
Product Technoloqy Development
From 1996 to 2000, Suzlon marketed only one 350kW model, the technology acquired from
Sidwind. In 2001 the firm installed one 1MW turbine in India, the first MW-class turbine
introduced to the Indian market. Suzlon installed three of 1.25MW model in 2002. In 2003 the
market started responding the firm's MW-class turbines enthusiastically; 78% of the number of
turbines installed by Suzlon was the 1.25MW model, while the installation ratio of the 350kW
model dropped from 74% in 2002 to 18% in 2003. In early 2005 Suzlon introduced its first
2MW model to the Indian market (interpolated from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd.
2005). In addition to these MW-class turbines, Suzlon has marketed the 600kW and 950kW
models in Europe and the United States.
The original 350kW model from Stidwind was stall-regulated, two-fixed speed turbines with
WRIG. GFRP was the blade material. Suzlon shifted to pitch-regulated turbines from its 1MW
model, and its 1.25MW, and 2MW models have incorporated slip ring system with standard
WRIG; however their rotor speed remains two-speed. The slip control provides the maximum
slip up to 16% by varying the resistance of rotor winding dynamically, and increases energy
conversion efficiency by containing the loss of power from wind derived from frequent wind
speed changes at low wind level. From these MW-class turbines, Suzlon incorporated GFRE
into their blades and vacuum infusion production technique (Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2005a). This
slip mechanism is unique to Suzlon, and there are obvious technological influences of the
European R&D on the development of these MW-class models.
Production Technology Development and Vertical Integration
Suzlon first set up its production facilities in the union territory of Daman, utilizing its tax free
status and excellent port facility, as Enercon India did. The additional facilities were built in
Maharashtra and Gujarat. Between 2003 and 2005, the firm expanded its production to two
other union territories, Diu and Pondicherry. Two of the five production locations are dedicated
to blade manufacturing. In 2005 the firm began the construction of integrated wind turbine
manufacturing facility in China (including production of rotor blades, nacelle covers, control
panels and generators) and a blade manufacturing facility in Minnesota in the United States.
The contribution of Suzlon to the Indian production capability building has been important. By
2001, the technology indigenization level of the firm was still not 100%, although it was quite
high. Some components such as controllers were still imported from Europe (Suzlon Developers
Pvt. Ltd. 2002; Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2002). From 2001 Suzlon began targeted vertical
integration, starting from in-house blade manufacturing. It was the time that not only the firm
began its international expansion but also the supply chain bottle necks in the industry started.
With the incorporation of AE-Rotor Holding in the Netherlands, Suzlon started manufacturing
rotor blade using the high-tech RIM techniques in India. Since then, the firm has gradually
increased control over various components and built the capacities for manufacturing of all key
components of wind turbines. Suzlon Structures Pvt. Ltd. was set up to manufacture tubular
towers. The activities toward vertical integration have been most active since 2005. In 2005
Suzlon Generators Pvt. Ltd. set up a joint venture with Elin EBG Motoren GmbH of Austria to
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manufacture generators. The acquisition of Hansen Transmissions brought its three world-class
gearbox manufacturing facilities to Suzlon along with the R&D capacity and will bring high-tech
manufacturing technique of gearbox to India soon. During the 2006-07 year, the firm's
manufacturing capacity will expand into the United States and China. At the point of 2006,
Suzlon manufactures rotor blades, generators, gearboxes, control systems and tubular towers on
its own (Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2006). The firm enjoys the cost advantages over its global
competitors by way of operating its major manufacturing capacities in India. Strong capability
building through learning-by-doing has been evident (Suzlon Developers Pvt. Ltd. 2002; Suzlon
Energy Ltd. 2002).
Project Execution Technology Development - Wind Park
Project execution skills of the Suzlon professionals have also proven very high. Generic skills
were inherited from the parent Corporate Group and supported the initial diversification into
wind energy business. Then the skills have been further polished by developing several Wind
Parks on remote, high plateau in Maharashtra.
The most innovative marketing and project development method developed by Suzlon was a new
concept called "Wind Park." It is a turnkey development concept. However, in this method,
Suzlon acquires a large area of land that is suitable for wind project development on its own
rather than buying a small patch of land as order comes in. The entire land is developed and
engineered together, and Suzlon sells each turbine to different investors as order comes in with
guaranteed care of lifetime (Suzlon Developers Pvt. Ltd. 2002; Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2002). This
concept could be only materialized with the extensive capital base, which Suzlon has enjoyed as
a part of large business group. The first Wind Park project in Vankusawadw near Satara in
Maharashtra was conceived already in 1995, before Suzlon began importing Sidwind turbines.
The Suzlon Group acquired the land identified by the National Wind Resource Programme of
MNES. Vankusawade became the largest wind farms in Asia, offering the turnkey ownership of
turbines to many major Indian industrial companies, including Tata Finance, Bajaj Auto, Bajaj
Electricals and Savita Chemicals (Power Line 2002). Another project, the Kavdya Dongar Wind
Park with total 58MW of installed capacity, is also located in Maharashtra.
The advantages of this concept is that each wind turbine set up under the Suzlon Wind Park
gains several economies of scale and efficient wind farm design, which enables: extensive
infrastructure development through collective design; minimized power transmission losses;
increased array efficiency leading to optimized the power generation; adequate flow of wind
available to all wind turbines; project execution under the ISO 9001:2000 quality requirements;
24-hour on-site monitoring & control; increased return on investment; and coordinated dispatch
management with transmission operator. The Wind Park package comprises of host of services,
which includes: site selection; micro-siting; site infrastructure development; installation of wind
turbine; power evacuation facilities; interfacing with state grid; 24-hour services at site; liaison
with the government departments and agencies; and financial arrangements for third-party sales
(Suzlon Energy Ltd. 2005b).
Additional but very important advantage of Wind Park is overcoming the infrastructure
deficiency by building strong grids and road infrastructure collectively. In particular, the issues
of transportation and logistics of large capacity wind turbines are solved by establishing road
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infrastructure that connects the site and the Suzlon production facilities. Once the connections
are made, a large number of turbines can be transported easily. The other important feature of
Wind Park was its sophisticated use of SCADA in wind farm environment. All wind turbines in
Wind Parks are monitored for 24 hours in real time by the Centralized Monitoring Stations,
which linked to satellite systems and can be controlled to produce optimal energy output from
the Stations as well as the Pune headquarters. This total quality control system ensures more
than 98% of annual availability factor (Power Line 2002).
Making of Indian Wind Giant
Suzlon has become an Indian wind giant through its aggressive but careful and innovative
business expansion. It has not been hesitant to seek technology help necessary for its growth
from the outside, but the firm has done so very wisely.
This making of the Indian wind giant started almost accidentally by the bankruptcy of Stidwind.
Stdwind was the stronger partner (technology holder and provider), when it formed the license
agreement with Suzlon in 1995. However, the Sidwind bankruptcy wiped out the restriction;
Suzlon became the technology holder, making decisions without any business restrictions from
Stidwind and not paying any license fees. On business side, this presented a huge opportunity
for Suzlon to understand the business on its own, and it certainly succeeded to learn business
know-how rapidly. At the same time, on technical side, Suzlon was pressured to absorb the
Stidwind technology and its technical know-how before the license agreement was expired and
the technology disappeared from its hands; this pressure pushed Suzlon to improve the Indian
capacity and capability quickly. As a result, Suzlon grew to succeed in installing approximately
750 of the 350kW turbines licensed by Stidwind after the bankruptcy. The market that did not
move to medium- and large-capacity turbines also helped Suzlon master business and technology
through the installation of this model. In addition, the Stidwind bankruptcy created an
opportunity to directly tap into the human resources of Stdwind. Suzlon could form its R&D
centers in Europe only by acquiring the parts of Stidwind in 1997 and Aeropec in 2001 (Twele
2005). Thus, the Sidwind bankruptcy created the business and technological basis of today's
Suzlon, and unintentionally speeded up knowledge transfer from Germany to India.
However, it is very important to stress that it was Suzlon that grasped the opportunity and grow
on its own. Thus, Suzlon have proven the importance of technological ownership as well as the
formidable high potential of the Indians.
6.7.2 Section Summary
Knowledge Transfer and Spillover Effects
All the above manufacturers have been successful in accumulating technological capability
through knowledge transfer and spillovers from their foreign collaborators. It seems that all
backward linkages, forward linkages, learning-by-doing, and demonstration effect have been
present.
= Careful selection process of local suppliers and personnel training by foreign collaborators
created good backward linkages, providing local suppliers higher incentives to adopt new
technologies.
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- The Indian partners gained knowledge directly through leaning-by-doing and training that
build human capital and skills. Some entrepreneurs who worked and accumulated
experiences in some of these joint venture firms spun off and started forming their own
companies to provide services in especially in O&M for projects developed by their former
employers (IWTMA 2002).
- Forward linkages created by Enercon and Suzlon have raised the product and service quality
of the Indian sides by linking them to the developed country market.
- Demonstration effects also happened when the Indian sides adopted managerial, marketing
and production processes of higher efficiency technologies of the frontier, e.g., acquiring the
ISO standards.
However, the size of developmental and spillover effects are ambiguous with two reasons. One
is because the technology transfer has not been very active in recent years compared to the initial
stage by the mid 1990s; the above effects have not been large for some newer technologies that
were not introduced to India or introduced with several years of delay from the frontier. WTO
(2002) reports that development spillover effects are smaller, as technology gaps are larger
(World Trade Organization 2002). In this regard, the size of developmental effects is considered
getting smaller more recently in the wind energy sector. The second reasons are the dominance
of the Indian industry by large-scale developer-manufacturers; considering the lower presence of
SMEs, developmental and spillover effects could be limited.
Effects of Technology Provider/Partnership Characteristics on Cross-
Border Technology Transfer - Technology Ownership and Control
The above examination demonstrates that the results and effects of cross-border technology
transfer also vary tremendously among manufacturers. Different partnership characteristics
influence the results greatly.
The cases of Vestas RRB, BHEL, NEPC-Micon, and Pioneer Wincon illustrate the difficulty of
joint venture/license agreement and various reasons behind the stagnation of technology transfer.
The Vestas RRB case shows the strong hesitation of Vestas toward technology transfer for more
than a decade. The stagnation is simply dreadful, considering the exceptional advancement that
Vestas made at the frontier and the strong mutual collaborations until 1995. Although the exact
reason is unknown, the technology control and unwillingness of passing new technology to RRB
by Vestas is obvious, as the Indian partner has the majority of the venture share. The BHEL-
Nordex case tells the special circumstances of SOE; the firm has suffered from the shortcoming
of its own bureaucratic structure. BHEL has been assigned to an impossible task of performing
as the industry frontrunner for sustainable development while all the restrictions on SOE have
prevented it from doing so. Both Vestas RRB and BHEL could have contributed to the Indian
wind energy much more, considering their high potentials and technological capability.
Meanwhile, the NEPC-Micon case points out the importance of business ethics for keeping up
good collaborations. Unfortunately, many broken joint ventures including this one and Flovel
Tacke left bad reputations of the Indian firms during the early years, which affected the
development of the industry. On the other hand, the Pioneer Wincon case demonstrates the
effect of the weak status of technology provider Wincon at the frontier.
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All the above cases tell that long-lasting technology collaborations require stable and
constructive conditions from both sides of the partnerships. And the case of Enercon India
demonstrates such conditions can be successfully created, but only with the continuous efforts
from both sides. Enercon GmbH has incorporated its Indian partner into its global strategy and
the strong trust existed from the beginning. The locations of manufacturing facilities and the
establishment of export-oriented subsidiary were all decided around the strategy. The sole
private ownership of the unique technology by the innovator Aloys Wbbben and his enthusiasm
for technology transfer as well as high-level business expertise offered by the Mehra Family
contributed to the successful technology transfer and collaborations. The decision making for
technology development and transfer has been quick and decisive due to this ownership structure
and mutual trust. The other aspect of Enercon India that is different from other joint ventures is
the holding share of the venture. While the technology providers in Vestas RRB and Pioneer
Wincon do not have the majority holding, Enercon GmbH has 56% of the venture share.
Because of this, Aloys Wbbben still has the control over the technology that he passed to the
Indian side. The continuous technological pathway of Enercon also helped creating the
exceptional results of this collaboration and benefited to alleviate several Indian specific
problems.
The case of Suzlon also illustrates the importance of technology ownership and control for
indigenous technological capacity and capability building from the opposite side. The strong
financial position of the Suzlon Group has made the acquisition of key resources at the frontier
possible as well as the innovative business concept such as the Wind Park from the early on.
The firm has been able to advance oversea market expansion and create forward linkages and
demonstration effects on its own by acquiring reputation and high-level of innovation and
production technology through vertical M&A at the frontier. Although the technology
ownership was first created almost accidentally by the bankruptcy of Stidwind, it was the Indians
that flourish on its own by grasping the presented opportunities and grow into the Indian wind
giant.
The Enercon and Suzlon cases also illustrate that the low quality production prevailing in India is
not the absolute condition. India can definitely produce high-quality products and services and
can be a part of global sourcing. Creating forward linkages to the frontier markets and inducing
active transfer and strategic training that absorb the transferred knowledge and technology can
quickly improve technological capacity and capability in India.
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Section 6.8: Synthesis - Value Chain Policy Analysis and
Causal Loop Diagram
This section synthesizes the analytical results of the previous sections by using value chain
policy analysis and causal loop diagrams, focusing on the roles and effects of policy. Policy
value chain analysis clarifies the target of each policy and causal loop diagrams illustrate the
effects and the extent of each policy measure within the entire dynamics. Through the two
analyses, the effectiveness of the system structure of wind energy sector development of the
frontier and India as well as the effectiveness of policy measures are evaluated.
6.8.1 Framework of Value Chain Policy Analysis and Causal Loop
Diagrams
Framework of Value Chain Policy Analysis
Wind energy policy instruments of the three countries are analyzed along wind energy
technology and project value chain. The aim of value chain policy analysis is to clarify the target
of various policy measures and the complexity of policy framework of each country and to
highlight the similarities and differences of policy mechanisms of the three countries.
Policy Value Chain Matrix
In order to perform value chain policy analysis, a matrix that clarifies policy target stages in
value chain of wind energy project and policy clusters are constructed for each country.
Targeted stages of value chain represent broad functions, not each individual value activities at
firm or business unit levels. Target activities in the value chain are divided into two categories:
power supply-push activities and power demand-pull activities. Power supply and cost are
defined in the earlier stages of value chain, and policy instruments targeting these phases can be
called power supply-push measures. On the other hand, power demand is stimulated by
instruments targeting consumption, and they can be called power demand-pull measures (Van
Dijk et al. 2003). Target stages and target activities are expressed in rows in the matrix.
Target policy clusters are divided into four categories: 1) domestic market development,
investment and transaction; 2) technology development and investment; 3) industry structure and
development; and 4) cross-border technology transaction and investment. Some policies have
effects on more than one activity clusters. Target policy clusters are expressed in columns of the
matrix. Policy measures may have more than one target functions and/or target clusters. Policy
incentives will be classified into the four clusters as follows.
Policies related to domestic market development/investment and market transaction:
= measures reducing project investment costs (fiscal and financial incentives for project
investment includes subsidy, grant, low interest loans, tax advantages for wind energy
investment and loans, etc)
m measures reducing wind electricity production cost (price control measures such as feed-in-
tariffs, tax advantages on wind energy generation income, etc)
- measures reducing wind electricity price (tax advantage on the wind electricity
consumption)
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- non-financial measures on production and consumption (quantity control measure such as
quota obligation on production or consumption)
- measures reducing resource cost and availability (national and regional data/information
system, financial and technical support for grid connection and infrastructure, etc)
- rules on investor characteristics (ownership restriction, domestic and foreign investment
restriction, tax exemption or advantages on domestic and foreign capital investment, etc)
- rules on market size and location (institutional boundary, rules regulating regional
transmission and distribution, etc.)
- rules on market transaction (rules regulating electricity banking, wheeling, regional
electricity trade, etc.)
Policies related to technology development and investment:
- government R&DD programs
- measures support private sector R&DD (fiscal and financial support and incentives
including subsidy, grant, low interest loans, tax advantages for R&DD investment and
loans, etc)
- establishment of R&DD focal point and partnership between public and private sectors
- establishment of testing facilities
- rules on project development requirement (project development/planning application
requirement, etc)
- rules on product and service quality requirement (technology standards, technology
certification requirements, environmental requirements, grid interface and management
regulations, etc)
Policies related to domestic industry development and structure:
- rules on concentration of firms in an industry (antitrust regulation that concern merger,
vertical mergers, monopoly, and oligopoly)
- rules on entry and exit (control of entry of new firms and foreign firms, control of entry
of existing regulated firms, restriction of the decision to exit to provide services to wider
consumers)
- measures supporting specific types of firms (fiscal and informational supports for small
and medium sized enterprises and women's firms, etc)
- rules on firm investment (investment regulation entails government intervention into
production facility and process (firm's choice of technology and inputs) and the
ownership of investments (foreign ownership restriction, etc)
- rules on product and service quality requirement (technology standards, technology
certification requirements, environmental requirements, etc)
Policies related to cross-border investment and transaction between countries:
- rules on trade (custom tariffs and duties, trade quota)
- rules on Intellectual Property Right (IPR)
- rules on Foreign Investment
- rules on product and service quality requirement (technology standards, technology
certification requirements, environmental requirements, etc)
- measures supporting trade (fiscal and financial incentives for export and import, trade
supporting programs such as information support from trade association and government)
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- oversea project development support measures (oversea development aids, fiscal and
financial incentives for oversea projects, etc)
Framework of Causal Loop Diagram Analysis
Causal loop diagrams are one of diagramming tools to capture the structure of systems in system
dynamics. They can present the feedback structure of systems (Sterman 2000). The aim of use
of causal loop diagrams is to synthesize the analytical findings of this chapter, to see the
dynamics of market, technology, and industry, to clarify the relationships between the dynamics
and their co-evolutionary process, and to see the effects of policy measures categorized by the
policy value chain matrix. The effects of policy measures can be seen easily in causal loop
diagrams that identify positive or negative feedback structures created by policy measures and
other variables. Thus, the diagrams are used to examine the effectiveness of policy, which is
evaluated by whether or not it has had the targeted effects and the effects beyond the original
policy intention.
Causal Loop Diagram Notation
A causal diagram consists of variables connected by arrows denoting the causal influences
among variables. Variables are related by causal links, shown by arrows. Each causal link is
assigned a polarity, either positive (+) or negative (-) to indicate how the dependent variable
changes when the independent variable changes. A positive link means that if the cause
increases, the effects increases above what it would otherwise have been, and if the cause
decreases, the effects decreases below what it would otherwise have been. A negative link
means that if the cause increases, the effects decreases below what it would otherwise have been,
and if the cause decreases, the effects increases what it would otherwise have been. Link
polarity describes not the behaviors of the variable but the structure of the system; they describe
what would happen if there were a change and they do not describe what actually happens.
These positive and negative links complete loops, which are either positive or negative. Positive
loops are self-reinforcing. Negative loops are self-correcting and counteract and oppose change
(Sterman 2000).
The causal loop diagrams in this research deviate from common causal loop diagrams in several
points. Although usually causal loop diagrams do not put circle, hexagons or other symbols
around the variable, diagrams here use different shapes to distinguish policy variables (in
rectangular) and external variables (in hexagons) from other variable (in ovals). Also some
variables are circled by rectangle with round corners to show their aggregated characteristics.
External variables are defined here as variables belong to the outside of the local wind energy
sector. They can be either domestic or foreign factors. Lastly, a loop identifier that usually used
to show whether the loop is a positive or negative feedback is not drawn, in order to simplify the
complicated diagrams visually.
107 See Sterman (2000) for the basic principles of graphic design of causal loop diagrams.
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Policy Variables Other Variables
External Variables Aggregation of Similar
Variables
Causal Link + _ Positive and Negative
Loop Identifier
Figure 6-11: Causal Loop Diagram Notation and Key
Causal loop diagrams constructed here do not necessarily complete within the expressed
structure, because the diagrams only represent regional/domestic wind energy sector structure
and there are some external factors that internal variables of the regional/domestic wind energy
sector structure cannot influence. Also, the diagrams can be disaggregated far more in details.
However, because the purpose of this analysis is to capture the basic dynamics of system
structures, the diagrams do not have every detail examined in the previous sections.
6.8.2 Policy Value Chain and Causal Loop Diagram at Technology
Frontier
Policy Value Chain at Frontier during the 1990s and 2000s
Value chain matrix is created for each country. The JOULE Programme by the EU is
incorporated into the matrixes of both Denmark and Germany due to its important impacts
although it was not the national R&D programs.
Denmark
Table 6-28 shows the policy value chain of Denmark. All measures in Denmark have been in
power supply-push measures. As seen, policy measures are heavily concentrated in the domestic
market development/investment/transaction and the technology development/investment
clusters. All power supply-push value chain activities are covered by the measures in both
clusters.
Policy measures in the domestic market development/investment/transaction cluster range across
all supply-push value chain activities down from project investment, while policy measures in
the technology development/investment cluster also cover all activities except project
investment. The main measures in the domestic market development/investment cluster
(ownership limits, feed-in tariffs, production subsidy) that supported the market growth during
the 1980s and 1990s were retreated from the beginning of 2000, simplifying the framework of
policy. No formal and specific measures have been provided in the industry development/
investment cluster. Three policy measures in the cross-border transaction/investment have
focused on the project investment and development/execution activities oversea. Some R&DD
projects covered by EEP and UVE have also focused on reinforcement of exports of Danish
technologies and expertise and international standardization from technology development
perspectives.
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Table 6-28: Policy Value Chain Matrix of Denmark after 1990
Target Policy Domestic Market Technology Industry Cross-border
Cluster Development/ Tehnology
Target Value\ Investment/ Ivsm DevelopmentTasato
Chai~n Activity \ Transaction Invsmn
Turbine
Technology
Manufacture 1
Project
Investment
Project
Development
Execution
EEP R&DD (1978-)
UVE R&DD
(1982-2002)
Noise regulation
(1991-)
JOULE-WEGA 11
(1990s)
EEP & DEA R&DD
(2003-05)
PSO R&D (1998-)
Turbine Testing &
Certification (1979-)
1 t I. I
Tax deduction (1976-)
Repowering subsidy
(1994-97)
Utility Agreement (1985-)
Ownership area/project
capacity limits (1979-99)
Spatial planning (1995-)
Noise regulation (1991-)
EEP R&DD (1978-)
UVE R&DD
(1982-2002)
PSO R&D (1998-)
JOULE-THERMIE
(1990s)
Wind
turbine
guaranteed
company
(late
1980s-)
DANIDA
project
development
aid (1 980s-)
RISO
WindConsult
(1980s-)
Feed-in tariff (1992-99)
Production subsidy
Power (1981-99)
Generation Green certificate (2000-) PSO R&D (1998-)C2 tax refund (1992-)
Repowering feed-in
tariffs (2001-03)
Power T&D
Wind Power
Consumption
Grid connection
obliqation PSO R&D (1998-)
1- 1* +
Germany
Table 6-29 is the policy value chain matrix of Germany. The German policy covers both power
supply-push and power demand pull functions in value chain. Like Denmark, the policy
measures are heavily concentrated in the domestic market development/investment/transaction
and the technology development/investment clusters. All supply-push and demand-pull value
chain activities from project investment are covered by policy measures in the domestic market
development/investment/transaction cluster.
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Power
Supply
Push
Power
Demand
Pull
.
Table 6-29: Policy Value Chain Matrix of Germany after 1990
Target Policy Domestic Market Technology Industry Cross-border
Cluster Development/tDevelopment/ Structure/ Investment/
CainrAcivity Tunsatin Investment Development Transaction
Chain Activity Transaction
Turbine
Technology
Manufacture
Energy Research &
Energy Technology
(1980s-)
WEMP (1991-)
ZIP (2001-)
BMU R&D (2004-)
Noise regulation
Blade material
regulation (1995-)
JOULE-WEGA II
(1990s)
Turbine Certification
(1992-)
Subsidy for
plant building
(1990s)
State support
for local
manufacturer
(1990s)
El Dorado
turbine
export
assistance
(1991-99)
250MW program
capital subsidy State subsidy
(1989-96) for use of local Prit
Project Federal loans (1990-) manufacturer Pate
Investment Tax Income deduction turbines (2003-)
(1990s-)
State capital subsidy
(1993-1999)
Energy Research &
Zoning (1997- Energy TechnologyProject Turbine privilege (1980s-)
Development (97)WEMP (1991-) TERNA
& (1997-) ZIP offshore (2001 (1995-)
Execution Licensing (2001-) BMU R&D (2004-)
Noise regulation JOULE-THERMIE
___________(1 990s)
250MW program
production subsidyPower (1989-96)
Generation Feed-in tariffs
s(1991-, EFL & EEG)
Power T&D Grid connectionobligiation BMU R&D (2004-)
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Power
Supply
Push
Power Eco Tax (1999-) on
Demand Consumpo fossil fuel electricity
Pull consumption
Policy measures in the technology development/investment cluster also covered a wide range of
value chain activities. The main policy measures in these two clusters have been continuous
from the early 1990s to the 2000s. Unlike Denmark, there were several federal and state policy
measures that support manufacturing and project investment value chain activities in the industry
development/investment cluster during the 1990s. The German policy in the cross-border
transaction/investment cluster also differs from those of Denmark; the turbine exports were
supported by El Dorado Program, while two other measures have targeted the project investment
and project development/execution activities oversea.
Wind Energy Sector Causal Loop Diagram at Technology Frontier
Figure 6-12 is the regional causal loop diagram of the wind energy sector at the technology
frontier. Due to the similarity of policy measures of both countries and the strong influence of
the German mechanism on both the Danish and German technology and industry development,
only one diagram was constructed to express the regional structure.
Structural Characteristics
At a glance, it is very clear that there have been many positive links which have created positive
feedback loops in the frontier structure and dynamics.
The policy-driven wind energy market dynamics starts with market development/investment
incentives. Both the production incentives (the feed-in tariffs guaranteed by laws in both
countries; the production subsidy and the CO 2 tax refund in Denmark; and the 1 OOMW/250MW
program production subsidy in Germany) and the investment incentives (the tax deduction in
both the countries; the 1OOMW/250MW capital subsidy, the federal loans, and the state capital
subsidy in Germany)108 as well as the strong environmental concerns pulled the market
investment, then the market development. However, this link soon created the utility/general
development resistance variable, hence, negative links to market investment and political
certainty. Also both the market development and utility/general development variables created
negative effects on resource availability. However, at the frontier, these negative elements were
corrected by new policy variables and technology-related variables. The utility/general
development resistance induced the formation of ownership/land use regulations and
noise/materials regulations, which generated positive feedback loops by increasing political
certainty and by positively affecting technology development. The decreased resource
availability due to the utility/general development resistance, the growing market, and the
ownership/land-use regulations fortified the technology development/efficiency demand
variable, which worked on technology upscaling/advancement directly as well as indirectly
through changing the industry dynamics. The production incentives also directly increased the
technology efficiency demand.
108 Denmark already retreated the investment subsidy by 1989.
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Market
Dynamics
Figure 6-12: Regional Causal Loop Diagram of Technology Frontier
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In the technology dynamics, the technology development/efficiency demand intensified the
manufacturer R&D efforts, which directly influenced technology upscaling/advancement. In
addition, the EU/national R&DD supports assisted the development of high-tech/systemic/
science-based technology through basic science research directly, while the industry
collaboration was also stimulated by both the EU/national R&DD supports and the manufacture
R&D efforts. Throughout these processes, both the regional technological capacity and
capability and the development of high-tech/systemic/science-based technology were advanced,
resulting in the technology efficiency increase. The technology certification/quality standard
policy, created by the need for quality improvement and avoiding the abuse of the investment
incentives, enhanced technology advancement, which in return improved technology
certification/quality standards. This reciprocal relationship also increased the quality assurance,
which helped both regional market development and oversea expansion. In particular, the
Danish technology certification efforts have continuously contributed to international
standardization, fortifying the Danish industry position in oversea expansion.
The industry dynamics was basically triggered by the technology development/efficiency market
demand and the manufacturer R&D efforts. These two variables were the driving force behind
the modification of various competitive strategies, resulting in the increase of public listing,
M&A, industry collaboration, geographical capacity control, and sourcing control. Several
policy variables directly influenced some of the competitive strategy modifications. Cross-
border transaction/investment policy in Denmark supported oversea expansion of the
manufacturers. Industrial policy from the EU and Germany enhanced geographical capacity
management in the region. Then, the EU/national R&DD supports enhanced the industry
collaboration in R&D, which supported the manufacturer R&D. The R&D supports also
intensified the industry competition through the process of project selection. While the
competitive strategy modification and the industry competition intensified each other, the
industry consolidation and the technology control were increased by the manufacturer strategy
modification. The increased technology control then enhanced the regional technological
capacity and capability in Europe. Although the industry consolidation decreased the available
technology option, which is considered influencing technology advancement negatively, its
effects were relatively small, as all other links had larger positive effects on the technology
dynamics.
All these links in the technology and industry dynamics, then, came back to the market
dynamics, reducing the cost and the utility/general development resistance by improving
technology efficiency. The cost reduction then reduced the needs for both investment and
production incentives, which are actually gradually reduced in both Denmark and Germany,
completing a virtuous cycle of policy, market, industry, and technology development.
Frontier Policy Evaluation
Policy Evaluation based on Effectiveness
Policy measures are evaluated by the effectiveness based on whether it has created the originally
intended effects on the activities they targeted. In this regard, the policy measures at the frontier
were quite effective. In particular, the policy measures in the market development/investment/
transaction cluster were very effective, triggering the market dynamics by stimulating the project
investment and power generation activities as intended. Then, the policy measures that targeted
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the project development/execution activity helped increase political certainty and orderly
development, correcting the negative effects created by the market development.
The policy measures in the technology development/investment cluster were also effective,
because they supported the specific technology development/efficiency demands derived from
the market dynamics. This was not the case before 1990 in Germany, as the policy measures in
this cluster targeted technology development that was not necessarily connected to the
commercial market at the time.
Not all policy measures in the industry structure/development cluster in Germany were effective,
as many manufacturers that the measures were trying to support did no survive. Effective policy
measures in this cluster were the ones that more focused on providing financial assistance in
manufacturing activity, not the ones that give preferable treatment to the manufacturers or the
product buyers; as such treatments distort the competition and do not help the proper industry
development at the end.
The effectiveness of policy measures in the cross-border transaction/investment cluster was also
not as large as the indirect effects of the policy measures in the market and technology
development/investment clusters, in terms of assisting cross-border activities by the
manufacturers; the manufacturers that gained enough competitiveness in the regional/domestic
markets did not require strong cross-border investment policy supports for their oversea
expansion. At the same time, however, the focus of the measures such as RISO WindConsult
and TERNA has not been the supports for the domestic manufacturers but the international
knowledge dissemination. In this regard, their contribution is quite large.
Policy Effectiveness on Virtual Cycle Creation
The effectiveness of policy measures at the technology frontier also derived from their power
that balanced out some negative effects created in the process of market development.
At the frontier, as mentioned, the policy measures that targeted the project development/
execution activities have played the roles of correcting the negative links and turned them into
positive loops or create new positive loops that offset the effects of the negative loops. The
ownership regulations, the land use/spatial planning regulations, and the environmental
regulations concerning noise and materials addressed the concerns and resistance for further
development, reinstated political certainty, and triggered technology advancement directly, while
the continuity of policy measures, in particular, the production incentives guaranteed by law,
have supported the basic mechanism of the market dynamics.
It is also important to note that the balancing-out happened only in the market dynamics and the
technology and industry dynamics just followed what the market dynamics required. The
frontier system structure proved that the properly functioning market is most important to offset
the negative effects that could have discouraged the technology and industry dynamics. Thus,
the market policy measures at the frontier succeeded to create rippling positive effects on the
activities beyond the ones that they originally targeted, resulting in virtuous cycle creation.
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6.8.3 Policy Value Chain and Causal Loop Diagram in India
Policy Value Chain of India
Table 6-30: Policy Value Chain Matrix of India
Target Policy Domestic Market Technology Industry Cross-border
Cluster Development/ Development/ Structure/ Investment/
ialet Fucin rnstin Investment Development Transactionin au hi rnato
Turbine
Technology
Manufacture
Project
Investment
Indigenous turbine
R&DD (-1992)
Commercialization
R&DD (1992-)
Turbine certification
(1995-)
Import duty measures
(1997-)
Exercise & Sales tax
exemption (1993-)
Exercise & Sales Tax
on spare parts (1998-)
Exercise Tax on high
value added activities
(1993-)
Corporate
tax reduction
(1991-)
Promotion of
FI (1991- )
T r -tIREDA project loan
(1992-)
Tax holiday (1993-)
Accelerated
depreciation
(1993-)
Zero-tax (1993-96)
Import duty
measures (1993-)
MAT (1997-)
Wind Estates
(1994-)
TUF (1999-05)
State subsidy
Import duty
measures
(1993-)
IREDA
manufacturing
equipment
loan
(oversea
market)
(1990s-)
Project IREDA equipmentDeosrtn(18-Demonstration (1985-)Prveojet lEa equimen Wind resource MNES
m lase ind992-) assessment (1983-) consultancy
&xecuto eae i a Project guidelines (late 1990s-)Execution clearance (1991-) (95)____________(1995-)
Power
Generation
Power T&D
Feed-in Tariffs
Third-party sales
Wheeling
Banking
Grid connection
obligation
International
collaboration in R&D
(late 1990s-)
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Power
Supply
Push
Power Wind PowerDemand Consumption
I
Table 6-30 is the policy value chain of India. All measures have been in power supply-push
measures. Similar to Denmark and Germany, the policy measures are heavily concentrated in
the domestic market development/investment/transaction and the technology development/
investment clusters, and they cover all supply-push value chain activities. The policy measures
in the market development/investment/transaction cluster range across all power supply-push
value chain activities from project investment, but they are most heavily concentrated in the
project investment value chain activity. Although the industry electricity tariffs determined by
SEB of each state are a very significant incentive for project investment and production, they are
not the wind specific policy measure but an external factor to the sector; hence they are not
included in the matrix. One big difference from the frontier policy is that India has had more
policy measures in the technology development/ investment cluster that focus on manufacturing
activities. Also as seen, the import duty measures have been used to stimulate different value
chain activities in three policy clusters.
Wind Energy Sector Causal Loop Diagrams in India
Due to the structural break happened in the mid 1990s, two causal diagrams are constructed for
India: one for before the structural break and the other for after the structural break.
Structural Characteristics of Causal Loop Diagram of India before Structural Break
Figure 6-13 is the causal loop diagram of the Indian wind energy sector before the structural
break. Many positive links were in present.
The market dynamics started with the two external variables: the 1991 economic reforms/limited
power sector commercialization and privatization and the multinational/bilateral funding for
IREDA revolving fund. These two variables contributed the creation of the investment
incentives (IREDA project loan, tax holiday, accelerated depreciation, and zero-tax), which was
the largest contributor in increasing the market investment. Another external variable, the high
electricity tariffs for the industrial customers by SEBs, also initiated the first positive link for the
market investment. The power sector privatization and commercialization encouraged the
private power producer participation, hence the wind energy sector investment, through the
creation of the production incentives. However, the feed-in tariff incentives offered by SEBs
were too weak to initiate a positive link on its own. Other production incentives such as third-
party sales in Tamil Nadu, wheeling, and banking, were also important contributors. The eased
clearance also positively influenced the market investment. Then, the market development
stimulated by the investment growth boosted the technology transfer demand. The
demonstration and wind resource assessment measures contributed to the market development by
increasing the information of suitable sites for projects as well as by reducing the resource
availability cost. On the other hand, without any counteracting measures, the investment
incentives created the gold-plating/incentive abuse variable, which reduced the cost reduction
demand greatly.
In the industry dynamics, the technology transfer demand created by the market development,
the increased interest in oversea expansion by the frontier manufacturers, and the GOI
encouragement of foreign investment all contributed to increasing the number of technology
providers and their local joint venture partners, resulting in the formation of the industry as well
as the increase of technology introduction and local capacity/capability building.
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Figure 6-13: Causal Loop Diagram of India before Structural Break
The technology dynamics was also stimulated by the import duty and exercise/sales tax
exemption, which increased the technology introduction and local technological
capacity/capability building. Then, the increased technology introduction and local
technological capacity/capability generated positive links to the cost reduction. However, there
were several negative links created by the infrastructure deficiency, the tax on high value added
activities, and the diminished cost reduction demand by the gold-plating/incentive abuse.
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Overall, during this period, the positive links from the market dynamics through the industry
dynamics created the positive feedback loops that go through the technology dynamics and
reached to the cost reduction, coming back to increasing the market investment. On the other
hand, the powerful negative links created by the gold-plating/incentive abuse and the
infrastructure deficiency offset the positive influences on the technology introduction and local
technology capacity and capability, hence the cost reduction. The cycles including market,
industry, and technology were generated, but they did not reach the level to influence the policy
variables, as seen at the frontier, because in reality the technology efficiency increase did not
happen and the cost reduction effects were overshadowed by the gold-plating.
Structural Characteristics of Causal Loop Diagram of India after Structural Break
Figure 6-14 shows the causal loop diagram of India after the structural break.
The structural break was caused by both the internal policy variables (the MAT/income tax, the
turbine certificate/quality standards variables, and the new import duty measures) and the
external variables (the SEBs financial troubles, the transformed frontier technology
characteristics into systemic/high-tech/science-based technology, the frontier industry
consolidation, and the technology provider characteristics).
The new variables that triggered the structural break changed the market dynamics greatly. The
gold-plating/incentive abuse variable induced the introduction of a new policy variable, the
MAT/income tax, which returned a negative link to the abuse variable, hence reducing its effect,
but it also generated a negative link to the market investment. Another new variable, the SEB
financial trouble, generated a negative link to the production incentive variable by increasing the
SEB resistance to wind energy development. The SEBs financial troubles also created positive
links to the industrial electricity tariffs and to the 2003 Electricity Act through the SEB reform
efforts, but the latter was introduced with a great time delay. These new policy and SEB
variables increased negative influences on the market investment, hence the market development
and the technology transfer demand, until the 2003 Electricity Act began outweighing their
negative effects.
The industry dynamics was greatly influenced by new variables as well. However, unlike the
market dynamics, the new variables in the industry dynamics were external, coming from the
frontier. First, without the innovation capacity and capability, whether the technology transfer
demand creates positive or negative link depended very much on the technology provider
characteristics. Yet, the competitive strategy modification at the frontier changed the technology
provider characteristics in terms of technology control, mostly toward its tightening, and created
a strong negative link to the technology introduction variable. The technology introduction
variable also got another negative link due to the industry consolidation at the frontier, which
reduced the number of technology providers. Only a small number of technology providers with
technology transfer willingness could positively influenced the technology introduction variable.
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Figure 6-14: Causal Loop Diagram of India after Structural Break
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A different external variable created at the frontier changed the technology dynamics too; the
transformed technology characteristics (high-tech, systemic, science-based) generated negative
links to the technology introduction variable. The internal and external domestic variables were
also the cause of negative links; the continuous infrastructure deficiency and the newly imposed
import duty did influence the technology introduction variable negatively. Thus, most of the
new variables created negative links and reduced the technology introduction, which then
decreased the local technological capacity/capability building and technology efficiency variable.
The technology efficiency variable was also negatively influenced by the tighter technology
control by technology providers, which also decreased the effectiveness of the national R&D.
Only the technology certification/quality standards variable created a positive link to local
capacity/capability building and counteracted the gold-plating/incentive abuse variable,
contributing to the elimination of the phenomenon.
Overall, negative effects increased in all the market, industry and technology dynamics in the
new diagram. In particular, the number of negative links that influenced the technology
introduction variable has greatly increased. However, their effects were not reversed by any
counteracting variables. As a result, all of the technology introduction, the local technological
capacity/capability building, the technology efficiency increase, and the cost reduction as well as
the links between them ended weak, creating the loop structures far from virtuous cycle. This
was the structure that increased the technology gaps with the frontier.
Indian Policy Evaluation
Policy Evaluation based on Effectiveness
The policy measures that targeted the project investment activity and the project development
and execution activity in the market development/investment cluster stimulated the investment in
the beginning, hence were effective in this sense. However, all the investment incentives
generated the gold-plating/incentive abuse variable in the first boom years, which was the
exactly opposite that they intended to do. In terms of policy measures after the structural break,
the MAT/income tax measure created the desired effects by eliminating the gold-plating/
incentive abuse phenomenon, but at the same time outweighed the effects of other original
investment incentives, greatly reducing the market investment. The effectiveness of the
production incentives, in particular, the feed-in tariffs, have been weak because the market
investment was rather induced by a strong external variable, the high electricity tariffs to the
industry sector. Overall, the effectiveness of policy measures in this cluster has been greatly
mixed.
The effectiveness of policy measures in the technology development/investment cluster is also
mixed. The demonstration and wind resource assessment measures increased the information
necessarily for project development. And the exercise/sale tax exemption measures as well as
the technology certification/quality standards measures were effective in increasing the local
technological capacity and capability. On the other hand, the R&D measures did not produce
any positive or negative links in the first boom years, and its existence was faded out by the tight
technology control posed by technology providers after the mid 1990s. Also the exercise tax on
high value added activities has continuously worked as a variable producing negative link.
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The policy measures in the industry structure/development cluster had been effective for the
industry formation in the beginning. On the other hand, the two measures in the cross-border
transaction/investment cluster, the IREDA Manufacturing Equipment Loan and the MNES
Consulting, have not been creating links to the dynamics.
In terms of import duty policy, which targeted different value chain activities in different policy
cluster, the duty exemption in the early years as cross-border transaction/investment policy was
effective by positively influencing the technology introduction. Also it was effective as market
development/investment policy by reducing the cost. However, the increased duty after the
structural break diminished both the effects. As a result, it was not effective to increase the local
technological capacity and capability building as it targeted. Thus, the Indian import duty
showed the ineffectiveness of inconsistent use of one policy measure targeting different value
activities in different policy cluster in wrong timing.
In overall structure, the Indian policy measures were not constructed effectively to reinforce
positive influences and counteract negative influences created in the loop structures. Although
there was difficulty of influencing the external variables by the domestic wind energy policy
alone, some of the negative loops were generated by the policy measures themselves. The policy
measures could have been constructed to avoid such effects.
Difficulty of Replicable Cross-border Energy Technology Transfer and Role
and Effects of Policy
Fragile Balance, Incomplete Loop Structure, and Strong External Variables
Compared to the virtual cycle and co-evolution of policy, market, industry, and technology
dynamics created at the frontier, the Indian causal loop structures were the complex system of
negative and positive links, which resulted in fragile balance of the system.
A significant contributing factor to the fragile dynamics was the large number of strong external
variables. The frontier technology and industry characteristics and the infrastructure deficiency
in India were the ones directly influenced the technology introduction, while the financial
problems of SEBs and the industry electricity tariffs created links connected to the market
investment. Those strong external variables increased the complexity of the system by adding
many links. However, many of them were negative links, in particular, to the technology
introduction. More importantly, because these external variables could not be easily and directly
influenced by the Indian wind energy sector, the loops were not closed, resulting in many
incomplete loops. All of the market, industry, and technology dynamics, hence the entire Indian
system, were left to the mercy of the external factors.
Role and Effects of Policy in Cross-border Wind Energy Technology Transfer
Thus, the causal loop diagram analysis of India illustrates a difficulty of replicable cross-border
technology transfer of distributed power generation technology under many external variables.
In the internally closed structure such as the frontier dynamics, the properly functioning market
dynamics can start rippling effects in technology and industry dynamics, spurring technology
development and diffusion and reaching to the stage of virtuous cycle. However, the Indian
structure cannot be enhanced by the improved market dynamics alone, because the Indian
structure and dynamics are not closed internally and there are external variables that dictate the
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Indian industry and technology dynamics from the frontier. Moreover, these external variables
posed by the frontier technology and industry are constantly transforming themselves, creating
the illusive, moving targets.
How to deal with such external variables strategically is an important agenda for energy
technology development and diffusion involving cross-border technology transfer between
developed and developing countries, along with the question of how to improve internal
dynamics. Such strategic dealing can happen both at firm/business level and policy level.
Making and implementing effective policy that turns negative links into positive ones and
reduces the effects of negative loops is a key strategy at policy level. However, this is not an
easy task by any means. Policy may not be able to interfere external variables directly, because
they can be only dealt with strategically at business/firm level and/or because possibly effective
policy measures may not conform the international rules of cross-border transaction/investment
policy that are changing constantly.
The next chapter tries to form the findings of this chapter into more theoretical thinking of cross-
border transfer of climate friendly energy technology and consider the role of policy, taking the
international climate change mitigation mechanisms such as the Kyoto Protocol into
consideration.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Chapter 6 examined the causal factors and processes that created the similarities and differences
in technology development and diffusion between the technology frontier of Denmark/Germany
and India, and their effects on technology transfer results. .
This chapter concludes the research. The chapter consists of two parts. The first section reviews
the key findings according the conceptual focus and theoretical and practical contexts of the
research introduced in Chapter 1. The second section draws some practical implications for
future climate change mitigation technology transfer based on the research findings.
Section 7.1: Key Findings
7.1.1 Direct Role of Policy and Institutional Settings
Technology Frontier - Denmark and Germany
Market Development
- The monetary value creation and rewarding policy, which creates favorable policy/
institutional sensitivity factors (revenue sources, fiscal measures, cost of financing, purchase
agreements) in project finance mechanism, served the market development, hence technology
inducement, most effectively in the case of wind energy.10 9' 110 Direct environmental policy
or direct technology forcing measures such as energy consumption/emission restriction
requirements have not been the market driver.
- The sequencing and combination of monetary value creation and rewarding policy incentives
was the critical factor of the market size expansion.
o The production incentives (feed-in tariffs) were the most important factor for market
development. At the frontier, their legal guarantees were especially important to provide
the certainty of investment by reducing the risks and showing the continuity of political
109 Sawin (2001) very clearly articulated the effectiveness of demand-pull policy in her detailed comparative study
on wind energy technology development and diffusion in Denmark, Germany, the United States as a whole, and the
state of California, from 1970 through 2000. Her dissertation research particularly focused on the role of
government policy and their effectiveness. Unlike the conventional economic theory, which insists that renewable
energy will achieve greater market penetration once it is cost-effective with conventional generation, her research
concluded the government policy is the most significant causal factor in determining the diffusion of wind energy
technology, and the priority should be given on demand creation rather than government R&D to achieve the
competitiveness. Sawin also lists the importance of turbine certifications as well as political certainty as significant
success factors (Sawin 2001). This research confirms her findings again in many areas.
110 Also a series of publications by Norberg-Bohm and her colleagues stress the importance of demand-pull policies
and the existence of sustained markets, along with supply-push policies, for innovations and deployment of newer
energy technologies in developed countries including wind. See (Norberg-Bohm. 1996, Banales-Lopez, and.
Norberg-Bohm. 2002, and Loiter and Norberg-Bohm. 1999).
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will, although the links of the feed-in tariffs to market retail electricity price often created
investment uncertainty.
o The investment subsidies in early years can be effective means to kick-start the market.
However, it was their gradual retreat and shift toward the production incentives that
contributed to strengthening the cost reduction demands and successfully establishing
sustainable market and competitive sector growth at the frontier.
o The fiscal and financial incentives were also effectively used to increase the
competitiveness of technology and support the market growth.
- The ownership regulations (Denmark) as well as the availability and types of fiscal and
financial incentives shaped the investor profile in great deal.
- The spatial planning regulations and the ownership regulations contributed to the local
acceptance of wind energy technology, the prevention of the government incentive abuse,
and the orderly market growth greatly. However, the process of their establishment and
refinement took time.
- Timely manner of effective policy implementation to replace obsolete technology is
important. In particular, the Danish experiences showed that the use of long-term production
incentives (reduction of monetary reward for production from obsolete technology) was more
effective than the use of one-time only investment subsidies (capital subsidies for
replacement of obsolete technology).
" Long-term certainty of policy and institutional supports is essential for sustainable market
development. Stability and continuity of governmental supports and showing the political
will are critical, even if the policy mixture itself is changed over time.
o Shift of timing from one policy mechanism to another, e.g., the feed-in tariffs to the
support mechanisms based on free market mechanism such as green certificates, needs to
be carefully examined, as the Danish experience since 2000 showed the difficulty of such
shifting under the uncertainty of transition to liberalized market and energy sector reform.
o Under the market liberalization process, legal measures that separate policy measures
from the uncertainty of the market, e.g., the EEG of Germany, can be effective and are
often necessary to support environmental technologies that are not fully competitive.
Their supports are well-justified on externality ground.
Industry Development
- The direct roles of industry structure-related regulations and industrial policy interventions
on the wind industry development were limited in the well-established institutional
environments of Europe. The indirect influences of the market and technology development
and investment policy incentives were the main forces that shaped industry development and
structure. However, the governments did still play significant roles as coordinator and
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initiator of industry collaborations and networks at both international and national levels for
industry-wide competitiveness building.
Technoloqy Development
- The supply-push policy for technology development in supporting incremental innovations
based on the market and industry experiences have been timely and cost effective for wind.
Pushing radical innovations without the backing of market and industry knowledge
accumulation have been far less successful and created the costly failures.
- The distinction of the roles of regional/international bodies and the national governments in
R&DD (the EU efforts in the grand scheme of turbine upscaling and the national R&DD
programs in basic science, commercialization and technology analysis of components and
system) successfully reduced the redundancy but created an effective synergy. The
effectiveness of international R&DD networks was amplified by the capability of national
governments in coordinating such networks.
Technoloqy Transfer
- The developmental and financial assistance tied with donor-country technology can help the
infant industry's oversea expansion strategy and transfer of technology. The Danish supports
tied with the Danish technology/enterprises gave the first mover advantages to the Danish
industry.
Policy that played Multiple Roles
- There are the measures that directly influenced multiple policy clusters beyond the originally
targeted one. At the frontier, the technology development measures played this role by
influencing the market and industry dynamics.
o The turbine testing and certification requirements, which originally targeted to support
high-quality technology development, have played significant multiple roles. In
Denmark, they have been effective in: 1) eliminating the abuse of the government
incentives; 2) deterring the entry of low quality firms into the industry by working as
institutional-technical barrier for business entry as well as eliminating the existing low
quality firms; 3) creating de facto international standard, giving the first mover advantage
to the Danish industry as well as containing the regional competitiveness within the
limited areas of Europe with higher capacity and capability.
o The public R&DD programs have played dual roles in sorting out the competitive firms
as well as coordinating the industry collaboration efforts and projects, strengthening the
industry competitiveness as a result, while supporting technology development.
350
Technology Receiver - India
Market Development
The creation and implementation of policy measures that increase the certainty and
controllability of the market is critical. Although the Indian policy incentives look similar to
those at the frontier at a glance (investment, production, fiscal and financial incentives), they
have had great difficulty in developing stable and sustainable market due to the following
reasons:
o The entire market growth has been supported by an external factor, i.e., high electricity
tariffs posed on the industry sector, which made the production incentives totally
ineffective regarding the control of market development.
o The heavy reliance on the above external factor and on the short-term fiscal incentives
made the Indian wind energy investment one-time tax planning and management tool for
industry investors. Such mechanism does not contribute to competitive market
development due to the lack of performance-oriented characteristics and cost reduction
demands, and the market cannot engage in sunset-clause of investment and fiscal
measures as it deeply depended on those non-performance-oriented measures.
o The difficulty of policy management for market development has been further increased
by the strong fluctuation and geographical segmentation of the market caused by the
federal structure, along with intense local political uncertainty under the unhealthy
financial conditions of state utilities and the controversial sector restructuring process.
The weak policy and infrastructure coordination between states also contributed to the
segmentation.
o Implementation of the incentive-abuse prevention measures from the beginning is critical
in order to create the orderly and continuous growth of new market and its certainty. The
lack of quality assurance measures in early years in India caused the abrupt policy change
that created the sudden market recession, but the trust of investors could not be easily
regained.
- Showing a clear national direction and strong political will for the sector development by
national legislations, e.g., the Electricity Act of 2003, was important for the market,
especially under the strong political uncertainty due to the sector transition and the
segmented institutional structure in India.
- The procedure and methods of the power sector reform and restructuring are very important.
The hasty and mishmash procedure and methods of the power sector liberalization can pose
larger costs later by creating self-contradictory mechanisms and increasing political
uncertainty, affecting the market negatively.
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Technoloqy Development
" The most significant technology support measures have been the National Wind Assessment
Program and the MNES demonstration program, as they have reduced the resource costs
greatly.
- On the other hand, the public R&D program has been ineffective due to the limited financial
sources and the restricted business practices on R&D posed by most of technology providers.
Policy that played Multiple Roles
- The industrial policy measures played multiple roles at the technology receiver side. India
has used more industrial policy measures, in particular targeting manufacturing activities,
than the frontier governments. However, their records are mixed; they were both effective
and counter-effective. The effective sequencing of those measures requires high capability
of policy makers in grasping the conditions surrounding the industry and the technology in
timely manner.
o The industrial policy interventions played the direct role of establishing the wind energy
industry and technology transfer in early years. The supportive FDI policy, the favorable
trade policy, and the rules on prohibiting foreign manufacturers to set up a shop
independently played important roles in industry formation by encouraging joint ventures
and license agreements with foreign manufacturers. They also actively supported
technology transfer through foreign collaborations, but their effectiveness has lessened
over the years, as individual technology providers began taking control over technology
transfer contents. FDI and other forms of technology partnerships do not automatically
guarantee the continuous technology upgrading and replicable technology transfer.
o Both the import duty and the exercise duty have mixed records as manufacturing
incentives. Frequent changes in the import duty without the stable and sizable market
and enough technological capability as well as the exercise duty on high value added
activities disrupted the targeted technology development as well as contributed to the
market recession by increasing the costs. The lack of political capacity and capability to
make appropriate assessments and policy measures in appropriate timing was an
important factor behind the failure.
" The establishment of the national level revolving fund and its continuous usage can not only
be a cost effective way of utilizing international public lending to support private market
development, but also contribute to effectively eliminating the danger of bilateral
concessionary financing and avoiding potential technology-lock-in situation.
" The quality assurance measures such as turbine certification and project guidelines
contributed to increasing technological capability building greatly as well as induced the
industry structural adjustment by eliminating low quality firms.
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7.1.2 Co-evolution of Policy, Market, Industry and Technology
In the process of wind energy technology development and diffusion, the whole ensemble and
the co-evolution of policy, market, industry, and technology was critical. While their ensemble
successfully created virtuous cycle of technology development and diffusion at the frontier, this
research highlighted the difficulty of creating such cycle in India.
Frontier - Virtuous Cycle of Policy, Market, Industry and Technology
Development
Central Role of Policy in Creation of Virtuous Cycle
- The virtuous cycle creation among policy, market, industry, and technology development
was critical for competitive wind energy technology development, as it effectively reduced
the cost of power generation and increased the competitiveness of technology, which in turn
reduced the necessity and amounts of policy supports. Their dynamics determines the
direction and speed of technology development and diffusion. The establishment of such
cycle has been successful at the frontier.
- Policy has been central in the process of making the virtuous cycle by: 1) triggering new
dynamics; and 2) reducing the negative effects by introducing new measures that create the
counteractive positive effects for them. The starting point of the cycle was the creation of
market dynamics by market value creation and rewarding policy measures, because they
generated the rippling effects on technology and industry development by creating strong
synergy for technology improvement. The performance-oriented market development policy
(feed-in tariffs) was very effective measures, creating the similar effects with what
technology forcing standards could have achieved.
o The policy measures that corrected the negative effects were mainly in place in the
market dynamics, indicating the importance of creating the effective market dynamics in
virtuous cycle creation.
o At the frontier, other factors such as land development pressures reinforced by the wind
turbine zoning and noise regulations in Germany fortified the technology efficiency
improvement demands. In addition, the competition with other investments was
successfully created by not giving too generous policy incentives to wind.
o The German EEG has further fortified the technology forcing demands as dynamic
performance measures by its formulation of feed-in tariffs as a function of time.
- The frontier cycle creation showed that the indirect effects of policy are also important due to
the interaction among factors in the whole system dynamics. Continuous adjustment and
overall coordination of policy according to the evolution of other aspects of the sector are,
therefore, essential.
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Market, Industry, and Technology Interaction
- Both supply and demand factors played important roles in wind energy innovations as the
sources of technological change. However, the main role in technological change was played
by the demand-pull factors; both the market size and demand characteristics were necessary.
They were collectively the driver of technology development and the determinant of
technological characteristics.
o The market with size and continuity matters, as only the sizable and continuous market
can have enough power to justify all technology development investments and determine
the speed of technology development. At the frontier, several local markets with similar
characteristics (Denmark, Germany, and Spain, etc.) contributed to create the stable and
sizable regional market.
o The market demand characteristics determined the direction of wind energy technology
development. Technology development and diffusion at the frontier has been very much
demand-pull, as almost every technology can be traced back its origin to a certain market
demand and/or the combination of them. In particular, technology efficiency
improvement demands created by the investment economic pressure and various policy
measures were most important for leading tremendous wind turbine upscaling in size and
capacity as well as various innovative features of wind energy technology.
o Technology supply by exogenous innovations outside the wind energy industry worked
as effective support-factors to satisfy the market demands, but they also determined the
speed and direction of wind energy technology development as pacing technologies. The
exception was blade technology innovations that are specific and endogenous to the wind
energy industry.
- Technological characteristics/specificity and industry competitiveness management strategy
were deeply related to each other. The strong and continuous technology upgrading market
demands were the modification driver for both. Technological characteristics determined by
the market demands greatly influenced the necessity of capacity and capability management,
hence the transformation of various firm-level competitiveness strategies.
o The market demands for technology efficiency improvement transformed wind energy
technology into high-tech integration of increasingly specialized components/value chain
activities with stronger science-based innovation focus and increased technological
complexity since 1990.
o In the process of technological transformation, the wind industry was forced to modify
various competitiveness management strategies (business entry, organizational growth,
innovation network building, and geographical management of capacity and capability
procurement and sourcing) in order to manage the required technological capacity and
capability. However, the strategies have been specific to component and value activity;
management strategy is closely related to technological specificity. This co-evolving
technology-management transformation process cumulatively increased the technical
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barriers, which in turn contributed to consolidating the industry by eliminating less
capable firms and containing the industry competitiveness within the region with high
technological capacity and capability.
o The close networks of government organizations, academics and researchers,
manufacturers, sub-suppliers, and users amplified the effectiveness of capacity and
capability management of firms and the industry as a whole on technology development.
India - Difficulty of Virtuous Cycle Creation
Market, Industry and Technoloqy Interaction
" Replicable technology transfer is process-oriented. Unsuccessful virtuous cycle creation
interrupted the replicable technology transfer from the frontier to India and contributed to the
increase of technology gaps after the initial strong transfer trend.
- Installed capacity and new technology introduction through new turbine introduction have
very strong structural relationship. The domestic market factors as well as both internal and
external industry and technology factors are closely intertwined with the development and
transformation of the structural relationship.
o The structural relationship between installed capacity and new technology introduction
changed after the 1996-97 year to the one that requires more installed capacity for the
introduction of the same number of new turbine models to the market. This type of
transformation is neither necessarily harmful nor something should be avoided, because
installed capacity is not only indicating the amount of investments made but also related
to the size/capacity of models used in the projects. To a certain degree, it is the natural
transformation created by turbine upscaling. However, the problems in India was that
this structural change accompanied the reduction of both installed capacity and the
number of new turbine introduction, and contributed to the increase of technology gaps
with the frontier greatly.
- The development of the initial structural relationship that spurred the strong technology
transfer and new turbine introduction from the frontier was supported by positive interactions
among the strong market growth, the industry formation through foreign collaborations, and
the existing technological capability that were suited to small-capacity, mid-tech wind
turbines at the time.
- The transformation of the structural relationship between installed capacity and new
technology introduction had the complex causal factors, which were caused both internally
and externally. Coincidentally, all the internal and external negative events occurred during
a short period of time, amplifying the damaging effects further, interrupting replicable
transfer, and contributing to the increase of technology gaps with the frontier.
o The market-related causal factors were that: 1) the sudden and severe market slowdown,
which was mainly caused by the abrupt policy change and happened to be coinciding
with the frontier trend towards large-capacity turbines, amplified the negative side of the
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structural transformation by reducing the investments necessary to introduce those new
and larger models; and 2) the market recession also contributed to the slowdown and
termination of many technology collaborations with foreign technology providers.
o The technology-related causal factors were that: 1) the increased systemic integration
characteristics of wind energy technology at the frontier have made partial transfer of
newer technology without the introduction of the entire models very difficult; 2) the
increased technological complexity and high-tech characteristics required higher
technological capacity and capability, which many Indian collaboration partners could
not offer, and this has made the Indian manufacturers outside the global value chain and
sourcing/production networks of technology providers, further deterring the opportunities
of capacity/capability upgrading; and 3) the weakness in infrastructure in both electricity
grid and transportation interrupted the introduction of larger-capacity turbines.
o The industry-related causal factors were: 1) the industry consolidation at the frontier as
well as various troubles in business relationships between technology providers and
receivers during the first boom years reduced the number of technology providers in
India; and 2) the tightened technology control as a result of the transformed
competitiveness management strategies by technology providers deterred the introduction
of newer and upgraded technologies.
Role of Policy in Technoloqy Transfer
= The policy and institutional settings is central in both development and transformation in the
structural relationship between capacity development and new technology introduction by
influencing market-, industry-, and technology-related factors.
- The process-oriented nature of replicable technology transfer requires continuous and
simultaneous demand-pull forces and supply-push forces. Policy plays a vital role in both
aspects. However, the combination and sequencing of policy measures in India were not
powerful and effective enough to induce both demand-pull and supply-push technology
transfer.
o Performance-oriented market development policy formulation and policy adjustment
without abrupt change are vital for demand-pull technology transfer through sizable and
continuous market growth with strong technology upgrading and cost reduction demands.
This creates replicable technology transfer demands. The market demand characteristics
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for inducing technological change, which
requires the sizable market too. The demand-pull policy measures are also important
because domestic market can be more easily controlled than industry- and technology-
related factors that are more strongly influenced by external factors.
o Technological capacity and capability and its relationship with technological
characteristics are very important for managing supply-push technology transfer.
Technology receivers have vulnerability to external factors due to the lack of technology
ownership and control and the inherently lower technological capacity and capability
356
than the frontier. In this regard, policy formulation for supply-push technology transfer is
trickier and more difficult than demand-pull policy, because it requires flexible
adjustment of policy incentives to manage and enhance technological capacity and
capability at firm level in line with the industry and technology transformation happening
on both technology provider and receiver sides, while not intervening and distorting free
business activities and competition among firms in the industry.
- Industrial policy measures, especially manufacturing incentives such as import duty and
exercise duty, can create controversial effects as supply-push technology transfer policy.
Their formation and implementation as cost and technology management policy require
careful consideration because both cost reduction and technological capability building may
not be accomplished simultaneously.
- Infrastructure development policy is crucial not only for technology transfer of distributed
power generation technologies such as wind but also for other sector business activities.
Hence, prioritizing its early development and the necessary political coordination are vital.
7.1.3 Application of Theories of Technological Change on Wind
Energy Technology Development and Diffusion
This part examines the mechanisms of wind energy technology development and diffusion at the
frontier and India against the neo-classical theories and the evolutionary theories, and evaluates
the adequacy of policy approaches related to these theories.
Technology Frontier
As easily seen, the analysis of technology innovation at the frontier, in particular the early
Danish success by many other researches (see Chapter 4) as well as the technology advancement
since 1990 by this research, strongly support the evolutionary theories in: 1) path-dependent
technology development at firm level; 2) appropriateness and effectiveness of the evolutionary
policy measures related to industrial network building (initiating and supporting interactions
among various economic actors and providing coordination mechanisms) and related to the
system of innovation (maintaining the institutional knowledge infrastructure, stimulating
interactive learning among various actors presented in the national or regional innovation
system, monitoring the innovation system, creating complementary links between public and
private actors, creating and facilitating access to knowledge, and matching the supply and
demand for knowledge within the system) at industry level, regarding wind energy technology.
The incremental and evolutionary nature of wind energy innovation since the 1970s showed
strong path dependence; the wind turbine manufacturers innovated along certain familiar and
known paths, their technological learning has been costly, and they coped with uncertain and
risky business environments by developing and adapting organizational and managerial routines.
This strong path-dependent process also showed the importance of technology development
continuously backed and inspected by the market; the constant market trials are a cost effective
way of developing technology. The technologies developed without going through such constant
market trials were doomed to fail, as many radical attempts during the 1970s and the 1980s
failed quickly despite their enormous consumption of time and financial resources because they
never faced market trials in the process and lost the opportunities of continuous improvements.
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The wind energy innovations since 1990 also have shown the increased importance of exogenous
science-based innovations and pacing technologies, which the mainstream traditional neo-
classical models argue as the sources of technical change taking the form of shifts of production
function. However, it is important to recognize that these supply-side factors did not work in the
way that the mainstream neo-classical theories indicate; their contribution was closely
intertwined with endogenous firm innovations and industry dynamics, and the sources of
technological change are far more complex and comprehensive than the neo-classical theories
assume. Yet, the wind energy innovations also have shown the importance of expanded pool of
design knowledge as public goods, which the new growth models argue important for firms to
stimulate the interaction with human capital to shift production function by optimizing R&D
choices. A large amount of scientific codified information created by international R&D
networks created the level playing field for industry players at the frontier and became the
sources of competitiveness for each manufacturer.
In terms of policy aspects, it is true that the frontier governments of Denmark, Germany and the
EU covered some of the neo-classical policy measures to address the market failures of under-
investments of R&DD (stimulating R&DD and expanding/accumulating the pool of design
knowledge as public good), market imperfections (the EU antitrust measures), and information
asymmetries (gathering and providing data/information). Yet, their effectiveness largely
depended on the fact that many of these neo-classical measures were formulated and provided
along the line of evolutionary support measures (formulating/stimulating R&DD and expanding
the knowledge base through the national/regional system of innovation, and gathering and
disseminating the information based on the data gathered through the government-industry
network), because the links between exogenous innovation/knowledge base and technological
change are not instantaneous and costless. The evolutionary ways of thinking played the
decisive roles in policy formulation and they contributed to increasing the effectiveness of basic
neo-classical policy measures at the frontier.
Thus, both the neo-classical and evolutionary policy measures played important roles in wind
energy technology innovations, as both the movements of and along the production functions
have happened. The frontier governments successfully supported both aspects. Incorporating
the evolutionary policy measures contributed to amplifying the power and effectiveness of some
of the neo-classical policy measures. And all these were possible with the strong market base.
India
On the other hand, the Indian side of wind energy development and diffusion showed clear
inadequacy of addressing the assimilation aspects of the evolutionary theories.
As the evolutionary theories suggest, the assimilation of technology was time-consuming and
costly and the Indian firms were not permitted to select technology freely. Each of them spent
time and resources to build skillful entrepreneurship and technological capacity and capability by
learning to build their own original production lines. However, the gaps in productivity with the
frontier have increased overtime; during the Indian firms were struggling mastering the
technology on old production functions of smaller-capacity turbines, the frontier shifted to newer
production functions of larger-capacity turbines with various innovative features; the simple
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transfer of technology and capital was not enough to overcome the difference of productivity
level.
In terms of policy aspects, the Indian governments have tried to correct market failures created
by the externalities caused by costly technological learning and capability building through some
evolutionary policy measures (e.g., technology acquisition through the new FDI and trade policy
that induced foreign technology collaborations in the early years). However, the market
development measures, other measures such as several manufacturing incentives, and the attempt
to create generic knowledge base through C-WET have been rather indecisive and ineffective, in
terms of creating scale and opportunities necessary for learning-by-doing and learning-by-
searching (R&D). The restricted business practices posed by technology providers have also
intervened policy measures in addressing the externalities created by cost of technological
learning and capability building in India; the system of innovation and the knowledge network
building within India regarding both med-tech and more advanced level technologies were weak.
From the neo-classical and "accumulation" perspectives, it is difficult to evaluate the Indian
wind energy policy incentives because India has been engaging in policy measures involved in
industrial activity and providing protections, and intervening free international flows of capital
and technology. Certainly, the stagnation of introducing and mastering technology was
intensified by the lack of physical and human capital accumulation aspects; in particular, the lack
of physical capital investments on infrastructure (both the electricity grid and transportation) was
one of the reasons that prevented India from shifting to newer and more efficient technologies.
However, it is clear that the assimilation aspects have been very important for wind energy
technology development and diffusion in India due to its direct influences on mastering
technology from the outside sources, and the policy measures have not been fully effective in
correcting the market failures associated with technology assimilation.
7.1.4 Application of International Technology Transfer Theories on
Wind Energy Technology Transfer from Denmark/Germany to
India
This part tries to apply some of the existing international technology transfer theories on the
wind energy case examined by this research.
Determinants of Entry Mode of Wind Energy Technology Transfer to India
The initial entry mode of wind energy technology transfer to India was mostly determined by the
GOI restriction on building manufacturing facilities by foreign firms without the collaboration
with local firms. Local manufacturing was necessary in order to reduce the costs. Therefore, all
foreign entries in the early years chose joint ventures and license agreements over FDI. The
location advantages advocated by Dunning were high in India at that time; the market prospect
was strong and the availability and cost of labor input and transportation were satisfactory.
However, due the above government restriction, foreign technology providers did not fully
exercise the privilege to choose among the options stemming from internalization and ownership
advantages; the choice between higher entry mode such as FDI and intermediate mode such as
joint ventures/license agreements were not strategically made in this regard. The choice between
joint ventures and license agreements was made by: 1) initial capacity and capability of the
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Indian sides (higher original capital and capacity/capability firms such as Suzlon and BHEL
cases for license agreements); and 2) ownership restrictions of SOE (BHEL case). This supports
the organizational capability perspectives on determinant factors on technology receiver side.
The removal of the GOI entry mode restrictions contributed to the emergence of FDI as entry
mode since the late 1990s (NEG-Micon and GE cases); they could exercise their strategies
freely. One of the important backgrounds that made both the firms to decide to take FDI was,
however, their business troubles with the former Indian partners (Micon with NEPC and Tacke/
GE with Flovel) during the mid 1990s; as a result, after their bitter court disputes, Micon lost its
rights of manufacturing their turbines under 400kW in India and Tacke was also restrained its
business activities in India. Therefore, ownership advantages (controlling firm's specific assets)
by FDI were considered very high for both the firms at that time. As for location advantages
(market attractiveness), the conditions were somewhat in question. NEG Micon remained in
business in India after the break-up with NEPC during the severe market recession, solely in
order to replace the bad quality turbines and projects built under Micon's name during the first
boom years. Location advantages for GE are also unknown: GE has not been extensively
installed its turbines in India, and the extent of export by the Indian subsidiary to other markets
has not been so strong, considering the small amount of total export figures by the Indian wind
industry. The Indian market entered to the recession and the technological capability supply
from India began showing inadequacy for newer and more high-tech turbines. As for
internalization advantages (transaction and coordination costs through internalization), the exact
assessments are difficult due to the lack of data, comparing with other joint venture firms.
Thus, the existing theoretical frameworks regarding the choice of entry mode can be only
partially applied to the wind energy technology transfer from Denmark/Germany to India,
although the inadequacy of some data made full examination difficult. The O-L-I framework by
Dunning as well as transaction cost theories cannot fully explain the choice of mode by
technology providers, although parts of their arguments fit. This is largely because these
frameworks mainly concern the factors from technology provider side. As many empirical
studies have suggested, the factors that influence the mode of transfer are far more complex than
any of the existing theories suggest, and more considerations on internal and external factors on
technology receiver side need to be incorporated.
Mode of Transfer and Technology Transfer Results
As for the relationship between the mode of transfer and the transfer results, FDI have shown the
introduction of more advanced technologies. However, in terms of developmental effects, the
difference between FDI and joint ventures are ambiguous, as technology transfer itself has not
been very active in recent years, compared to the initial stage by the mid 1990s. In addition, the
results of technology transfer can greatly differ even among the same mode of transfer,
depending on the detailed ownership structure and the willingness of technology providers for
sharing advanced technology and business activities, as seen various cases of joint ventures in
Chapter 6. The most thriving case in creating developmental effects and technological capacity/
capability building was the case of fully independent ownership, which could take an advantage
of technological advancements at the frontier while overcoming technology control by
technology providers, as seen in the Suzlon's case, but this requires the strong capital base.
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The research indicates that more in-depth analysis and empirical data from other country and/or
other technology cases can be useful to explore the relationship between equity share structure
and transfer results as well as the difference in developmental effects between the modes, for
wind energy technology.
Importance of Evolutionary Process of Partner Relationships on Transfer
Results
Although the importance of the relationship between mode of transfer and transfer results should
not be diminished, this research found that the evolutionary process of technology collaborations
is another very important element to determine the technology transfer results and developmental
effects of the transfer. Market, industry, firms, and technology are alive and evolve constantly;
as a result, the dynamics of technology partnerships change. Technology transfer is a reciprocal
process. Therefore, the mode of transfer alone cannot determine the evolving transfer results.
As for the forms of technology transfer, both the Indo-Danish and Indo-German technology
transfers have the elements of horizontal technology transfer, as the production of similar goods
for the local Indian market by multiple firms using local labor force has occurred. Also, the
partnership cases have shown the mode of technology diffusions beyond learning-by-doing and
training of fragmented production activities, i.e., backward and forward linkages formation and
demonstration effects. However, there have been also the elements of vertical technology
transfer at the same time; the production of high value goods has never occurred in many
partnership cases. In addition, the export of lower value goods from India to other markets has
not been strong either. Thus, the forms of transfer to India have been quite mixed; although
technology transfer potentials have been stronger than a pure from of vertical technology
transfer, they have never been fully realized and the technology gaps have increased over the
years. The original reason for creating more of horizontal technology transfer elements was the
initial strong market prospect and the cost reduction demands in India. However, all the factors
analyzed in Chapter 6, the prolonged market recession, the lagged technological capability
building, and the tightened technology control by the providers hindered the realization of larger
potentials by strengthening the horizontal transfer elements.
This also shows that the importance of evolutionary dynamics of technology partnerships on the
extent of transfer potential realization; initiating and sustaining the higher transfer potentials do
not automatically happen and both strong demand-pull and supply-push efforts are necessary.
Future Research Needs
Thus, this research found that the importance of incorporating more factors on technology
receiver side into the theoretical frameworks of the mode of international technology transfer.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, many empirical studies have enhanced the knowledge regarding the
factors on the technology receiver side and this research backed up those findings.
The research also found that the importance of factors and processes beyond those which
determine the mode of transfer for the ultimate and long-term results of technology transfer; all
domestic and external factors of market, industry, firms, and technology and their interactions
change the transfer outcomes greatly. In particular, 1) the role of local market size and demand
characteristics in technology inducing replicable transfer; 2) the implications of technological
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characteristics on technology transfer decision, subsequent technological capacity and capability
building, and firm management of competitiveness; and 3) their dynamic changes, are all
important to determine the outcomes. Due to the limitation of the scope of this research, which
was confined within the wind energy sector of limited countries in a limited timeframe, it is
inappropriate to generalize the results too widely. However, the future research on international
technology transfer should, therefore, take more of dynamic interactions among various factors
into consideration, especially for their long-term effects.
7.1.5 Role of Industrial Competitiveness Management on Wind Energy
Technology Transfer Outcomes
The role of firm competitiveness management of technology providers is considered as the
central element as the determinant of the mode of transfer in various international technology
transfer theories; all transaction-cost-related arguments as well as Dunning's ownership
advantages are about the competitiveness management by technology providers. Although this
research showed that other factors happened to be more important as the determinant of entry
mode in the wind energy technology transfer case to India, the firm competitiveness management
by technology providers through technology control has increased its importance in determining
the process and outcomes of technology transfer over the years, along with the market and
infrastructure factors.
Simultaneous Transformation of Firm Competitiveness Management and
Technological Characteristics
The research showed that the increased intensiveness of firm competitiveness management has
derived from its strong relationship with technological characteristics and their transformation.
Within the relatively short research timeframe, the wind energy industry grew from an emerging
industry to a maturing but still growing industry and wind energy technology has become more
complex with high-tech and science-based components. The importance of science-based
innovations as the sources of competitiveness has increased, although the competitiveness
continuously comes from all activities of value chain. Firm competitiveness strategies have been
transformed tremendously not only to survive but also to thrive in the fast-evolving technology
environments. As the technology intensiveness increased, so did the intensiveness of firm
competitiveness management. The process of acquiring technology became more difficult and
demanding for technology receivers, as a result.
Firm Competitiveness Management and Technological Specificity
This research also demonstrated that the firm competitiveness management and its strategies are
very component/value activity specific. Technological characteristics and their evolution, which
are technology-specific, greatly influence how to build technological capacity and capability.
The development of innovation/production/project execution capacity and capability and their
sources of knowledge creation and accumulation, i.e., learning mechanisms (e.g., R&D or
learning-by-searching, learning-by-doing, learning-by-interacting), greatly differ in different
science/engineering disciplines as well as technological levels and maturity (low-, med-, and
high-tech) which each component/value activity relates to, even within one technology system.
The frontier players took very different competitiveness management approaches for different
components and value activities according to their technological specificity. While the industry
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players took the tight R&D cooperation tactics to increase the entire industry competitiveness in
generic knowledge accumulation in components with very strong basic science nature such as
blade materials and aerofoil technology, technology improvement and development in more
conventional and mature engineering disciples such as mechanical/structural/electrical/
transportation engineering components and value activities are carefully handled at firm level
R&D and cooperation with sub-suppliers. More mature-level applied R&D in blade technology
is also undertaken at firm level. In conventional and mature components/value activities, the
knowledge creation and accumulation largely depends on the existing firm capacity and
capability, while technology components in newer scientific disciplines require strong
governmental and industry-level efforts to reduce the risks and costs. Thus, the roles of
government and firms in technology development at the frontier are well-separated, according to
technological specificity of components/value activities within the technology system, according
to the required knowledge creation and accumulation mechanisms.
Firm Competitiveness Management at Technology Receiver Side
On the contrary to the active and intensified firm competitiveness management at the frontier,
the management practices at the Indian side are largely passive, except a couple of cases. The
firms which were able to take more active competitiveness management and/or roles in the
collaborations with technology providers, such as Enercon and Suzlon, could engage more
deeply in technological capacity and capability development. Although those cases showed the
importance of willingness of transfer from the frontier and technology control by the receiver
itself, working hard to cultivate the capacity and capability necessary to be a part of global
management and sourcing of the collaborations is also essential. Thus, the firm level efforts on
technology receiver side are very important for breaking a hole in the intensifying firm
competitiveness management by technology providers.
Future Research Needs
The research tried to examine the relationships between technology transformation and firm
competitiveness management as well as the effects of the relationships on technology transfer
outcomes as much as possible from the available data sources. However, the unavailability of
the first-hand data from technology provider firms regarding their competitiveness management
strategies and the lack of data regarding wind R&D expenditures, export values, and
manufacturing value added in India made it impossible for this research to take quantitative
examinations in this area. The availability of these data could have strengthened the research
substantially.
Although these data will be continuously difficult to obtain especially for the one from private
firms, strengthening the statistical data base, in particular in developing countries, regarding
monetary value data related to various climate change mitigation technology development and
diffusion will definitely support more of both quantitative and qualitative analytical measures
and deepen our understanding of the role and effects of firm competitiveness management on
transfer of climate change mitigation technologies.
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7.1.6 Sector Specific Aspects of Wind Energy Technology Transfer
There are some sector specific factors and processes regarding wind energy technology transfer
that are different from more general technology transfer.
The most significant sector specific aspect derives from its strong relationship with government
policy. The entire sector development is strongly policy-driven; hence, cross-border technology
transfer has been also driven by policy, compared to the transfer of other commercial products.
Another important sector aspect relates to its infrastructure technology characteristics;
specifically, the quality and characteristics of local electricity grids and the integration with them
were the important factors that greatly influenced the technology transfer results.
The other aspect that was specific to wind energy was probably the speed of the industry and
technology transformations. Their tremendous changes happened during a relatively short-
amount of time was a part of the reasons that contributed to the increased technology gaps
between the frontier and India.
7.1.7 Enabling Environments and Wind Energy Technology Transfer
This part re-examines the wind energy technology transfer from the perspectives of enabling
environments and their ten dimensions defined by IPCC (2000) introduced in Chapter 1. Table
7-1 summaries the strength of such environments on both the technology provider and receiver
sides as well as between them, based on the research findings.
At a glance, it is very clear that the frontier has developed the strong enabling environments for
wind energy, addressing all of ten dimensions by some kinds of public and/or private measures
and efforts. However, it is important to note that enabling environments at the frontier, in
particular many elements and dimensions specific to wind energy, are the product of various
public and private efforts over the years, being built and re-shaped as the technology progressed
and reaching gradually to the current stage.
Meanwhile, the strength of enabling environments in India varies, depending on different
elements of the dimensions, but in general they are more problematic or weak compared to the
frontier. Although enabling environments have also progressed in India over the years, building
better enabling environments has been difficult, as expected. In the Indian wind energy
development,
- The market-specific dimensions such as the Sustainable Markets dimension and the
Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks dimension have been problematic, weakening the
demand-pull force for replicable technology transfer. The former as sector-specific
dimension cannot be built without the favorable latter as generic dimension. Various
elements in the Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks dimension still need to be strengthened.
- The technology-related dimensions such as the National Systems of Innovation and the
Research and Technology Development interrelate to each other but are significantly weak in
both generic and technology-specific aspects. The weakness has been partially caused by
both the fragile vertical connections between technology providers and receivers and by the
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inadequate horizontal connections among the fellow Indian players, both of which are
restricted by technology provider controls. However, generic technological capacity/
capability developments that can be enhanced by various educations and training,
independent of technology provider controls, have been also inadequate, contributing to the
weakness of entire supply-push forces.
In terms of the Codes, Standards, and Certifications dimension, the Indian case demonstrated
their strong necessity and effectiveness for healthy market and technology development in
new and developing country markets from the beginning.
Table 7-1: Enabling Environments at Frontier, India and In-between
Dimensions of Enabling Frontier Cooperation IndiaEnvironments
National Systems of Some generic Progressed with C-WET,Strong at all levels supports but weak ss wit C-ET,Innovation in general but still weak at all levels
Social Infrastructure Strong in Weak in technology
and Participatory innovation/project Weak selection/project
Approaches development develo mrelebut has
Human and Institutional Firm - vary Firm -varymaa itio Strong at all levels Powiteal - ak Political - need to improve
Financial - good
Capital/financial - strong Capital/financial - Capital/financial - strong
Fiscal - good strong in Fiscal - strong
Macroeconomic Policy Interest rates - low trngtin Interest rates -high
Frameworks Risks - lower today international Risks - medium today
Energy price - liberalized Other are - weak Energy price - subsidized
Stability - strong Stability - getting stronger
Sustainable Markets Strong with technology Weak with replicableupgrading demands transfer demands
National Legal Risk reduction - strong Risk reduction - weak
Insuttutions Governance - strong --- Governance - good todayCorruption - very low Corruption - high in early
Codes, Standards, and Strong Getting stronger Getting strongerCertifications
Equity Considerations Gradually developed Weak, but relevance isRights to Productive with Zoning/Ownership 
-- lowResources laws
Research and Vary at firm level,Technology Strong but weak in general Weak
Development
- As for the National Legal Institutions, although the IPR regime was not so important for
wind energy technology because patent activities in Europe were generally weak especially
in early years, more informal restricted business practices have been used by many
m The Danish Patent Office publicly warned the country's wind industry of its vulnerability to aggressive business
tactics by overseas competitors in 1998. A Danish patent investigation revealed that none of the global wind
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providers, in particular for technology adaptation and innovations within India. In addition,
other aspects of this dimension were especially weak in early years, interrupting the healthy
development of market and technology.
- The technology-specific development of the Human and Institutional Capacities dimension
vary, depending on firms and partnerships. However, more generic development of this
dimension needs to be strengthened significantly in order to support both market-related and
technology-related dimensions.
- The relevance of the Social Infrastructure and Participatory Approaches, the Equity
Considerations, and the Rights to Productive Resources dimensions has been weak so far.
This is because the sector development has progressed without the inclusion of a large
number of different social groups. The relevance may grow as the wind energy sector
development grows further and increases the contact with diverse social groups regarding
both production and consumption of wind power.
In terms of cooperation between the two sides, the international lending and its use as the
revolving funds have been very effective to advance financial elements in the Macroeconomic
Framework for wind in India greatly. The sharing of technology codes/standards/certification
with the frontier has also contributed to the enhancement of enabling environments. However,
the cooperation activities have been weak or sporadic in general. The firm competitiveness
management is the key for both enhancement and interruption for the National Systems of
Innovation, the Research and Technology Development, and the Human and Institutional
capacities dimensions.
Thus, reorganizing the research findings according to the dimensions of enabling environments
showed the importance of such environments in supporting technology development and
diffusion on both technology provider and receiver sides. However, it also showed the difficulty
of technology receiver countries to build such environments in a short amount of time, in
particular in the dimensions that concern firm-level activities under the restrictions posed by
technology providers. Replicable technology transfer can only happen when both demand-pull
and supply-push forces are strong; enabling environments can be only effective if they are
concerted and well-balanced.
The research also found a missing dimension, the importance of "physical infrastructure," in
terms of development and diffusion of distributed power generation technologies such as wind.
This dimension should be considered as a part of enabling environments, as it is very important
to support various economic activities in general.
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industry's best-known names on the top 20 list of companies were most active within wind industry patent
applications between 1985 and 1996 (Wind Power Monthly. 1998a).
Section 7.2: Practical Implications of the Research
This section draws some practical implications for the future climate change mitigation efforts in
terms of technology transfer, based on the findings of this research.
7.2.1 Specific Implications for the Indian Wind Energy Sector
The Indian wind energy sector has been experiencing the second boom years since the enactment
of the 2003 Electricity Act. However, the technology gaps with the frontier have not been
closed. The following recommendations can be made for the future, based on the research
findings.
- Engaging in market transformation toward more performance-oriented market with
replicable technology transfer demands is necessary to encourage stronger technology
improvement and upgrading. In order to do so, it is essential to separate the wind energy
market investment mechanism from the industry electricity tariffs, the external factor that
wind energy policy cannot control, and reinforce the feed-in tariffs that make wind project
economics profitable without fiscal subsidies. State feeds-in tariffs can also reflect more of
the conditions of resource availability of sites in terms of wind resources and infrastructure,
like dynamic performance standards such as the German EEG.
- It is important to create the stronger cost reduction demands to stimulate transfer and
indigenization of higher value technologies. While keeping the robust market demands with
performance-oriented incentives, the implementation of sunset-clause of investment
subsidies is recommended.
- Advancing the entire electricity sector reform and restructuring further and correcting the
mistakes already made are still very important. Although the privatization has already made,
SEBs and SERCs have to make further efforts to remove cross-subsidy policies, while
requiring full recovery of capital, operation, and maintenance costs.
- India will experience the needs of replacement of old technologies within several years. This
can be a big opportunity to effectively reduce the technology gaps and increase power
production and efficiency by implementing replacement policy, coupling with performance-
oriented production incentives and fortification of the infrastructure.
- Strengthening infrastructure development in the electrify grid system and interface as well as
in transportation by putting more national and international resources is urgent, in order to
receive larger benefits through future wind projects including the CDM projects.
- GOI, state governments, and the wind energy industry need to explore more active supply-
push measures in technological capacity and capability building, while eliminating
ineffective manufacturing incentives. They can try to fortify or create stronger networks that
contribute to the generic problem solving as well as the industry-level competitiveness
creation. Although there are always the needs to avoid the conflict with firm business
practices, the industry can involve generically in many areas.
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o In order to reduce the number of low quality products, policy measures that penalize
them can be fortified, e.g., increasing penalties on repeated component failures.
o Industry-level data gathering and analysis on the existing manufacturing problems,
collaborative training on high-tech component manufacturing, and fortification of
science-related education can be attempted.
o Industry-level collaborative R&D of interface technology between weak grid and high-
tech wind turbines with technology providers can be another important supply-push
support. GOI can initiate the collaborative programs with the frontier governments and
developmental agencies as well as various industry associations.
- The CDM can provide great opportunities to bring technology and practices beyond the
existing Indian regulations/policy require due to its additionality requirement. There are also
possibilities of south-south technology transfer and market-base expansion to other
developing countries through collaborations with technology providers by utilizing the CDM.
GOI and the wind industry should actively explore such opportunities. In either case,
creating stronger backward and forward linkages through the CDM is a key.
- In order to identify the existing market failures and formulate effective policy, further
reinforcement of capacity and capability of policy markers and collaborations with the
industry players are recommended.
7.2.2 Practical Implications on Climate Change Mitigation Efforts
Enabling Environments - Role of Government and Role of Firms in Light of
Intensifying Industrial Competitiveness Management
Building and re-shaping enabling environments in keeping with the evolution of the technology
and industry is very important but difficult. The frontier has done this well over the years by
clearing various obstacles one by one, while enabling environments in India still show many
deficiencies, as this research has shown. The tasks to build and fortify each dimension are more
demanding for technology receivers due to the lack of various capacity and capability.
Enabling environments and the elements in each dimension can be largely divided into the ones
that can be built by more generic policy- and institutional-level activities and the ones that
concern more of firm- and technology-specific activities. The balance between the two is
dimension-specific; the technology-related dimensions such as the National Systems of
Innovation, the Research and Technology Development, and the Human and Institutional
Capacities, concern more deeply both firm-level and generic policy-level activities than the
Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks, the Sustainable Markets, and the National Legal
Institutions dimensions, which are far more generic and hence can be dealt with the efforts to
improve government policy and institutional settings.
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The technology-related dimensions are directly influenced by more complex issues of firm
competitiveness management. This research actually showed that various restricted business
practices and technology controls by technology providers, along with the unsustainable market,
have significantly reduced the opportunities to build the strength of these technology-related
dimensions. Even if the generic macroeconomic and market-related dimensions were fortified in
technology receiver countries, the weak technology-related dimensions can reduce the
effectiveness of the entire enabling environments by interrupting the transfer of more advanced
or locally suitable technologies.
The centrality of firms in the current and future technology development will continue, as the
global business environments and practices have been already shaped to empower private sector.
Therefore, in these technology-related dimensions, it is important to consider how to incorporate
private firms into development of enabling environments in light of competition, because
technology provider firms can be the force of strengthening such environments through
technology transfer; their role and responsibilities are quite substantial. However, this centrality
of firms may dictate both generic and technology-specific capacity and capability development
in the technology-related dimensions, if active policy measures are not taken to incorporate them
into the development of enabling environments.
The research findings on.the strong relationship between firm competitiveness management and
technological evolution/specificity indicate that: 1) the role of government and the role of private
firms in the development of technology-related dimensions of enabling environments strongly
depend on technological characteristics and specificity, i.e., science/engineering disciplines,
technological levels and maturity, and factor intensity of components/value activities; and 2)
both firm strategies and government policy need to evolve dynamically along with the
environments surrounding technology, market and industry. Both policy developers and firm
managers need to understand the component/value activity-specific sources of knowledge
creation and accumulation (learning mechanisms) for effective policy formulation and
implementation.
Role of Firms - Value Creation at Firms and Partnerships
In order to gain the long-term and continuous developmental effects by transfer of fast-evolving
technology, technology receiver firms need to engage very actively in competitiveness
management to enhance technology-specific capacity/capability and to be continuously a part of
the global capacity/capability management of technology providers. And their technology
management and development strategies need to be carefully constructed, depending on
component/value activity characteristics, the level of existing technological capacity/ capability,
and factor intensity.
At firm level, ideally, both technology provider and receiver firms should engage in more
strategic value creation and value finding activities through active exchanges with each other, in
order to increase the competitiveness together. For example, technology receiver firms need to
generate strong sale points to their technology providers continuously to induce replicable
technology transfer. Cost advantages due to low cost labor and resources of developing
countries cannot be the only factor; technological advantages are necessary to be provided
simultaneously for long-lasting relationship.
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At the same time, technology provider firms can also try to find more vigorous roles of the
technology receiving partners in their global competitiveness management, not as mere sale
and/or production agent for the local market. Initial technology transfer can be induced by the
sector-specific improvement in the Macroeconomic and Market dimensions of enabling
environments, as it happened in India in the early 1990s. However, continuous and replicable
transfer strongly depends on the process after the initial activities. At firm level, it depends on
building good business relationships and trust between technology providers and receivers,
because technology transfer is a reciprocal process, as the Enercon owner Aloys W6bben
mentioned.
Role of Government- Generic Capacity and Capability Building
On the other hand, the role of government is also quite significant in terms of building generic
capacity and capability through policy and institutional support measures. However, the
difficulty of formulating and implementing effective industrial and technology development
policy is increasing today, as many products and services have increased technological
intensiveness as well as complexity and their targets are always shifting in the fast-moving
technology fields such as wind; fragmented and static industrial and technology development
policy has not been effective in the past but will be much less effective in the future. In addition,
the evolving global rules of private capital movement and trade have reduced the efficacy of the
knowledge accumulated for effective policy measures in the past.
For capacity and capability building, policy incentives need to address various generic aspects of
technology acquisition, capacity/capability building, and development of market and business
environments simultaneously. For example, the import/export incentives should be constructed
together with the strong domestic market growth policy in order to generate good learning
opportunities through large production scale, while technical training and science education
being provided to increase generic capacity/capability for different specificity of components/
value activities and to become a base of continuous learning and backward linkages at firm level.
This is important for both technology provider and receiver sides.
Meanwhile, the intensifying firm competitiveness management by technology providers will
increase the roles of firm and government simultaneously in technology receiver countries in the
fast-moving and complex technology fields, in order to develop and supply technical capacity
and capability to satisfy the replicable technology transfer demands. In addition, for highly
integrated technology system such as wind which requires the entire system transfer for new
technology introduction, a well-concerted capacity/capability building and import policy for
different components are important for replicable technology transfer.
In terms of development of generic dimensions of enabling environments as well as generic
elements in the technology-related dimensions in technology receiver countries, they can be
supported by more of international developmental assistance and/or NGO activities, neutral to
technology origin. Such international supports and cooperation can be most effective in
strengthening the Human and Institutional Capacities, because this dimension concerns all other
dimensions and becomes the base for technology-specific capacity development.
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Further Business Involvement and Role of Government - Market Value
Creation
Along with capacity/capability development policy and business strategies, continuous value
creation at the market is the central factor in incorporating private sector firms into technology
development, replicable technology transfer, and development of enabling environments. The
key for the private sector involvement is the stimulation of firm motivation through new value
creation and rewarding activities and fortification of existing value activities in the market. Both
need to be initiated by policy and the international mechanisms in the climate change mitigation
efforts due to market externalities that are not incorporated into the current market mechanism.
Many countries have engaged in individual market value creation efforts in various climate
change mitigation technology areas. Wind energy development in the European countries is an
excellent example of the monetary value creation and rewarding efforts as the central success
factor. Once policy triggers the performance-oriented market dynamics, technology and
economics are improved by private businesses that try to maximize the gaining from the market.
On top of the individual market value creation efforts, another important success factors in wind
energy development at the frontier was its regional European market, as mentioned in Chapter 6.
The wind energy development history showed that simultaneous international business
expansion opportunities are very important to increase learning opportunities by providing larger
production and innovation scale and to reduce the risks involved in different political markets.
The current climate change regime took these points and has created the carbon finance
mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. The carbon finance mechanism created a new
international currency of carbon credits and links it to the existing monetary system to stimulate
the further private sector firm involvements in the climate change mitigation and adaptation
efforts. Although such an additional value creation has certainly the potentials that can override
the technology control issues by expanding the investment recovery opportunities, in reality
there are still many practical issues remained and the effectiveness of the mechanism yet to be
seen. Each country, therefore, still needs to provide as much as value creation and rewarding
policy, sometime in combination with environmental tax and technology/emission requirements,
in order to foster wider and more advanced technology development and diffusion.
CDM and Technology Transfer
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the CDM is one of the three carbon finance mechanisms under the
Kyoto Protocol. One of the important purposes of the CDM is to spur technology transfer by
encouraging private sector in developed countries to engage in the clean development projects
that reduce emissions in developing countries, where the costs of the GHG emission reductions
are lower, and generate the emission reduction credits that can be applied toward their emission
targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The potentials of technology transfer through the CDM can be
influenced by the following factors.
Carbon Price
The monetary value of the CDM projects is linked to the price of carbon (the CER price), which
is decided by supply and demand of carbon in the carbon market. The global carbon market can
be divided into: 1) project-based system or baseline and credit system such as CDM and JI; and
371
2) allowance market or cap and trade system such as the Emission Trading under the Kyoto
Protocol (global), the European Union Emissions Greenhouse Gas Trading Scheme (EU ETS,
regional), the British and the Danish trading systems (national), and BP ands Shell internal
trading (firm). Such fragmented nature of the global carbon market generates no single carbon
price but creates differentiated prices for emission reductions.
There are many market, policy, and technology variables that determine the carbon price in the
market. 1 2 Several economic models forecast low carbon prices with the absence of the United
States in the market, since the demands from the largest emitter of GHGs of the world will be
non-existent. Also, if the so-called "hot air" allowances from the former Soviet Blocks such as
Russia and Ukraine are used in the market, it also greatly lowers the carbon price as a result of
carbon oversupply. If the price of carbon is too low, the value of engaging in the CDM will
decrease tremendously, and so will the potentials of technology transfer through the CDM. The
impacts of CER price on IRR also vary by project (technology) type.
Transaction Costs
The CDM has very complicated and lengthy procedures in order to avoid the abuse of the
mechanism. With all requirements and procedures for the CDM projects to be officially
registered and implemented, upfront transaction costs (search cost, negotiation costs, costs for
CDM due diligence, baseline determination, documentation, approval, validation, review, and
registration) as well as implementation transaction costs (costs for monitoring, verification,
review, certification, enforcement) are very high. These high transaction costs have been
considered harmful for the CDM to be widely utilized.
Although transaction costs of the CDM will likely decrease over time due to learning curve,
some early evidences suggest that the magnitude of absolute transaction costs depend on factors
such as project complexity, the economic condition of host country (EcoSecurities 2002;
Michaelowa and Steonzik 2002; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2000), and the host country capacity
to competently address the issues relating to project approval and coherently articulate national
sectoral priorities and transparently define sustainable development criteria (UNDP Energy &
Environment Group 2003). One empirical study on the 65 CDM already-approved projects in
India found that the higher the emission reduction of a project, the higher the probability that the
transaction costs do not impact the project's viability (Krey 2004). This means that the project
using more advanced mitigation technology may have more advantages in terms of reducing the
effects of transaction costs. However, it is also all relative to the CER price, project complexity,
and human and institutional capacities and the economic condition of host country as well.
112 For example, the EU ETS has the market variables such as : 1) the national allowances (the currency of the EU
ETS) traded in the scheme; 2) the linkages with other domestic trading schemes (e.g., Canada and Japan), and other
carbon commodities created by the Kyoto Protocol's market mechanisms, such as the CDM; 3) the potential
addition of other gases and sectors into the EU ETS; 4) the quantity of cost-effective abatement options within
Europe available to participants in the carbon market; and, 5) the surplus allowances (e.g., hot air), particularly from
Russia and Ukraine entering the market. In particular, the latter two variables are considered to have large influence
on the carbon price. For example, if Russia and Ukraine hot air allowances are used in combination with the
available abatement options, there is a potential to meet all demand requirements, which lower the carbon price due
to oversupply. However, without the use of hot air allowances, the price of carbon would increase considerably and
creates the possibilities of the increased use of CDM credits (ICF Consulting. 2005).
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Additionality Requirements and Baseline Methodoloqies
The additionality requirement is the central element of the CDM that can contribute to newer and
more advanced technology development and diffusion in host country, which will be difficult
under the normal circumstances due to high performance uncertainty and/or various investment
and technical barriers. The additionality requires the GHG emissions to be reduced below those
that would have occurred in the absence of the CDM project activity (a business-as-usual-
scenario, which is the baseline for the project); hence, the additionality is relative to the baseline
of the project.
The baseline development is conceptually and technically the most difficult phase in developing
a CDM project. Using different baseline methodologies can generate different results in the
GHG emission estimates; hence, it can greatly influence project economics of the CDM project
as well as the advancement level of the technology used in the project, e.g., most updated
technology or technologies that are one or more generations older. However, the baseline
methodologies have evolved greatly in recent years and many are submitted to and approved by
the CDM Executive Board. As a result, the uncertainty regarding the baseline methodologies
have been significantly reduced, for example for wind energy technology CDM, though there are
many rooms for improvement.
Sustainable Development Criteria
On the other hand, the other central element of the CDM, the sustainable development criteria
are left open to the host country of the CDM and far more ambiguous. Although this means that
what the host country wants determine the long-term developmental effects and the incorporation
of any of social, economic and environmental criteria to the CDM can have a certain level of
long-term benefits, the depth of developmental effects will change tremendously, depending on
the type of technologies and the ways of their transfer. For example, building a clearer energy
plant will definitely bring environmental and health benefits and conserve local resources
(environmental criteria) and it can improve quality of life (social criteria) and/or provide
financial returns to local entities (economic criteria) to the host country. However, the
developmental benefits beyond such contributions, e.g., building production capacity and
capability of energy equipment and plants beyond mere project execution capability, require
different commitments from both technology providers and receivers.
Each country needs to choose what kinds of capability in which technology to be built based on
its own developmental goals. In addition, the sustainable development criteria do not guarantee
to bring what the host country wants; it also strongly depends on technology provider control and
willingness. Therefore, the balance between the host country sustainable development criteria
and the provider willingness determines the direction and depth of long-term developmental
effects brought by the CDM technology transfer.
Geographical Distribution of the CDM Projects
Another issue, which is drawing a growing attention, is the geographic distribution of the CDM
projects. As of September 2006, the vast majority of the approved CDM projects are in large
countries such as China, India, and Brazil, and only a handful in Africa (CD4CDM 2006).
Various reasons are considered for this divide; for example, these rapidly industrialized countries
already have better macroeconomic environments and human and institutional capacity/
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capability to increase project viability and provide better business and market expansion
potentials and lower risks than least-developed countries in Africa. However, the existence of
such divide means that the CDM can be a new development divider among developing countries
in the future, and this can bring some detrimental effects on both global sustainable development
and climate change mitigation.
Uncertain Potentials of the CDM Technology Transfer and Policy Focus
Due to the above factors that influence the value (project viability) and the contents of the CDM
projects greatly, it is very difficult to estimate the effectiveness of the CDM on technology
transfer at this moment. Whether the CDM can really spur the private sector technology transfer
and whether the CDM will bring the long-term sustainable developmental benefits are strong
concerns in light of intensifying global competition. There are also concerns over the
possibilities that technology providers and the CDM developers may be seeking for not long-
term developmental benefits but just quick profits.
At the same time, there is one significant advantage of the CDM over non-CDM projects. That
is its strong mechanism of governance; the UNFCCC and the CDM Executive Board oversee the
whole process of the projects and this can contribute to reducing various potentials of corruptive
business practices. Many international organizations and agencies are also watching and lending
their hands on building capacity for the CDM, which can be utilized for other developmental
activities. Inadequacy that derives from actual implementations is necessary to be corrected as
the commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol progresses, which will give the mechanism itself
various learning opportunities.
Some suggestions can be made to increase the effectiveness of the CDM on technology transfer.
- Developed country governments and NGOs as well as international organizations should
engage in more vigorous support activities for generic human and institutional capacity and
capability building and the creation of macroeconomic environments in developing countries
through ODA to reduce transaction costs of the CDM and encourage more even geographical
distribution of the CDM projects by creating more level playing fields.
- Potential host countries of the CDM projects should use their national policy wisely, in order
to utilize both the additionally requirements and the sensitivity factors of project economics.
o National policy should create performance-oriented market mechanism and/or
environmental/technology requirements that generate technology efficiency demands,
which make the higher additionality requirements and induce more emission reductions
and project revenues by bringing more advanced technologies.
o National policy also should work on policy/institutional sensitivity factors as well as
technology-related sensitivity factors of project economics, e.g., offering investment and
financial incentives to reduce cost of financing and investment costs, and utilizing land
use policy and/or other measures to create economies of scale to reduce transaction costs
of the CDM projects.
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- Higher carbon price is a key to generate stronger interests in the CDM. Carbon market
design to suppress carbon oversupply becomes very important.
Replicable Technology Transfer, CDM and Beyond the Kyoto Mechanisms
In terms of replicable technology transfer, whether the CDM can initiate such transfer depends
on what kind of mechanisms will be in place after the first four-year period of the Kyoto
Protocol.
Taking the importance of replicable technology transfer for the advancement of both climate
change mitigation and sustainable development into account, however, the efforts beyond the
Kyoto Protocol should consider the mechanisms that induce replicable technology transfer. If
the CDM or similar mechanisms continue, the research findings suggest that the fundamentals of
initiating replicable technology transfer are the same with the non-CDM projects; strengthening
both demand-pull (continuous and sustainable market value creation and rewarding with
performance-oriented characteristics through carbon price) and supply-push forces
(technological capacity/capability building and management at both national and firm levels for
reducing costs and attracting more carbon investors) continue to be fundamental for the future
mechanism, in order for more advanced technologies to be continuously introduced to the host
countries.
Suggestions for Future Distributed Power Generation Technology
Development and Transfer
The followings are suggested for the future distributed energy generation technology
development and transfer, based on the research findings.
Policy-driven Virtuous Cycle Creation
Global climate change is a result of the externality associated with the GHG emissions,
which has not been corrected through any institutions or market. Hence, policy intervention
is well justified. Virtuous cycle creation in both technology provider and receiver countries
is very important for international technology development and diffusion of climate change
mitigation technologies, and it needs to be driven by simultaneous demand-pull and supply-
push policy incentives.
Sustainable Market Development Policy
- Market development policy needs to be formulated to stimulate the demand-pull, replicable
technology upgrading and transfer forces with performance-oriented incentives, targeting
both continuous expansion of market size and technology inducing/forcing by emphasizing
technology improvement and cost reduction market demands.
- Policy options are not limited to feed-in tariffs and investment subsidies. Various policy
options including power demand-pull measures such as CO2 tax are also available.
Appropriateness and sequencing of policy incentives should be considered well by each
country, based on the criteria such as cost effectiveness, certainty for industry and
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consumers, market efficiency, transparency, equity, and transaction costs and administrative
capacity.
- International lending is better utilized as revolving financial resources, which create a
sustainable financial basis for continuous market development, rather than one-time
subsidies.
Technological Characteristics and Technological Capacity/Capability Development
- In building technological capacity and capability, the role of firms and their competitiveness
management and the role of government differ greatly according to technological specificity.
It is important that the roles also evolve and change overtime, according to technological
transformation as well as capacity/capability advancement.
o The component/value activity-specific sources of knowledge creation and accumulation
(learning mechanisms) should be well-understood by both policy developers and firm
managers, not only to devise R&D responsibility and projects but also to satisfy the
replicable technology transfer demands in timely manner.
o Government policy makers should contact industry players as well as independent
analysts periodically to gain the fair industry data and to formulate and sequence supply-
push policy that supports generic aspects of learning mechanisms of each technology
component through training and education and fortifies the basis of backward linkage
formation and development.
o The technology receiver side needs to continuously evaluate technological transformation
that is constantly happening at the frontier and their position in technology provider
firm's global capacity/capability management strategy and to create/adjust their own
strategy to upgrade their capacity/capability to induce replicable technology transfer
through both cost and technological advantages. Meanwhile, the technology provider
firms also can try harder to find the ways to incorporate the technology receiver sides into
their global strategy by finding the potentials of cost and technological advantages. This
links up simultaneous enhancement of competitiveness for both sides.
Infrastructure Aspects and "Enabling Technologies" for Distributed Power Generation
Technologies
= For distributed power generation technologies, infrastructure technology aspects (the
electricity grid system and quality, in particular for incorporation of high-tech power
generation equipments, and transportation infrastructure for large equipments such as more
updated wind turbines) are extremely important as they can determine the types of
technologies that can be transferred and incorporated into the national system.
- Development of so-called "Enabling Technologies" can spur more transfer of advanced
distributed power generation technologies. "Enabling Technologies" are an interface
technology, which can manage the local grid management system to make it workable with
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high-tech distributed power generation equipment regardless of the original grid quality.
Because they enable to bring high-tech power plants such as multi-MW wind turbines as a
black box and connect to the local, even weak, grid system, they can satisfy the
competitiveness protection needs by technology providers while bringing higher economic
and environmental benefits to technology receivers (Danish Wind Industry Association
2005b).11 This type of interface technology can be developed in order to spur technology
transfer of high-tech distributed power generation equipment. The collaboration between
countries is essential.
Risk Reductions
- The role of codes/standards/certifications is large in high-risk new technology and market
development. It is extremely important to implement high-quality assurance measures with
high-level governance from the beginning, in order to create continuous market confidence
and guarantee high-quality industry and technology development and transfer. Early
development and constant upgrading of international quality measures/systems can benefit all
aspects of market and technology development.
- National macroeconomic framework and national legal institutions are very important for
general investment risk reduction. However, in order to reduce the risks, various elements
within these dimensions need to be all well-functioning; strengthening only parts of these
dimensions can create the unbalanced environments, which can generate undesirable effects
in governance and growth pattern, e.g., strong fiscal elements without sound governance can
invite corruptive business practices.
- International/regional collaborations and network building in R&D should be utilized well in
order to share risks and high-costs, in particular in basic research area, as done in wind
energy at the frontier.
Electricity Sector Reform and Restructuring
- Under the global trend of the electricity sector reforms and restructuring, the priority between
the free market principle and the environmental interests that can permit the state supports
needs to be clarified in order to determine the types of policy incentives used in each country.
= In developing country context, the necessity and timing of embarking on such reforms and
restructuring should be cautiously considered. The procedure and methods of the reforms
and restructuring need to be carefully constructed, and the step-by-step approach of
commercialization and privatization is recommended. Hasty process only creates conflicting
outcomes.
113 This is a part of public technology. DWIA considers that how to move to this type of technologies, which are
not the equipment of wind turbines that are privately owned and fiercely protected, is the future theme of wind
energy technology transfer. "This type of technology is what we are willing to transfer, not the core sources of
competitiveness of wind turbine technology. Keeping competitiveness is bringing a black box of wind turbine
technology after transferring technology of how to make it work as power plant locally. There are huge
opportunities in this type of transfer." (Danish Wind Industry Association. 2005b)
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Overall Human Capacity and Capability Buildinq
- Every economic development activity ultimately depends on human capacity and capability,
building of which requires strong initiatives of those who are really engaging in the activity
itself; no outside assistance guarantees the development of such human capacity and
capability. However, it is also true that the outside assistance can be a great support. The
role of international and national developmental agencies and organizations including NGOs
can be further fortified to provide genuine support from neutral perspectives. In this sense,
developing countries should utilize ODA and the CDM as great opportunity provider to
obtain neutral supports in capacity and capability building that can be used for other
economic activities.
Remaining Deep Chasms
The research showed the importance of enabling environments in developing countries, as
insisted by developed countries for climate change mitigation technology transfer. This research
also confirmed the gaps between the immediate technology transfer needs and the long-term
process of sustainable development remains strong, and the materialization of replicable
technology transfer is very important to reconcile them.
However, it could not answer the question whether or not fortifying enabling environments of
developing country alone can effectively solve the issues of industrial competitiveness
management and control between technology providers and receivers and the issues of
immediate technology transfer and long-term sustainable development needs, because the
technology receiver country of India in the research still have many deficiencies in its enabling
environments. There is no doubt that enabling environments are a necessary condition for
initiating technology transfer. However, whether or not they are also a sufficient condition to
induce technology transfer that remove technology gaps remains unanswered.
This study was a research on cross-border technology transfer involving a developing country
that had basic med-tech technological capability and capacity and were begun engaging in the
rapid industrialization in the beginning of the process. Also, this was the research that strongly
concerns manufacturing capability and industrialization. However, the path for sustainable
development will differ among countries due to the differences in country sizes and locations,
populations, resource types and intensities, cultures, and histories, and this is why the selection
of the sustainable development criteria in the CDM is left open to the host country choice,
although the ultimate goals of sustainable development will be the same for all nations and
people on this planet. There is no universal answer to the path of development. The forms of
technology transfer, therefore, vary as well.
The perennial debate over technology transfer between developed country parties and developing
country parties continues today, and many issues in the north-south divide remain unsolved. The
most recent debate in COP 12 at Nairobi, Kenya, in November 2006 was over the development of
a standing body with strong role in promoting the transfer of technologies from developed
countries. Proposals from developing countries included the creation of a Technology
Development and Transfer Board with decision-making powers and the establishment of a
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Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund to make technologies available to developing
countries by "buying out" IPRs. However, these proposals were firmly opposed by developed
countries. Also the gaps between the immediate technology transfer needs and the long-term
process of sustainable development are increasing under the intensifying global competition and
the growing climate change threats as seen in the rising number of severe natural disasters in
recent years. However, technology transfer activities still remain weak, compared to the gravity
of the issue.
The deep chasm among the countries may not be diminished until all nations recognize the
urgency and gravity of global climate change and begin seriously work together toward the
common solutions. The surrounding global business environments with the intensifying
competition that is accompanying strong exploitative characteristics are one of the largest
obstacles for the cooperation. Tough roads are ahead, in order to further incorporate the private
sector into cross-border transfer of climate change mitigation technologies while avoiding unfair
exploitation of people and resources everywhere.
At the same time, however, those who take climate change and sustainable development
seriously have made progresses in many areas. Many international efforts on capacity building
and development and implementation of the carbon financing mechanisms, including diverse
international carbon funds, have advanced since 1992. The first commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol will begin in 2008 and new activities are added toward the global efforts
everyday. The global community building is in progress; our colleagues are all over the world.
We simply need to add success stories one by one, one place after another.
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Appendix A: Policy Instruments
Appendix A-1: Government Wind Energy R&DD Budget in Denmark 1975-2002
(Million USD)
Wind Total RE Total Wind/Total Wind/Total Annual
Year Energy R&DD* Energy RE R&DD Energy Growth of
R&DD* R&DD* R&DD WE R&DD
1975 0.090 0.540 22.539 16.7% 0.4% ---
1976 0.247 0.907 24.749 27.2% 1.0% 174.4%
1977 2.677 5.315 36.982 50.4% 7.2% 983.8%
1978 4.426 10.190 46.766 43.4% 9.5% 65.3%
1979 3.093 19.100 59.309 16.2% 5.2% -30.1%
1980 4.158 9.052 35.502 45.9% 11.7% 34.4%
1981 2.303 5.758 19.069 40.0% 12.1% -44.6%
1982 3.027 4.552 16.707 66.5% 18.1% 31.4%
1983 2.452 3.936 17.883 62.3% 13.7% -19.0%
1984 2.999 4.255 16.337 70.5% 18.4% 22.3%
1985 3.345 4.243 14.381 78.8% 23.3% 11.5%
1986 4.879 5.699 21.761 85.6% 22.4% 45.9%
1987 4.081 5.051 21.600 80.0% 18.9% -16.4%
1988 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1989 8.448 11.035 26.475 75.6% 31.9% ---
1990 4.132 8.759 35.533 47.1% 11.6% -51.1%
1991 8.362 17.689 42.132 47.2% 19.8% 102.4%
1992 7.813 18.750 48.438 34.6% 16.1% -6.6%
1993 6.937 20.040 46.553 33.9% 14.9% -11.2%
1994 5.908 17.421 39.234 34.5% 15.1% -14.8%
1995 5.614 16.276 36.498 41.3% 15.4% -5.0%
1996 5.419 13.119 31.612 48.8% 17.1% -3.5%
1997 8.249 16.911 36.737 39.1% 22.4% 52.2%
1998 7.277 18.593 44.504 43.3% 16.3% -11.8%
1999 6.911 15.947 42.863 39.5% 16.1% -5.1%
2000 6.308 15.975 43.258 36.3% 14.6% -8.7%
2001 6.474 17.838 42.215 36.3% 15.3% 2.6%
2002 8.498 9.158 20.241 49.7% 42.0% 31.3%
Average Annual Growth Rate 47.8% 16.0% 16.5%
* Million USD (2002 prices and exchange rates)
RE = renewable energy WE = wind energy
Source: lEA
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Appendix A-2: Transitional Rules for Green Electricity between 2000 and 2003 in
Denmark
Programs Contents
For turbines built before January 2003
DKK 0.33/kWh for at least the first ten years of their operation, or until a
Interim Tariff Rules well functioning market for renewables credit trading is established plus
applied between DKK 0.10/kWh, a refund of C02 tax. Production incentive of DKK
January 2000 and 0.17/kWh will be added as follows:
March 2001 - for 25,000 full load hours for turbines under 200kW;
- for 15,000 full load hours turbines rated at 201-599 kW;
- for the first 12,000 full load hours for turbines over 600 kW
Turbines bought before 1/1/2000 Turbines bought after 1/1/2000
DKK 0.60/kWh:
- for the first 25,000 full load
hours for turbines up to DKK 0.43/kWh for the first 22,000
200kW; full load hours with purchase
applied from April 2001 - for the first 15,000 full load obligation. Then, income from
to 2002 hours for turbines rated at sale of certificates plus DKK
201-599kW; 0.10/kWh that has price cap of
- for the first 12,000 full load DKK 0.36/kWh with no purchase
hours for larger turbines obligation.
Then, DKK 0.43/kWh
____________________Purchase obligation. _______________
For turbines bought before
1/1/2003, DKK 0.43/kWh for the
DKK 0.60/kWh until end of first 22,000 full load hours with
assigned full load hours, then DKK purchase obligation. Then, market
0.43/kWh until age ten years with price plus DKK 0.10/kWh that has
Interim Tariff Rules purchase obligation. For turbines price cap of DKK 0.36/kWh with
applied from 2003 with age 10 to 20 years, market no purchase obligation.
price plus DKK 0.10/kWh that has For turbines bought after
price cap of DKK 0.36/kWh with 1/1/2003, market price plus DKK
no purchase obligation. 0.10/kWh that has price cap of
DKK 0.36/kWh with no purchase
nterimTariffRules purchaseobligation.Forturbsobligation.
Source: (lEA 2003a; lEA 2004; lEA 2005; Meyer and Koefoed 2003)
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Appendix A-3: Danish Wind Power Tariffs as of May 30, 2005
Turbine Type Contents
Turbines connected to A fixed premium of DKK 0.10/kWh for 20 years and an allowance of
the grid from 1/1/2005 DKK 0.023/kWh for offset costs, etc.
Turbines connected to A premium up to DKK 0.10/kWh for 20 years with price cap of DKK
the grid 2003-2004 0.36/kWh*, plus an allowance of DKK 0.023/kWh for offset costs, etc.
A tariff of DKK 0.43/kWh for the first 22,000 full load hours for turbines
Turbines connected to on land and 10 years for offshore turbines.**A premium up to DKK 0.10/kWh until the turbine is 20 years old withthe grid 2000-2002 price cap of DKK 0.36/kWh*, plus an allowance of DKK 0.023/kWh for
offset costs, etc.
A tariff of DKK 0.60/kWh until full load hours are used up and
subsequently DKK 0.43/kWh until the turbine is 10 years old. Full load
hour allowance is:
- 25,000 hours for turbines of 200 kW or less;
- 15,000 hours for turbines of 201-599 kW;
- 12,000 hours for turbines of 600 kW and over
turbined bough prir If the turbine is more than 10 years old but has not used its full load
allowance up yet, it is eligible for a premium of DKK 0.27/kWh with price
cap of DKK 0.60/kWh*
A premium up to DKK 0.10 /kWh until the turbine is 20 years old with
price cap of DKK 0.36/kWh*, plus an allowance of DKK 0.023/kWh for
offset costs, etc. for turbine is over 10 years old and its full load
allowance is used up**.
Turbines on land or offshore connected to the grid no later than
12/31/1 999:
*Plant owners are responsible for the sale of production on the
electricity market and for related costs.
Turbines on land connected to the grid from 1/1/2000:
*Plant owners are responsible for the sale of production on the
Turbies fnancd byelectricity market and for related costs. They are eligible for a
etries fiancedsb subsidy that combined with the market price comprises DKK
(Allectricity u i es 0.43/kW h for 10 years from the grid connection. W hen the turbine
connected before 4 June is over 10 years old, a premium up to DKK 0.10/kWh until the
2002 and offshore wind turbine is 20 years old with price cap of DKK 0.36/kWh*, plus an
farms at Horns Rev and allowance of DKK 0.023/kWh for offset costs, etc.rsbitnesr R dor Offshore turbines connected to the grid after 1/1/2000
- Plant owners are responsible for sale of production on the
electricity market and for related costs. They are eligible for
subsidy that combined with the market price comprises DKK 0.453
/kWh for 42,000 full load hours. If production is subject to a grid
tariff, it is eligible for compensation up to DKK 0.007 /kWh. After
all full load hours are used up, a premium up to DKK 0.10/kWh
until the turbine is 20 years old with price cap of DKK 0.36/kWh*,
plus an allowance of DKK 0.023/kWh for offset costs, etc
The premium is regulated in accordance with the market price. The price cap is applied to the
total of the premium and market price.
Once the full load hours are used up, turbine owners are responsible for the sale of
production on the electricity market and for related costs.
Source: DEA, www.ens.dk data as of May 30, 2005
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Appendix A-4: Selected R&DD Programs by BMWi in Germany
Wind Power R&D and WMEP Phase
and Phase IV (July
11, Phase III (July 1996-June 2000)
2000-June 2004)
Subject R&D Contractor Period (MillonsEUR) BMWi
Wind measurement data 4/92-1/98 607 (MDEM) 100
processing up to 150m for
planned achieve of wind data
250MW wind measurement 7/96-6/00 13.683.5 100
and evaluation program (MDEM)
Special wind data and German weather 7/93-6/97 0.84 (1641.9 100
programs for complex terrain service MDEM)
Early recognition of turbine ISET/Industry 1/94- 12/97 0.732 (1431.8 50
failure MDEM)
Fatigue loads WECS VDMA/DEWI 7/95-6/97 0.227 (443.6 50.
MDEM)
MW WECD inland RWE Enertgie 6/95-9/99 2.502 (4893.6 20.43
MDEM)
Control LS WECS ISET/Industry 7/95-6/99 0.61 (1192.6 40
MDEM)
Active stall rotor blade A&R Rotec 8/96-7/98 1.281 (2505.98 50
MDEM)
Lightening protection WECS Fordegesellschaft 10/96-9/99 0.307 (600 50
Windenergie MDEM)
Development of a 3-4MW Enercon 8/98-6/02 5.113 (10000 35
WECS MDEM)
Decentralized electrical Windtest KW.koog 8/99-1/02 0.416 (813 50
power plants for grid; voltage MDEM)
fluctuation
Integration of decentralized Engineering high 8/99-1/02 0.445 (870 100
electrical power plants for grid school MDEM)
Wilhelmshaven
Phase IV, WMEP ISET 7/00-6-04 5.85 (11450 100
MDEM)
Forecast wind electricity for Fordegesellschaft 5/00-10-01 0.332 (650 94.31
medium and large utility Windenergie MDEM)
regions
Aspects of construction and University Hannover 10/00-9/03 0.854 (1670 100
environment of offshore MDEM)
WECS
Advanced drive train for LS- Fr. Flender AG 1/01-12/03 0.941 (1840 40
WECs MDEM)
Advanced life time analysis of Germanischer Lloyd 12/99-11/02 0.481 50
WECs Windenergie
Drivetrain for offshore WECs MULTIBRID 5/01-4/05 16.617 25
entwicklungsgesellsc
haft mbh
3-4 offshore wind power Germanischer Lloyd 4/01-9-03 15.33 100
measurement platforms Windenergie
Source: (lEA 2001; IEA 2002a)
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Appendix A-5: Government Wind
(Million USD)
Energy R&DD Budget in Germany 1974-2002
Wind Total Wind/Total Annual
Year Energy Total RE Energy Wind/Total Energy Growth of
R&D) R&D* R&D* RE R&D R&D WE R&D
1974 0.000 1.110 953.079 0.00% 0.00% NA
1975 0.000 10.15 1142.857 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1976 0.000 17.722 1100.564 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1977 5.346 26.727 1246.340 20.00% 0.43% 0.00%
1978 8.552 45.324 1336.653 18.87% 0.64% 59.97%
1979 15.756 99.069 1462.444 15.90% 1.08% 84.24%
1980 29.947 104.028 1489.482 28.79% 2.01% 90.07%
1981 36.191 109.327 1586.104 33.10% 2.28% 20.85%
1982 27.378 165.708 2007.163 16.52% 1.36% -24.35%
1983 11.795 79.560 1220.830 14.83% 0.97% -56.92%
1984 12.670 96.973 1197.295 13.07% 1.06% 7.42%
1985 16.406 86.448 1137.208 18.98% 1.44% 29.49%
1986 7.846 53.948 831.864 14.54% 0.94% -52.18%
1987 11.341 75.946 640.575 14.93% 1.77% 44.54%
1988 10.045 80.856 566.055 12.42% 1.77% -11.43%
1989 7.791 79.384 490.231 9.81% 1.59% -22.44%
1990 13.014 94.250 508.690 13.81% 2.56% 67.04%
1991 10.385 105.252 503.504 9.87% 2.06% -20.20%
1992 14.278 111.007 394.525 12.86% 3.62% 37.49%
1993 27.970 121.152 383.602 23.09% 7.29% 95.90%
1994 20.019 80.022 306.716 25.02% 6.53% -28.43%
1995 19.932 70.625 262.669 28.22% 7.59% -0.43%
1996 32.815 87.641 282.704 37.44% 11.61% 64.63%
1997 20.551 68.653 255.372 29.93% 8.05% -37.37%
1998 19.683 76.938 272.971 25.58% 7.21% -4.22%
1999 20.237 67.769 182.034 29.86% 11.12% 2.81%
2000 14.608 71.050 260.997 20.56% 5.60% -27.82%
2001 16.858 67.527 280.164 24.96% 6.02% 15.40%
2002 14.420 54.571 262.017 26.42% 5.50% -14.46%
Average Annual Growth Rate 18.60% 3.52% 4.05%
*Million USD (2002 prices and exchange rates)
RE = renewable energy WE = wind energy
Source: IEA
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Appendix A-6: Energy-related Ministry Budget in India in INR. Crore
Energy Power Petroleum Coal & MNES MNES/
Total Lignite TOTAL
1992-93 20289.8 12157.4 5698.5 2276.5 157.4 0.78%
1993-94 26909.0 14773.1 9589.3 2293.1 253.5 0.94%
1994-95 27482.0 16346.4 8643.6 2238.7 253.3 0.92%
1995-96 26893.3 16511.4 8123.5 1948.3 310.2 1.15%
1996-97 27330.4 16937.5 8007.6 1958.6 426.7 1.56%
1997-98 31792.7 19396.3 9682.7 2212.7 501.0 1.58%
1998-99 35572.4 21159.0 11213.6 2540.2 659.5 1.85%
1999-2000 35809.6 21327.4 9953.2 3719.1 809.9 2.26%
2000-2001 40893.4 28015.4 9867.2 2093.5 917.3 2.24%
2001-2002 37145.4 25180.0 8702.1 2106.8 1156.5 3.11%
2002-03 44709.99 25280.77 15805.67 1911.31 1712.24 3.82%
2003-04 (RE) 57926.04 30725.99 23892.72 2378.62 928.71 1.60%
2004-05(BE) 46788.21 19112.94 23575.80 3073.62 1025.85 2.19%
1 crore = 10 million
Source: Eighth plan outlay, Ninth plan outlay, and Tenth plan outlay by heads of development:
centre, states and union territories in (Economic Division Ministry of Finance 2005)
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Appendix A-7: Support Policy in Other States in India
State Time Wheeling Banking Feed-in Tariffs Third-Party
Period Charge Sales
1994 2%of pwerSix months
3/199* 2% of power w/ 2% To be decided by SEBcharge
Kerala Nine months INR 2.8/kWh Not allowed
4/2000 - 5% of power (June - 5% annual escalation
Present generated February) based on 2000-01 tariffs
I _for five years
* In addition capital subsidy of 15% of installation cost with a ceiling of INR 5 lakh was available.
1994-
1999* INR 2.25/kWh
Madhya 2002- Allowedwe
6I2004** 2% of poer Not Allowed Allowed
6/2004 - INR 3.97/kWh in 2004-05,
Present ** INR 0.17 annual
and *** reduction for 20 years
* In addition, land lease for a period of 5 years at a token rent of INR 1/per annum and thereafter
on government prescribed rates and capital subsidy same for other industries were available.
Exemptions of electricity duty for 5 years, of state sales tax on plant & machinery, and from
power cut to the extent of 30% were available.
** Exemption of electricity duty for 5 years and capital subsidy same for other industries were
available. Reactive power charge of INR 0.27 per consumed power was applied.
*** In addition, infrastructure development charge of 50% of the cost of grid extension,
application/processing fee of INR 50,000/MW, and reactive power charge of INR 0.27 per
consumed power are a plied.
INR 1.75/kWh in 1994-95 Allowed w/
Utter 1994- 2% of power INR 2.25/kWh in 1995-97 2.5%
Pradesh 3/2000* generated One year 5% annual escalation wheeling
based on 1995-96 tariff charges
* land lease for a period of 35 years and capital subsidy same for other industries were available
West 1995- 2% of power Six months To be decided by SEB Not allowedBengal Present generatedII
Sources: (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002; Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2005;
MNES 1995a; MNES 1996a; MNES 1997a; MNES 1998; MNES 1999a; MNES 2000a; MNES 2001a;
MNES 2002a; MNES 2003; MNES 2004; MNES 2005)
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics
Appendix B-1: Regression Result for Equation I
Dependent Variable: TNUMBER
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1992-93 2004-05
Included observations: 13
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 3.081062 1.761609 1.749005 0.1081
CAPACITY 0.004246 0.004481 0.947606 0.3637
R-squared 0.075472 Mean dependent var 4.230769
Adjusted R-squared -0.008577 S.D. dependent var 4.585373
S.E. of regression 4.604994 Akaike info criterion 6.032798
Sum squared resid 233.2656 Schwarz criterion 6.119713
Log likelihood -37.21319 F-statistic 0.897957
Durbin-Watson stat 1.077026 Prob(F-statistic) 0.363683
Appendix B-2: Regression Results for Equation 2
Dependent Variable: TNUMBER1
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1992-93 2002-03
Included observations: 11 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 2.091142 0.721831 2.896997 0.0231
CAPACITY 0.035875 0.003095 11.59197 0.0000
Dl*CAPACITY -0.021578 0.005358 -4.027391 0.0050
D1 -2.353188 1.059676 -2.220668 0.0618
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
0.974720
0.963885
0.928169
6.030488
-12.30245
2.254958
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
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4.363636
4.884112
2.964082
3.108772
89.96535
0.000006
Appendix B-3: Regression Results for Equation 3
Dependent Variable: TNUMBER1
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1992-93 2002-03
Included observations: 11 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.999245 0.645379 1.548307 0.1601
CAPACITY1 0.039461 0.003224 12.23844 0.0000
D1*CAPACITY1 -0.031506 0.003606 -8.736294 0.0000
R-squared 0.956910 Mean dependent var 4.363636
Adjusted R-squared 0.946138 S.D.dependentvar 4.884112
S.E. of regression 1.133515 Akaike info criterion 3.315525
Sum squared resid 10.27885 Schwarz criterion 3.424042
Log likelihood -15.23539 F-statistic 88.82961
Durbin-Watson stat 1.583928 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003
Appendix B-4: Regression Results for Equation 4
Dependent Variable: TNUMBER2
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1996-97 2004-05
Included observations: 9 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.262046 0.818388 -0.320197 0.7618
CAPACITY 0.014297 0.004614 3.098965 0.0269
D2*CAPACITY -0.004490 0.005354 -0.838636 0.4399
D2 -4.564145 2.542814 -1.794919 0.1326
R-squared 0.840222 Mean dependent var 2.333333
Adjusted R-squared 0.744355 S.D. dependent var 1.936492
S.E. of regression 0.979116 Akaike info criterion 3.096770
Sum squared resid 4.793343 Schwarz criterion 3.184425
Log likelihood -9.935463 F-statistic 8.764466
Durbin-Watson stat 2.348092 Prob(F-statistic) 0.019563
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Appendix B-5: Regression Results for Equation 5
Dependent Variable: TNUMBER
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1992-93 2004-05
Included observations: 13
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 2.091142 1.089067 1.920122 0.0870
CAPACITY 0.035875 0.004669 7.683131 0.0000
D3*CAPACITY -0.032026 0.004893 -6.545396 0.0001
D3 -0.957571 1.269533 -0.754270 0.4700
R-squared 0.930047 Mean dependent var 4.230769
Adjusted R-squared 0.906730 S.D. dependent var 4.585373
S.E. of regression 1.400381 Akaike info criterion 3.759026
Sum squared resid 17.64961 Schwarz criterion 3.932857
Log likelihood -20.43367 F-statistic 39.88610
Durbin-Watson stat 1.792238 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000016
Appendix B-6: Regression Results for Equation 6
Dependent Variable: TNUMBER
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1992-93 2004-05
Included observations: 13
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.386462 0.547478 2.532450 0.0297
CAPACITY 0.038189 0.003443 11.09100 0.0000
D3*CAPACITY -0.034736 0.003249 -10.69144 0.0000
R-squared 0.925625 Mean dependent var 4.230769
Adjusted R-squared 0.910750 S.D. dependent var 4.585373
S.E. of regression 1.369865 Akaike info criterion 3.666476
Sum squared resid 18.76531 Schwarz criterion 3.796849
Log likelihood -20.83210 F-statistic 62.22715
Durbin-Watson stat 1.777284 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002
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Appendix B-7: Regression Results for Equation 7
Dependent Variable: CAPACITY
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1993 1996
Included observations: 4 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -254.4447 105.1005 -2.420965 0.1365
TAXSAVING 2.62E-05 6.03E-06 4.338232 0.0492
R-squared 0.903940 Mean dependent var 178.6425
Adjusted R-squared 0.855910 S.D. dependent var 173.1523
S.E. of regression 65.72729 Akaike info criterion 11.51576
Sum squared resid 8640.153 Schwarz criterion 11.20891
Log likelihood -21.03152 F-statistic 18.82026
Durbin-Watson stat 2.134351 Prob(F-statistic) 0.049243
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Appendix C: Summary of Cash Flow Analysis
Appendix C-1: Assumption for Cash Flow Calculations
1) Average Turnkey Capital Cost and Average Project Size
Average Capital
Year Cost
(INR Million per MW)
1992-93 29
1993-94 35
1994-95 40
1995-96 45
1996-97 52
1997-98 40
1998-99 42
1999-00 43
2000-01 44
2001-02 45
2002-03 45
2003-04 45
2004-05 45
Sources: Based on data from (Consolidated Energy Consultants Ltd. 2002; Consolidated Energy
Consultants Ltd. 2005; Rajsekhar, Van Hulle, and Jansen 1999; Wind Power Monthly 1999d)
2) Majority Turbine Size, Wheeling Charges, and Capacity Utilization Factor (CUF)
CUF = Energy generated per year (kWh)/[Installed Capacity (kW) * 8760 (hours)].
2% of wheeling charge is deducted from generated power, as all generated electricity is used as
captive use and wheeled.
Year Majority Turbine Size CUF Wheeling Net CF
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96 18% 16%
1997-98 150kW s X < 500kW
1998-99 2%
1999-00
2000-01 20% 18%2001-02
2002-03
2003-04 500kW s X < 1000kW 22% 20%
2004-05
3) System/Economic Lifetime
Economic lifetime and system lifetime are both considered 20 years.
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4) O&M Cost
1.5% of capital cost for the first two years and subsequently 2% of capital cost per year with 5%
annual escalation.
5) IREDA Financing Term
Year Interest Rate Loan Repayment Equity-DebtSchedule Ratio
1992-93 12%
1993-94 12% Eight years with
1994-95 14.5% one year 40:60
1995-96 15% moratorium
1996-97 18%
1997-98 15.5%
1998-99 14%
1999-00 16%
2000-01 13.5% Ten years with one 25:752001-02 13.5% year moratorium
2002-03 12.5%
2003-04 11.5%
2004-05 10.5%
6) Tax Conditions
Return on MAT and Corporate First-year Tax
Equity Income Tax Tax Rate Depreciation
________(IT) Rate
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95 0% 46%
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98 35% 100%
1998-99 16%* 12.9%
1999-00 11.4%
2000-01
2001-02 30%
2002-03 8.4%
2003-04 80%2004-05
* According to the minimum rate of return by the GOI guideline private sector participation.
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7) National Average of Industry Electricity Tariffs
Industry Expected
Power Annual
Tariff Raise
1992-93 1.72 7%
1993-94 1.98 7%
1994-95 2.21 10%
1995-96 2.20 8%
1996-97 2.76 10%
1997-98 3.13 10%
1998-99 3.29 8%
1999-00 3.51 7%
2000-01 3.59 5%
2001-02 3.67 3%
2002-03 3.46 3%
2003-04 359.7 (ES)* 3%
2004-05 374.4 (ES)* 3%
* estimated based on available data.
Sources: (Central Electricity Authority 2003; Lok Sabha 2001; Planning Commission 2001 and 2002)
8) De-rating by Aging
Generated wind power will be reduced 5% every five year due to aging of wind turbine.
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Appendix C-2: Base Case Cash Flow Calculations (All in INR)
1) 1992-93 Year
Average project size 650kW
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment on MAT/IT Tax Use Outflow Inflow Cash
Cost Cost Payment Equity Depreciation Saving OutlowwFlow
0 18850000 0 0 0 18850000 -18850000 -18850000
1 0 282750 0 1206400 0 8671000 1727605 1489150 10398605 8909455 7954871
2 0 282750 2276735 1206400 0 1848538 3765885 1848538 -1917348 -1528498
3 0 377000 2276735 1206400 0 1977935 3860135 1977935 -1882200 -1339713
4 0 395850 2276735 1206400 0 2116391 3878985 2116391 -1762595 -1120161
5 0 415643 2276735 1206400 0 2264538 3898778 2264538 -1634240 -927311
6 0 436425 2276735 1206400 0 2423056 3919560 2423056 -1496504 -758176
7 0 458246 2276735 1206400 0 2592669 3941381 2592669 -1348712 -610089
8 0 481158 2276735 1206400 0 2774156 3964293 2774156 -1190137 -480676
9 0 505216 2276735 1206400 0 2968347 3988351 2968347 -1020004 -367824
10 0 530477 .1206400 0 3176132 1736877 3176132 1439255 463402
11 0 557001 1206400 0 3228538 -1763401 3228538 1465137 421192
12 0 584851 1206400 0 3454535 -1791251 3454535 1663285 426924
13 0 614093 1206400 0 3696353 -1820493 3696353 1875860 429899
14 0 644798 1206400 0 3955098 -1851198 3955098 2103900 430500
15 0 677038 1206400 0 4231954 -1883438 4231954 2348517 429065
16 0 710890 1206400 0 4528191 -1917290 4528191 2610902 425895
17 0 746434 1206400 0 4845165 -1952834 4845165 2892330 421252
18 0 783756 1206400 0 5184326 -1990156 5184326 3194170 415369
19 0 822944 1206400 0 5547229 -2029344 5547229 3517885 408450
20 0 864091 1 1206400 0 5935535 -2070491 5935535 3865044 400677
First-year Tax Saving = INR 8,671,000
IRR = 1.44%
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2) 1993-94 Year
Average project size 900kW
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment on MAT/IT Tax Use Outflow Inflow Net Inflow Cash
Equity Depreciation Saving Flow
0 31500000 0 0 0 31500000 -31500000 -31500000
1 0 472500 0 2016000 0 14490000 2753660 2488500 17243660 14755160 13174250
2 0 472500 3804624 2016000 0 2946417 6293124 2946417 -3346707 -2667974
3 0 630000 3804624 2016000 0 3152666 6450624 3152666 -3297958 -2347421
4 0 661500 3804624 2016000 0 3373352 6482124 3373352 -3108771 -1975680
5 0 694575 3804624 2016000 0 3609487 6515199 3609487 -2905712 -1648779
6 0 729304 3804624 2016000 0 3862151 6549927 3862151 -2687776 -1361711
7 0 765769 3804624 2016000 0 4132502 6586393 4132502 -2453891 -1110016
8 0 804057 3804624 2016000 0 4421777 6624681 4421777 -2202904 -889716
9 0 844260 3804624 2016000 0 4731301 6664884 4731301 -1933583 -697269
10 0 886473 2016000 0 5062492 2902473 5062492 2160019 695468
11 0 930797 2016000 0 5146024 2946797 5146024 2199227 632225
12 0 977337 2016000 0 5506245 2993337 5506245 2512908 645001
13 0 1026204 2016000 0 5891682 3042204 5891682 2849479 653027
14 0 1077514 2016000 0 6304100 3093514 6304100 3210586 656950
15 0 1131389 2016000 0 6745387 3147389 6745387 3597998 657341
16 0 1187959 2016000 0 7217564 3203959 7217564 4013605 654706
17 0 1247357 2016000 0 7722794 3263357 7722794 4459437 649492
18 0 1309725 2016000 0 8263389 3325725 8263389 4937665 642092
19 0 1375211 2016000 0 8841827 3391211 8841827 5450616 632853
20 0 1443972 2016000 0 9460754 3459972 9460754 6000783 622082
First-year Tax Saving = INR 14,490,000
IRR = 0.50%
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3) 1994-95 Year
Average project size 1 100kW
First-year Tax Saving =
IRR = 5.23%
INR 20,240,000
Year Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofCost Cost Payment Equity MATIT Deprecation Saving Outflow Inflow Inflow s
0_ __ _ 44000000 EqutyDe re iaioSvig 
Flow
0 44000000 0 0 0 44000000 -44000000 -44000000
1 0 660000 0 2816000 0 20240000 3756537 3476000 23996537 20520537 17921866
2 0 660000 5786831 2816000 0 4132190 9262831 4132190 -5130640 -3913457
3 0 880000 5786831 2816000 0 4545410 9482831 4545410 -4937421 -3289150
4 0 924000 5786831 2816000 0 4999950 9526831 4999950 -4526880 -2633765
5 0 970200 5786831 2816000 0 5499946 9573031 5499946 -4073085 -2069646
6 0 1018710 5786831 2816000 0 6049940 9621541 6049940 -3571601 -1585003
7 0 1069646 5786831 2816000 0 6654934 9672476 6654934 -3017542 -1169540
8 0 1123128 5786831 2816000 0 7320427 9725958 7320427 -2405531 -814267
9 0 1179284 5786831 2816000 0 8052470 9782115 8052470 -1729645 -511337
10 0 1238248 2816000 0 8857717 4054248 8857717 4803469 1240224
11 0 1300161 2816000 0 9256315 4116161 9256315 5140154 1159086
12 0 1365169 2816000 0 10181946 4181169 10181946 6000777 1181794
13 0 1433427 2816000 0 11200141 4249427 11200141 6950713 1195523
14 0 1505099 2816000 0 12320155 4321099 12320155 7999056 1201606
15 0 1580354 2816000 0 13552170 4396354 13552170 9155817 1201198
16 0 1659371 2816000 0 14907387 4475371 14907387 10432016 1195310
17 0 1742340 2816000 0 16398126 4558340 16398126 11839786 1184815
18 0 1829457 2816000 0 18037938 4645457 18037938 13392482 1170475
19 0 1920930 2816000 0 19841732 4736930 19841732 15104803 1152951
20 0 2016976 2816000 0 21825905 4832976 21825905 16992929 1132814
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4) 1995-96 Year
Average project size 1100kW
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment on MAT/IT Tax Use Outflow Inflow Inflow Fls
Equity Depreciation Saving Fo
0 49500000 0 0 0 49500000 -49500000 -49500000
1 0 742500 0 3168000 0 22770000 3739539 3910500 26509539 22599039 19651338
2 0 742500 6618648 3168000 0 4038702 10529148 4038702 -6490446 -4907709
3 0 990000 6618648 3168000 0 4361798 10776648 4361798 -6414850 -4217868
4 0 1039500 6618648 3168000 0 4710742 10826148 4710742 -6115406 -3496503
5 0 1091475 6618648 3168000 0 5087601 10878123 5087601 -5790521 -2878912
6 0 1146049 6618648 3168000 0 5494609 10932696 5494609 -5438087 -2351035
7 0 1203351 6618648 3168000 0 5934178 10989999 5934178 -5055821 -1900670
8 0 1263519 6618648 3168000 0 6408912 11050166 6408912 -4641254 -1517234
9 0 1326695 6618648 3168000 0 6921625 11113342 6921625 -4191717 -1191548
10 0 1393029 3168000 0 7475356 4561029 7475356 2914326 720377
11 0 1462681 3168000 0 7669715 4630681 7669715 3039034 653220
12 0 1535815 3168000 0 8283292 4703815 8283292 3579477 669030
13 0 1612606 3168000 0 8945955 4780606 8945955 4165350 676986
14 0 1693236 3168000 0 9661632 4861236 9661632 4800396 678433
15 0 1777898 3168000 0 10434562 4945898 10434562 5488665 674527
16 0 1866793 3168000 0 11269327 5034793 11269327 6234535 666252
17 0 1960132 3168000 0 12170873 5128132 12170873 7042741 654453
18 0 2058139 3168000 0 13144543 5226139 13144543 7918404 639848
19 0 2161046 3168000 0 14196107 5329046 14196107 8867061 623047
20 0 -2269098 -3168000 0 1 15331795 5437098 15331795 9894697 604569
First-year Tax Saving = INR 22,770,000
IRR = -0.79%
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5) 1996-97 Year
Average project size 1200kW
First-year Tax Saving = INR 28,704,000
IRR = 2.69%
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Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofYear Inta & on on MATIIT Tax Use CashGrssNeCost Cost Payment Outflow Inflow Inflow FasEquity Depreciation Saving Fo
0 62400000 0 0 0 62400000 -62400000 -62400000
1 0 936000 0 3993600 0 28704000 5117914 4929600 33821914 28892314 24485012
2 0 936000 9181949 3993600 0 5629706 14111549 5629706 -8481843 -6091528
3 0 1248000 9181949 3993600 0 6192676 14423549 6192676 -8230872 -5009563
4 0 1310400 9181949 3993600 0 6811944 14485949 6811944 -7674005 -3958166
5 0 1375920 9181949 3993600 0 7493138 14551469 7493138 -7058330 -3085261
6 0 1444716 9181949 3993600 0 8242452 14620265 8242452 -6377813 -2362543
7 0 1516952 9181949 3993600 0 9066697 14692501 9066697 -5625803 -1766080
8 0 1592799 9181949 3993600 0 9973367 14768348 9973367 -4794981 -1275648
9 0 1672439 9181949 3993600 0 10970704 14847988 10970704 -3877284 -874157
10 0 1756061 9181949 3993600 0 12067774 14931610 12067774 -2863836 -547177
11 0 1843864 9181949 3993600 0 12610824 15019413 12610824 -2408589 -389996
12 0 1936058 3993600 0 13871907 5929658 13871907 7942249 1089832
13 0 2032860 3993600 0 15259097 6026460 15259097 9232637 1073642
14 0 2134504 3993600 0 16785007 6128104 16785007 10656904 1050226
15 0 2241229 3993600 0 18463508 6234829 18463508 12228679 1021291
16 0 2353290 3993600 0 20309859 6346890 20309859 13962968 988247
17 0 2470955 3993600 0 22340844 6464555 22340844 15876290 952259
18 0 2594502 3993600 0 24574929 6588102 24574929 17986826 914278
19 0 2724227 3993600 0 27032422 6717827 27032422 20314594 875085
20 0 2860439 3993600 0 129735664 6854039 29735664 22881625 835308
6) 1997-98 Year
Average project size 1250kW
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment on MAT/IT Tax Use Outflow Inflow Inflow asEquity Depreciation Saving _____ Flow
0 50000000 0 0 0 50000000 -50000000 -50000000
1 0 750000 0 2000000 258000 17500000 6045845 3008000 23545845 20537845 17781684
2 0 750000 7614863 2000000 258000 6650430 10622863 6650430 -3972433 -2977780
3 0 1000000 7614863 2000000 258000 7315473 10872863 7315473 -3557390 -2308796
4 0 1050000 7614863 2000000 258000 8047020 10922863 8047020 -2875843 -1615985
5 0 1102500 7614863 2000000 258000 8851722 10975363 8851722 -2123641 -1033168
6 0 1157625 7614863 2000000 258000 9736894 11030488 9736894 -1293593 -544886
7 0 1215506 7614863 2000000 258000 10710584 11088369 10710584 -377785 -137775
8 0 1276282 7614863 2000000 258000 11781642 11149145 11781642 632498 199712
9 0 1340096 7614863 2000000 258000 12959807 11212959 12959807 1746848 477548
10 0 1407100 7614863 2000000 258000 14255787 11279963 14255787 2975824 704348
11 0 1477455 7614863 2000000 258000 14897298 11350318 14897298 3546979 726870
12 0 1551328 2000000 258000 16387027 3809328 16387027 12577699 2231605
13 0 1628895 2000000 258000 18025730 3886895 18025730 14138835 2171940
14 0 1710339 2000000 258000 19828303 3968339 19828303 15859964 2109378
15 0 1795856 2000000 258000 21811133 4053856 21811133 17757277 2044780
16 0 1885649 2000000 258000 23992247 4143649 23992247 19848598 1978874
17 0 1979932 2000000 258000 26391471 4237932 26391471 22153540 1912271
18 0 2078928 2000000 258000 29030619 4336928 29030619 24693690 1845484
19 0 2182875 2000000 258000 31933680 4440875 31933680 27492806 1778940
20 0 2292018 2000000 258000 35127049 4550018 35127049 30577030 1712993
First-year Tax Saving = INR 17,242,000
IRR= 10.11%
427
7) 1998-99 Year
Average project size 1100kW
First-year Tax Saving = INR 13,621,608
IRR = 6.92%
428
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment Equity Depreciation Saving Outflow Inflow Inflow
____quit Depreciatio Saving_____ ____ Flow
0 46200000 0 0 0 46200000 -46200000 -46200000
1 0 693000 0 1848000 238392 13860000 5592310 2779392 19452310 16672918 14625367
2 0 693000 6642874 1848000 238392 6039695 9422266 6039695 -3382571 -2602779
3 0 924000 6642874 1848000 238392 6522871 9653266 6522871 -3130395 -2112928
4 0 970200 6642874 1848000 238392 7044701 9699466 7044701 -2654766 -1571834
5 0 1018710 6642874 1848000 238392 7608277 9747976 7608277 -2139700 -1111293
6 0 1069646 6642874 1848000 238392 8216939 9798912 8216939 -1581973 -720726
7 0 1123128 6642874 1848000 238392 8874294 9852394 8874294 -978100 -390885
8 0 1179284 6642874 1848000 238392 9584237 9908550 9584237 -324313 -113691
9 0 1238248 6642874 1848000 238392 10350976 9967515 10350976 383462 117918
10 0 1300161 6642874 1848000 238392 11179054 10029427 11179054 1149627 310105
11 0 1365169 6642874 1848000 238392 11469710 10094435 11469710 1375275 325414
12 0 1433427 1848000 238392 12387287 3519819 12387287 8867467 1840524
13 0 1505099 1848000 238392 13378270 3591491 13378270 9786779 1781873
14 0 1580354 1848000 238392 14448531 3666746 14448531 10781786 1721959
15 0 1659371 1848000 238392 15604414 3745763 15604414 11858650 1661355
16 0 1742340 1848000 238392 16852767 3828732 16852767 13024035 1600545
17 0 1829457 1848000 238392 18200988 3915849 18200988 14285139 1539934
18 0 1920930 1848000 238392 19657067 4007322 19657067 15649745 1479858
19 0 2016976 1848000 238392 21229632 4103368 21229632 17126264 1420596
20 0 2117825 1848000 238392 22928003 4204217 22928003 18723786 1362375
8) 1999-2000 Year
Average project size 1500kW
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment Ei MATIT Tax Use Outflow Inflow Inflow Fls
Equity Depreciation Saving Fo
0 64500000 0 0 0 64500000 -64500000 -64500000
1 0 967500 0 2580000 294120 19350000 8135815 3841620 27485815 23644195 20382927
2 0 967500 10008840 2580000 294120 8705322 13850460 8705322 -5145138 -3823676
3 0 1290000 10008840 2580000 294120 9314695 14172960 9314695 -4858265 -3112485
4 0 1354500 10008840 2580000 294120 9966723 14237460 9966723 -4270737 -2358690
5 0 1422225 10008840 2580000 294120 10664394 14305185 10664394 -3640791 -1733428
6 0 1493336 10008840 2580000 294120 11410901 14376296 11410901 -2965395 -1217123
7 0 1568003 10008840 2580000 294120 12209664 14450963 12209664 -2241299 -793038
8 0 1646403 10008840 2580000 294120 13064341 14529363 13064341 -1465022 -446869
9 0 1728723 10008840 2580000 294120 13978845 14611683 13978845 -632838 -166407
10 0 1815160 10008840 2580000 294120 14957364 14698119 14957364 259245 58766
11 0 1905918 10008840 2580000 294120 15204160 14788877 15204160 415283 81153
12 0 2001213 2580000 294120 16268452 4875333 16268452 11393118 1919317
13 0 2101274 2580000 294120 17407243 4975394 17407243 12431849 1805435
14 0 2206338 2580000 294120 18625750 5080458 18625750 13545293 1695807
15 0 2316655 2580000 294120 19929553 5190775 19929553 14738778 1590712
16 0 2432487 2580000 294120 21324622 5306607 21324622 16018014 1490325
17 0 2554112 2580000 294120 22817345 5428232 22817345 17389113 1394735
18 0 2681817 2580000 294120 _ 24414559 5555937 24414559 18858622 1303966
19 0 2815908 2580000 294120 26123578 5690028 26123578 20433550 1217985
20 0 2956704 2580000 294120 27952229 5830824 27952229 22121405 1136718
First-year Tax Saving = INR 19,055,880
IRR = 5.43%
429
9) 2000-01 Year
Average project size 1500kW
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net Cash
Cost Cost Payment Equity MAT/IT Deprecation Saving Outflow Inflow Inflow s
0 66000000 0 0 0 66000000 -66000000 -66000000
1 0 990000 0 2640000 221760 19800000 9245830 3851760 29045830 25194070 22197418
2 0 990000 9305355 2640000 221760 9708121 13157115 9708121 -3448994 -2677323
3 0 1320000 9305355 2640000 221760 10193527 13487115 10193527 -3293588 -2252588
4 0 1386000 9305355 2640000 221760 10703203 13553115 10703203 -2849912 -1717307
5 0 1455300 9305355 2640000 221760 11238364 13622415 11238364 -2384052 -1265716
6 0 1528065 9305355 2640000 221760 11800282 13695180 11800282 -1894899 -886361
7 0 1604468 9305355 2640000 221760 12390296 13771584 12390296 -1381288 -569263
8 0 1684692 9305355 2640000 221760 13009811 13851807 13009811 -841996 -305734
9 0 1768926 9305355 2640000 221760 13660301 13936042 13660301 -275740 -88214
10 0 1857373 9305355 2640000 221760 14343316 14024488 14343316 318828 89867
11 0 1950241 9305355 2640000 221760 14307458 14117357 14307458 190101 47210
12 0 2047753 2640000 221760 15022831 4909513 15022831 10113318 2212806
13 0 2150141 2640000 221760 15773972 5011901 15773972 10762072 2074673
14 0 2257648 2640000 221760 16562671 5119408 16562671 11443263 1943604
15 0 2370530 2640000 221760 17390805 5232290 17390805 12158514 1819460
16 0 2489057 2640000 221760 18260345 -5350817 18260345 12909528 1702067
17 0 2613510 2640000 221760 19173362 -5475270 19173362 13698092 1591221
18 0 2744185 ____ 2640000 221760 20132030 -5605945 20132030 14526085 1486699
19 0 2881394 2640000 221760 21138632 -5743154 21138632 15395477 1388263
20 0 3025464 
_ 
_2640000 221760 22195563 -5887224 22195563 16308339 1295664
First-year Tax Saving = INR 19,578,240
IRR = 4.76%
430
10) 2001-02 Year
Average project size 1250kW
Year Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive 
Gross Gross Net PV of
Cost Cost Payment on MAT/IT Tax Use Outflow Inflow Inflow sEquity Depreciation Saving Flow
0 56250000 0 0 0 56250000 -56250000 -56250000
1 0 843750 0 2250000 189000 16875000 7876554 3282750 24751554 21468804 18915246
2 0 843750 7930701 2250000 189000 _ 8112851 11213451 8112851 -3100600 -2406878
3 0 1125000 7930701 2250000 189000 8356236 11494701 8356236 -3138464 -2146494
4 0 1181250 7930701 2250000 189000 8606923 11550951 8606923 -2944027 -1774020
5 0 1240313 7930701 2250000 189000 8865131 11610013 8865131 -2744882 -1457285
6 0 1302328 7930701 2250000 189000 9131085 11672029 9131085 -2540944 -1188557
7 0 1367445 7930701 2250000 189000 9405017 11737145 9405017 -2332128 -961128
8 0 1435817 7930701 2250000 189000 9687168 11805517 9687168 -2118349 -769185
9 0 1507608 7930701 2250000 189000 9977783 11877308 9977783 -1899525 -607690
10 0 1582988 7930701 2250000 189000 10277116 11952689 10277116 -1675572 -472285
11 0 1662137 7930701 2250000 189000 10056158 12031838 10056158 -1975680 -490639
12 0 1745244 2250000 189000 10357843 4184244 10357843 6173599 1350791
13 0 1832506 2250000 189000 10668578 4271506 10668578 6397072 1233204
14 0 1924132 2250000 189000 10988636 4363132 10988636 6625504 1125322
15 0 2020338 2250000 189000 11318295 4459338 11318295 6858957 1026408
16 0 2121355 2250000 189000 11657844 4560355 11657844 7097488 935774
17 0 2227423 2250000 189000 12007579 4666423 12007579 7341156 852776
18 0 2338794 2250000 189000 12367806 4777794 12367806 7590012 776814
19 0 2455734 2250000 189000 12738841 4894734 12738841 7844107 707330
20 0 2578521 2250000 189000 1 13121006 5017521 13121006 8103485 643805
First-year Tax Saving =
IRR = 0.55%
INR 16,686,000
431
11) 2002-03 year
Average project size 1300kW
First-year Tax Saving
IRR = 1.77%
= INR 17,353,440
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment Ei MATIT D at s Outflow Inflow Inflow sEquity Depreciation Saving Flow
0 58500000 0 0 0 58500000 -58500000 -58500000
1 0 877500 0 2340000 196560 17550000 8495175 3414060 26045175 22631115 20116546
2 0 877500 7924781 2340000 196560 8750030 11338841 8750030 -2588811 -2045480
3 0 1170000 7924781 2340000 196560 9012531 11631341 9012531 -2618810 -1839274
4 0 1228500 7924781 2340000 196560 9282907 11689841 9282907 -2406934 -1502637
5 0 1289925 7924781 2340000 196560 9561394 11751266 9561394 -2189872 -1215223
6 0 1354421 7924781 2340000 196560 9848236 11815762 9848236 -1967526 -970522
7 0 1422142 7924781 2340000 196560 10143683 11883483 10143683 -1739800 -762837
8 0 1493249 7924781 2340000 196560 10447993 11954590 10447993 -1506597 -587188
9 0 1567912 7924781 2340000 196560 10761433 12029253 10761433 -1267819 -439223
10 0 1646307 7924781 2340000 196560 11084276 12107648 11084276 -1023372 -315143
11 0 1728623 7924781 2340000 196560 10845964 12189964 10845964 -1343999 -367893
12 0 1815054 2340000 196560 11171343 4351614 11171343 6819729 1659346
13 0 1905807 2340000 196560 11506483 4442367 11506483 7064117 1527830
14 0 2001097 2340000 196560 11851678 4537657 11851678 7314021 1406115
15 0 2101152 2340000 196560 12207228 4637712 12207228 7569516 1293541
16 0 2206209 2340000 196560 12573445 4742769 12573445 7830676 1189485
17 0 2316520 2340000 196560 12950648 4853080 12950648 8097568 1093356
18 0 2432346 2340000 196560 13339168 4968906 13339168 8370262 1004601
19 0 2553963 2340000 196560 13739343 5090523 13739343 8648820 922697
20 0 2681661 2340000 196560 14151523 5218221 14151523 8933302 847152
432
12) 2003-04 year
Average project size 1400kW
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV ofYear Cost Cost Payment Flow MAT/IT D at s Outflow Inflow Inflow s
IEquity Depreciation Saving OufFwInloonfo
0 63000000 0 0 0 63000000 -63000000 -63000000
1 0 945000 0 2520000 211680 15120000 9518826 3676680 24638826 20962146 18800131
2 0 945000 8192073 2520000 211680 3780000 9804391 11868753 13584391 1715638 1379990
3 0 1260000 8192073 2520000 211680 10098523 12183753 10098523 -2085230 -1504283
4 0 1323000 8192073 2520000 211680 10401478 12246753 10401478 -1845275 -1193882
5 0 1389150 8192073 2520000 211680 10713523 12312903 10713523 -1599380 -928063
6 0 1458608 8192073 2520000 211680 11034928 12382361 11034928 -1347432 -701226
7 0 1531538 8192073 2520000 211680 11365976 12455291 11365976 -1089315 -508428
8 0 1608115 8192073 2520000 211680 11706956 12531868 11706956 -824912 -345310
9 0 1688521 8192073 2520000 211680 12058164 12612274 12058164 -554109 -208028
10 0 1772947 8192073 2520000 211680 12419909 12696700 12419909 -276790 -93197
11 0 1861594 8192073 2520000 211680 12152881 12785347 12152881 -632466 -190991
12 0 1954674 2520000 211680 12517468 4686354 12517468 7831114 2120924
13 0 2052407 2520000 211680 12892992 4784087 12892992 8108904 1969649
14 0 2155028 2520000 211680 13279781 4886708 13279781 8393074 1828407
15 0 2262779 2520000 211680 13678175 4994459 13678175 8683716 1696612
16 0 2375918 .2520000 211680 14088520 5107598 14088520 8980922 1573704
17 0 2494714 2520000 211680 14511176 5226394 14511176 9284782 1459147
18 0 2619450 2520000 211680 14946511 5351130 14946511 9595381 1352429
19 0 2750422 2520000 211680 15394906 5482102 15394906 9912804 1253066
20 0 2887943 1 2520000 211680 15856753 5619623 15856753 10237130 1160596
First-year Tax Saving
IRR = 3.08%
= INR 14,908,320
433
13) 2004-05 year
Average project size 1300kW
Li'
K
First-year Tax Saving
IRR = 4.37%
= INR 13843440
Initial O&M Loan Return Saving on Captive Gross Gross Net PV of
Cost Cost Payment FlowT a s Otlw Inlw Iflw CsEquity Depreciation Saving Outflow Inflow Inflow
0 58500000 0 0 _ 0 58500000 -58500000 -58500000
1 0 877500 0 2340000 196560 14040000 9182645 3414060 23222645 19808585 17926322
2 0 877500 7294540 2340000 196560 3510000 9458125 10708600 12968125 2259525 1850515
3 0 1170000 7294540 2340000 196560 9741869 11001100 9741869 -1259231 -933294
4 0 1228500 7294540 2340000 196560 10034125 11059600 10034125 -1025475 -687822
5 0 1289925 7294540 2340000 196560 10335148 11121025 10335148 -785877 -477027
6 0 1354421 7294540 2340000 196560 10645203 11185521 10645203 -540318 -296808
7 0 1422142 7294540 2340000 196560 10964559 11253242 10964559 -288683 -143511
8 0 1493249 7294540 2340000 196560 11293496 11324349 11293496 -30854 -13881
9 0 1567912 7294540 2340000 196560 11632301 11399012 11632301 233289 94980
10 0 1646307 7294540 2340000 196560 11981270 11477407 11981270 503862 185647
11 0 1728623 7294540 2340000 196560 11723672 11559723 11723672 163949 54667
12 0 1815054 2340000 196560 12075382 4351614 12075382 7723768 2330676
13 0 1905807 2340000 196560 12437644 4442367 12437644 7995277 2183353
14 0 2001097 2340000 196560 12810773 4537657 12810773 8273116 2044548
15 0 2101152 2340000 196560 13195096 4637712 13195096 8557385 1913846
16 0 2206209 2340000 196560 13590949 4742769 13590949 8848180 1790843
17 0 2316520 2340000 196560 13998678 4853080 13998678 9145598 1675149
18 0 2432346 2340000 196560 14418638 4968906 14418638 9449732 1566385
19 0 2553963 2340000 196560 14851197 5090523 14851197 9760674 1464187
20 0 2681661 2340000 196560 15296733 5218221 15296733 10078512 1368204
434
